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ABSTRACT 
Perceived control was investigated in secondary school adolescents from secular Turkish and 
British schools. Five published questionnaires were used. Perceived control was measured mainly 
with the Control beliefs, Means-Ends beliefs, and Agency Scale (CAMI - Skinner, Baltes, 
Chapman, 1988) As supplementary measures, Nowicki and Strickland's (1973) Internal-External 
Locus of Control for Children Scale (CNSIE) and Palenzuela's (1988) Multiple Academic Specific 
Locus of Control Scale (MASLOC) were also used. Two other questionnaires, measuring social 
antecedents, were included in the study. These were the Religiosity in Youth Scale (Rothbough & 
Jessor, 1976) and the F-Scale (Adorno, 1950; Christie, 1991). 
In order to detect item biases within and between cultures, two procedures were followed: 
a) The questionnaires were translated from English to Turkish, and then both versions were 
completed by a bilingual Turkish sample. Translation fidelity was tested using three different 
approaches: Generalizability theory (Cronbach et al., 1972; Shavelson & Webb, 1991), Classical 
Item Analysis (Nunnally, 1978) and Item Response Theory (Lord, 1980; Hambleton et al., 1990). 
The results are discussed in terms of consistency and the cost of the procedure. 
b) The Turkish and English versions of the questionnaires were completed by unilingual Turkish 
and English samples in their own language. The purpose here was to detect similar (etic) and 
different (ernic) functioning of the items across cultures using Classical and Modem item analysis. 
The questionnaires were found to be functioning similarly in the two cultures. But CNSIE was 
found to be a poor scale in both cultures and was not used in the next stage. 
In the final part of the thesis perceived control was investigated as a function of culture, religion, 
religiosity, authoritarianism, age and gender. The perceived control scale showed significant 
cultural differences on 3 out of 10 subscales of CAM!. Agency beliefs and MASLOC showed 
significant effects of religion, religiosity, authoritarianism and gender. Generally, the Turkish 
sample was more Internal, more religious, and authOlitarian. The gender differences were more 
inconsistent in terms of the direction of the relationship, with boys more internal on attribute while 
girls were more internal on unknown factors and effort. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Perceived Control has been one of the most heavily researched areas in applied psychology in the last 
three decades. Perception of control has been widely studied in relation to education, health, business 
and sport. All these areas may benefit from investigation because of the potential value of perceived 
control in predicting behaviour. However, not many studies have looked at under what conditions it 
develops. Although assumptions have been made about the importance of environmental factors and 
experiences from a very early age the antecedents of an individual's perception of control have not been 
investigated to a great extent. This study is concerned with children and adolescents' development of 
perception of control in different, Turkish and English, cultures. It is particularly concerned with the 
methodological difficulties of cross-cultural studies and focuses on two main issues, the conceptual and 
item equivalence of the measurements. 
Studies of perceived control (locus of control) have shown that there are clear cultural differences 
between people's experiences within their environment (Lefcourt, 1982; 1991). The differences in 
experiences are explained by environmental conditions such as the availability of resources (developing 
country against developed) and cultural differences (e.g. different religions, belief in chance or luck). 
The author's interest was aroused partly by changes over the years in the education system in Turkey. 
Recently, the number of religious secondary schools number has increased from 7% to 13% (Toker, 
1992). Also in the 1980s they were given the status of state schools and students graduating from these 
schools were allowed to apply for any university degree instead of being restricted to related subjects 
such as higher education in the history of Islam. Since then these students' university choices have 
shifted from religious topics to politics and economics. Given that Turkey's population is mainly 
Moslem and run by a secular government, these changes may be expected to have some impact. 
Personal experience of these policy and other political changes made the author wonder if any changes 
in the general belief system have had any effects on the development of perceived control in specific 
areas. 
The generalizability point of view stresses the importance of the comparability of cross-cultural studies 
(Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen 1992). Up to now non-western cultures have used well-developed 
western concepts and theories without questioning them. Although to a certain extent the communality 
of psychological theories and concepts can be accepted, clearly nowadays this view is not enough for 
most of the issues addressed in psychology. Particularly, when investigating environment related 
psychological issues such as perception of control, cross-cultural differences become more of an issue 
then ever. 
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Another issue is to find the right methodology to deal with the problems of cross-cultural 
investigations. Nowadays, it is obvious that comparability between cultures can only be assured if the 
equivalence of the concepts and instruments are tested before the comparisons start. 1bis 
comparability problem of cross-cultural comparison is addressed by many cross-cultural 
methodologists with different approaches, but what they have in common is that they all consider it 
important to investigate the similarities (etic) and differences (ernic) between cultures to be able to 
make comparisons. The differences between methodologists occur in their view of the ernic and etic 
that exist between different cultures. Triandis (1974) puts the emphasis on the differences, while Beny 
and others (1992) emphasise the similarities. To test these conceptual approaches available statistical 
methods are used. Given that the non-westem cultures are already using the concepts and instruments 
they have borrowed from the West it is vital to test the validity of this adaptation to the non-westem 
culture for two reasons: first to be sure that the differences detected between west and non-west are due 
to the culture and not to the noise in the instrument used to test the concept; second, and more 
importantly, to allow applied psychologists to use the instruments with confidence in making an 
assessment of specific situations. 
It now seems clear that the psychological processes that link behaviour to its outcomes are responsible 
for different perceptions of the causes of outcomes (Locus of Control). In a special issue of 
"Psychological Monograph" Rotter (1966) explained Locus of Control within Social Learning theory 
and argued for the first time that individual's beliefs about the origins of control lie in the relationship 
between behaviour and its outcomes. Even though this subject has been studied for the last 25-30 years 
there is still a need to develop the concept of Locus of Control. Firstly, the similarities and differences 
between theories that use LOC (Locus Of Control) need to be made clear. For example Social Learning 
theory uses locus of control (LOC) and self-efficacy similarly and Attribution theory and Learned 
Helplessness share the same concept with Social Learning theory (palenzuela, 1988). Secondly the 
conceptual definition needs to be reconsidered. These two revisions will enable the researcher to use 
the concept more meaningfully and apply it more usefully. Given that Locus of control (recently called 
perceived control) has proved to be a very predictive concept for more then one behaviour pattern (e.g. 
achievement, health behaviour etc.), it is important to investigate how it develops in an individual. 
According to LOC individuals who believe that their own effort and ability control outcomes are 
classified as having internal locus of control while others who believe that outside factors are 
responsible are classified as having extemallocus of control. As we know, some individuals may think 
that outcomes are the result of their own efforts and so might nominate themselves for harder duties or 
put themselves forward as problem solvers. These individuals have usually had early experiences that 
made them believe that outcomes can be controlled by their own efforts. On the other hand, in 
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communities where less responsibility is taken or where it is believed that outside factors control 
outcomes individuals will have difficulty in understanding the relationship between their efforts and 
outcomes and so might be less successful and think that outcomes are beyond their control (Lefcourt, 
1991). Individuals from developing countries, where inequality and economic problems are frequently 
observed, have a tendency to explain outcomes in terms of chance and fate. It is very natural in these 
communities to perceive an individual's success as a result of luck or a protector. As a result of this, 
instead of using their own abilities and effort to achieve an outcome they pray or try to find an 
influential person or persons to achieve success (Lefcourt, 1991). 
If we want to understand the development of locus of control we need to think about individuals 
learning the relationship between events and their causes from their environment. In explaining the 
theory of socialleaming we need to remember that people. learn through their life experiences and 
form their perception of events within this system of experiences. Only then we can talk about the 
effects of an individual's perception of control on their characteristic behaviour. 
There is no doubt that the differences in life experiences between young people in different societies 
will influence their general tendency towards perception of internal or external control. Pupils from 
different cultural backgrounds will have different perceptions of the relationship between outcomes and 
their causes. For example, a group of cross-cultural studies done with the Adult Nowicki-Strickland 
Internal-External Control Scale showed that Israeli and Western cultures were the most intemal, with 
Hungarians almost as internal as Westerners and the Japanese the least internal of all (Lefcourt, 1982). 
But we need to remernber that there will still be differences in individual behaviours because even in 
the same culture it is unlikely that all pupils will have had exactly the same life experiences. 
19 
1.1. DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES 
1.1.1. Overview 
Social Learning theory developed as a reaction against biological and trait approaches to individual 
differences. Rotter (1966) was the pioneer of this approach and developed the theory in the early and 
mid sixties. Following him Bandura, Seligman, and Weiner made their contribution to this approach. 
Each of these researchers adopted slightly different theoretical frameworks but nevertheless their 
research tended to lead to similar conclusions (Lefcourt, 1981; 1982. 1991, 1992). 
One way in which these different theories can be grouped is as cognitive or motivational theories. 
Rotter's and Bandura'stheories are cognitive theories whereas Weiner's and Seligman's are more 
eclectic and motivational theories (pervin & John, 1996). However, a historical perspective produces a 
similar classification and we will introdnce theories of perceived control in historical order. First, their 
contributions, similarities and differences will be discussed. Then, methodological and conceptual 
improvements will be introduced and the implications discussed. 
Five social learning theories address the concept of control. Historically these are: Social Learning 
theory, Social Cognition theory, Causal Attribution theory, Learned Helplessness, and Action theory. 
We will be giving priority to Rotter's Social Learning Theory, Bandura's Social Cognitive theory, 
Weiner's Causal Attribution theory, and Seligman's Learned Helplessness theory. Following, this we 
will be expanding on the new extensions and improvements found in Bandura's Action theory. 
1.1.2. Perception of Control: Brief Historical Perspective and a Review of Some Key Theories. 
1.1.2.1. Social Learning Theory 
Social learning theory is mainly a behaviourist theory. The main differences between classical 
behaviourist theories and social learning theory is that social learning theory takes into account the 
values of reinforcement and combines this with the importance of cognition (pervin & John, 1997). 
Reinforcement is also used in a more elaborate way than early learning theories. Therefore, studies 
related to locus of control also take into account the expectancy values of reinforcement. The needs, the 
value of the outcomes and the expectancy of outcomes all contribute to the outcome. Behaviour can 
only occur if the circumstances fulfil all of these conditions: high needs, high value, and high 
expectancy for the outcome. Social Learning theory serves to explain many behavioural patterns. In the 
Locus of Control case Rotter (1966) and his research students Phares and James were particularly 
interested in explaining relationships between events and their outcomes. They usually worked with 
20 
clinical patients and their aim was to develop a belief in the relationship between events and outcomes 
for the patient's benefit. They were aware of common patterns and tendencies and of individual 
differences in the population that make some people more capable of seeing relationships between their 
action and the consequences of their actions than others. Rotter, particularly, called this internal belief 
(belief in the person's own ability or effort). On the other hand, some people are not capable of seeing 
the causal link between their actions and outcomes and explain events with more external reasons (such 
as luck, chance, powerful others). This kind of tendency is called external (Rotter, 1966; Rotter, 1990). 
Rotter was careful to attribute this behaviour pattern to his own culture: 
"When the reinforcement is perceived by the subjects as following some action of his own but not being 
entirely contingent upon his action, then, in our culture, it is typically perceived as the result of luck, 
chance, fate, as under the control of powerful others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity 
of the forces surrounding him. When the event is interpreted in this way by an individual, we have 
labelled this a belief in external control. If the person perceives that the event is contingent upon his own 
relatively pennanent characteristics, we have termed this a belief in internal control" (Rotter, 1966, p.l). 
It seerns he has changed his view very little since then. He used the same quote from his early work in 
his 1990 article in the American Psychologist. 
Strickland (1989) is a follower of Rotter's conceptualisation of LOC. Her interest in locus of control 
began when she and a colleague studied children's achievement motivation. Nowicki & Strickland 
(1973) also developed scales for adult and young children to measure LOC. Strickland's (1989) new 
interest in the topic is the relationship between the concept and creativity. She argues that internality 
shares many attribute with creativity such as autonomy, seeking out information, independence of 
judgement and the taking of reasonable risks. 
1.1.2.2. Social Cognition, Self-Efficacy 
Within the same theoretical framework, Bandura (1986) also investigated self-efficacy, a term that is 
usually used in the same way as LOC. Unlike Rotter, his work, although it is highly related to action, is 
particularly concerned with the causes explained by cognitive process rather then just causal 
relationships between action and behaviour. In particular self-efficacy as a concept is highly related to 
the results of control rather then perception of control. Self-efficacy is more attributable to real life 
experiences rather than the perception of actual experiences, although initially it is internalised or is an 
interpreted version of the actual experiences (the relationships between thought and action). This theory 
has been improved in recent years and instead of one way determinism, this new Social Cognitive 
theory proposes a three way reciprocal relationship between agency and outcome via means. Ellen 
Skinner and her colleagues (1988) later called this approach Action theory. We will return to it later. 
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1.1.2.3. Causal Attribution 
Between the development of the one way deterministic and the three way reciprocal approaches to 
Social Learning theory, Attribution theory made a noticeable contribution to the conceptualisation of 
LaC. Weiner (1979) introduced Causal Attribution theory to explain the causes of behaviour (or 
action) not only with internal and external causes but also with stable and unstable causes. TIlls new 
concept of stability combined with the interna1Jexternal concept neatly (see table 1.1). According to this 
model internal causes are related to ability and effort. Ability is considered stable and effort unstable. 
On the other hand external causes are related to task difficulties and luck. Task difficulties are 
considered stable and luck unstable. 
Table 1.1: Possible Causal Attribution for Success and Failure. 
CAUSE INTERNAL EXTERNAL 
Stable Ability Task Difficulties 
Unstable Effort Chance or Luck 
Source "A theory of Mohvahon for Some Classroom Expenences" by Werner, 1979, Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 7l. 
Weiner's view was particularly welcomed by social psychologists and educationalists studying 
motivation and performance. For the first time causal attribution theory brought a cognitive perspective 
to LaC studies. 
Causal attribution theory later took on some other features. Contemporary examples of these changes 
are Fumham, Hewstone and Lefcourt. Fumham (1988) was mainly concerned with describing lay 
persons' attributions. Hewstone's (1989) book on causal attribution clearly makes a distinction between 
micro and macro analyses of attribution. In his view attribution exists at four levels: intra-personal 
attribution (causal logic, cognitive process and knowledge structure), interpersonal attribution (from 
social interaction to close relationships), inter-group attribution (social categorisations) and :finally 
societal attribution (collective beliefs and the explanation of societal events). Lefcourt (1981) took into 
account causal attribution and other theories to develop a more cohesive measurement technique. 
Therefore he took into account not only intemal vs. external and stable vs. unstable but also positive 
and negative events within these domains (e.g. task difficulties). 
Lefcourt's other contribution to the area was to bring all related studies on LaC together in three 
volumes of a book in the early 1980's. During this period deCharms in France (1968; 1980) was 
working on agency beliefs, which are again highly related to cognitive aspects of control. He 
particularly put an emphasis on an individual's needs and understanding of outcomes from his/her point 
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of view. At the same time, alongside Lefcourt's new measurernent, Levenson (1982) and Paulhus 
(1983) also made big contributions with a new methodological approach to LOC. Levenson divided 
external control into two parts, one related to chance and luck and the other to powerful others who 
exist in the world. Therefore she brought a new dimension to the topic. That is, not only the beliefs or 
perceptions of individuals but also actual facts (powerful others). This conceptualisation also separated 
internal locus of control from external locus of contro1. LOC was no longer a bipolar concept. It was 
possible to be both internal and also external (belief in powerful others). Paulhus on the other hand, 
looked at locus of control from three aspects related to the micro and macro cosmos of individual 
relationships. This view can be seen in Hewston's later work as well. Paulhus' work grew as an 
opposition to Rotter's one dimensional testing of LOC. The literature strongly suggests that Rotter's 
LOC scale is multidimensional and not unidimensional as he said. A second factor, apart from internal 
vs. external beliefs, is political beliefs. 
1.1.2.4. Learned Helplessness 
Seligman's (1975) early work investigated behaviour under inconsistent circumstances. The early work 
in this area was carried out by Weiss, Stone & Harrell (1970) in the laboratory with rats. Under 
conditions where there was an unpredictable relationship between their behaviour and an electric shock 
rats stopped trying to avoid the shock. In some cases they became completely withdrawn and died. This 
behaviour was attributed to learned helplessness. It did not occur in a condition in which the shock was 
predictable and therefore controllable. Although Seligman's theory was particularly taken up by 
clinicians who worked with psychiatric patients with depression etc. Seligman's recent work is mainly 
orientated to the normal population and the learning of this negative behavioural pattern. His work with 
young school children and some retrospective studies with university students have shown that 
childhood experiences are crucial in the development of learned helplessness. He combined the results 
of these studies with his early animal work and with early behaviourist views on social learning theory 
and causal attribution. Finally he added one more new domain to the construct of perception of control-
global vs. non-global. According to his theory internal vs. external causality and stable vs. unstable 
causes are not enough to explain the learned helplessness behaviour related to depression, but if these 
two domains are combined with an individual's explanatory style (global vs. non-global) then it is 
possible to understand negative thinking better. It becomes possible, in fact easy, to see the 
relationships between these three domains and possible conditions of depression. If a person has 
negative experiences at an early age and attributes this to internal, stable and global causes then they are 
more likely get depressed. Imagine a little girl who has lost her mother at the age of 8. She thinks her 
mother went away and will never come back again (stable) because of her (internal) and so she may 
start thinking that she is the cause of her death. More importantly she may generalise this sad 
experience to all other new experiences (global). Weiner's studies on controllability have shown that 
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"attributions of controllability for personal failure are associated ~tllemotions such as guilt, shame, and 
humiliation, whereas attributions associated with uncontrolled ability for personal failure do not lead to 
such self-criticism" (pervin & John, 1996). 
1.1.3. Current contributions to the study of Perceived Control: 
1.1.3.1. Action Theory 
Action theory sees "actions instead of behaviolITS or responses as central units of analysis" (Skinner, 
1995). From Bandura's (1986) attempt to establish the foundations of thought and action, three way 
reciprocal models of action theory were born. These are improved versions of social cognitive theory. 
According to his triadic reciprocal detenninism, causal factors and action mutually interact with each 
other. The term mutual is often used to soften the meaning of the deterministic relationships between 
the three components of behaviour, cognitive and other personal factors, and environmental influences. 
Because of the multiplicity of the interactions in this model the same factors may cause different 
actions. 
Skinner, Chapman, & Baltes (1988) took Bandura's version of the relationships between behaviour, 
cognition and environment and Intrinsic motivation theory (Stipek & Weisz, 1981) and elaborated the 
triadic interactions involving Agents, Means and Ends. The relationships between these three were also 
described in terms of three types of belie£: namely Capacity beliefs (route between Agency and 
Means), Strategy beliefs (route between Means and Ends), and Control beliefs (route between Agent 
and Ends). Control, Capacity and Strategy beliefs are all general expectancies of a different form. For 
example, Control beliefs are a person's general expectancies about the selfs ability to create desired 
events or avoid undesired events. Strategy beliefs are about certain means and causes that are 
conditions for certain ends or outcomes. Similarly Capacity beliefs are about a person's access to causes 
within themselves. While Control beliefs are general descriptions of one's perception of control of the 
relationship between actions and outcomes, strategy and capacity beliefs directly influence the actions 
in any kind of performance. They are both used to understand the meaning of success or failure 
(Skinner, 1995). Usually capacity expectations refer to beliefs about future performance; on the other 
hand strategy attributions are about past experiences. Both could be either domain general, or specific 
to certain circumstances. Another umbrella concept, which particularly covers capacity and strategy 
beliefs, is called competence. According to this argument perceived control simply "reflects the 
fundamental human need for competence" (Skinner, 1995). As Skinner (1995) and her colleagues did, 
it is possible to explore the theory in a specific academic (school) environment or for different life 
events (Skinner, Chapman, Baltes, 1988; Schmitz & Skinner, 1993). 
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1.1.4. Some key issues in perception of control: 
1.1.4.1. Positive vs. negative life events 
There are well established research results that people's perception of control is different for positive 
and negative life events. The concept in an achievement related area such as education and sport is 
called success and failure. If the outcomes are positive the person's perception of control tends to be 
internaL if the outcomes are negative it tends to be external (Lefcourt, 1982; Findley & Cooper, 1983; 
Skinner et al., 1988). This contribution to the concept carne mainly from studies based on causal 
attribution theory (Weiner, 1979, 1985). The results are very profound and persistent, regardless of 
which scale of perceived control is used or when or where the research took place. It is possible to 
explain them in tenns of the innate capacity of coping and the striving attitudes of human beings. 
Therefore studies on health psychology try to explore the possible strategies and personality 
characteristics which may alter this natural balance toward more pessimistic tendencies (e.g. people 
with high neuroticism scores (Darvill & Ronald, 1991). Other studies done with Afro-American 
participants consistently found this group to be more external then their counterpart, but studies done 
by Hillman, Wood, and Sawilowsky (1994) showed that their perception of control, which was 
measured by an Attribution Style Questionnaire of positive life events, was more internaL stable and 
global. These results showed the necessity of taking this dimension into account as a separate variable 
in research in this area Nowadays almost all perceived control measures have an equal number of 
items representing positive and negative life events (e.g. CAMI- Skinner et aL 1988; MASLOC-
Palenzuela, 1989; MMCS-Lefcourt, 1981). 
1.1.4.2. Stable vs. Unstable causes 
Since Causal Attribution theory was brought into the subject area of locus of control, another 
dimension that has been acknowledged is that of Stable vs Unstable. According to Weiner (1979), it is 
possible to divide both Internal and External causes into two groups in terms of their consistency and 
stability. In Internal locus of control, ability can be considered to be more stable than effort. Within 
External locus of control we can identify more than one factor, some of which are more stable than 
others. Task difficulty is stable while luck is less stable. The problem with this conceptualisation is that 
there are possibly more factors than the ones mentioned and sometimes it is very difficult to categorise 
them on this dimension. For example, powerful others is the most frequent reason for external locus of 
control but it is hard to categorise clearly as stable or unstable. On the other hand perhaps fate will be 
very stable, but in tenns of outcome will be very different from (stable) task difficulties. Later on, 
Weiner, Perry & Magnusson (1988) added the controllable vs. uncontrollable dimension to his theory. 
It seems that people's attitudes towards controllable and uncontrollable events differ. If they think that 
25 
events are controllable but nothing is done by the person to prevent them then they are reluctant to offer 
any help to the person (widely used examples of this people who are HIV positive, or hyperactivity). If 
they think a person can do nothing to prevent the outcome then they are more willing to help (e.g., 
learning disabilities, cancer etc.). This perception of controllability can be altered if related to 
attribution and the understanding of the problem. For example "homeless" can be used as a neutral 
term to try to eliminate the sort of bias that may attached to the condition. 
1.1.4.3. Global vs. Non-global 
Seligman's expectancy theory combined early social learning theory concepts, such as needs and the 
value of reinforcement, with causal attribution theory's concept of stable vs. unstable causes. It also 
added a new dimension called global vs. non-global. Global causes refer to some sort of domain 
generality of the attribution. If the person explains or rather attributes the experience to general reasons 
this may be more disturbing than if they explain the experience with specific reasons. Therefore 
Seligman's explanatory style which is mainly useful for clinical ( depressive) cases will produce the 
worst scenario if the person uses an intemal, stable and global explanatory style at the same time. In 
these circumstances they create the worst possible explanation of the experience, which is attributed to 
themselves (intemal), can not change (stable), and always happens the same way (global) (Seligman, 
1995). 
1.1.4.4. Consistency vs. Inconsistency 
Research shows that from the first days of life infants detect and respond with vigour and joy to control 
experiences. Even neonates detect contingencies between action and outcomes and respond to them 
with increased action and anticipatory reactions (Jones & Papusek, 1977; Papusek and Papusek, 1979; 
1980). The idea that human organisms are sensitive to contingencies and are equipped to react 
adaptively to them, referred to as "contingency awareness" (Watson, 1966, cited in Skinner, 1995), is 
supported by both observational and experimental work. In one experiment, described in Watson 
(1971, cited in Skinner. 1995), the turning of a mobile was wired to a pressure-sensitive pillow placed 
under the infant's head or feet. The apparatus was used to compare the effects of contingent stimulation, 
non-contingent stimulation (in which the mobile turned independently of the baby's action), and no 
stimulation (stationary mobile). As early as 8 weeks of age, children detected and responded to 
contingency. Relative to both control groups, infants with the contingent mobiles were more 
behaviourally active and persistent. 
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Contingency between action and outcomes is a key feature of control experience. As Seligman (1975) 
argues, 
"I am convinced that certain arrangements of the environment and contingencies will produce a child 
who believes he is helpless-that he cannot succeed- and that other contingencies will produce a child who 
believes that his responses matter - that he can control his little world" p.137. 
1.1.4.5. Competency System: Strategy and Capacity 
Recent studies of Skinner and her colleagues re-define the concept of perceived control as a 
competence system. In this competence system they define two main concepts that were not 
distinguished in the early studies. These two concepts are Strategies, which are mediated by a person's 
perceptions of means-ends, and Capacities, which are the person's perception of themselves as an 
agency. Means-ends beliefs were perhaps the most widely represented in early measurements of 
perceived control (Nowicki-Strickland Intemal- External Locus of Control Scale for Children (1973); 
Crandall and Katkovsky's Achievement for Intellectual Responsibility (1965)) but very few social 
learning theorists had considered Agency as a part of perceived control (deChanns, 1980). This new 
conceptualisation of a competence system allows us to see many different aspects of perceived control 
together in an elaborate way, such as the perception of one's own capacity as well as the perception of 
links between events and outcomes. 
1.1.5. The models of the Perception of Control 
1.1.5.1. Theoretical Models of Perception of Control 
The last three decades of studies of perceived control have been based on several elementary principles 
of psychology. These principles are found in the one way detenninistic model (used by Social Learning 
theory), the one way reciprocal model (used by Attribution theory), and the three way reciprocal model 
(used by Social Cognitive theory or Action theory). 
Firstly Social Learning theory is based on behaviourist principles and the one way detenninistic model 
of action. Actions lead to Outcomes. In this one way detenninistic model, actions are regulated by the 
current stimulus and the person's past experiences in similar circumstances. 
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Causal Attribution moved further and suggested a reciprocal one way deterministic model, which 
accepts interactive relationships between the Person and Environment via perceived relationships 
between them. According to this the 
"person cannot effect the environment other than through their actions. Their actions take the dominant 
role in how people influence the situation which, in turn, will affect their thoughts, emotional reactions, 
and behaviour" (Bandura, 1986), p.18. 
Thirdly, Social Cognitive theory or Action theory prefers " a conception of interaction based on triadic 
reciprocity" (Bandura, 1978; 1986). According to this model behaviour, cognitive and other personal 
factors, and environmental factors all work interactively. The term deterministic is used in a more 
flexible way in this model than in the others. It refers to more probabilistic relationships and 
interactions between all the components. 
While Social Learning theory mainly focuses on learning via actions and experiences the only 
relationship between action and outcome is one way and is represented by the completion of learning 
shown in behaviour. Causal Attribution theory focuses on cognitive processes involved in the final 
behaviour or the perceptions created by the actions. Therefore it simply acknowledges the reciprocal 
relationships between the person's action and situations. But this reciprocal relationship still starts with 
the person and is directed from the person to the environment. It is clearly stated in the theory that the 
person's attributions can be of three types a. personal, b. situational, c. external. This is quite 
revolutionary and sensible perspective, which allows environmental effects to be taken into account on 
their own merit. Finally Social Cognitive theory particularly emphasises interactive relationships 
between all these three components, action, perception of action and environmental factors. This last 
approach not only acknowledges the effect of the environment on the individual but also the person's 
voluntary contributions that make changes in the environment. 
The last model introduced here has recently been tested with some empirical data. These new 
empirically based models of perceived control and human action have influenced the development of 
the area The reason why these empirical models came late is because nowadays it is easier to run 
multivariate statistical models to test multi-level and directional models using real data Also 
theoretically, more progress has been made recently than in the last two decades. Therefore with a 
reasonable amount of experimental information it is more possible to come up with a working model 
of perceived control. Yet these models are still mainly subject specific (e.g. health models of perceived 
control or performance specific models of action). 
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The main early models of perceiVed control were more theoretical than empirical. Although the 
theories were established using experimental studies (e.g. Rotter's formula of potential behaviour, and 
Seligman's studies on learned helplessness) they were not complete enough to explain a large number 
of detailed circular (feedback) relationships between actions and outcomes. Today's models are more 
based on a large body of knowledge in the area and also on advanced multilevel statistical analysis that 
enables us to understand better the relationships between real and latent variables in empirical data (e.g. 
Skinner, Little, Oettingen (1993); Bandura's action theory and models). 
1.1.5.2. An Empirical model of Perceived Control 
Skinner (1995) developed two methodologies to test circular relationships and developmental changes 
in control belief systems. The first is testing the consistency over time of the competence system for an 
individual. This was done using time series data analysis which allowed the researchers to analyse the 
results at an individual (intra) as well as a group (inter) level (Schmitz & Skinner, 1993). The :first 
investigation was of intra-individual relationships between control and action over time. The second 
one was of inter-individual differences in control beliefs and action over time. After 4 months there 
was a follow up study. The study investigated school children's graded assignments and their 
attributions after they received their results from the assignment. Their responses were recorded in 
terms of their attributions for correct answers and errors (e.g. to effort, ability, help, task difficulty and 
unknown factors). They were also given a standard intelligence test. The expected model was that 
perceived control, which is mediated by motivation and coping, would effect the engagement of the 
student, and that engagement, which is mediated by task difficulty and the anxiety of the child, would 
then affect performance. Performance would be internalised by the child as perceived performance, 
which depends mainly on how the child explains the performance to herself and this is related to her 
successful or unsuccessful attempts. Eventually these individual experiences would develop or alter the 
individual's perceived control. 
The inter-individual findings mainly confirmed the model. But the differences expected for the intra-
individual level were not found. These were effort-performance consistency and the control-effort link 
and the link between performance, attributions and control. Firstly, not all students showed effort-
performance consistency. A high anxiety level sometimes created negative relationships between effort 
and performance for average or low performance students. Second, the control-effort link within 
individuals was not observed for the 4 months period of the study. The children who made a greater 
effort when they expected more control were those who already had high coping skills or high intrinsic 
motivation for the task. The positive explanation of this would be that the children did not change their 
effort level for a one-off experience but perhaps used cumulative control experiences to regulate their 
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effort. This obviously could help them to keep their engagement level high even if they had had one or 
two negative experiences. Thirdly unlike the inter-individual findings successful students were more 
likely to use unknown causes to explain their mistakes. This result could also be explained if the 
students used similar cumulative strategies to protect themselves from one-off failures. 
Therefore the mediators of motivation, coping and task difficulties that are inserted into the model are 
necessary to explain complicated relationships between previous perceived control and final perceived 
control, which is driven by recent experiences. 
1.1.6. Conclusions of the theories 
In the last thirty years of research, the definitions and understanding of perceived control have changed 
a lot but it is still possible to see the strong contribution of social learning theory to the concept in 
identifYing two major components of perceived control (Intemal vs. Extemal locus of control). It is 
also to fair to say that if it was not for Rotter's (1966; 1975; 1990) strong definition ofLOC (perceived 
control) perhaps the consensus today between different traditions and theories would not be possible at 
all. After theoretical refinement, measurement needed to be changed and that happened over the years 
through improvements in the conceptual structure - becoming more multidimensional than it was. The 
second major contribution came from Causal Attribution theory (Weiner, 1979) which was followed 
by Learned Helplessness (or Expectancy theory) and Social Cognition. The contributions of each 
approach can be seen in the conceptual dimension each added to the area It is possible to say that 
Causal Attribution introduced the stable - unstable dimension and controllable - uncontrollable 
dimension. Learned Helplessness usually investigated the negative and health related aspects of the 
concept in the context of the global- non-global dimension. Finally Social Cognition theory evolved 
from the new developments and changes to the concept. This would be one way of reading the 
historical changes and development of perceived control. Perhaps another way is that all these theories 
more or less developed at the same time but grew in different directions and their emphasis was 
different in terms of the life events they studied. For perceived control it is fair to say that nowadays 
researchers are completely aware of the changes and the new conceptual developments. Nevertheless 
each study is mainly based on one of three theoretical backgrounds. What is really strange is that when 
we look at the literature most of the studies are still using the concept and measurement of Rotter (or 
Social Learning Theory) rather than its contemporary versions. This situation produces problems 
concerned with the reliability of measurement. 
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1.2. ACQUISmON OF PERCEPTION OF CONTROL IN CIDLDHOOD AND 
ADULTHOOD 
1.2.1. Overview 
It is quite clear from the theoretical development of perceived control that the concept has grown 
towards a multidimensional structure over the years. Although many dimensions (e.g. internal for effort 
and ability; and external for luck, chance, powerful others, etc.) were identified early (Rotter, 1966), 
they were not presented in a factorial way in the early measurernents (Levenson, 1981; Paulhus, 1983; 
Lefcourt, 1981). Later they were separated from each other and added to new measurement instruments 
e.g. Intemal, Powerful Others, Chance (!pC - Levenson, 1981); Multidimensional Academic Specific 
Locus of Control Scale (MASLOC - Palenzuela, 1984 & 1988; Control, Agency and Means-Ends 
Beliefs Inventory (CAMI - Skinner et al, 1988). Additionally there were other changes in the scales 
which were related to theoretical changes so that most of the scales became subject specific (MASLOC 
- Palenzuela, 1988; CAMI - Skinner et al., 1988) rather than general (!pC - (Levenson, 1981; I-E -
Lefcourt, 1981; CNSIE - Nowicki & Strickland, 1973). These progressive changes to perception of 
control and related theories cannot be completely separated from other theoretical developments. Age 
related changes in perceived control have recently also been taken into account (Langer, 1982; 
Flammer, 1995). Therefore the first focus in this section will be some developmental aspects of 
perceived control over the life span. We would like to consider some aspects of cognitive development 
and studies of domain specific and domain general fimctioning of the mind (Hirshfield & Gelman, 
1994). Related to this we are interested in the causal detenninistic concepts of children. 
When children learn categories they use conceptual and theory like beliefs. These theory-like beliefs, 
according to Medin (1989), are based on children's essentialist beliefs about living things. What we will 
try to argue here is that essentialist thinking perhaps can be applied to children's categorisation of social 
or other environmental experiences (Rothbart & Taylor, 1996). Another belief system which develops 
during childhood is that of faith and religious beliefs, which are domain general. We believe that there 
are parallel lines between perceived control as a domain-specific belief and religious belief as a 
domain-general belief (Boyer, 1994). There are not many psychological theories that describe the 
development of religious beliefs. The one used here is Fowler's faith development model (1976 cited in 
McDargh, 1983). 
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1.2.2. Age related changes in perceived control: 
Early social learning theorists (Rotter, 1966; Bandura, 1986) were not particularly interested in the 
curvilinear development of perception of control over the years. They only acknowledged and 
advocated the importance of internal perceived control. Therefore research was mainly focused on the 
predictive aspects of LOC and in some cases the progressive increase in internal LOC with age 
(Findley & Cooper, 1983). Recent developmental approaches have shown experimentally that perhaps 
the relationship between age and LOC is not as straightforward as had been thought. The 
developmentalist view was mainly backed up by many cognitive studies on perception and action. 
These provided evidence that the perception of control decreases around the age of 8 (Skinner & 
Chapman, 1987). At this age, children tend to overestimate the effects of their and others actions on 
outcomes. They are mainly positively biased about their ability and their power over events. This is 
called a magico-phenomena1ism by Piaget (piaget & Inhelder, 1975; Skinner & Chapman, 1987). In 
looking at the strategies domain (Means-Ends beliefs), Skinner & Chapman found that internal 
perceived control of strategies declined around the age of 8 and then started increasing again at the age 
of 10 and continued to increase. But the same phenomenon was not found in the external perception of 
control scores (e.g. powerful others or unknown factors), which declined until age 12 (the maximum 
age tested). These results made theorists re-think conceptual issues like whether Internal-External LOC 
is a bipolar concept, or whether we need to consider separately the many possible external causes such 
as powerful others, luck, faith, chance etc. 
The second exploration of age differences during middle childhood showed that the dimensionality of 
beliefs increase with age. Investigations of means-ends beliefs have shown that 7-8 year old children 
can only discriminate two aspects (unknown and remaining causes), 9-10 year olds can use three 
dimensions (internal, external and unknown means), and 11-12 year olds four factors (effort, ability, 
external, and unknown causes) (Skinner & Schindler, 1990). These results were interpreted in terms of 
children's understanding of causality improving with experiences and cognitive development. These 
results are also consistent with Dweck's (1975) study: children's understanding of attributional causality 
and learned helplessness behaviour starts developing around the age of 11 or 12. 
There are well established results that during childhood (after middle age) internal LOC gradually 
increases and is highly related to academic achievement in school. Afterwards the relationship between 
high perceived control and achievement is not significant (Findley & Cooper, 1983). On the other hand 
Little, Oettingen, Statsenko and Baltes's (1995) study with American, German and Russian children in 
grades 2-6 threw some doubts on the generalizability of American-dominated results to other cultures. 
Their American sample showed the same results as previous (American) research in that the children 
had the highest level of personal agency belief and control expectancy but their high perceived control 
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had the lowest correlation with their perfonnance. 1bis was not the case for the Gennan and Russian 
children who showed high correlation between school perfonnance and perceived control. 
Langer's (1983) studies on perceived control particularly focused on changes in old age. It is expected 
that when people get older and their body starts to decline then the chances of losing control over many 
daily activities becomes inevitable. Her studies, which were done in nursing homes, found clear 
evidence of the importance of feeling under control. In one of her studies the residents of the nursing 
home were divided two groups. People in one group were given the chance to make their own choices 
in daily life decisions, while people in the other group were completely looked after by nurses. At the 
end, the latter groups death rate was much higher (Langer, 1983). 
There are very few reviews of developmental changes in the literature. Stipek and Weisz (1981) 
reviewed studies done on elementary school age children and found slight increases in internal control 
over the years. Another, cross-sectional, study done by Skinner and Chapman (1987) showed that 
perception of control was inconsistent in middle childhood, increased from childhood to adulthood, 
and was constant from adulthood to old age. Other reviews (Gatz & Karel, 1993; Kogan, 1990; 
Lumpkin,1986, Lachman, 1986) of adulthood and old age showed that the results of changes in 
adulthood and old age are not consistent. However, some of these studies are cross-sectional or short 
tenn longitudinal studies (Gatz & Karel, 1993). Lachman's (1986) long tenn study of the effects of 
perceived control on memory perfonnance in adulthood and old age showed that there were no age 
differences between young and old adults in control beliefs for the interpersonal and political domains. 
However for control in the health and intellectual ageing domains, the older adults had lower internal 
control than young and middle-aged adults. Most importantly an intervention programme aimed at 
memory improvement was mainly useful for young and middle age-adults but not much for older 
adults. Nelson (1993) studied adults perceived control in the cognitive, social and health domains. 
Although the validity of the domains was tested in advance there were no differences in control beliefs 
among domains within age groups (30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s). Yet, people in their 70s showed lower 
perceived control in the cognitive domain than the other four age groups. In the health domain people 
in their 60s scored significantly low, and in the social domain people in their 40s and 50s scored lower 
then the rest. It was also the case that perceiVed control in all three domains was stable until the age of 
70s. 
On the basis of new emerging patterns of development of perceived control, Flammer (1995) 
suggested that 5 levels of perceived control develop during childhood. He also suggested a further 3 
levels for adulthood. These levels are called: 1. Functional experience: the event schema, 2. Elementary 
action towards an effect: the causal schema, 3. Doing by oneself: attribution of intemal causes, 
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4. Success and failure: personal achievement, 5. Distinguishing different causes: control beliefs. The 
other 3 levels of adult development of perceived control are called: 6. Self-esteem on the basis of 
personal control beliefs, 7. Contemplating and prioritising values and finally, 8. Confrontation of the 
decline in control and death. Each of these stages was backed up by different research results. Flammer 
did not match each level with a certain age but still made some suggestions about at what age each level 
occurs. Therefore it is possible to call his developmental model of perceived control a stage theory. 
To sum up, the developmental changes in perceived control over the life span are far from being clear. 
Yet there are certain trends that seem quite consistent. These trends are also supported by other research 
such as cognitive studies of the relationship between perception and action and 1 of course.., 
developmental psychology as well. According to these results children develop self-awareness of the 
outside word and the relationships between their action and the environment as early as 8 months old 
(papusek, 1979). But it takes quite a while to develop realistic perception of control. It seems quite 
likely that they optimistically judge control over their own environment around the age of eight, but 
towards the ages of 10 and 12 their perception of control decreases in a way that is adjusted to reality 
and then gradually increases in a linear way depending on their own experiences. The evidence after 
adolescence (for adulthood) is more inconsistent. Mostly, after the age 20 until the 60s perceived 
control remains the same. After 60 it starts declining again, which is related to health conditions, 
memory losses etc. But it is difficult to collect long term longitudinal data and the short term 
longitudinal and cross-sectional data on adulthood are too inconsistent to make any clear conclusions 
(Gatz & Karel, 1993). 
From the point of view of this research, there does not to appear to be a critical age in adolescence at 
which perceived control changes. One of our aims was to investigate the coming generation. Therefore 
)c,.-, .. ··-, 
it was thought quite sensible to work with teenagers in the 4th to 6th forms, /at the second part of their 
secondary education. 
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1.2.3. Acquisition of concept development: 
Children have a quite clear (perhaps innate) ability to learn and make sense of what is going on in their 
environment from a very early age. According to Gelman, Coley and Gottfried (1994), children in the 
first few years of life make sense of the real world in at least in two ways. Along with language 
development, children learn to classifY objects in terms of their similarities. When they categorise 
objects they develop concepts and theories (belief systems) which cluster these similar things together. 
TIlls applies to 
" ... where things come from, how things change over time, what causes an events to occur, and why. 
These belief systems include understanding causal relations, and they allow children to make predictions 
and provide explanations. II (Gelman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994, p.341). 
During this conceptual learning, children have a theory (at least for living things) called essentialist 
belief, which is that all living things have an essence which makes them move (Medin, 1989). So the 
causal link between people (agents) and movements (events) are explained by this essence of the 
object. TIlls belief is actually a false belief but nevertheless it helps children to understand the causal 
relationships between events and some principles of the world of living things. Medin and Ortony 
(1989) tried to explain the link between the surface (seen) and deep (unseen, perhaps abstract) 
similarities of objects understood and conceptualised by children (and adults). To do this they 
introduced essentialist psychology which denies the probabilistic (or random) similarities or 
togetherness of objects but instead uses a causal deterministic explanation (Vosniadou & Ortony, 
1989). TIlls essentialist belief although scientifically without foundations helps children, and perhaps 
also adults, to build up theories and concepts which enable them to understand the regularities in the 
world (ironically in a very unscientific way). 
What is interesting from our point of view is that this essentialist psychology can be expanded to 
inanimate objects and social concepts as well. Gelman & Gottfried (1993) showed that children as 
young as four years old explained the movement of an animal, a toy and a transparent non-living object 
(a plastic paper mill) in terms of their essences, although they had seen that the objects were clearly 
being moved by hand. Over 90% of the children said that the animals moved by themselves. Even in 
the transparent object case many children attributed an intemal mechanism to the object. If essentialist 
thinking was only applied to biologica1living things you may think that it was domain specific but this 
experiment shows that it is more general than that. Rothbart and Taylor (1996) further expanded Medin 
and Ortony's essentialist psychology to social domains and found evidence that essentialism is used for 
social categorisations and for theory-like thinking. Firstly they made a deduction from essentialist 
psychology that if the object has an essence it cannot belong to more than one category. But, on the 
other hand, we know that in the social domain objects or concepts do not stand on their own and 
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multiple categorisation is very common. For example in terms of social roles one person can be a 
father and a professional (dentist, businessman or actor) at the same time. Siegel, Statz & Roskind 
(1967 cited in Rothbart & Taylor, 1996) showed that 63% of the children at the age offive thought that 
a father who studied to become a doctor would not be a father when he became a doctor. So they were 
denying the double categorisation ( essence) of the same object. These experiments suggest that 
children's essentialist thinking may apply not only to living objects but also to non-living objects and to 
social categories. This seems to be domain general thinking. 
This argument of how children may learn concepts and theories by using some simple theory-like but 
unscientific rule (essentialism) perhaps helps us to understand how the mind develops categories, rules 
and regulations that help the child to understand the unknown world. This argument also suggests a 
kind of conclusion that perhaps concept and theory learning go side by side rather than that concepts 
are followed by theories. Perhaps domain-specific thinking and domain general thinking are going on 
at the same time in the mind. This could explain how perceived control can be domain or subject 
specific (e.g. health, school, sport etc.) but at the same time domain general (Internal or External in all 
these areas) (Nelson, 1993). Perhaps experiences in one area alter opinions in another subject area. See 
below for further evidence on this issue. 
1.2.4. Development of a faith belief: 
o " 
In many modern societies, children ~w up in a faith or belief systern (Islam, Christianity, Judaism, 'f-. 
Hinduism etc.). Religion helps parents to bring up a new generation within a certain ethic and moral 
order that allows them to live together, to share, and become an individual at the sarne time as they 
become a part of society (McDargh, 1983). Religion plays a big part this socialisation process. Fowler 
has developed a stage-like structural model of faith development to give an account of faith in God 
usiJ;1g Piaget's and Kohlberg's stage theories of cognitive and moral development. Although his theory 
is ~y basedr~n a Western religious system - McDargh (1983) specifically called it Protestant belief-
it is possible to accept for other religious systems as well. According to Fowler (1977 cited in 
McDargh, 1983), faith develops at six stages during the life span. They are: 1. Intuitive-Projective faith 
(age 4-7),2. Mythic-Literal faith (age 6.5-11), 3. Synthetic-Conventional faith (age 12-adulthood), 4. 
Individuating-Reflective faith (age 18-adulthood), 5. Paradoxical-Consolidative faith (minimum 
around 30), 6. Universalising faith (minimum around 40). These stages are highly similar to Kohlberg's 
Moral stages, which are also based on Piaget's cognitive-structural stages. The moral equivalent of faith 
stages are: 1. Heteronomous morality, where rules of obedience and avoidance of physical damage to 
person and property are backed up by threat of punishment. 2. Instrumental morality, where a person 
follows the rules for their immediate interest, and to see fairness as an equal exchange. 3. Good child 
morality, where the child behaves as others behave in order to establish good social relationships. The 
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child's morality is characterised by having good motives, concern about others and having mutual 
fiiendships where trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude exist. 4. Law and order morality, where an 
individual is part of the society and the law specifies the rules to follow. 5. Social construct reasoning, 
where there is an awareness of other people's rules and values and a respect for them. 6. Universal 
ethical principles, where an individual has his own self-chosen ethical principles. As we know from the 
developmental psychology literature, these 6 stages are also described in three levels within which each 
of these two stages take place. These are: 1. Pre-conventional level, 2. Conventional level, 3. Post-
conventional level (Cole & Cole, 1996). 
The problem with this approach is that there is no solid scientific support that .1:his age related 
categorisations are stable. It is also true that stage related structural theories mostly use semi-structured 
interviews (including Fowler, 1977). This allows them to explore the stages but it does not allow ~d~ H'T 
~. 
make researcher to make further inferences. Stage theories may be nothing more than a template to 
work in. Still it is important to see parallels between different aspects of development and try to link 
them in an unusual way. 
1.2.5. Conclusions 
After establishing the developmental changes in perceived control, a second step was to advance some 
explanations for how these changes occur, and then to give some account of similar developmental 
changes in one other social developmental domains which may have some effect on the development 
of perceived control (religious beliefs). At another level, we also explored the possible interaction or 
parallelism between domain specific and domain general aspects of perceived control through !:bl 
conceptual development. It seems that cognitive studies of conceptual development have got many 
parallels to the development of perceived control. 
Gelman et al.'s (1994) explanation of conceptual development during childhood involves using the idea 
of essentialist thinking. This essentialist thinking seems closely linked to causal determinism. It was 
specifically applied to living objects but there is also evidence that the child applies the theory to 
inanimate objects (Hirschfield & Gelman, 1994) as well as social concepts (Semin & Fiedley, 1996). 
Therefore it may be a theory for concept learning of most life experiences. 
Early knowledge of concepts is related to subordinate ( domain specific) and superordinate (domain 
general) categorisations, which develop with children's judgements of similarities between objects and 
the use of surface and deep analogies (Medin & Ortony, 1989; Vosniadou & Ortony 1989). It seems 
that children's learning of these two levels of subordinate and superordinate, in other words ~ 
surface and deep analogies (similarities), goes in parallel instead of sequentially (Medin, 1989; Gelman 
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et aL 1994). So if we apply the same idea to the learning of perception of control, we see that the same 
or similar process may be involved. 
First children up to age 8 may use surface analogies between domains and make an optimistic 
assessment of their capacity (Skinner, 1990). They are only able to discriminate 2 dimensions 
(unknown and remaining causes). At the age of 9-10 they discriminate three dimensions (internal, 
external and unknown means), and then at 11-12 years four dimensions (effort, ability, external, and 
unknown causes) (Skinner, 1990). It seems that, when new experiences come to the system, the specific 
concepts and general theory are reviewed at the same time and lead to new levells of categorisation/so 
The link between developmental changes and domain specificity are also develop so that, when the 
child gets older, she is more likely to see more complex rules of how the environment and her own 
skills affect the outcome. S/he develops new complicated theories of similarities in different domains 
(taking into account more variables and criteria at the same time) but these will be like each other 
(domain general) because the experiences will be connected with each other. Also a child who revises 
her/his experiences in similar circumstances to previous experiences will be most likely to use parallel 
evaluations of the concepts they learn and theories they have already established. Therefore, the child's 
perception of control can be similar in different domains and become domain general. 
Evidence that perception of control can be domain specific and domain general comes from Nelson's 
(1993) study of an adult sample. She found that in three domains of perceived control (cognitive, 
health, social) there were no differences in control beliefs between domains within age groups (30s, 
40s, 50s, 60s, 70s). This can be taken as evidence for how domain specific and domain general aspects 
of perceived control work in parallel to each other, just as children's conceptual and theory like thinking 
work in parallel to each other. 
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1.3. CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPIDC ASPECTS OF PERCENED CONTROL 
1.3.1. Overview 
In this section we introduce literature related with the variables being investigated. These are: SES and 
gender as demographic variables, and nationality, religion, religiosity and authoritarianism as culture 
related variables. It is possible to argue that these demographic variables are also cultural variables but 
for the purposes of this review they are covered separately. 
1.3.2. Demographic Variables 
The demographic variables considered in this study are socio-economic status (SES) and gender. 
1.3.2.1. Socio-Economic Status (SES) 
The investigation of socio-economic status (SES) has not specifically been done in relation to locus of 
control. Although the importance of SES had been acknowledged by people like Stipek and Weisz 
(1981), very little investigation has been carried out to clarify the relationship. It is quite sensible to 
think that, as a major environmental variable, the family's SES will have an important effect on 
children's experiences. This point of view is particularly defensible if we take the socialleaming point 
of view rather than that of attribution themy. Studies that have taken SES into account have mainly 
shown that there are positive and linear relationships between internal locus of control and SES 
(Maqsud & Rouhani, 1991; Brain, Holliman, & McCallum, 1989; Tripathi & Tripathi, 1984; Masqud, 
1983). The age range covered by these studies is varied but most of them have been done with school 
age pupils. Brain, Holliman, & McCallum (1989) studied SES, LOC and achievement motivation 
effects on mastery scores in kindergarten and first year primary schoo1. They found that SES scores 
were the best predictors of the children's mastery scores. Tripathi & Tripathi (1981) found that SES, 
LOC and the strength of the approval motive jointly influenced perceptual dependence in 
undergraduates. It is clear that SES has been used as a confounding variable in studies related to LOC 
but it doesn't seem to have been investigated as an antecedent variable. As an eclectic researcher 
(combining social learning and attribution theory), Lefcourt (1991) points out that people's perceived 
control develops within their immediate environment, but does not refer to any specific research on the 
issue. Therefore it seems it is quite important to investigate SES as a predictor of LOC and clarify the 
relationships between the two variables. 
1.3.2.2. Gender 
Studies relating gender and LOC have never come out with any clear results. Although some of them 
did find differences between girls and boys in schools and colleges it seems these differences are 
determined by child rearing and cultural factors (Hoffinan & Kloska, 1995). While some of the studies 
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have fOlmd gender differences in perceived control (Mwamwenda, 1995; Wehmeyer, 1993; Fumham 
& Greaves, 1994; Duxbury, Higgins, & Lee, 1994; Roth & Amstrong, 1991) others are inconclusive or 
non-significant (Hoffinan, Kloska, 1995; Choran, Antonucci, & Adelman, 1989; Chia, Moore, Lam & 
Chuang, 1995). Most of these study's samples were adults or adolescents. Although most of them have 
found males to be more internal some have found fernales to be more internal (Jayaratne & Ivey, 1983; 
Tsui, 1974 cited in Hui, 1982). It is difficult to come to a clear conclusion but it seems that females 
have a greater intemal LOC if the sample is an adult or adolescent population. It is also possible that 
the results are highly related to the context and country in which the study took place (Hui, 1982). For 
example, studies in America, Japan, China, India, and Israel have found females to be more extemal in 
one or more domains of perceiVed control, whilst in Russia, Turkey and Greece no gender differences 
were found. This in itself is evidence that gender differences are heavily affected by experiences. The 
other important variable that needs to be taken into account is the year the study took place as Chia et 
al. (1995) emphasised that modernisation has caused social and sex role changes in all cultures. Their 
longitudinal study showed that in 1979 both American and Taiwanese girls scored more external than 
boys but in 1992-3 there was no significant differences between them even though the cultural 
differences remained. However, several recent studies have still found girls to be more external than 
boys (Mwamwenda, 1995; Wehmeyer, 1993; Fumham & Greaves, 1994; Duxbury, Higgins, & Lee, 
1994; Roth & Amstrong, 1991). 
1.3.3. Cultural Differences 
The cultural variables considered in this study are religion, religiosity, and authoritarianism and 
nationality. 
1.3.3.1. Religion and religiosity 
Very few studies in the literature have looked at differences between religions regarding perceived 
control (Saeeduzzafar & Sharma, 1991; Asonibare, 1986) where Muslim students were found to be 
more external than their Christian peers. But there are a fair number of studies on religiosity and 
perceived control (LOC) (e.g. Kahoe, 1974; Silverman, 1979; Friederberg & Friederberg, 1985; Lesser 
& Painser, 1985). There are some contradictory results. While some of the studies have found high 
correlations between internal locus of control and religiosity (Shrauger & Silverman, 1971; Silvestri, 
1979; Kahoe, 1974, 1977; Lesser & Painser, 1985; Gabbard, Howard, & Tageson, 1986) others have 
no significant differences (Friederberg & Friderberg, 1985; Ritzema, 1979; Purdy, Simari, Colon, 
1983). 
There are some explanations for the inconsistent results of the relationship between religious belief and 
perceived control. Firstly perhaps the measurements used to explore the relationships were not efficient 
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enough to link these two concepts (Friederberg & Friederberg, 1985; Fmnham, 1982). Second, and 
more likely, is that the relationships between religiosity and perceived control are more complex than 
early studies expressed. As Friederberg & Friederberg (1985) said "It is likely that highly religious 
people may make attributions which reflect elements of both internality and externality". Adding to this 
is Lesser et al. (1985) and Fumharn's (1982) finding that perhaps religious people can score high in 
certain sub-domains of internal attribution (e.g. ability) and external attribution (e.g. fate and powerful 
others or unknown depending on how they are defined). 
Lesser and Painser (1985) studied 30 women. Half were members of a religious group and half were 
not. They were interested in the relationship between Piaget's concept of magical thinking, in which 
evety event must have a cause, and his stage of formal operational thinking, in which causes are logical 
but not always known. They did not find any differences in terms of the formal operational level but 
they did find that the religious group had a stronger belief in the supernatural and personal 
responsibility and a higher internal locus of control. These two groups also differed in their conception 
of the operation of chance in human life. While the religious group believed in a universe in which 
every event has a 'meaning' the ordinary group accepted some randomness in the universe. These 
results are consistent with the Fumharn's (1982) study of clergymen of the Church of England. The 
fundamentalists scored significantly lower than the liberals on the chance domain of Levenson's LOC 
scale. These results suggest that perhaps magical concepts of causality can develop into maturity in 
certain domains and exist side by side with logical thinking. 
Skinner & Chapman (1987), using Piaget's magical thinking argmnent in a similar way, explain the 
development of perceived control in children. Their thinking procedures are at first irrational because 
they tend to attribute magical powers to themselves and others and therefore misjudge their capability 
and then become rational and less deterministic. 
It is possible to use this co-existence argmnent to make inferences about why and which religious 
beliefs are linked to LOC. Lesser and Painser's study can be linked with Gelman et al's (1994) studies 
of the development of conceptual and theoretical thinking in childhood. It is possible to understand this 
better if we expect parallels in the development of human cognition at different stages. Perhaps like 
children's analogical thinking, religious thinking leads to simultaneous development of domain specific 
and general categories. It is possible to apply the same idea to adult thinking and therefore it is not odd 
or illogical to think that a general belief systern such as religion develops into maturity along with 
logical thinking. Therefore it is legitimate to think that religious beliefs and a personal belief system 
such as perceived control can be linked with each other and/or co-exist during the life-span. 
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There is only one more line of investigation on religiosity, distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiosity (Allport and Ross, 1968 cited in Kahoe, 1974). These studies, comparing different religions, 
have shown that intrinsic religiosity is related to internal locus of controL According to this study, 
intrinsic religiosity is described as an internalised belief system and the person lives by it Extrinsic 
religiosity is a social aspect of religion and some people use religion for their own ends such as 
providing security, sociability etc. Kahoe's results showed that there were positive and moderate 
relationships between intrinsic religiosity and internal control (r=.24, p<.OI), and negative relationships 
between extrinsic religiosity and internal locus of control (r=-.25, p<O.OI). These results were also 
positively linked with the samples' intrinsic motivation and consequently achievement (high intrinsic 
religiosity, intrinsic motivation and intemallocus of control). Ronald, Morris & Hood (1988) found 
that intrinsic religious orientation was generally consistent with healthy psychological characteristics 
such as self-consciousness and self-efficacy while extrinsic and orthodox beliefs tend to predict 
maladjustment 
1.3.3.2. Authoritarianism 
It has been suggested that religion can be a breeding ground for authoritarianism and prejudice. But on 
the other hand there is established evidence that the relationship between religious service attendance 
and authoritarianism is curvilinear (Strueling, 1963; Friedrichs, 1959; Young, Benson, & Holtzman, 
1960; Hoge & Carroll, 1973; Kilpatrick, Sutker, & Sutker, 1970 all cited in Wul£( 1991). So it is not 
necessarily the case that all religious people or church attenders are authoritarian. The other argument 
related to authoritarianism is that perhaps traditionally the concept and its measurement are both highly 
related to conservatism (Altemeyer, 1988 cited in Wul£( 1991). But studies reported by Christie 
(1991) provide evidence that the relationship between authoritarianism and political views is not 
straightforward. A comparison between three different countries on the Authoritarianism scale, on 
which high scores mean greater authoritarianism, showed that while communists in England and 
Netherlands scored an average of 2.8 and 3.4, in India they scored 4.4 which is almost higher than 
conservatives (3.9) in Britain and the same as fundamentalists in the Netherlands (Christie, 1991). 
1.3.3.3. Cross-Cultural Studies 
In cross-cultural studies of perceived control there is one extensive review (70 papers) and one small 
review (30 papers) in the early eighties (Hui, 1982; Furnham & Henry, 1980). There are also two 
chapters on studies of LOC in a cross-cultural context (Dyal, 1984) and recently one on explanatory 
style in the context of culture (Little, Oettingen, Statsenko & Baltes, 1995). Hui's study covers 70 
articles that are published not only in main stream journals but also in nation specific journals. 
Therefore, it covers a wide range of relevant studies. Furnham & Henry reviewed 30 articles and 
mainly used the review as a rationale for the research they had done. Since then many articles have 
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been published in the area, mainly in single culture journals but we have not been able to reach them 
because of the locality of the studies or language differences. Therefore this review is restricted to 
journals written in English. The tendency seems that with one or two exceptions these studies are still 
affected by the main problems of cross cultural research such as measurement and comparability. The 
most widely used scale is still Rotter's (1966, 1975) I-E scale, which was the:first to be developed (e.g. 
Furnham & Henry, 1980; Perussia, 1995; Smith, Trompenaars, & Dugan, 1995). The second most 
widely used scale is Levenson's (1981) Internal, Powerful Others & Chance Scale (e.g. Lao, 1977; 
Chia, Moore, Lam, Chuang, & Cgeng, 1995). 
The studies in this area can be categorised in terms of when and where the research took place. From 
this study's point of view we are not covering ethnic, within-coun1:ly research, which undoubtedly 
gathers valuable information. Nor will research done only in one non-western coun1:ly be covered. Our 
interest in particular will be in cross-cultural (national) comparisons of more than one coun1:ly .. 
The studies in the area can be clustered in terms of the location of the coun1:ly as western or non-
western. It is also possible to divide the studies in terms of region or the number of countries compared. 
The main clustering that will be used here is based on the region of the second culture. For example the 
comparison between Indian and North American samples will be categorised as Asian, and a 
comparison between any European countries and North America will be considered European. There 
are some studies comparing Far East (Asian) samples against Australian and that group will called 
Asian as well (Hamid, 1994). 
1.3.3.3.1. Studies In Asia 
Although they are not necessarily identical to each other it is possible to cluster studies in the same 
region because of long term cultural similarities. In this group there are studies from Japan, China 
(mainly in Hong Kong), Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea and India Studies in Israel, Russia and Turkey will 
be also considered in this part only for the reason that they are fairly close to each other in geographical 
terms. The contrast argument will be taken into account later on. 
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Japan 
Early studies had shown that the Japanese are more external than their American counterparts (Bond & 
Tornatzky, 1973; Mahler, 1974; Krampten & Wieberg, 1981 cited in Hui, 1982) but the results are not 
necessarily that clear. When Mahler (1974) and Krampen & Widberger (1981) used Levenson's 
multidimensional LOC scale instead of Rotter's I-E scale they only found differences on Chance 
(Mahler) and Internal (Krampen & Widberger) but not on Powerful Others. A recent study in Japan 
(Yajima, Sato, Arai, 1996) investigated relationships between perceived control and achievernent 
anxiety and found that motives for science and self-regulation seemed a good explanatory model of 
perceived control injunior school Japanese pupils. 
Chinese 
The results of studies with Chinese people are quite conflicting. Hsieh, Skybut & Lotsof (1969, cited in 
Hui, 1982) and Hamid (1994) found the Chinese to be more external than their American and New 
Zealand (respectively) counterparts. But on the other hand Tsui's study (1974 cited in Hui, 1982) 
showed that Chinese women college students (in Hong Kong) were more internal than their American 
counterparts. Similarly studies in Taiwan also showed no significant differences from American 
samples (Hung, 1974; Reitz & Groff: 1972 cited in Hui, 1982 & Dyal, 1984; Lao, 1977). But Dyal is 
suspicious about the representativeness of Lao's American sample, saying that Levenson's (1981) 
normative American sample were more internal than Lao's South Carolina White American group. The 
other studies that have been done in the same region found that countries like Malaysia and Korea and 
India were more Internal then their Western counterparts - Australian and Canadian respectively 
(Rafaei & Rahman, 1976; Carment, 1974 cited in Hui, 1982). Other studies have found that Taiwan 
Chinese are more external than their American counterparts. This includes a study by Chia, Moore, 
Lam, Chuang, & Cheng, 1995) who hypothesised that there would be no differences in perceived 
control due to the last 15 years of modernisation in both countries. 
India 
Carment's study (1974 cited in Hui, 1982 and Dyal, 1984) showed that an Indian sample of students 
and workers were more internal on the general factor ofLOC than Canadian students and workers. But 
at the factorial level Indian students were more internal on control of ideology and systern modification 
but more external on personal factors. A sample of Indian workers was also more internal on ideology 
and systern modification but the same as the Canadians on personal factors. A study with religious 
samples, comparing India and America found no differences between thern in terms of their LOC 
(Tyler & Sinha, 1986). Smith & Whitehead (1984) used Weiner's model rather than Rotter's and 
compared Indian and Americans attributions to job promotion and job demotion. In both cultures 
promotion was attributed to internal causes while demotion was attributed to external causes. These 
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results are consistent with early studies and with Attribution theory. But they also found that Americans 
attributed both promotion and demotion more to internal causes than the Indians. This result is in the 
expected direction because promotion and demotion are more dependent on external causes in India 
These two results indicate the cross-cultural validity of the concept. 
1.3.3.3.2. Middle East and Russia 
Cross-cultural studies of Russian children have shown that Soviet students are more external that their 
counterparts in America and Israel on almost all dimension of locus of control. For example, on the 
LucklFate, Academic achievement, Leadership/success and politics subscales Russian were more 
external, but on the Respect subscale American were more external (Rawdon, Willis, & Fincken, 
1995). In a study of immigrants in Israel, Russian immigrants were more external than American 
immigrants on predictable world and just world factors, but not on the friendly world and politically 
responsive world factors, on a scale constructed from Rotter's LaC scale (Aviram & Milgram, 1977). 
A recent study has compared German (East and West separately), Russian and American children on 
the relationship between perceived control and academic achievement. They found that American 
children believed that effort was more important in producing school performance than did Russian 
and German children and also that the former communist countries' (East Berlin and Moscow) samples 
thought that unknown causes had more effect on school outcomes than did West Berlin and Los 
Angeles children (Little, Oettingen, Stetsenko, & Baltes, 1995). In this last study the new conceptual 
framework of Bandura's Action theory was used and the scale was CAM! (Control, Means-Ends, & 
Agency Scale), which is one of the new generation scales that have been used successfully in cross-
cultural settings (Chapman, Skinner, & Baltes, 1988). 
1.3.3.3.3. Europe 
East Europe 
Studies in East European countries have not found any significant differences compared with 
American, some Asian and other European samples (Reitz & Jewell, 1979; Rupp & Nowicki, 1978; 
Torestad, 0100, & Magnusson, 1989). Reitz & Jewell's (1979) study found that factory workers in 
Yugoslavia, America and Asia were similar on Locus of Control and job involvement. A study 
comparing Hungarian & American children on LaC and school achievement found a similar 
relationship between internality and school achievement (Rupp & Nowicki, 1979). Multi-dimensional 
comparisons of behavioural control and predictive control beliefs in Hungary, Italy and Yemen showed 
that, except for the Yemen, the other two countries' patterns of relationships between behavioural 
control, predictive control and anxiety level were similar, and locus of control played a mediating role 
in these relationships (Torestad, 0100, & Magnusson, 1989). 
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Other comparisons between Western European coWltries have shown some differences between 
coWltries which are greater than those of COnfOWlding variables such as life style and social class. 
According to a comparison of six coWltries on LOC as a part of a large European Value System study, 
Germany and Denmark were the most illternal followed by the Irish, and British. ill the middle were 
Spain, Belgium and France and the least illternals were Italy, and Holland. The data were presented in 
terms of raw scores and no post hoc results were given in the article therefore the sequence given here 
is completely based on mean scores (Jensen, Olsen, & Hughes, 1990). 
Italy 
Perussia (1995) recently questioned the validity of Rotter's concept in the cross-cultural context. She 
used three of Rotter's items with the highest item-total correlation, which were then embedded in an 
attitude scale. The results showed that in both adult and college (adolescent) samples the questions did 
not come out in the expected factors, instead they loaded on three different factors. This has been 
interpreted as the dimensionality of the scale, at least in Italy. But it is not clear in this study why the 
author did not test the factorial structure of Rotter's scale as a whole. Although there is no clear 
consensus in terms of the factors of Rotter's scale (Dyal, 1984), one thing which is quite clear is that 
there are consistent results showing the multidimensionality of the Rotter scale in cross-cultural settings 
as well as in America (see Smith, Trompenaars, & Dugan, 1995). Therefore, although very well 
designed and tested, Perussia's (1995) argument is not valid in the first place because of the existing 
evidence, mainly from cross-cultural studies, that Rotter's scale is multidimensional and not 
unidimensional. 
Greece 
A study has shown that a Greek sample scored like an American sample on the Personal domain 
measured by Levenson's IPC, but were more external on the Powerful Others and Chance domains. 
Given that the study took place just before the military coup in Greece this result is Wlderstandable 
(Malikiosi & Rykman, 1977 cited in Hui, 1980; Dyal, 1984). 
Denmark 
Two comparative studies of Denmark and America showed that the Danish sample overall were not 
significantly different from their American COWlterparts. But Krampen & Wieberger's (1981) study 
noticed some difference at the item level for the items related to governmental control, the Danes being 
more external. Schneider & Parsons (1970) found that out of five factors the Danes came out as more 
external only on the factor called "leadership and success". 
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One example of studies in Scandinavian countries is a teenage sample from Sweden, who were found 
to be the most external overall compared with the Japanese, Australians, Americans, and New 
Zealanders (McGinnies, Nordholm, Ward, & Bhanhumnavin, 1974). These results were criticised by 
Dyal (1984) who said that the Swedish sample was smaller and younger than the other samples. 
Therefore they had different characteristics developmentally and environmentally (e.g. still living with 
their parents). 
German 
West German samples have usually been found to be more internal then any other cultures (Maroldo & 
Flachmeier, 1978; Oettingen, Little, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 1994). Recently the CAM! scale, first 
developed in Germany distinguishes three major dimensions of locus of control namely, Agency, 
Means-Ends and Control beliefs. Within each of these domains there are ten scales for internal and 
external causes (e.g. effort and ability for internal; powerful others, luck and unknown for external) 
(Skinner, Chapman, & Baltes, 1988). Using this scale Little, Oettingen, Statsenko, & Baltes (1995) 
compared West & East Berlin, Moscow and Los Angeles children in terms of their perceived control 
and academic performance. The results revealed that although there were similarities cross-culturally in 
children's everyday causality beliefs about what factors produce school performance, differences were 
found on agency control, which is apparently the main predictor of achievernent in school, and also on 
control expectancy. Americans in this study were found to be the most internal on agency beliefs and 
control expectancy. But the surprising result was that although Americans had the highest agency 
beliefs score this was not correlated with their actual performance in school as was expected. This 
result is fairly consistent with Findley & Cooper's (1983) review. On the other hand in the German and 
Russian samples agency belief was highly positively correlated with school performance. Particularly 
for the East Berlin sample, agency beliefs were found to be highly correlated with school performance. 
This result can be attributed to teaching and school system differences which will be discussed later. 
1.3.3.3.4.)lfrica 
South Africa 
The studies done in South Africa have not always used representative samples but usually selected 
samples related to the purpose of the study. For example Fumham & Henry compared African, fudian 
and European Nurses LOC to test cultural differences while controlling occupation and gender. They 
found no significant differences on total scores but factor analyses were different for each subgroup. 
Given that the sample was small for each subgroup this part of their results will not discussed here. 
Another study did not find any significant differences between White and fudian origin South African 
school children when they used CNSIE (Nowicki & Strickand, 1973; Barling & Fincham, 1978). 
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The Other Studies in Africa 
The main comparison made between African culture and other White cultures was by Reimanis & 
Posen's (1980) study in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, White Rodesia and America The results showed that the 
Zimbabweans and Nigerians were more external than White Rhodesian and Americans. Hui (1982) 
reported in his review that studies in Africa showed that there was a strong positive relationship 
between supernatural beliefs and external beliefs (Jahoda, 1970; Plug, 1975 cited in Hui, 1982). But 
the relationships between religion or superstitious beliefs or religious beliefs and LOC is in the opposite 
direction in Western cultures (e.g. America) (Strickland & Shaffer, 1971; Tong, 1978 cited in Hui, 
1982). These differences have been attributed to differences in the context and meaning of the 
supernatural beliefs. Supernatural beliefs in Africa can be seen as a· way of coping with an 
unpredictable environment while in Western culture, where God is very personal (internal), the 
relationship between internal beliefs and religion appears. Not enough work has been done to 
investigate differences in the meaning of religion in different cultures. This will be a challenge for our 
research point of view. 
Summary 
It seems that Asian and African cultures/nations are more external compared with western (mainly 
American) cultures. Europeans with very few exceptions (Swedish and Greece) are as internal as 
Americans. But it is not always the case that all Asians cultures (e.g. Chinese and Indians) are external 
compared with their western counterparts. On the other hand it seems that Japanese are consistently 
more external than their western counterparts. 
Most of these studies used Rotter's I-E LOC scale to measure perceived control. It seems that they 
usually missed the point that Rotter's scale is in fact multidimensional. The second most widely used 
LOC scale is Levenson's (1981) IPC and studies with this scale have found some evidence of the 
Internal domain being consistent but Powerful Others and Chance val)' from one culture to another due 
to differences in experiences (Malikiosiki & Rykman, 1977 cited in Hui, 1982). But even the 
differences found in these domains with the multidimensional version of Rotter's scale were not always 
in expected direction, such as western cultures believing less in chance or powerful others. In some 
studies Asians have been found to be external but at the same time politically active (pandey & Kahan, 
1977; Navarro, 1975 cited in Hui, 1982), which is contradictory to western studies which have found 
politically active people to be more internal (Strickland, 1989). Navarro's study also found that political 
awareness and activity was highly related to external LOC. But this kind of externality needs to be 
discriminated from fatalism because it is created by real circumstances and is therefore highly goal-
oriented. 
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1.3.4. Conclusions: 
The social antecedents of perceived control can be classified as culture dependent and relatively culture 
independent. We have classified mainly religiosity, authoritarianism and culture (nationality in this 
study) as a culture dependent and SES and gender as relatively less culture dependent. 
SES seems to have a clear linear relationship with perceived control - high SES being highly related 
with high internal perceived control. Gender studies have usually found that males are more internal 
then fernales but these results have not always been replicated. Some researchers have not found any 
gender differences. 
The relationship between religiosity and LOC is not conclusive. High religiosity is sometimes related to 
internal control and some other times to external control. These results have made the author consider 
curvilinear relationships between the two variables. Authoritarianism is mainly linked with religiosity 
and cultural variables like the political regime of the countIy. The link made so far with religiosity is 
that generally the more religious the person the more likely they are to be authoritarian as well, but 
some curvilinear relationships also exist. The relationships between culture and authoritarianism have 
shown that culture has far more effect on a persons' authoritarianism than their political views (Christie, 
1991). It may be that environmental constraints such as lack of facilities as well as the history of the 
nation may cause differences in the authoritarianism of the individual. This suggests the importance of 
the environment to the development of authoritarianism. The similarities expected between perceived 
control and authoritarianism suggest that high authoritarianism will be related to high external 
perceived control. 
In terms of cultural differences, in general, western cultures are more internal than their Asian and 
Afiican counterparts. But some findings are not so clear, either finding no significant differences or 
finding Asian cultures to be more internal than their counterparts in Canada or Australia There is also 
evidence that detailed differences between domains are more complicated, such as personal control 
being constant between cultures but social and other environment-related domains being different. 
The issues raised by these cross-cultural studies of perceived control are mainly related to 
measurement. It is not clear if the measures of perceived control are valid in most of the studies. This 
doesn't mean that the researchers were not aware of the problems of comparability but perhaps that the 
ways they tried to overcome them were not always adequate. For example most of these studies used 
Rotter's I-E LOC scale which was claimed to be unidimensional by Rotter (1975) and almost all of 
thern (more then 50%) applied factor analysis to identify the differences between cultures. What was 
problematic and what has not been discussed much is that the factor solutions differed from one study 
to another, and all of these studies made cross-cultural comparisons on the basis of their own individual 
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factor solutions. This creates a problem. There have been very few attempts to develop culture specific 
scales (Aviram & Milgram, 1977; Skinner et al., 1988, Palenzuela, 1989) that were successful in later 
cross-cultural work (Skinner et al., 1988). 
The second criticism of cross-cultural studies of perceived control is that because of the different times 
of the studies (mostly in the seventies, recently in nineties as well), there may have been changes within 
these cultures. This was partly shown by Chia et al.'s (1995) study of Taiwan and America 15 years 
apart (1979-1994). The results did not show any changes in the difference between the two samples. 
The Americans were more internal then the Taiwanese at both times. However, the gender differences 
for both cultures disappeared. This was explained by the modernisation of the societies over the years. 
There are likely to be other differences between past and recent studies now that improved knowledge 
of the area has led to more sophisticated measurements that are domain specific and multidimensional 
(Skinner et al., 1988; Little et al, 1995). We will try to take all these changes into account in this study. 
There are other general methodological problems of cross-cultural studies of Perceived Control which 
come from the comparability problems of cross-cultural data which will be explained in detail in the 
next section. 
1.4. TECHNICAL ISSUES OF CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES 
1.4.1. Overview: History and Methodological Issues of Cross-Cultural Psychology 
Up to now, the traditional way to investigate cross cultural differences is to use scales developed in the 
Western World to see whether the concept and theories developed in the USA or Europe are valid in 
more traditional societies (Triandis, 1974; Berry, 1980). This approach requires research done in 
different cultures to have enough dimensional similarities to enable use of the same theories or 
concepts (Frijda and Jahoda, 1966; in Berry 1980). Berry (1980) says that this dimensional identity can 
be obtained in two ways. In the first way, which is universal, it can be obtained by transforming 
sociology, anthropology, linguistic and biology to psychology. In the second way it can be obtained by 
demonstrating an experimental equivalence for the data collected from two or more cross-cultural 
studies. In this study the second way will be adopted. 
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1.4.2. Emic and Etic dilemma of cross-cultural studies: 
The basic problem of cross-cultural psychology is whether the comparison between different cultures is 
possible or not. This problem of cross-cultural psychology is described as the ernic and etic dilemma 
The two concept were drawn from phonetics and phonernics approaches in linguistics (Beny, 1980; 
1992). The conceptual analogy is here that phonetics describes more general, universal rules of the 
language while phonemics describes the sound system of a single language. So in cross-cultural 
psychology, while etics is used to describe general, universal rules across cultures ( cultural similarities), 
ernic focuses on culture specific issues. In other words if we are comparing two or more cultures with 
each other etic will be the similar behaviours and etic will be the differences. 
Before making any psychological comparisons between cultures a researcher should make a choice 
between two strategies for identifYing the etic and ernic. These are Berry's Iterative model of the 
derived etic and Triandis's Combined ernic-etic method. 
1.4.2.1. Suggested Models of Emic & Etic Comparability: 
Two models of cross-cultural comparability had been suggested. These are iterative model of derived 
etic (Beny et al., 1992) and combine ernic and etic (Triandis, 1974). We will shortly introducing both. 
The one will be used in this study is Berrry's iterative model of drived etic. 
1.4.2.1.1. Berry's Iterative model of derived etic: 
According to this approach it is possible to start the research in one culture then transfer the information 
gained from this to another culture and eventually combine the similarities and the differences between 
them until common ground is reached. So, first of all we start to investigate the behaviour in our own 
culture, which is the ernic approach. Then we transfer this to the other culture (usually by translation of 
the measurement material) and then, when we test the other culture with this translated instrument, we 
investigate the same behaviour in the new culture. In the third step we compare the two cultures which 
means comparing the two ernics. Then, in a fourth step we look at whether comparison is possible or 
not. If it is possible, we can talk about derived etic which exists between two or more culture's ernics 
(Beny, 1992). See figure 1.4.1 for the Venn Diagram. 
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Figure 1.4.1: Venn diagram.; steps taken to operationalize emics and erics (Adapted from Berry, 1992). 
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(OTHER) 
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One of the criticisms of this approach is that the comparison gets very complicated if the nmnber of 
cultures compared is more then two, even though this is theoretically possible. On the other hand·the 
strategy gives practical guidelines for making psychological comparisons using psychological 
measurement techniques. 
1.4.2.1.2. Triandis's model: Combine emic-etic 
The second approach also uses the same conceptual analogy of ernic and eric but suggests a different 
way to combine them. Triandis's (1980) model of cross-cultural comparison is called "combine ernie-
etic". This method is quite similar to Beny's iterative approach for derived eric. The difference with 
Triandis's approach is at the beginning of the model. It starts with constructing an eric by developing 
different scales for the different cultures at the same time. Then it develops ernic ways of measuring in 
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each culture. Triandis (1974) points out that in this procedure the etic concepts such as race, nationality, 
religion, and occupation are much more general than the related ernic concepts. So this method is trying 
to discover etic with ernic instruments. For this reason it has been criticised by Van de Vijver & 
Poortinga (1982) and Brislin (1980) who argue that the Triandis's model produces validity problems 
that are very- difficult to overcome. One reason why his method has been criticised is the statistical 
analysis that has been used to construct a combined ernic and etic. He uses factor analysis to find out 
the similarities between two ernics but, as Brislin (1980) points out, using factor analysis may increase 
the chance of misjudging the similarities between cultures because there is no best agreed method of 
factor rotation which will lead to the best fit of the model (e.g. varimax or oblique rotation). This will 
also have an effect on the number of factors constructed from the model. Additionally, sometimes it 
may well be case that the factor analysis can show that there could be a better set of etics than that 
originally proposed by the researcher. 
On the other hand there are some successful uses of the model in the literature, one of which was 
recently published by Godin, Maticka-Tyndale, Adrien, Manson-Singer, Willms, & Cappom (1996). 
They tested the cross-cultural validity of three different social psychology theories of health specific 
risk-taking behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen's theory of reasoned action, Ajzen's theory of planned 
behaviour, and Triandis's theory of interpersonal behaviour). They went through a quite difficult 
process of establishing conceptual validity in all three cultures they investigated (Latin America, 
English speaking Caribbean, and South Asian) and then developed a scale that would measure the same 
behaviour pattern for condom use in all these three cultures. 
It is obvious that the choice of method is highly related to the purpose of the study and the target 
sample of the specific investigation. Still, if the methods were to be judged in terms of their practicality 
and applicability, our favoured model would be Berry's iterative model of the derived etic. The reason 
for this is that most of the time the theoretical model is established in one culture before its validity is 
tested in the second (imposed) culture with the existing measurement material. If Triandis's model is 
adopted the measurement instrument would have to be developed simultaneously in both cultures from 
the beginning, which seems rather impractical. The second criticism of this, as we have already 
mentioned, is that the validity of the comparison should be questioned because of the different 
materials used to collect the information. But of course recent studies with Triandis's model are more 
advanced and the final measure is a single scale which has been constructed from preliminary 
investigations in the target cultures (Godin et al., 1996). In some cases this has been done using back 
translation to decentralise the concepts in the scale. In this procedure the scale is translated and back 
translated several times until the concept is neutralised and represents the same meaning in all cultures. 
The details of this method will be given below in translation methods for conceptual equivalence. 
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To be able to compare two or more different cultures we need to know whether equivalency is possible 
between cultures, for instance conceptual equivalency, functional equivalency and metric equivalency. 
Without looking at these different kinds of equivalency criteria we wouldn't be able to compare 
different cultures reliably. It might be good idea to use some of these equivalency concepts as a main 
framework and to discuss the possible statistical techniques within this framework. In the cross-cultural 
literature, these equivalency concepts are frequently used (e.g. Klien, 1988; Beny and Dagen, 1974; 
Beny, 1980; Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1982) but recently Beny (1992) has suggested that there has 
been some misuse of them. Although they are not perfect these are still concepts which will help to 
create criteria for cross-cultural research methodology in terms of comparability, reliability and less 
biased measurement. 
1.4.3. Methodological Difficulties of Cross-Cultural Comparison: 
Equivalency & Comparability Problems of Cross-Cultural Psychology 
The approach that interests us constructs the basis of reliability through cross-cultural equivalence. 
Beny and Dasen (1974) argue that there are three different kinds of equivalence. These are 1. 
Functional, 2. Conceptual and 3. Metric equivalence. To supplement metric equivalence, Poortinga 
(1962) has added 3a Scale equivalence and Hui has added 3b. Item equivalence. 
1.4.3.1. Functional Equivalence 
"Functional equivalence exists when two or more behaviours (in two or more cultural system) are 
related to functionally similar problems" (Beny, 1980). Triandis (1980) claims that "without this 
equivalence, it is suggested, no valid cross-cultural behavioral comparison may be made". 
1.4.3.2. Conceptual Equivalence 
"Conceptual equivalence is that the meaning of the research (stimuli, concept etc) or of behaviour must 
be equivalent before comparison is possible" (Beny, 1980). 'TIris involves the demonstration that 
concepts mean the same in the different cultures. Beny and Dasen (1974) and Beny (1980) have 
various suggestions how this can be achieved, although it is not a simple problem' (Brislin, 1980). 
Conceptual equivalence is a precondition for comparison, like functional equivalence. The first study 
of our research concerns transliteral equivalence. At this stage the aim is to test the scales used in this 
study for equivalence across languages. 
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Three approaches have been identified in the literature to make this conceptual equivalency possible. 
These are Translation methods (Brislin, 1980, 1986), Osgood's Semantic differential analyses from 30 
different countries (Osgood, 1965,1971,1977, cited in Brislin, 1980) and the Ethnoscience or cognitive 
tradition of anthropology (Tyler, 1969; Sturtevant, 1964; Berry, 1980). Because it is directly relevant to 
this study, we will be considering Brislin's (1980) translation techniques in detail. 
Brislin (1980) suggested and reviewed at least five different ways of testing translation quality. These 
are a back translation, b. bilingual sample, c. committee approach, d. pre-test procedure and e. back 
translation for decentralisation. 
1.4.3.2.1. Brislin's methods of translation for conceptual equivalence: 
Brislin (1980) introduced five complementary approaches to methods of translation for cross-cultural 
studies. These are back translation, the bilingual approach, the committee approach, pre-test and 
decentralisation. Each of these will be discussed below. 
1.4.3.2.1.1. Back translation, in which the researcher prepares material in one language and asks a 
bilingual to translate it into the other target language. A second bilingual independently translates the 
material back into the original language. The researcher then has two forms in the original language to 
examine and, even if s/he does not know the target language, can make a sound judgement about the 
quality of translation. The back translation method is nowadays a pretty standard procedure in cross-
cultural comparisons but the validity of the method on its own is not always adequate. This method, for 
example, cannot overcome the problem of the connotational meaning of the word. Also it can give a 
false sense of security. Therefore it is important to have different methods, as well as back translation, 
to overcome this kind of problem. These methods can be used by people who do not know the target 
language, a common problem in cross-cultural research and especially difficult to avoid in studies 
comparing three or more cultures. In the following section, some alternative methods of translation are 
suggested to overcome the comparability problern of cross-cultural studies. 
1.4.3.2.1.2. The bilingual approach, in which the bilingual takes the same test, or different groups 
take different halves of a test in two languages that they know. Items yielding different responses, or 
differing frequency of responses, can be easily identified. The advantage of the technique is its 
precision and that it can be analysed with complex statistics and the concepts tested with split half 
assessment. The disadvantage is that the research instrument is being developed using responses from 
an atypical group of bilingual people. 
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1.4.3.2.1.3. The committee approach, in which a group of bilinguals translates from the source to the 
target language. The mistakes of one member can be detected by others on the committee. The 
weakness of the method is that committee members may be uncritical of one another (Brislin, 1980). 
1.4.3.2.1.4. Pre-test procedure. After a translation is completed it should be field tested to ensure that 
people will comprehend all material to which they will be expected to respond. There is no weakness 
per se with this method. Indeed, all translated material should be field tested (Brislin, 1980). 
1.4.3.2.1.5. Procedure of decentralisation. The results of the decentering procedure can be related to 
ernics and etics. Using the decentering approach, etic concepts would be those that 'survive' the 
translation / back translation procedure since the terms would have to exist in both languages if the 
concepts are to survive. Emic concepts would be those that are lost (like 'gossip' and 'daydreaming'), 
since after a concept is described in one language, losing it means that no equivalent could easily be 
found in the other language(s). Etic and ernic concepts would then be interrelated through statistical 
techniques described earlier in this chapter (Brislin, 1980). 
Decentralisation can be done in two ways. Using the back translation procedure several times is one 
way but the other one, suggested by Triandis (1980) to support his approach of combined ernic-etic, is 
to investigate the cultures separately. Therefore the instruments are developed simultaneously to test the 
same concept with different materials and no translation or back translation procedures are involved. 
But the approach involves complex multivariate statistics and the reliability of the results has been 
criticised by others (Brislin, 1980; Beny, 1992). 
1.4.3.3. Metric Equivalence 
"Metric equivalence exists when the psychometric properties of the two (or more) sets of data from two 
(or more) cultural groups exhibit essentially the same coherence or structure" (Beny, 1980). For this 
reason two lines of argument have been developed: subsystem validation and scalar equivalence. 
Subsystem validation (Robert and Sutton-Smith, 1962) needs statistical relationships to remain fairly 
constant among independent and dependent variables, no matter if the variance available is used intra-
culturally or cross-culturally. This first argument is mainly that covariation among variables should be 
stable regardless of the source of the variation. A second argument is that statistical relationships 
among dependent variables should be pattemed similarly in two or more cultural groups before 
comparisons can be made. This argument attempts to demonstrate scalar equivalence (Vande Vijver & 
Poortinga, 1982; Irvine & Carroll, 1980). This can be demonstrated by similarity in the correlation 
matrices (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1982) or by common factor structures (Irvine, 1966, cited in 
Beny, 1992). In both cases, it requires behavioural measurements (observations, test data, etc.) to be 
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structured in similar ways within groups before comparisons across groups are allowed. Unlike 
functional and conceptual equivalency, metric equivalence can usually be established only after the data 
have been collected and analysed. This can be done in two ways. One is formulated by Vande Vijver 
& Poortinga (1982) and is called scalar equivalence and the other is formulated by Hui (1982) and is 
called item equivalence. 
1.4.3.3.1. Scalar Equivalence 
Van de Vijver & Poortinga's (1982) scalar equivalence can be demonstrated by the similarity in 
correlation matrices or by common factor structures. Both these cases require behavioural 
measurements (observations, test data etc.) to be structured in similar ways within groups before 
comparison across groups is allowed. This is done in the second part this thesis. 
1.4.3.3.2. Item Equivalence 
Item equivalence is a more detailed statistical investigation of the scale with Item Response theory 
(friandis & Hui, 1987). Using this theory it is possible to detect items which function differently in the 
two cultures. This can be done by comparing Item Characteristics Curves of each sample. This 
comparison is called Differential Item Functioning (Holland & Weiner, 1993; Hambleton, 
Swaminathan & Rogers, 1991, de Gruijter & Van der Kamp, 1984). 
In summary, comparability is a prerequisite for valid comparison; it may be constructed either by 
adopting universals (etics) from other disciplines (e.g. social anthropology or linguistics) or by 
demonstrating the equivalence of psychological concepts and data across groups. The latter is the one 
we adopted in this research. Which ever method is adopted to test the equivalence of psychological 
concepts, either Berry's "Derived Etic" or Triandis' "Combined Ernic and Etic", it is important to 
remember that cross-cultural studies have two different levels to be investigated, the ernic at a local 
level and the etic at a universal level. 
1.4.3. Applications of equivalence to this study: 
In our research, Brislin's (1980) suggestions for translation and back translation have been carried out, 
but instead of aiming at the decentralisation of items we work on each item individually in the target 
language to make sure the connotative as well as denotative meanings of items are the same for each 
culture. So, instead of decentering items, they have been the kept the same in the original questionnaire 
(as much as possible) but changed in the target language in terms of culture specific expressions. For 
example, in English the meaning of "homework" is functionally different from Turkish. In Turkish it 
refers to specific tasks given by the teacher for marking but not to all other preparation they do for 
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class. Therefore, in Turkish all uses of "homework" in the items have been changed to "all your school 
work at home". 
In the psychome1ric literature there are three theories used to test the quality of measurement. These are 
Classical, Generalizability and Item Response theories. Classical theory is the one most widely used. 
The information gathered by this theory includes item difficulty, item discrimination, reliability and 
validity. It includes the use of factor analysis. GeneraJizability theory detects biases in the 
administration of a test. It can test for different sources of variability at the same time. For example it 
can test for the effects of different occasions of test administration and the use of different forms. Item 
response theory is able to test item difficulty and discrimination for each item independently from the 
rest of the items in the same scale using likelihood models. The parameters estimated from this analysis 
are more sophisticated than classical analysis and, to a certain extent, generalizability analysis. 
Usually one of these psychometric analyses is used to test cross-cultural equivalence. For example, 
conceptual equivalence (item fidelity) can be tested by generalizability, classical or item response 
theory approaches with a bilingual sample. Metric equivalence can be tested by generalizability theory 
(Berry et al., 1992; Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1982) and classical theory. Scalar equivalence can be 
tested by factor analysis (Poortinga & Van de Vijver, 1987). Item equivalence can be tested by item 
response theory (Hulin, Drasgow & Komocar, 1982). Unfortunately, although these methods are 
acknowledged in the literature, they are not used very often to test cross-cultural equivalence or to 
detect biases because they are not very cost effective. They all need a preliminary investigation and 
extra statistical analysis. 
In this study all the major psychometric techniques are used for the cross-cultural comparison. But 
instead of making an early decision as to which method would be most useful for a particular aim, the 
three methods are compared against each other in terms of the quality of information gathered and the 
cost effectiveness (e.g. practicality, availability of the statistical packages etc.) as well. 
Recommendation will then be made. 
In part one, the conceptual equivalence of the comparison is tested by three psychometric methods 
(Genera1izability, classical, IRT). For this part of the study bilingual Turkish pupils were used to test 
item fidelities. Then the similarity and the efficiency of the results are discussed to make decisions on 
the item fidelities of the measures used. 
In part two, metric equivalence and item equivalence are tested with classical theory and IRT. The 
validity of structure is also tested by exploratory factor analysis. For this part, counterbalanced Turkish 
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and English samples were used. At the end of this part the methods are used to draw a derived etic 
from both cultures samples. 
Finally, in part three, the two culture's samples are compared on the basis of derived etic items and the 
relationships between variables identified between and within cultures with univariate (ANOV A) and 
multivariate (Canonical correlation, regression analysis) statistics. 
1.5. THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: The Turkish and English educational System 
1.5.1.Ove~ew 
In this section the author would like to give some information about the Turkish and English secondary 
education system in which the research took place. Although the study did not directly investigate any 
educational variable the hypotheses were made on the basis of the adolescent education setting and 
their experiences in the school related to perceived academic achievement. Therefore it is important to 
explain what kinds of educational legislation and school setting these adolescents are in. 
1.5.2. Current Provisions for Education 
1.5.2.1. Present structure and organisation of the English and Turkish Education System: 
1.5.2.1.1.English: 
In the United Kingdom schooling is compulsory between at the age of 5 and 16 and many pupils stay 
at the school longer than the minimum leaving age. Secondary school education starts around the age 
of 11 after primary school education. Then, around the age of 16, pupils sit the GCSE exam. After this 
students are free to stay in the schools to do their A levels or alternatively leave the school and to go to 
colleges to do their A levels which gives them a sense of belonging to the "real world". Colleges also 
give opportunities to mature students to do their A levels and some vocational courses as well. Average 
class size is usually 35 though this depends on the subject and level. Most of the subjects are taught in 
skill based groups within the class (e.g. maths). There are a total of 7368 secondary schools in the 
United Kingdom. This includes independent schools. The breakdown figures for the four countries are: 
England 6259, Wales 298, Scotland 552, Northern Ireland 259. 
1.5.2.1.2. Turkish: 
In Turkey schooling is compulsory between the ages of 7 and 11 but in reality many pupils start 
education earlier than age 7 and stay in education after 11. Particularly in the cities, nursery education 
starts around the age of three. After age 11 the majority of students continue their education to access 
universities later on. Secondary education starts at the age of 11 and finishes around the age of 17. But 
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if the student does not pass all the subjects they took during the year they are not allowed to proceed to 
the next stage. Instead they are asked to sit the exams again the next year or re-attend the same subjects 
until they are successful in all subjects. Students have to finish secondaIy school before they are 
allowed to take a university central exam to go to university. 
There is a significant drop in the number of students from lower secondaIy school education (age 11 to 
14) to the upper level but in recent years because of the high unemployment these drop out numbers 
have decreased and the number of students attending the upper level (lise) secondaIy school education 
has increased. This increase is also because of the increase in the young population in Turkey during 
the last 10-20 years (Gokce, 1996). Because of the limited number of available places in university, 
application to universities is regulated by a central organisation located in capital city of Ankara This 
centre is called OSYM (Ogrenci Seyme ve Yerlestirme Merkezi - The centre of student selection and 
location). The centre organises the entrance exams (in two levels) and then locates the students 
according to their exam results. The choice of department and university is based on the availability of 
places for the particular degree course. Only 30% of the student get places at university and another 
40% get places in Open University. 
Average class size in secondaIy schools is 50 and this size is smaller if the school is privately run 
(around 30-40). Most of the subjects are taught in a whole class environment and this style applies to 
almost all the main subjects (e.g. maths, language, geography etc.) but not to subjects like music. 
There are 4187 secondaIy schools in Turkey. These include the private schools (Toker, 1992; 
Mihcioglu, 1989). The breakdown figures of the schools for the regions are: Mannara 908, Ege 587, 
Mid-Anatolia 819, Blacksea 673, Mediterranean (the south) 448, South-East Anatolia 214, and East 
Anatolia 383. 
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1.5.2.2. Types of schools 
1.5.2.2.1. In England: 
We can put schools in u.K. into three categories: publicly funded schools, independent schools and 
city technology colleges. Publicly funded schools are funded via local authorities on the basis of their 
student numbers. One third of these schools are supported by Christian charities (Anglican or Catholic). 
Some of these schools have recently (1990) had an opportunity to become independent from local 
authorities and are directly funded by central governing (government) bodies. These call themselves 
grant-maintained schools. These schools are funded on the basis of their success rather that the number 
of the students. Independent schools, although they get some support from government, are privately 
run. Finally the city technology colleges are independently established outside of the main curriculum 
and funded partly by the private sector to educate students mainly in technical subjects (Brown, 
Coupland & Davies, 1993). 
1.5.2.2.2. In Turkey: 
We can put the schools in Turkey in three categories: publicly funded schools, private schools and 
vocational schools which are also publicly funded. Publicly funded schools account for the majority of 
secondary schools in Turkey and are funded directly by central government although managed by local 
authorities. Only 8.4% of publicly funded schools are seminary (Islamic) schools. They follow the 
national curriculum but also emphasise religious values. Although private schools get some funds from 
the government they are privately run. The vocational colleges are established within the state education 
system and students graduate with some form of vocational qualification at the end of standard 
secondary school education (6 years) or with one extra year. Some of these colleges are training 
schools for primary school teachers, some others are technical schools for technical subjects. When 
these colleges were established (1950-60) the idea was to give students a chance to qualify enough to 
start work around the age of 18. The rule in the past was that students who attend specific vocational 
schools could only apply for a related degree at university but now this rule has been changed to one of 
equal rights for all secondary schoolleavers to apply for any degree subject at university. Therefore the 
nature of the vocational schools has changed. 
1.5.3. The importance of school success in Turkish society. 
Although Turkey is a fairly industrialised country, 50% of the population live in villages and earn a 
living by agriculture. On the other hand, because of complicated government policy and individual 
needs, there are large numbers of internal immigrants from villages to cities. The difficult, ruthless 
circumstances in cities seem to have encouraged academic achievement. It is a well-known fact in 
Turkey that not only middle class families but also working class families are highly motivated and 
attach a high value to education. 
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1.5.4. Conclusion: Similarities and Differences Between English and Turkish Education 
Systems. 
Both the secondary education systems have a similar school structure (e.g. public and private and 
vocational schools) but the funding system seems relatively different. In the UK it seems that the 
system is more locally organised, therefore the independence of schools is greater. For example 
vocational technical colleges are almost completely independent from the public system but in Turkey 
vocational schools are supported by public funds. 
Religious organisations have some fonn of influence in education in both countries. It seems more of 
the schools in Britain are run or supported by religious (seminary) organisations (1/3 of public schools) 
and they follow the national curriculum. The ratio of religious (seminary) school is smaller in Turkey 
(8.4%) and they also follow the national curriculum, but these schools are more religious than their 
English counterparts and they are usually located in small cities or towns. 
1.6. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the social antecedents of perceiVed control, especially cultural differences. The 
antecedents considered are culture, religion (embedded in the culture), religiosity, authoritarianism, 
socio-economic status and gender. Except for the first two, this set of variables are not directly culture 
dependent, therefore the investigation of them will be done both within and between cultures. 
The assumption behind these comparisons is the cross-cultural comparability of the concepts and their 
metric equivalencies. These assumptions have been tested by three different psychometric techniques 
namely, generalizability, classical item analysis and item response theory. Each technique is used to test 
the translation equivalency and similarities between cultures in tenns of reliability of measurement. 
Three sets of hypotheses were made to test a) the translation and conceptual equivalency of the scales, 
b) the metric equivalency (derived etic) and finally c) the differences between and within cultures. 
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Translation equivalency: 
PART I 
The translation equivalency of scales in cross-cultural studies historically has been tested with classical 
psychometric methods, but these techniques have problems because of the difficulties of comparing the 
results statistically (Ferguson, 1959; Ferguson & Tokane, 1989). Despite these problems there are still 
good practical reasons to use these techniques. They are the most widely used psychometric techniques 
in psychology so far. It is possible to improve the use of classical item analysis using Ferguson's (1959) 
significance test for the differences between correlation values. This is easy to calculate. 
The Generalizability technique (mainly using GENOVA) is the second suggested psychometric 
technique to test for translation fidelity and cross-cultural comparisons (poortinga & Vande Vijver, 
1987). This technique is able to test for more than one error source. Generalizability theory uses 
analysis of variance to detect differences under different circumstances of testing e.g. different 
language forms or different instructions. It uses the nested design of ANOV A. 
The third psychometric technique is called Item Response theory or Latent Trait theory. It uses an 
iterative algorithm to predict the best fitting model to given responses. This test allows us to compare 
item characteristic curves and uses the X2 test to detect similarities and differences on the same item in 
different language forms and different samples. Because of the sophistication of the statistics this test 
has became widely used in cross-cultural studies. The future of this technique is greater then others. On 
the other hand the technique is based on highly sophisticated statistical analyses and the computer 
programs are made for a very specific purpose. For example the programs called BICAL, PML, 
RASCAL, BILOG and RlDA are only able to deal with single parameter data with one correct 
response point. Others such as ASCAL and LOGIST are able to deal with up to three parameters and 
are able to take into account item difficulties and estimated responses as well (Hambleton, 
Swaminathan, Rogers, 1991). The programme called MULTlLOG can also be used on rating scales 
(Thissen, 1991; Thissen & Steinberg, 1984). 
These three techniques compensate for each others weaknesses and so improve our measurement 
strategies in cross-cultural studies. Therefore, it is important to explore them from a specific research 
point of view and adopt the most efficient and least costly technique for future use. This will be one of 
the major considerations of this thesis. Van de Vijver and Hambleton (1996) published some practical 
guidelines for the cross-cultural psychologist, taking into account the inquiry of the futemational Test 
Commission (XXV futemational Psychology Conference in Madrid, 1994), which encouraged the 
researcher to use psychometric criteria to test cross-cultural equivalence. They specifically encourage 
the use ofItem Response Theory. 
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Please note that the three different psychometric techniques have been used twice, and each time they 
were used to test different hypotheses. These techniques were used :first to investigate the differences 
between language fonns in the same bilingual sample and second to investigate the differences between 
cultures in two monolingual samples. 
Ia) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish translated version of 
the same items of CNSIE scores when answered by Turkish bilingual students in various orders. 
I b) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish translated version of 
the same items ofMASLOC scores when answered by Turkish bilingual students in various orders. 
Ic) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish translated version of 
the same items of CAMI scores when answered by Turkish bilingual students in various orders. 
Id) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish translated version of 
the same items of Religiosity Scale for Youth scores when answered by Turkish bilingual students in 
various orders. 
Ie) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish translated version of 
the same items of Authoritarianism (F-Scale) scores when answered by Turkish bilingual students in 
various orders. 
Comparability of metric equivalency (Derived Etic) 
Partn 
There are several possible ways of testing conceptual and metric equivalency of cross-cultural methods 
in psychology. One compares responses from one culture to another by item analysis, and the second 
looks at the factorial structure of the test in the two cultures. If the items are loaded on the same factors 
in both cultures this can be intetpreted as structural (conceptual) equivalence. Item analysis can be done 
the classical way or by item characteristic curves which are part of Item Response (latent trait) theory. 
Both methods are used to back up each other and to compare the utilities of both for future studies. On 
this occasion Item Characteristics Curves (ICC's) are used for judgements by eye, but the main 
decisions about scales are made on the basis of X2 analysis of the comparisons between ICC in both 
samples. 
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2a) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples on CNSIE's 
scores at the item level. If there are any differences between the English and the Turkish samples they 
will be due to cultural differences. 
2aa) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples 
on CNSIE's factorial structure. 
2aaa) There will be no differences between item characteristic curves of CNSIE's scores 
for the English and the Turkish samples. 
2b) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples on 
MASLOC's scores at the item level. 
2bb) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples 
on MASLOC's factorial structure. 
2bbb) There will be no differences between item characteristic curves of MASLOC's scores 
for English and Turkish samples. 
2c) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples on CAMI's 
subscale scores at the item level. 
2cc) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples 
on CAMI's sub scales factorial structure. 
2ccc) There will be no differences between item characteristic curves of CAMI's items for 
the English and the Turkish samples. 
2d) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples on Religiosity 
for Youth's scores at the item level. 
2dd) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples 
on Religiosity for Youth's factorial structure. 
2ddd) There will be no differences between item characteristic curves of Religiosity for 
Youth's scores for the English and the Turkish samples. 
2e) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples on Religiosity 
for Youth's scores at the item level. 
2ee) There will be no significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples 
on Authoritarianism (F-Scale) scores factorial structure. 
2eee) There will be no differences between item characteristic curves of Authoritarianism 
(F-Scale)'s scores for the English and the Turkish samples. 
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Main Hypotheses: Between and within subjects differences in both cultures. 
Part ill 
This part of the hypothesis refers to differences between the two cultmes on three sets of perceived 
control scales and on Religiosity and Authoritarianism. 
3a) There will be significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples' CNSIE scores. 
3aa) Turkish schools children CNSIE scores will be significantly more external then their 
English counterparts. 
3b) There will be significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples' MASLOC 
scores. 
3bb) Turkish schools children MASLOC scores will be significantly more external then their 
English counterparts. 
3c) There will be significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples' CAM! subscale 
scores. 
3cc) Turkish schools children CAM! subsca1es' scores will be significantly more external 
then their English counterparts. 
3d) There will be significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples' Religiosity for 
Youth scores. 
3dd) Turkish schools children Religiosity for Youth scores will be significantly more religious 
then their English counterparts. 
3e) There will be significant differences between the English and the Turkish samples' Authoritarianism 
(F-Scale) scores. 
3ee) Turkish schools children Authoritarianism (F-Scale) scores will be significantly more 
authoritarian then their English counterparts. 
IntroductionlHypotheses 
Another set of hypotheses refers to the effects of cultme and the individual variables of religion, 
religiosity, authoritarianism, SES and gender on the three sets of perceived control scales. The first 
assumption is that individuals' perceptions about outcomes will depend on their cultme because of 
their different experiences. Additionally, these individual experiences will also be related to their 
social environment and individual beliefs. 
4a) In Western cultmes people are more likely to be internal than in Eastern cultmes because they 
may perceive more causal links between their actions and outcomes (Lefcourt, 1991). In Eastern 
cultmes people perceive or believe that they have less control on outcomes so they build fewer 
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expectations of affecting outcomes. They believe that environmental factors, powerful others, luck 
and fate are more likely to determine or affect outcomes than their own actions. Therefore, we 
expect the English sample to be more internal than the Turkish sample. 
4b) Age, gender and socio-economic status affect perceived control. When a person gets older 
perceived control increases (Findley & Cooper, 1983; Skinner & Chapman, 1987; Skinner, 1990). 
Boys are more likely to be internal than girls because of different, gender related, social 
experiences (Hui, 1982; Jayaratne & Ivey, 1983; Mwamwenda, 1995). A working class 
background may mean that a person has less experience of competence and is therefore less likely 
to develop greater perceived control. 
4c) It may be that people with different religious backgrounds have different perceptions about the 
relationship between behaviour and outcomes. People who are brought up in a Christian culture 
may be more internal than Muslims because the Muslim religion is more fatalist (Asonibare, 
1986). Therefore we expect the Christian sample to be more internal than the Muslim sample 
4d) It is expected that there will be a relationship between religiosity level and perception of 
control and that people who score high on religiosity the scale will score more external on the 
perceived control scales. Although the evidence on this issue is conflicting (Lesser & Painser, 
1985; Gabbard, Howard & Tageson, 1986; Friederberg & Friederberg, 1985), we expect religious 
people to believe more in external causes. Some religions, such as Christianity and Islam, 
encourage individuals to take initiatives about their life. However, because of the belief in God 
and HisIHer influence on their lives, religious people may be more likely to explain outcomes in 
terms of external factors such as fate and God. 
4e) Similar to religiosity, we expect that there will be a relationship between authoritarianism and 
perceived control. We expect authoritarians to be more external because they are more likely to 
explain outcomes in terms of external factors, mainly powerful others. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
2.1. OVERVIEW 
In this chapter we will present the three different parts of the research methodology used in this 
research. The first and second parts are about the adaptation of the scales for use in two languages 
(English and Turkish). The third part is about comparing two cultures. 
The purpose of the first part of this research is to establish conceptual equivalence for the scales used. 
Therefore a bilingual Turkish sample was used to test experimentally the validity of the translation 
(Brislin, 1980; Berry et al., 1992). This may not be successful if only the back translation method is 
used because there are times that translation does not preserve the actual meaning. The denotational and 
connotational meaning of a word can be different from one culture to another. Therefore, using 
additional experimental methods to back translation, it will be possible to detect changes in the 
meaning of the words. For example democracy has denotationally the same meaning in English and 
Russian but the connotational meaning may be completely different Three psychometric methods 
(Generalizability, Classical, Item Response) will be used to test translation equivalence and then the 
information gathered from each of the methods compared in terms of consistency and cost. If any 
differences are detected between forms this will be due to lack of translation equivalence or other 
biases, which can then be further investigated. 
The main purpose of part two is to establish a common ground for comparing the two cultures. This 
will help us to draw a derived etic from Berry's iterative method of ernic-etic comparability (Berry, 
1982; Berry et al., 1992). To succeed in this we have to apply metric equivalence which, in the recent 
literature, is divided into scalar and item equivalence. We will be adapting the item equivalence 
approach to fulfil the needs of comparability. We believe that without item comparability there will be 
no actual compatibility between measurement in the two cultures. The items of the scales were tested in 
both cultures and the differences in the variances were detected with classical and modem item 
analysis. The hypothesis is that there may be some differences between responses to the same items in 
the two cultures due to cultural differences between them. The items, which show differences will be 
considered as ernic items which are culture specific. 
The purpose of the third part of the study is to test if there are any differences between the two cultures 
after the derived etic of the two has been detected. In this part the main hypothesis of the study will be 
tested to identify the antecedents of perceived control in both cultures. To do this several univariate 
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(ANOV A) and multivariate tests (Canonical correlation and multiple regression) will be used to test 
similarity-relationships and differences on perceived control due to cultural and other social variables. 
2.2. INSTRUMENTS 
We used five different scales: a) the Control, Means-Ends and Agency Beliefs Scale (Skinner, 
Chapman, Baltes, 1988); b) the Nowicki-Strickland Internal-External Scale for Children (Nowicki and 
Strickland, 1973); c) the Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale (palenzuela, 
1988); d) the Religiosity in Youth Scale (Rohrbaugh and Jessor, 1976); and e) Authoritarianism Scale, 
California F Scale (60-65 Form) (Adorno et al., 1950; Robinson et al., 1992). These questionnaires 
were not all written in English and have not always been tested in English speaking countries. But 
regardless of in which language they were first developed they were also published in English. For 
example CAMl was simultaneously developed in German and English and has been tested in both 
cultures (Skinner et al., 1988). CNSIE and Religiosity for Youth was developed in the USA (Nowicki-
Strickland, 1973; Rohrbaugh and Jessor, 1976). The Authoritarianism scale has been widely used in 
many different languages and countries (Christie, 1991). MASLOC was developed in Spain but has not 
been used in English speaking countries (palenzuela, 1988). 
2.2.1. Several criteria were used for the selection of these scales: 
Several criteria were used for the selection of instruments. These were: a. suitability for the age range of 
the research sample, b. suitability to the life experiences of the research sample, c. multicultural 
applicability of the scales, d. theoretical foundations of the scale, especially important for the perceived 
control scales. For each scale there were additional considerations. For example, for the religiosity scale 
it was important that the scale is not religion specific and for the authoritarianism scale that it is general 
to all life events rather than specific to politics (Stogner, 1936; Levinson, Sanford, 1944, cited in 
Christie, 1991) or economics (Newcombe, 1943, cited in Christie, 1991). Cultural sensitivity was 
another variable which taken into account. 
a Age range was one of the most important variables taken into account in selection of the scales. They 
needed to be applicable to teenagers and adolescents. On some occasions, however, scales for young 
adults were used because other scales were unavailable. 
CAMl was originally developed for pupil 5-14 year olds so some of the staternents were adjusted to 
make it applicable to 14 to 18 year old pupils in secondary schools. 
CANSIE was developed for 12 to 18 year olds. 
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MASLOC was developed and used with college students who are slightly older than our sample, but 
because the items were selected on the basis of academic experiences they are also applicable to 
secondary school children. 
The Religiosity Scale has just been developed for secondary schools pupils and has been used in youth 
projects. 
The Authoritarianism scale was developed for adults and has been used in many different samples, 
including young adults. 
b. Suitability to the life expenences of the research sample: Except for the religiosity and 
authoritarianism scales all other scales' items are related to school experiences and so suitable to the life 
experiences of our sample who were all attending secondary school. The religiosity and 
authoritarianism scales are general enough to be applicable to this sample. 
c. Multi cultural applicability of the scales: Each of the scales used in this study were developed for the 
European and North American traditions and have been used in more than one culture. They therefore 
seem to be suitable to this study. 
CAM! was used in three different cultures (Gennan, Canadian, American) when it was developed. 
Since then it has been translated into two more languages (Polish and Russian). 
CANSlE is another very widely used scale. It has been translated into many languages e.g. Polish, 
Turkish and Greek (Dyal, 1984). 
MASLOC was developed in Spain. 
The Religiosity scale was developed in North America to be used in multicultural schools and 
communities so it is not connected to any specific culture or religion. 
The Authoritarianism scale has been used in many different languages and countries e.g. Gennan, 
North American, Turkish, Greek, Dutch, Norwegian, fudian etc. 
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d. The theoretical foundations of the scales were particularly important for the perceived control scales. 
Because the concept of locus of control has evolved towards perceived control, the measurement of the 
concept has also changed over the years. However, the changes in theory have not always been quickly 
reflected in measurement. An example is Rotter's (1966) scale. Although he himself pointed out 
problems with the concept, his original scale is the most widely used, even today. Furnham and Steel 
(1993) listed the problems related to the concept and its measurement such as reinforcement value, 
domain specificity, defensive externality, good and bad dichotomy, single or multiple belief systems 
(e.g. self-others), and the contribution of other concepts, such as cause, responsibility versus blame and 
stability versus temporability, to the measurement. 
One problem that is is frequently addressed in the literature is multidimensionality. Rotter (1970) 
agreed that his scale is meant to be unidimensional but it is actually multidimensional (Furnham and 
Steele, 1993). As a result recent studies have tried to develop new mutidimensional LOC scales. 
Levenson's (1981) Internal, Chance and Powerful Others scale is one of the first examples of this. 
Domain specificity, like multidimensionality, is another major variable, which is taken into account 
nowadays. The new scales have started taking into account possible differences in life experiences, so 
many recent LOC scales tend to be subject specific e.g. school related (Lefcourt, 1980; Skinner et al., 
1988), health related (Wallston, Wallston & De Vellis, 1978), and work related etc. 
CAMI (age 7-14 yrs. old) 
The Control, Means-Ends and Agency scales were chosen because they are one of the most recently 
developed LOC scales which represent new theories. Therefore they are domain specific (school 
related) and multidimensional (effort, ability, powerful others etc). 
CANSlE (Age 12 to 18 yrs. old) 
This is general and based on Rotter's conceptualization of Locus of Control. It doesn't discriminate any 
specific factor related to Internal or Extemallocus of control. Items represent various life experiences 
of children in the age range in school, sport and at home. 
71 
MASLOC (18 - 21 yrs. old) 
This is multi dimensional and domain specific. It is multi dimensional because it measures three 
different dimensions of perceived control (internal, helplessness and luck). It is also based on a new 
integrated model ofLOC (Palenzuela, 1988). It is domain specific because all of the items are related 
to academic experiences. 
2.2.2. Psychometric Characteristic of the Instruments: 
In this part, we describe the scales in terms of their psychometric characteristics. The reliability and 
validity of the scales in the literature will be given. 
2.2.2.1. Control, Means-ends, and Agency Beliefs - CAMI (Skinner, Chapman & Baltes, 1988). 
Conceptually this scale was developed from the Action-theory perspective which suggest a distinction 
between Control, Mean-Ends and Agency beliefs. This scale was constructed using these three different 
kinds of belief for school related subjects. The age range is 7 to 12 years old. Item analyses were done 
for German and US populations at the same time. These three belief systems are related schematically 
as follows: 
Figure 2.2.2.1: Two ways deterministic reciprocal model of action theory. 
MEANS 
Agency Belief Means-Ends Belief 
AGENT------------------------------------------------------------------------7> ENDS 
Control Belief 
Control beliefs refer to beliefs about the relationship between the agent and a desired outcome or class 
of outcomes (the ends). They are defined as the individual's (agent's) expectancies about the extent to 
which he or she can obtain desired outcomes, with no explicit reference to the means used. 
Means-Ends beliefs refer to beliefs about the relationship between the means and the ends. They are 
defined as an individual's expectancies about the extent to which a certain class of potential courses are 
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effective in producing desired outcomes or ends. Agency beliefs refer to beliefs about the relationship 
between the agent and certain potential means. They are defined as an individual's expectancies about 
the extent to which he or she possesses these means. 
CAM! was developed as a 64 item questionnaire for children between seven and twelve years old 
(Skinner et al., 1988; Chapman, Skinner & Baltes, 1990). The current version of 10 subscales refers to 
domains of school perfOImance: Control beliefs (8 items); Means-Ends beliefs for Effort (8 items), for 
Attributes (8 items), for Powerful Others (8 items), for Luck (8 items), and for Unknown Causes (8 
items); Agency beliefs for Effort (4 items), for Attributes (4 items), for Powerful Others (4 items), and 
for Luck (4 items). The Control and Means-Ends beliefs subscales contain twice as many items as the 
Agency scales because these two scales include an equal number of items which do not specifY 
outcomes. The items assessing them do not include outcome valences. Skinner et al. (1988) carried out 
factor analysis and reliability and Validity studies for the scale. 
Factor analysis: When the original study used factor analysis its aim was to test "whether the structure 
of children's responses would correspond to the three hypothesised sets of beliefs, namely Control, 
Means-Ends and Agency" (Skinner, Baltes and Chapman, 1988). To do this they ran a separate factor 
analysis for each domain of perceived control (i.e. Luck, Attribute, Effort, Powerful Others, Unknown 
Factors), expecting to come out with three factors each time which would represent the three sets of 
beliefs. In our study we are interested in whether these three sets of beliefs will emerge in our Turkish 
and English samples. Considering that the scale has already been tested in the German and American 
cultures simultaneously we at least expect to find a similar factor structure in the English sample. 
Reliability study: As indicated by split-half reliabilities and intemal consistencies, all of the scales have 
moderate to high reliability (average M= .76). Although adequate, the consistencies are lower for 
Means-Ends for Powerful Others and for four items of the Agency subscales. The test-retest 
correlations for all samples were moderate (p< .001, min= .37, max= .81) in a nine week period. 
Concurrent validity: Correlations were with the Bialer Locus of Control scale (Bialer, 1961) and the 
Nowicki-Strickland Internal-External Scale for Children (Nowicki-Strickland, 1973). Only the CAM! 
Means-Ends subscales were highly correlated with the Bialer LOC and CANSIE scales (M= .24) but 
the Control beliefs and Agency beliefs subscales were not. This means that the CAMl overlaps with 
some other measures of control-related beliefs (Means-Ends beliefs) but also contains a unique part 
(e.g. Control and Agency beliefs) (Skinner et al., 1988). 
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Scoring: All the subscales were scored so that high scores represented external perceived control and 
low scores internal perceived control. See appendix A for the English and the Turkish version of the 
Scale. 
2.2.2.2. Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale for Children - CNSIE (Nowicki & 
Strickland, 1973) 
In this scale, there are 40 items in yes/no fonnat and a large number of the items are based on Rotter's 
I-E scale (1966). This scale has been found reliable and valid in many studies because it has been 
translated into more than a dozen languages and also adapted to some of thern. The age range is 9 to 18 
years old. 
Factor analysis: The scale was intended to be unidimensional. Factor analysis supports this. One main 
factor explains at least one-third of the variance. It is usually called "general helplessness" (Lefcourt, 
1991). 
Reliability: Reliability studies have shown that the internal consistency of the scale is between .60 and 
.88 (Lefcourt, 1991). 
Concurrent validity: The correlation with the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire 
(IAR) is significant (r= AI). Also, CNSIE scores were not related to social desirability or the gender of 
the subject. Demographic variables were related to CNSIE in an atternpt to fill in the construct validity 
picture. For instance, it was expected and found that externality was more common among children in 
the lower socio-economic groups and among black and brown children in the USA. 
Scoring: All the subscales were scored so that high scores represented external perceived control and 
low scores internal. See appendix A for the English and the Turkish version of the Scale. 
2.2.2.3. Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale (palenzuela, 1988). 
The development of this scale began in the 1970's and was aimed at investigating psychological 
constructs related to the psychology of control (Langer, 1982). The scale was developed in Spain. The 
age range is adolescent and young adult. Palenzuela tried to separate the locus of control concept from 
its cognate and related concepts because he thought that they were muddled and the cause of 
conceptual. confusion. 
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Factor analysis: The early version of this scale (Palenzuela, 1984) contained five dimensions: 
Internality, luck, external agent, unresponsive environment and helplessness. In the last version the 
factors were reduced to three using factor rotations: Internality or Contingency, Helplessness or 
non-contingency and Luck or Chance. Each of these dimensions is represented in three separate 
subscales of 5 items, each with a 9 point Likert format. 
Reliability: The internal consistencies are 0.81 for Internality, 0.82 for Helplessness and 0.84 for Luck 
(Cronbach's alpha coefficient). There were strong correlations between Intemality and Helplessness and 
between Helplessness and Luck, which allows one to speak in terms of a single construct underlying all 
of them. 
Construct validity: The scale has shown strong construct and predictive validity. The construct validity 
results showed that the Luck scale was positively related to the Helplessness scale. Also, that the 
Internality subscale was related to Rosenbaum's Self Control scale but the two other subscales 
(Helplessness and Luck) were not (palenzuela, 1988). This could again be interpreted as evidence of 
the independence of the dimensions of Internality and Luck At the same time, while internal control 
may be related to self control they are clearly independent constructs. 
Scoring: All the subscales were scored so that high scores represented external perceiVed control and 
low scores intemal. See appendix A for the English and the Turkish version of the Scale. 
2.2.2.4. Religiosity in Youth (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1976). 
This scale was developed by Rohrbaugh and Jessor in 1976 as a part of a longitudinal research project 
which was called "The Socialization of Problem Behaviour in Youth". The age range is middle 
childhood and adolescence. 
The Religiosity questionnaire included 8 questions which represented four operational dimensions: (a) 
Ritual religiosity ("How often did you attended religious services during the past year?"), (b) 
Consequential religiosity ("When you have a serious personal problem how often do you take advice or 
teaching into consideration?"), ( c) Ideological religiosity ("Which of the following statements comes 
closest to your belief about God?", from a) "I am sure that God really exists and that He is active in my 
life." to e) "I don't believe in a personal God or in a higher power.") and (d) Experimental religiosity 
("During the past year, how often have you experienced a feeling of religious reverence or devotion?"). 
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Reliability: Cronbach's alpha was .90 and the response variance was broad with an almost eight point 
variation in total scores. Scoring for each item varied from 0 to 4, with high scores representing greater 
religiosity. 
Validity studies: Four different approaches were used to establish the validity of the religiosity 
measure. Known-groups validity was investigated by age and gender. Females were more religious 
then males and the young more religious the old, so known-group validity was high. For extemal 
validity self reported religiosity and the subscale's scores were highly correlated (.78 to .84). For 
internal Validity the inter-correlation between the four religiosity subscales averaged 0.69. This 
indicates high correlation between the subscales and therefore justifies the validity of the total score. 
The discriminant validity was assessed by examining the relationships of the four subscales to two 
separate measures of the perceived religious environment, social support from peers ( friends) and 
adults (relatives) for religious involvement. The results showed that all four subscales were highly 
correlated with each other and less correlated with perceived religious environment. This was taken as 
evidence for the unidimensionality of the scale. 
Scoring: The scale was scored so that high scores were represented high religiosity. See appendix A 
for the English and the Turkish version of the Scale. 
2.2.2.5. Authoritarianism 'F' Scale 40-45 or 60A form (Adorno et aI., 1950 cited in Christie, 
1991). 
The F scale was designed to measure ethnic prejudice and "prefascist tendencies' simultaneously 
without mentioning members of minority groups or having specific reference to fascist ideology. The 
age range is throughout adulthood. In this study the 40-45 form of Adorno's F-Scale is used. This scale 
contains 30 items scored on a 6 point rating scale and high scores indicate high authoritarianism. 
Reliability: The reliability of this form ranges from 0.81 to 0.97 with a mean of 0.90 (Christie, 1991). 
Validity: In several studies in the literature Authoritarianism was found to be different for individuals 
with the different political orientations. This was the case for the USA, England and the Netherlands 
(Christie & Garcia, 1951; Rokeach, 1960; Meloen & Middendorp, 1988, cited in Christie, 1991). It 
was also found that in some countries (e.g. India) the average scores were higher than in other countries 
(e.g. England) (Bushan, 1969, cited in Christie, 1991). These studies are taken as evidence for the 
conceptual validity of the scale (Christie, 1991). 
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Scoring: High scores represent high authoritarianism. See appendix A for the English and the Turkish 
version of the Scale. 
2.2.3. Review of the English form and Translation of the Scales: 
Although these scales were written in English, except for the F-Scale none of them have been used in 
Britain. For this reason each scale was reviewed before they were given to the English sample. First, the 
English fonns of the scales were given to 13 secondary school students in the 5th form in Hampstead 
State school in London. Students were asked to write down their opinions about each scale and its 
items and then the author approached some of them informally to ask them about these opinions. 
Additionally, several psychologist colleagues were also asked about the scales' suitability to English 
students. As a result of this it was decided to make several changes to the scales. The MASLOC 9 point 
rating scale was reduced to 6 points. All references to "kids" in the CAM! scale were changed to 
"students" (e.g. Item 51 "When kids have problems in school, is it usually because of the teacher?" was 
changed to "When students have problems in school, is it usually because of the teacher?") and all 
references to "smart" changed to "clever" (e.g. Item 40 "Do you think it is better to be smart than to be 
lucky?" changing to "Do you think it is better to be clever than to be lucky?"). 
First each questionnaire was translated into Turkish by the author and checked by another Turkish 
colleague. The validity of this translation was tested using the back-translation technique. This was 
done by a bilingual Turk with a degree in English Literature. This back-translation was compared with 
the original scale and revisions made if necessary. Then the scales were sent to a Turkish linguist for 
review. Lastly, a psychologist who had experience with schools in Turkey reviewed the scales again. 
So after several revisions for better face validity, the final version was obtained. For the purpose of the 
main investigation of cross-cultural comparison some changes were made to both languages fonns 
(details are given later). 
2.3. PART I: METHOD OF THE FIRST STUDY: TRANSLATION/CONCEPTUAL 
EQUIVALENCY 
2.3.1. Overview 
In the first study, we were concemed with the adaptation of the Turkish version of the scales. For this 
reason, it was given to bilingual subjects in Turkey. Four different experimental fonns of the scales 
were created. These were an English form, a Turkish form, a half English/half Turkish form and a half 
Turkish/halfEnglish form. These were given to four different groups of bilingual students. Each group 
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were given two forms on different occasions. The results were analysed using Generalizability theory, 
Classical theory, and Item Response theory and are presented in chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 
2.3.2. Design: Translation Equivalency of the Turkish Form ofthe Scales 
As mentioned above four forms of each scale were used. The first form was the original English scale 
(nForm An) and the second form was the translated Turkish scale ("Form B"). The remaining two 
forms, "Form CIt and "Form D", were split-language scales. Half of the items were in English and the 
other half were in Turkish (see table 2.3.4 in procedure section). 
2.3.3. Sample: Bilingual Sample for Translation Equivalency: 
Two hundred and four bilingual Turkish schoolchildren participated in this study. They were between 
14 and 18 years old. The data were collected from two different secondary schools. One was a state 
school (BomovaAnadolu Lisesi;N = 133), the other was a private school (American College; N = 71). 
See table 2.1. The motivation of the students of the two schools was generally high. In the state school 
the number of subjects in each class was more than in the private school. The quality of the second 
language education in the American College might be better than in the state school. However, students 
in both schools are selected by a central admission examination and may be better educated and of 
above average IQ. In terms of socio-economic background the state school has children from low 
middle class to upper class and the private school from middle to upper class. After one year of 
preparatory English, the majority of courses in both schools are taught in English. 
Table 2.3.3: Composition of the bilingual sample according to School and Gender. 
Bomova Anadolu Lisesi American College Total 
Females 59 53 112 
Males 74 16 90 
Total 133 69 202 
2.3.4. Procedure 
The four forms (A,B,C,D) of the test were administered to four different groups in a counterbalanced 
design. Actually each group was one class of students. Each group responded to two forms of the 
questionnaire, within an interval of approximately two weeks. In this way, each subject responded to 
every item both in English and Turkish. The order of four experimental forms can be seen in detail in 
table 2.3.4. 
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Table 2.3.4: The Order of Performance of Four Experimental Fonns 
GROUP GENDER First testing Second TOTAL 
testing 
Female Male 
I 15 41 A B 56 
IT 32 18 B A 50 
ill 34 9 C D 43 
N 22 31 D C 53 
TOTAL 90 112 202 
A= English Fonn; B= Turkish Form C= Half English-Half Turkish Form; D= Half Turkish-Half English Form. 
2.3.5. Statistical Analysis 
1bree different psychometric approaches, Genera1izability, Classical and Item Response Theory used 
to test translation equivalency. 
2.3.5.1. Generalizability Theory 
Generalizability theory allows assessment of multiple sources of error variance (e.g. times/occasion 
differences as well as forms) therefore it has got some advantages over Classical Theory. 
Generalizability Theory is like Classical Theory because it uses the dependability of the behavioural 
measurement as a statistical theory (Shavelson & Webb, 1991). The statistical test used is ANOV A. 
Because of the design we were able to test the effects of different occasions (first and second) and 
different language forms (A, B, C, D) at once within a univariate ANOV A. The design was an 
Occasions (2) x Forms (4) ANOVA mixed design. 
If the scales had been well translated then the same variables will affect all fonns equally and therefore 
there should not be any differences between occasions and forms. If the items were translated well and 
were meaningful for the Turkish bilingual students then there should be no differences between 
different language forms. Any significant differences between the language forms will be caused by 
poor translation fidelity. It was also expected that there would be a high correlation between the English 
and Turkish Scales scores. High correlation would indicate the equivalence of the English and Turkish 
scales. 
2.3.5.2. Classical Item Analysis-Psychometric Theory 
Classical theory (CT) is known and widely used for testing the psychometric quality of self-report 
measures. It tests the reliability and Validity of the tests used. Because Classical theory can only look at 
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one source of error at a time (e.g. occasions or test-retest but not conditions and fatigue effects etc. 
simultaneously) it has been criticised by Cronbach and his colleagues (1972). In order to test the 
translation fidelity of cross-cultural measures in this research the times/occasions and language forms 
of the questionnaires are made different. Therefore, although it is possible to investigate form 
differences with Classical theory, it is better if it is also confirmed by a more sophisticated 
psychometric analysis. For this reason Generalizability and Item Response Theory (IRT) were also 
used to test item fidelity. 
To use classical item analysis we ignored possible time and form effects and combined data from the 
different conditions. ill the design of the study every subject received every item once in Turkish and 
once in English. The only difference between subjects in different conditions receiving Turkish items is 
how they received them (on one single language form or on two split forms) and when they received 
them (first or second). The same subjects also received the same items in English but again in different 
forms and times depending on condition. Therefore, if we ignore form and time differences, for each 
subject we have responses to English and Turkish versions of the same items. Although this procedure 
eliminates time and order effects it allows the researcher to investigate the scales at the item level and to 
compare items in the two language forms. See figure 2.3.5.2. 
Figure 2.3.5.2: Design of the new data file. 
Scale Lan~ge Form 1 
CAMI English 
CANSIE English 
MASLOC English 
RELIGIOSITY English 
F-Scale English 
Lan~ge Form 2 
Tutkish 
Turkish 
Turkish 
Turkish 
Turkish 
Differences between the English and Turkish forms were tested with Ferguson's t-test (Ferguson, 1959; 
Ferguson & Takone, 1989), so the differences in item-total correlation coefficients between language 
forms was investigated at the item level. Although the occasion differences between applications were 
ignored the method allowed us to investigate the items rather than only total scores. Any significant 
differences between language forms can be attributed to poor item fidelity. 
2.3.5.3. Item Response Theory 
Item Response Theory allows the researcher to test items in the scales independent from each other, 
unlike Classical Theory (CT) and Generalizability Theory (GT). It tries to find the best fitting 
parameters for each item and then allows us to test differences between these parameters. This is called 
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Differential Item Functioning. DIF can be tested with a program called MULTILOG (Thissen, 1991). 
In this study DIF is used in a very specific way. First the program is run when the parameters are free 
for each item and then the parameters are constrained to be the same for each item in the different 
language forms. Finally, the difference between Chi-squares is compared for both runs. If the 
difference between Chi-squares is found to be significant this is presumed to result from translation 
problems. 
2.4. PART II: DERIVING ETIC AND EMICI METRIC EQUN ALANCE 
2.4.1. Overview 
In this part of the study two monolingual (English and Turkish) samples were tested. Metric 
equivalence was tested with two main psychometric approaches, Classical and Modem Item analysis. 
Classical item analysis was first used in the context of factor analysis to find similarities between the 
factors structures of the scales in the different cultures. It was then used to detect differences between 
items in the two cultures. Then, Modem item analysis was used to detect the differences between the 
Item Characteristic Curves (lCC) of the two cultures using differential item fimctions (DIF). The 
important point is that, after this process, we will be able to demonstrate the iterative model of the 
derived etic suggested by Berry et al. (1992). Because translation fidelity has already been investigated 
any differences detected in this second part should be due to cultural differences and could perhaps be 
considered the ernic aspect of the culture. At this stage we will also find out if some scales or items are 
problematic in terms of the psychometric information they produce in one or other sample. Therefore 
we will be able to refine the measurements for the main study (part 3) by using only items or scales that 
seem to be comparable and which have the same variances in both cultures. 
The data were analysed using classical item analysis, explanatory factor analysis and item response 
theory. The results are presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
2.4.2. Design: 
For the Classical Item Analysis the two cultures were compared for each scale and subscale using 
criteria we set such as the similarities of the reliability tests and the similarities of the item-total 
correlation for each item. For details see chapter 6. 
For the Factor analysis ofMASLOC, CNSIE, Religiosity and Authoritarianism the scale's factors for 
the English and Turkish samples were compared in terms of factor structure. For CAM! the Control, 
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Means-Ends and Agency beliefs subscales were factor analysed in five subsets: for Effort, Attribute, 
Powerful others, luck and Unknown Factors. For details see chapter 7. 
For Item Response Theory, Thissen'. Steinberg & Wainer's (1993) suggested data design was used to 
test the similarities between parameters. To do this the data for the two samples was redesigned and 
analysed together for each scale and subscale. For details see chapter 8. 
2.4.3. Samples 
Three hundred and sixty two/eight English pupils (163 girls and 197 boys) and 420/6 Turkish pupils 
(262 girls and 164 boys) were tested. These were secondary school students, with ages ranging from 14 
to 18. There were more 18 years olds in the Turkish sample (124 vs. 56) because in two of the Turkish 
schools there is a preparation year to leam English which means that the pupils graduate when one year 
older then their peers. All the schools were secular. 
The Turkish data was collected from Izmir, the third biggest city in Turkey. Four different schools were 
involved in the data collection and were selected to represent different social classes to make the data 
fairly heterogeneous in this respect. Two of these were state schools, containing middle and working 
class children. The other two schools recruited upper-middle and upper class children. These two 
schools selected students for their academic performance and they were taught in English for most 
subjects, particularly mathematics and science. In the following table you can see the distribution of the 
Turkish sample according to school. Suphi Koyuncuoglu and Sidika Rodop Secondary Schools are 
state schools, Bomova Anadolu Secondary School is a government supported private school and the 
American College is a charity supported private school. See table 2.4.3.a 
Table 2.4.3.a: Description of the Turkish sample according to school and gender (N=426). 
SAMPLE I 
SCHOOLS GlRLS BOYS TOTAL 
Suphi Koyuncuoglu 66 28 94 
Sidika Rodop 84 46 130 
Bomova Anadolu 59 74 133 
American College 53 16 69 
TOTAL 262 164 426 
Data collection in Britain was done in London. Five different schools were involved in the research 
which again represented all social classes. The schools involved in the research were all from London 
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boroughs: Alieyns, Westminster, Pimlico, Sedgehill and Haydon Secondary Schools. The first two of 
them are private schools, students coming from upper and upper-middle class families. The following 
two are state schools, their students coming from middle and working class backgrounds. The last 
schoo1, Haydon, used to be a grammar school but is now a grant-maintained school and the students 
there are likely to come from middle class families. See table 2.4.3.b. 
Table 2.4.3.b: Description of the English Sample according to Gender and School (N=368). 
SAMPLE II 
SCHOOLS GIRLS BOYS TOTAL 
Alleyn School 66 61 127 
Westminster School 3 37 40 
Pimlico School 21 26 47 
Sedgehill School 18 32 50 
Haydon School 55 41 96 
I TOTAL 163 197 360 
In the Turkish sample 93.98 % (442 out of 449) of the sample said they were Moslem and 5.34 % 
considered themselves non-religious. There were also 1 Jewish and 2 Christian (self-reported) students 
in the sample. In the English sample 54.64 % (194 out of355) of the sample said they were Christian, 
32.78 % were non religious, 5.35% were Moslem, 4.23 % Jewish and 3.11 % were from other 
religious background such as Hindu or Sikh. 
2.4.4. Administration (procedure): 
The questionnaire was administered to groups in their school environment. Students filled in the 
questionnaire in the same order in both countries with the same instructions. The instruction was given 
to the students by the author or her helper in the same way. After the questionnaire had been distributed 
to each student, the researcher informed the participants about the purpose of the research. It was made 
clear that this was not a test and that it was not measuring their ability and that there were no correct or 
incorrect answers. Each test occasion took about one hour. 
2.4.5. Statistical Analysis 
For the details of the Classical analysis and Item Response Theory see the Method for part I described 
earlier (2.3.5.2 and 2.3.5.3). 
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2.5. PART ill: COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO CULTURES 
2.5.1. Overview 
In this part of the study the scales and items which were derived from the early cross-cultural 
comparison were used to test the main hypotheses of this study. These are concerned with the effects of 
several social antecedents on perceived control. 
At this stage, we made some alterations to the instruments, such as dropping some of the scales or 
items completely. Then univariate and multivariate analyses were applied to test the hypotheses. Any 
differences on the perception of control scales should be due to actual effects of the antecedent 
variables without having any noise effects from extraneous factors or translation infidelity or from the 
non-comparable sources of the cultures. 
The same samples and data used in part two were used here (apart from CNSIE, and some items from 
MASLOC and Authoritarianism). Therefore there is no sample or procedure described in this part of 
the study. The statistical analyses applied were ANOV A, regression analysis and canonical correlation. 
Each of these analysis was used to test the main hypotheses. 
2.5.2. Design. 
The independent variables, with codings, were: Culture (Turkish (1), English (2)); Religion (Christian 
(1) Muslim (2) Jewish (3) Others (4)); Religiosity level (High scores were more religious); 
Authoritarianism (High scores were more authoritarian); SES (Low (1), Middle (2) Upper Middle (3), 
Upper (4)); Gender (Girls (1), boys (2)); Age (up to 15 yrs. (1), 15 yrs. (2), 16 yrs. (3), 17+ yrs. (4)). 
SES was decided by the catchment area of the school for ethical reasons and because it was also 
considered more reliable than the school records of the parents' occupations or income. 
Additional variables were created for regression and canonical analysis to eliminate small numbers in 
the religious groups (e.g. Jews and Sikhs). So Muslims and Christians were coded as separate binruy 
variables, so that non-religious, or minority religion groups such as Jewish, Sikh etc. were coded as 
non- Muslim or non-Christian. 
The dependent variables were eleven perceived control subscales or scales used to test perception of 
control. These were CAM!: Control beliefs; Means Ends for Effort, Attribute, Powerful Others, Luck 
and Unknown factors; Agency beliefs for Effort, Attribute, Powerful Others, Luck and MASLOC. All 
the sub scales and scales were scored so that high scores were External. 
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2.5.3. Sample: As part II. 
2.5.4. Procedure: As part II. 
2.5.5. Statistical Analysis: 
Three statistical analyses are used in this part. These are: ANOV A, Canonical correlation and 
regression analysis. 
2.5.5.1.~()"A 
In this study ANOV A gives us preliminru:y infOImation about the effects of some of the independent 
variables. These are age, gender, SES and culture. But ANOV A is not appropriate for Religiosity and 
Authoritarianism because of their interval nature, unless they are categorised, wbich would reduce the 
information gathered. Their effect on perceived control was investigated in the second step. 
Nevertheless for validity reasons Religiosity and Authoritarianism were investigated as dependent 
variables in this first step. 
2.5.5.2. Canonical correlation analysis 
In the second step a multivariate data analysis was used to investigate the relationsbips between age, 
gender, culture, religion, religiosity and authoritarianism and perceived control. Religion was broken 
down into two variables, Muslim and Christian, because of the number of non-religious and other 
religions in the samples. Canonical correlation were used to identiJY the major effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable after the effect of the covariance had been eliminated 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, Black, 1995). 
Canonical correlation analysis is usually used to see the functional relationships between dependent 
variables and latent functions derived from the independent variables. It is useful when the variables are 
measured in several ways, e.g. some interval, some ordinal. But, sometimes the results of canonical 
correlation analysis are not replicable and the validity of the test has to be tested. There are different 
methods for doing this. The one we used is the omission of independent variables from the model one 
at a time. 
There are several outcomes of the analysis that can be interpreted. These are canonical weights, 
canonical loadings, and canonical cross-loadings. Of those the most reliable is canonical cross-loadings 
but because we used SPSS-x to run this analysis we only had the results for canonical weights and 
canonical loadings. Therefore our interpretations will be based on canonical loadings because they are 
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relatively more stable and reliable than weights. Once the loadings are calculated the canonical 
functions and the loadings of the independent and dependent variables on these functions are 
interpreted in the same way that factor loadings are interpreted (Hair et al., 1995). 
2.5.5.3. Regression Analysis: 
Regression analysis gives valuable information when the dependent variables are not much related with 
each other. It helps to identify the causal relationships between independent variables and each of the 
dependent variables. 
2.6. Summary 
In part one, we tested item fidelity with bilingual Turkish sample. We used three different psychometric 
methods to make these comparisons. The results of the Generalizability approach are presented in 
chapter 3, the Classical approach in chapter 4, and Item Response theory in chapter 5. 
In part two, we tested the comparability of the concepts underlying the scales in the English and 
Turkish samples. We used two psychometric methods to make these comparisons: Classical theory 
(item and factor analysis) and Item Response theory. The results of classical item analysis are presented 
in chapter 6, factor analysis in chapter 7, and Item Response analysis in chapter 8. 
In part three, we tested the relationships between perceived control and its social antecedents. We used 
three statistical analyses. These were ANOV A, canonical correlation analysis and regression analysis. 
The results of all these analyses are given in chapter 9. 
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PART I 
TRANSLATION FIDELITY 
CHAPTER 3: GENERALIZABILITY THEORY 
PARTl 
DETECTING THE TRANSLATION FIDELITY OF DIFFERENT LANGUAGE FORMS 
3.0. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Although the methodological problems of cross-cultural research have been identified clearly in detail 
(Beny et al., 1980; Beny et al., 1992), the application of the methods are rarely seen in the literature 
(Van de Vijver, 1982; Katerberg, Smith and Hoy, 1977; Hulin, Drasgow, & Komocar, 1982, Hulin, 
1987). The first obvious problem comes from translation fidelity. Brislin (1980) discussed several 
possible methods for testing the reliability of the translation such as back translation and the use of 
bilingual samples. Brislin (1980) and Triandis (1980) first introduced translation and back translation 
for decentralisation of the language. It is still the most widely used method to deal with comparability 
problem (e.g. Leondari, 1992; Smith et al., 1995). 
It is clearly acknowledged by the cross-cultural psychology literature that the metric equiValence of an 
instrument is essential for the reliable comparison of two cultures. Therefore Scalar equivalence (Van 
de Vijver & Poortinga, 1982) or Metric equivalence (Hui & Triandis, 1983) are introduced as 
additional necessities to the use of the back-translation procedure to detect possible sources of bias with 
statistical methods. Poortinga & Van de Vijver (1987) and Katerberg, Smith and Hoy (1977) used 
generalizability theory to deal with the translation fidelity problem of cross-cultural studies. 
In this study we will be using back translation. We will investigate the questionnaires' metric translation 
equivalence to make sure that the cross-cultural materials (five scales) are reliable in the imposed 
culture (Turkish). To do this we will use three psychometric approaches, generalizability theory, 
classical test theory, and latent trait or item response theory. First, we will present the results of the 
translation equivalence obtained with each psychometric approach. Second, we will discuss the 
usefulness of each approach from the cross-cultural point of view. Third we will use the results to make 
decisions about each questionnaire and the items that survive translation. Finally we will use the new 
version of the questionnaires in the main body of research, which is a comparison of the two cultures. 
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CHAPTER 3: GENERALIZABILITY THEORY. 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Generalizability theory is a statistical theory about the dependability of behavioural measurement 
(Shavelson & Webb, 1991). It was:first introduced by Cronbach, GIeser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam (1972) 
as an altemative to Classical theory. Classical theory can estimate only one source of error at a time 
(e.g. test-retest for occasions, or intemal consistency for a form), but with Generalizability theory it is 
possible to test for multiple sources of error such as the use of different forms or testing on different 
occasions in one single analysis (Shavelson & Webb, 1991). This advantage of generalizability theory 
can be used to investigate the comparability problem of cross-cultural data.. We can test for translation 
fidelity using a bilingual sample as Brislin (1980) suggested. 
Generalizability theory was first suggested by Van der Kamp (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1982) as a 
psychometric solution to the comparability problem of cross-cultural data. It was also used to test 
translation fidelity by Katerberg, Smith, and Hoy (1977) in a 2 (forms) x 2 (occasions) x 128 (subjects) 
mixed design. They tested the item fidelity of a Job description Index in two different language forms 
(English and Spanish) on two different occasions with a bilingual Hispanic sample. Although the 
generalizability approach is known to cross-cultural researchers, mainly methodologists such as Vande 
Vijver & Poortinga, it is very rarely used. 
In our study, which is similar to Katerberg et al. (1977), we used four language forms (between 
subjects) presented on two occasions (within subjects) to subjects. Ideally, presenting the same items in 
two different language forms or on different occasions shouldn't make a difference to bilingual 
subjects. However, if the translation is not good or if the subjects' circumstances change between 
occasions then differences will occur. The improvement in this design compared with Katerberg & his 
colleagues is that this research takes into account biases created by the use of single language forms and 
creates two more new forms in which half the questions are presented in Turkish and the other half in 
English. Thus we created four language forms rather than two. This enables us to check the consistency 
of responses to items across four different types of form rather than just two. 
So, with this design we are trying to investigate the error sources for different language forms of the 
same questionnaire. If we have a good translation of the questionnaire and if participants understood 
the questions equally well in both languages, then any differences between the four language forms is 
likely to come from meaning differences of the items in the two languages or from cultural differences. 
However, cultural differences will be reduced or eliminated at this stage by using subjects from the 
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same cultural (bilingual Turkish) background. The differences due to the subjects' characteristics 
(between subjects design) will be reduced or eliminated by matching the groups carefully for age 
gender, social class and type of school. 
3.2. METHOD 
3.2.1. Design for Analysis 
A mixed 4 (between) x 2 (within) design was used. The first independent variable was the different 
language fonns of the scales. The four conditions for the fonns were: English, Turkish, Half English-
half Turkish, and half Turkish-half English fonns of the scales. This variable was tested with different 
groups of subjects. The second independent variable was the different occasions or times on which two 
forms of the questionnaires were given to each subject. So, in group 1, participants received the English 
fonn first and the Turkish fonn second. In group 2, they received the Turkish fonn first and the English 
fonn second. In group 3, the participants received the English-Turkish fonns first and the Turkish-
English fonns second. In group 4, they received the Turkish-English first and the English-Turkish 
forms second. So, each subject answered the same questions once in English and once in Turkish. 
3.2.2. Analysis 
A 4x2 mixed subject design ANOVA was used to analyse the results. At this stage of the research only 
total scores are investigated. Language fonn differences, occasion differences, and the interaction 
between these two were investigated for each scale and sub scale. The results for each analysis are 
presented in two tables in Appendix B. The language fonn effects in the between subjects table and the 
occasions and interaction in the within subjects table. For a summary of F scores and results of the 
Box's M test of homogeneity of variance see table 3.3. 
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3.2.3. Instruments 
The questionnaires used were: (a) Control, Means-Ends, and Agency Beliefs (CAM!); (b) Nowicki-
Strickland Internal-External Scale for Children (CNSIE); (c) Multivariate Academic Specific Locus of 
Control Scale (MASLOC); (d) Religiosity Scale; (e) Authoritarianism Scale (60-65 Form). 
3.2.4. Sample 
Two hundred and four bilingual Turkish schoolchildren from two schools participated in this study. 
See the Method chapter for details. 
3.2.5. Procedure 
For details of the presentation of the four different forms to four groups of participants see the Design 
section above and the Method chapter. The order in which the questionnaires were presented was 
CAMI, CNSIE, MASLOC, Religiosity and Authoritarianism. 
3.2.6. Hypothesis 
According to Generalizability theory testing the same subjects on different occasions should be one 
error source. But if the items mean the same in both languages then, apart from the time difference of 
just a week, there should not be any differences between the two scores. In the same way presenting the 
same test in different language forms should not make a difference if the items mean the same in both 
languages, but using different subjects for each form may be a main error source. 
HI: There will be differences between forms due to the different languages. 
HO I: There will be no differences between forms due to the different languages. 
H2: There will be differences between occasions. 
H02: There will be no differences between occasions. 
H3: There will be an interaction between forms and occasions. 
H03: There will be no interaction between forms and occasions. 
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3.3. RESULTS: Detecting Error Variances in Different Language Fonns 
In this part we report the descriptive and inferential statistics from each ANOVA for each scale and 
subscale in the order in which it was presented in the questionnaire. Note that only differences 
significant at the p < 0.01 level will be counted as significant. However, all results will be reported in 
the text and in the summary table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Summary of the MANOVA for the analysis offonns (4) by occasions (2) with the bilingual 
sample. The p values are given. 
Sig.ofF Sig.ofF Sig.ofF 
SCALES Between Within Subjects for the BoxM 
Subjects for the for the Times Interaction of 
Forms Times by 
Forms 
CONTROL, MEANS-ENDS, 
AGENCY BELIEFS 
Control Beliefs 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 * 
Means-Ends Beliefs 
Effort 0.01 * 0.02 0.04 0.44 
Luck 0.13 0.00 ** 0.06 0.88 
Unknown Factors 0.02 0.15 0.49 0.07 
Attribute 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.29 
Powerful Others 0.60 0.87 0.67 0.28 
Agency Beliefs 
Effort 0.40 0.78 0.15 0.76 
Luck 0.27 0.01 0.77 0.51 
Attribute 0.10 0.05 0.17 0.48 
Powerful Others 0.66 0.51 0.06 0.00 ** 
CANSIE 
Nowicki-Strickland LOC Scale 0.99 0.23 0.08 0.09 
MASLOC 
Palenzuela's LOC Scale 
Internal 0.67 0.52 0.48 0.43 
Helplessness 0.63 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.02 
Luck 0.40 0.30 0.00 ** 0.03 
RELIGIOSITY SCALE 0.59 0.87 0.63 0.17 
AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE 0.34 0.03 0.65 0.36 
p<O.Ol *, p<O.OOl ** 
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3.3.1. Control, Means-Ends, and Agency Beliefs (Skinner et al., 1988). 
There are 10 subscales: Control beliefs; Means-Ends beliefs for Effort, Luck, Attribute and Powerful 
Others; and Agency beliefs for Effort, Attribute, Powerful Others and Luck See table 3.3. for p values 
ofF scores and results of Box's M. See appendix B for ANOVA tables. 
3.3.1.1. Control Beliefs Subscale: 
The results of the ANOVA showed that there was a significant different for occasions (F(1,196) = 
9.81, P = 0.00). There were no significant differences for forms (F(3,196) = 3.44, P = 0.02) or the 
interaction between forms and occasions (F(3,196) = 3.08, P = 0.03). The Box's M test for 
homogeneity of variance was significant (Box = 23.09, F(9,349681) = 2.52, P = 0.01). 
The conclusion is that when the control beliefs subscale was presented, the different occasions (times) 
did make a difference to scores. Also, the Box test found that variances across the cells of the ANOV A 
were not equal and therefore the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not satisfied. The next 
step was to investigate these differences at the item level with two other approaches - classical item 
analysis and item response theory. 
Table 3.3.1.1: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Control Beliefs Subscale in the CAM! (N=200). 
Experimental Experimental N Means SD 
Groups Forms 
I A 55 13.82 3.56 
B 55 15.25 3.10 
II B 49 14.12 3.03 
A 49 13.86 3.57 
ill C 41 13.90 3.62 
D 41 14.34 4.05 
N D 55 15.29 4.12 
C 55 16.49 4.49 
3.3.1.2. Means-Ends Beliefs for Effort Subscale: 
The results of the ANOV A showed that there was a significant differences for language forms 
(F(3,196) = 4.17, P = 0.01). There were no significant differences for occasions (F(1,196) = 10.12, P = 
0.02) or the interaction between forms and occasions (F(3,196) = 2.91, P = 0.04). Box's M test for 
92 
homogeneity of variance was not significant (Box M = 9.18, F(9,353173) = 1.00, P = 0.44). See table 
3.3 .1.2. for means and standard deviations. 
The results show that within this subscale at least some of the items had been lUlderstood differently in 
the different language forms. These results suggest that this subscale needs further investigation at the 
item level. 
Table 3.3.1.2: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Means-Ends Beliefs for Effort subscale in the CAM! (N=200). 
Experimental Experimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 55 16.75 3.12 
B 55 17.78 3.20 
IT B 50 18.14 2.97 
A 50 17.90 2.61 
ill C 41 16.90 2.87 
D 41 17.42 3.52 
IV D 54 18.07 2.98 
C 54 19.46 2.77 
3.3.1.3. Means-Ends Beliefs for Attribution Subscale: 
The results of the ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between forms (F(3,197) 
= 30.02, P = 0.036), occasions (F(1,197) = 5.85, :Q = 0.02) or the interaction between forms and 
occasions (F(3,197) = 3.06, P = 0.03). The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = 16.25, 
F(9,334950) = 1.77, P = 0.07). See table 3.3.1.3. for means and standard deviations. 
This subscale was lUlderstood similarly in the different language forms and on different occasions and 
there was no interaction effect between forms and occasions either. The variances were homogenous. 
We can therefore conclude that this subscale's items survived the translation. 
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Table 3.3.1.3: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Means-Ends Beliefs for Attribution Subscale in the CAM! (N=201). 
Experimental Experimental Forms N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 55 21.91 2.91 
B 55 21.78 2.28 
n B 50 23.10 2.48 
A 50 22.80 2.30 
III C 43 22.33 2.58 
D 43 22.37 2.28 
IV D 53 23.59 3.00 
C 53 22.36 2.60 
3.3.1.4. Means-Ends Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale: 
The results of the ANOV A showed that there were no significant differences between forms (F(3,197) 
= 0.63, P = 0.60) or occasions (F(1,197) = 0.03, P = 0.87) and no interaction between forms and 
occasions (F(3, 197) = 0.51, P = 0.67). The Box's M test was not significant (Box m = 11.14, 
F(9,351977) = 1.22, P = 0.28). See table 3.3.1.4. for means and standard deviations. 
This subscale was understood similarly in the different language forms and on different occasions and 
there was no interaction effect between forms and occasions either. The variances were homogenous. 
We can therefore conclude that this subsca1e's items survived the translation. 
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Table 3.3.1.4: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Means-Ends Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale in the CAMl (N=201). 
Experimental Ex-perimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 56 15.86 3.08 
B 56 16.29 3.65 
IT B 50 15.80 3.12 
A 50 15.74 3.14 
ill C 41 15.37 2.84 
D 41 15.22 2.45 
IV D 54 15.98 3.54 
C 54 15.89 3.20 
3.3.1.5. Means-Ends Beliefs for Luck Subscale: 
The results of the ANOV A showed that there was a significant difference between occasions (F(1,194) 
= 25.38, P = 0.00). There was no significant difference between forms (F(3,194) = 1.94, P = 0.13) or 
for the interaction between forms and occasions (F(3,194) = 2.58, P = 0.06). Box's M was not 
significant (Box's M = 4.5, F(9,317466) = 0.49, p = 0.88). See table 3.3.1.5. for means and standard 
deviations. 
The results show that this sub scale was understood in the same way when presented in different 
language forms but presenting the same material at different times did make a difference. There was no 
interaction between forms and occasions and the variances were homogeneous. Because of the 
differences between occasions this sub scale might need further investigation at the item level. 
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Table 3.2.1.5: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Means-Ends Beliefs for Luck Subscale in the CAMl (N=198). 
Experimental Experimental Forms N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 56 12.45 2.73 
B 56 14.79 3.90 
II B 50 12.96 2.82 
A 50 13.54 3.89 
ill C 39 11.95 3.26 
D 39 12.87 3.56 
N D 53 11.98 2.83 
C 53 13.15 3.64 
3.3.1.6. Means-Ends Beliefs for Unknown Factors Subscale: 
The results of the ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between forms (F(3,193) 
= 3.26, P = 0.02), or between occasions (F(1,193) = 2.1, P = 0.15), or for the interaction between forms 
and occasions. The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = 16.26, F(9,334950) = 15.95, p= 0.07). 
See table 3.3 .1.6. for means and standard deviations. 
This sub scale was understood similarly in the different language forms and on different occasions and 
there was no interaction effect between forms and occasions either. The variances were homogenous. 
We can therefore conclude that this sub scale's items survived the translation. 
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Table 3.3.1.6: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Means-Ends Beliefs for Unknown Factors Subscale in the CAMl (N=197). 
Experimental Experimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 54 14.39 3.18 
B 54 15.42 3.70 
n B 49 14.08 3.32 
A 49 14.l8 2.95 
ill C 40 13.08 3.31 
D 40 13.08 3.20 
N D 54 14.13 3.42 
C 54 14.52 3.75 
3.3.1.7. Agency Beliefs for Effort SubscaIe: 
The results of the ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between forms (F(3, 197) 
= 1.00, P = 0.40) or occasions (F(1,197) = 0.08, P = 0.78). There was also no interaction between 
forms and occasions (F(3,197) = 1.81, P = 0.15). The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = 
5.88, F(9,380510) = 0.64, P = 0.76). See table 3.3.1.7. for means and standard deviations. 
This subscale was understood similarly in the different language forms and on different occasions and 
there was no interaction effect between forms and occasions either. We can therefore be satisfied that 
this subscale's items survived the translation. 
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Table 3.3.1.7: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language fonns (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Agency Beliefs for the Effort Subscale in the CAMI (N=20 1). 
Experimental Experimental Forms N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 56 9.45 2.42 
B 56 9.74 2.56 
n B 49 9.67 2.95 
A 49 9.86 2.60 
ill C 43 9.14 2.42 
D 43 8.72 2.60 
N D 53 9.36 2.55 
C 53 9.43 2.37 
3.3.1.8. Agency Beliefs for Attribution Subscale: 
The results of the ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences for fonns (F(1,198) = 
2.14, P = 0.10) or occasions (F(1,198) = 3.75, P = 0.06) and there was no significant interaction 
between fonns and occasions (F(3,198) = 1.69, P = 0.17). The Box's M test was not significant (Box 
M = 8.69, F(9,368672) = 0.95, P = 0.48). See table 3.3.1.8. for means and standard deviations. 
This subscale was understood similarly in different language fonns and on different occasions and 
there was no interaction effect between fonns and occasions either. We can be satisfied that all this 
subscale's items survived the translation. 
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Table 3.3.1.8: Means and Standard Deviations fonn tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Agency Beliefs for Attribution Subscale in the CAMl (N=202). 
Experimental Experimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 56 9.64 1.39 
B 56 9.80 1.33 
IT B 50 9.78 1.27 
A 50 9.34 1.33 
ill C 42 9.54 Ll9 
D 42 9.24 1.28 
N D 54 10.04 1.39 
C 54 9.83 1.30 
3.3.1.9. Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale: 
The results of the ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between forms (F(1,199) 
= 0.53, P = 0.66) or occasions (F(3,199) = 0.43, P = 0.51) or for the interaction effect between forms 
and occasions (F(3, 199) = 2.58, P = 0.06). The Box' M test was significant (Box's M = 25.42, 
F(9,368274) = 2.77, P = 0.00). See table 3.3.1.9. for means and standard deviations. 
The results show that this sub scale was understood similarly when presented in different languages 
forms and presenting the same scale in different times did not make a difference either. There was no 
interaction between forms and occasions. However, because the variances were not homogeneous and 
so failed to meet one of the assumptions of the analysis this subsca1e needs further investigation. 
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Table 3.3.1.9: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale in the CAMl (N=203). 
Experimental Ex-perimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 56 11.60 1.64 
B 56 11.05 2.06 
IT B 50 11.12 2.31 
A 50 10.62 2.54 
ill C 42 11.17 2.59 
D 42 11.48 2.62 
N D 55 11.09 2.86 
C 55 11.16 2.49 
3.3.1.10. Agency Beliefs for Luck Subscale: 
The results of the ANOV A showed that there was no significant difference between forms (F(3, 197) = 
1.32, P = 0.27), but there was a significant difference between occasions (F(1,197) = 7.30, P = 0.01). 
There was no interaction between forms and occasions (F(3,197) = 0.38, P = 0.77). Box's M test was 
not significant (Box's M = 8.36, F(9,385997) = 0.91, P = 0.51). See table 3.3.1.10 for means and 
standard deviations. 
The results show that this sub scale was understood the same when presented in different languages 
forms, but testing on different occasions did make a difference. There was no interaction between 
forms and occasions and the variances were homogeneous. Because of the difference between 
occasions this subscale needs further investigation at the item level. 
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Table 3.3. l. 10: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Agency Beliefs for Luck Subscale in the CAMI (N=20 1). 
Experimental Experimental FOlIDS N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 54 9.52 2.07 
B 54 9.89 1.90 
IT B 50 9.18 1.91 
A 50 9.72 2.15 
ill C 43 9.86 1.81 
D 43 10.16 2.17 
N D 54 9.24 2.05 
C 54 9.41 2.14 
3.3.2. Nowicki-Strickland's Internal and External Locus of Control for Children (Nowicki and 
Strickland,1973). 
This scale's ANOV A results showed that there were no significant differences between forms (F(3,183) 
= 0.04, P = 0.99) or occasions (F(1,183) = 1.47, P = 0.23), and no significant interaction between 
forms and occasions (F(3,183) = 2.33, P = 0.08). The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = 
15.28, F(9,351637) = l.66, P = 0.09). See table 3.3.2 for means and standard deviations. See appendix 
B for ANOV A tables. 
We can conclude that the Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control scale was understood similarly when 
presented in different language forms and on different occasions. The variances were homogeneous. 
We can conclude that this scale survived translation. 
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Table 3.3.2: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language fonns (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale for Children (N=187). 
Experimental Experimental Forms N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 50 84.10 7.52 
B 50 83.64 9.43 
II B 45 82.24 7.80 
A 45 85.l6 8.11 
III C 42 84.64 7.49 
D 42 83.55 8.48 
N D 50 82.80 7.69 
C 50 84.32 11.47 
3.3.3. Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale (palenzuela, 1988) 
See appendix B for ANOV A tables. 
3.3.3.1. Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale's Internal Subscale. 
The ANOVA results showed that there were no significant differences for forms (F(3,195) = 0.52, P = 
0.67) or occasions (F(1,195) = 0.41, P = 0.52). There was no interaction effect between forms and 
occasions either (F(3,195) = 0.82, P = 0.48). The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = 9.31, 
F(9,370603) = 1.02, P = 0.43). See table 3.3.3.1 for means and standard deviations. 
The MASLOC's Internal subscale was understood similarly when presented in different language fonns 
and also on different occasions. The variances were homogenous. We can conclude that the subscale 
survived translation. 
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Table 3.3.3.1: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language forms (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Internal Subscale of Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control 
Scale (N=199). 
Experimental Experimental FOImS N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 53 10.40 3.89 
B 53 10.49 4.12 
IT B 50 10.34 2.74 
A 50 10.66 3.86 
ill C 42 10.42 3.45 
D 42 9.55 3.33 
N D 54 10.89 3.68 
C 54 10.65 3.66 
3.3.3.2. Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale's Helplessness Subscale. 
The ANOVA results showed that there was no significant differences between forms (F(3,195) = 0.58, 
P = 0.63) but that there was a significant difference between occasions (F(1,195) = 14.35, P = 0.00) 
and an interaction effect between forms and occasions (F(3,195) = 8.66, P = 0.00). The Box's M test 
was not significant (Box's M = 9.31, F(9,329947) = 2.15, P = 0.02). See table 3.3.3.2 for means and 
standard deviations. 
The results show that this subscale was understood the same when presented in different language 
forms but that testing on different occasions did make difference. There was also an interaction 
between forms and occasions. So even though the subscale was understood similarly in the different 
language forms this sub scale needs further investigation. 
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Table 3.3.3.2: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language fonns (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Helplessness Subscale of Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of 
Control Scale (N=194). 
Experimental Experimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 53 13.68 3.83 
B 53 15.60 3.09 
IT B 47 12.26 3.93 
A 47 15.70 3.19 
ill C 40 14.70 3.38 
D 40 13.55 4.56 
N D 54 14.33 4.79 
C 54 14.94 3.54 
3.3.3.3. Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale's Luck Subscale. 
The ANOVA results showed that there were no significant differences between forms (F(3,194) = 
1.00, P = 0.40), or occasions (F(1,194) = 1.08, P = 0.30). There was an interaction effect between 
fonns and occasions (F(3,194) = 16.25, P = 0.00). The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = 
19.42, F(9,371864) = 2.11, P = 0.03). See table 3.3.3.3 for means and standard deviations. 
The results show that this subscale was understood the same when presented in different language 
forms and that testing on different occasions did not make any difference either. However, there was an 
interaction between fonns and occasions. Therefore we think this subscale needs further investigation. 
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Table 3.3.3.3: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language fonns (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Luck Subscales of Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale 
(N=198). 
Experimental b • ."perimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 53 16.11 3.47 
B 53 13.94 4.04 
IT B 47 14.21 3.51 
A 47 17.38 3.39 
ill C 43 16.19 4.09 
D 43 15.93 3.53 
N D 55 15.47 3.45 
C 55 15.87 3.58 
3.3.4. Religiosity in Youth Scale (Rohrbaugh and Jessor, 1976). 
The ANOVAresults showed that there were no differences between fonns (F(3,190) = 0.64, P = 0.59) 
or occasions (F(1,190) = 0.03, P = 0.87). There was also no interaction effects between forms and 
occasions (F(3, 190) = 0.58, P = 0.63). The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = 13.00, 
F(9,347720) = 1.42, P = 0.17). See table 3.3.4 for means and standard deviations. See appendix B for 
ANOV A tables. 
This scale was understood similarly when presented in different language fonns and also on different 
occasions. The variance and covariance matrices were homogenous. We can conclude that this scale's 
translation was satisfactory. 
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Table 3.3.4: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language fonns (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for Religiosity Scale (N= 194). 
Experimental Experimental Forms N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 53 23.60 4.63 
B 53 23.79 5.17 
II B 45 22.49 6.63 
A 45 22.64 6.72 
ill C 42 22.43 5.34 
D 42 21.91 5.33 
N D 54 22.50 6.32 
C 54 22.85 6.11 
3.3.5. Authoritarianism 'F' Scale (Adorno et al., 1950). 
The ANOV A results showed that there were no significant differences between fonns (F(3,158) = 
1.13, P = 0.34), or occasions (F(1,158) = 4.68, P = 0.03), or for the interaction effect between forms 
and occasions (F(3, 158) = 0.55, P = 0.65). The Box's M test was not significant (Box's M = to.to, F 
with (9,268722), DF = 1.10, P = 0.36). See table 3.3.5 for means and standard deviations. See 
appendix B for ANOV A tables. 
The Authoritarianism 'F' Scale 60-65 fonn (Adorno, 1950) was understood similarly when present in 
different language fonns and on different occasions. The variances were homogenous. We can 
conclude that this scale's translation was satisfactory. 
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Table 3.3.5: Means and Standard Deviations from tests of different language fonus (A, B, C, D) on 
different occasions for California F Scale (Authoritarianism Scale) (N= 162). 
Experimental EA-perimental Fonns N Means SD 
Groups 
I A 45 115.64 15.00 
B 45 118.62 l3.52 
II B 39 113.08 17.63 
A 39 117.64 17.45 
ill C 38 111.26 16.21 
D 38 1l3.68 16.84 
N D 40 111.68 17.00 
C 40 111.95 2l.44 
3.4. SUMMARY 
We have investigated how each scale and subscale JaS survived translation in the second language by ~ 
comparing Turkish bilingual subjects' answers to the different language forms (English, Turkish, and 
split forms) on different occasions. We also carried out tests for homogeneity of variance. If the scale 
or subscale didn't show any differences according to these criteria (forms, occasions, interaction and 
:.-~,~,<. 
homogeneity) then we concluded that translation was good. On the other hand if all these criteria were 
, /\ 
\-.(14.:" 
not fu1fi11ed we concluded that at least some of the items needed further investigation. 
" 
Differences between forms: Only one out of ten CAMI sub scales showed a significant difference 
between language forms (Means-Ends for Effort). All other scales and subscales (CNSIE, MASLOC, 
Religiosity, Authoritarianism) did not show any form differences. 
Differences between occasions: Five out of all 16 scales and subscales were significantly different 
(Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort, Means-Ends for Luck and Agency for Luck in CAMI; 
Helplessness in MASLOC). All other differences were non significant. 
Interaction effects between times and occasions: There were significant interactions for two out of all 
16 scales and subscales (Helplessness and Luck in the MASLOC). Post hoc analysis of these two 
v.;\--.O 
subscales showed that the interaction occurred between Groups I and II wbWb-had- both received 
complete language forms on each occasion. It seems that, in both groups, they scored high if the form 
was in English. 
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Homogeneity of Variance. Two of the 16 scales and subscales did not show homogeneity of variance 
(Control beliefs and Agency for Powerful Others in CAMI). 
3.S. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, seven out of 16 scales or subscales were found to be in need of further investigation. These 
were: Control beliefs; Means-Ends for Effort and for Luck; Agency for Luck and for Powerful Others 
and MASLOC's Helplessness and Luck. 
Because we used total scores rather than item scores in the analysis, we are not able to detect which 
items are causing these differences in these results (Shavelson and Webb, 1990; Poortinga & Van der 
Vijver, 1987). Brislin (1980) strongly recommend using experimental methods for translation fidelity. 
This was done in this study. But Brislin also criticised the use of bilingual samples. He suggested that 
bilingual responses are different from monolingual responses because the bilingual student's thinking 
processes and life experiences expand the two language borders. Also, in many cases the bilingual 
students came from very similar backgrounds such as middle, or upper middle class families who 
encourage high school achievement. This criticism of using a bilingual sample may be compensated for 
if the biased items remain in the study until they are tested with monolingual samples in both cultures, 
as we did in this study. We should also bear in mind that this criticism has very little effect on the actual 
results of this study because there are some subscales which clearly function differently from one 
language form to another. Therefore it is quite possible that in these subscales some of the items were 
understood in a different way in different language forms. 
Lastly we can conclude that using our experimental design to test item fidelity in a bilingual Turkish 
sample is a good idea. As far as the literature is concemed, although it has been introduced as an 
altemative technique to back translation by Brislin (1980), there are not many examples of it 
(Kater berg et al, 1977). In the author's experience this experimental design gives more information than 
back-translation. 
However, a criticism could be that the method chosen has got problems of two types. Firstly although 
Brislin's (1980) experimental model was used the actual experimental design created by the author 
went well beyond the experimental design suggested by him. Instead of a 2 (forms) x 2 (occasions) 
design, we used the expanded design of 4 (forms) x 2 (occasions). The two extra forms added to the 
design contained two languages but on the other hand kept one variable constant in that every subject 
responded to the same item in both languages. However, testing more possible variations of the same 
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item also introduced new variance into the design and it is not clear where this comes from - the 
English or Turkish items. Remember that we were using total scores of the split forms. A second 
criticism of this design is that because of the overwhelming number of items in the study we chose to 
use the total scores of each scale or subscale. Therefore our final information is restricted. This decision 
did not violate Brislin's (1980) model but changes the way we used Generalizability theoty (Shavelson 
et al., 1991) as a psychometric approach to test bias variances. Therefore, in the end the information we 
gathered was restricted by these decisions. 
So generalizability theoty has been useful for detecting language differences between different 
language forms within time. But the results have shown that some of the subscales need more 
investigation at the item level. So we will also use conventional and modem item analysis. Weare 
going to present these results in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: CLASSICAL ITEM ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER 4: CLASSICAL ITEM ANALYSIS FOR TRANSLATION FIDELITY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this part of the translation equivalence study we look at Classical item analysis of the English, 
Turkish and split fOIm versions of the questionnaires. The problem with classical item analysis is that it 
cannot compare items across different fOImS and times. The aim of using the Classical approach as 
well as the Generalizability approach is to compare the results of the different approaches and 
maximise the infoImation about items. We did not want to drop any scales or subscales which seemed 
to have a problem according to the generalizability analyses so to deal with this problem of classical 
item analysis we have ignored possible fOIm and time differences and combined results from the 
different language fOImS and from different times to produce two sets of data (English and Turkish). 
These have been analysed independently to see if items contribute to the total score and to the 
reliability of the scales or subscales. 
4.2. METHOD 
4.2.1. Design for Analysis 
The previous 4 x 2 mixed design was altered in such a way that items could be analysed in either the 
English or Turkish fOImS. To use classical item analysis we ignored possible time and fOIm effects and 
combined data from the different conditions. In the design of the study every subject has received every 
item, once in Turkish and once in English. The only difference between subjects in different conditions 
receiving the Turkish items is how they received them (on one single language fOIm or on two split 
fOImS) and when they received them (first or second). The same subjects also received the same items 
in English but again in different fOIms and times depending on condition. Therefore, if we ignore fOIm 
and time differences, for each subject we have responses to English and Turkish versions of the same 
items. Although this procedure eliminates time and order effects it allows the researcher to investigate 
the scales at the item level and to compare items in the two language fOIms. This "new" design then 
produces two language fOImS of the same scales, which can then be compared. 
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Figure 4.2.1: Design of the new data file: 
Scale LanW!ge Fonn 1 
CAMI English 
CANSIE English 
MASLOC English 
RELIGIOSITY English 
F-Scale English 
4.2.2. Analysis 
Language Fonn 2 
Turkish 
Turkish 
Turkish 
Turkish 
Turkish 
In this analysis the same raw data from the same scales and subscales were used. However, as 
explained earlier the data were collapsed to produce Turkish and English responses to each scale and 
subscale. The average means, standard deviations and item-total correlations were calculated for each 
item in each language. Also, to measure internal consistency, Cronbach's Alpha was calculated for each 
scale and subscale. 
For each scale and subscale, items in English and Turkish were compared using the absolute values of 
the item-total correlations, the difference between the item-total correlations and a measure of intemal 
consistency (Cronbach's alpha). The :first criterion used to decide if an item is "good" or "bad" is 
whether the item-total correlation is 0.30 or bigger (Nunnally, 1978). The second criterion is whether 
the difference between the item-total correlations in the two languages is significant using Ferguson's 
(1959) independent-correlations significant differences fonnula. Significant differences obtained by 
this fonnula are displayed at the 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance but for the purposes of assessing 
translation fidelity only differences at 0.01 will be considered. The third criterion is the absolute value 
ofCronbach's alpha If alpha is less than 0.6 it is considered "poor". If it is between 0.6 and «) 0.7 it is 
considered "medium"; ifitis between 0.7 and «) 0.8 it is considered "good" and ifit is 0.8 or greater it 
is considered "very good". The fourth criterion is whether the difference between Cronbach's Alpha in 
the two language forms of a subscale is more than two standard deviations from the mean of all 
difference scores. i.e. the mean and standard deviation were calculated from the sixteen difference 
scores (one for each scale or subscale). The mean of the differences was -0.001 and the sd was 0.04. 
Therefore the criterion values were 0.08 (Turkish better than English) and -0.08 (English better than 
Turkish). This criterion has been set because of the unavailability of any other criterion to assess the 
significance of a difference between two values of Cronbach's Alpha 
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4.2.3. Instruments 
The questionnaires were CAM!, CANSIE, MASLOC, Religiosity, and Authoritarianism. 
4.2.4. Sample 
In this study, like in the Generalizability approach, the same 204 bilingual Turkish student participated 
(see Method chapter). 
4.2.5. Procedure 
See Method chapter. 
4.2.6. Hypothesis 
If translation fidelity is good then there will not be any differences between the two language fOlTIls. 
The differences between the English and Turkish fonns in the bilingual sample's results, in terms of 
means, standard deviations and item-total correlations, will be non-significant. The scales and subscales 
will be intemally consistent (reliable) in both languages. If these criteria are met then the items are 
functioning similarly in the two language. If any item is functioning significantly differently in the two 
languages then it was not translated properly into the second language. 
4.3. RESVL TS: Detecting Item Bias with Classical Item Analysis 
4.3.1. CAMI 
4.3.1.1. Control Beliefs Subscale: See table 4.3.1.1. for item-total correlations and Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 8 items were presented in English the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.40 (item 5), and the maximum was 0.68 (item 35). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.37 (item 7), and the 
maximum was 0.63 (item 35). There was a significant difference (p<0.01) between item-total 
correlations in the two languages for item 41 (r= .67 in English, r=.49 in Turkish). These results show 
that both English and Turkish items were "good" because all item-total correlations were above 0.30 
and that one item (item 41) had poor translation fidelity. Item 41 is "If you want to can you keep from 
doing badly in school?". 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients (alpha) for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 
0.85 and 0.78 respectively. According to our criterion value this difference (0.07) is not significant and 
they have high and good reliability so the translation fidelity is good. 
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Table 4.3.1.1: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
CAMI's Control Beliefs Sub scale. 
CONTROL BELIEFS 
SUBSCALES'ITEMS 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want 
to? 
35. If you want to do well in schoo~ can you? 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do 
it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong 
(e.g. in maths or spelling) can you do it? 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.85 
0.55 
0.62 
0.63 
0.68 
0.52 
0.40 
0.59 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.78 
0.35 
0.52 
0.56 
0.63 
0.37 
0.43 
0.49 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 0.67 (*) 0.49 (*) 
N=202 in both English and Turkish fonns. P <0.01 (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the 
two 1-T correlations in the two language forms. 
4.3.1.2. Means-Ends for Effort Subscale: See table 4.3.1.2 for item-total correlations and Cronbach 
alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 8 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.25 (item 23), and the maximum was 0.43 (item 64). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.32 (item 56) and the 
maximum was 0.43 (item 61). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations in 
the two language forms. Two item-total correlations on the English scale were below 0.30 (16, and 23). 
No Turkish item-total correlations were below 0.30. These results show that all Turkish items were 
"good" items and that all items had good translation fidelity. The "poor" English items are probably 
because of the level of bilingualism. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 0.66 and 
0.70 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale (-0.04) is not significant and 
they have medium and good reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.2: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
CAMI's Means- Ends Beliefs for Effort Sub scale. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR EFFORT SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
23. Is the usual reason that students do well at school that they tty really 
hard? 
20. If a student knows a lot about something, is it usually because he or 
she has worked hard at learning it? 
61. When a student does well in school, is it usual because helshe works 
very carefully? 
64. Paying attention and listen carefully, is the usual reason that students 
understand what the teachers say? 
19. When a student doesn't understand something at school, is it usually 
because he or she doesn't pay enough attention? 
16. If students give the wrong answers on a test is it usually because they 
don't work carefully? 
56. When students don't learn very much in class, is it usually because 
he/she doesn't work very hard? 
47. When a teacher asks a question and student gives the '''TOng answer, 
is this usually because the student isn't trying hard enough? 
N=202 in both English and Turkish forms. 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.66 
0.25 
0.38 
0.38 
0.43 
0.42 
0.25 
0.34 
0.40 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.70 
0.38 
0.40 
0.43 
0.40 
0.39 
0.41 
0.32 
0.37 
4.3.1.3. Means-Ends for Attribution Subscale: See table 4.3.1.3 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 8 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item total correlation was 0.19 (item 53), and the maximum was 0.47 (item 49). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.26 (item 17) and 
maximum was 0.51 (item 18). There were no significant differences in the item-total correlations in the 
two languages. Two item-total correlations in the English form were below 0.30 (item 22, and 53) and 
one item in the Turkish form (item 17). Overall, for this subscale translation fidelity was "good" but 
two English and one Turkish items were poor. Item 17 is "if students get bad grades, is it usually 
because they are no good at school?" Item 22 is "When a student does badly in school is the main 
reason usually that he or she is no very bright?" Item 53 is "If students understand things quickly, is it 
because they are very good at school?" 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 0.68 and 
0.68 respectively. There was no difference between the two forms of the sub scale and they both have 
medium reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.3. Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English And Turkish Foons for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Attribute Subscale. 
:MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FORATTR1BUTIONS SUBSCALE'S ITEM 
18. If a student does well in school, is it usually because he or she is just 
clever? 
13. When students give the right answer to questions in class, is it 
usually only because they are good students? 
50. When a student manages to learn something, is it just because he/she 
is clever? 
53. If students understand things quickly, is it because they are very 
good at school? 
17. If students get bad grades, is it usually because they are no good at 
school? 
22. When a student does badly in school is the main reasons usually that 
he or she is just not very bright? 
49. When students don't understand something, is it because they are just 
no good at school? 
52. If a student gives the wrong answer to teachers' question, is it usually 
because s/he is just not smart? 
N= 202 in both English and Turkish forms. 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.68 
0.41 
0.31 
0.43 
0.19 
0.40 
0.26 
0.47 
0.37 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.68 
0.51 
0.29 
0.40 
0.36 
0.26 
0.45 
0.33 
0.37 
4.3.1.4. Means-Ends for Powerful Others Subscale: See table 4.3.1.4 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when the 8 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.16 (item 14) and the maximum was 0.54 (item 21). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.31 (item 45), and the 
maximum was 0.58 (item 21). There were no significant differences between the two forms. One 
English item (item 14) but no Turkish items were below 0.30. These results show that the subscale had 
good translation fidelity and that all Turkish items were good. One English item was poor. Item 14 is 
"Do some students do well at school just because their teachers help them?" 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish foons of this subscale were 0.71 and 
0.75 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale is not significant and they both 
have good reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.4: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR POWERFUL OTHERS SUBSCALE'S ITEM-TOTAL 
ITEMS CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.71 
24. When a students gets good grades, is it usually because he or she 0.53 
gets along well with the teacher? 
14. Do some students do well at school just because their teachers help 0.16 
them? 
60. When a student does well in school, is it usually because he/she gets 0.47 
along well with the teachers? 
45. When students do really well in school, is it usually just because of 0.30 
the teacher? 
15. If a student gets bad grades, is it usually because the teacher doesn't 0.43 
like them? 
21. If a student does badly in school, is it usually because the teacher 0.54 
doesn't really like him/her very much? 
63. When students do badly in a subject, is it usually because the 0.44 
teachers just don't help them very much? 
51. When students have problems in school, is it usually because of the 0.42 
teacher? 
N= 203 in both English and Turkish forms. 
ITEM TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.75 
0.46 
0.35 
0.55 
0.31 
0.51 
0.58 
0.51 
0.38 
4.3.1.5. Means-Ends for Luck Subscale: See table 4.3.1.5 for item-total correlations and Cronbach 
alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 8 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item total correlation was 0.26 (item 25) and the maximum was 0.66 (item 58). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.30 (item 25) and the 
maximum was 0.60 (item 57). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations in 
the two language forms. One item-total on the English scale (item 25) but no Turkish items were below 
0.30. These results show that this subscale has good translation fidelity and all the Turkish items were 
good. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 0.82 and 
0.81 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale was not significant and they 
both have high reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.5: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Luck Subscale. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR LUCK SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
28. Is doing well at school usually a matter ofluck? 
25. Some students learn things more easily than other students. Is it 
because they are luckier? 
57. Is getting good grades just a matter ofluck? 
48. If a teacher calls on a student and student knows the right answer, 
would you say it's just because the student is lucky? 
29. If a students get bad grades, is it just they have bad luck? 
32. If a teacher asks a student a question and the student doesn't know 
the answer, is this simply because the student's unlucky? 
58. When a student finds it difficult to learn something, is it usually 
because he/she is unluc1..-y? 
62. When a student has a hard time learning something, is it usually 
because the student is unluck-y? 
N= 20 lin both English and Turkish forms. 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELA nONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.82 
0.58 
0.26 
0.64 
0.47 
0.66 
0.57 
0.66 
0.58 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELA nONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.83 
0.59 
0.30 
0.59 
0.54 
0.58 
0.53 
0.57 
0.60 
4.3.1.6. Means-Ends for Unknown Factors Subscale: See table 4.3.1.6 for item-total correlations 
and Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 8 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.35 (item 59) and the maximum was 0.54 (item 54). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.32 (item 59) and the 
maximum was 0.53 (item 55). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations in 
the two language forms. All English and Turkish item-total correlations were above 0.30. These results 
show good translation fidelity and all Turkish and English items were good. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this sub scale were 0.75 and 
0.76 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the sub scale was not significant and they 
both have good reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.6: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Luck Subscale. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR UNKNOWN FACTORS ITEM-TOTAL 
SUBSCALE'S ITEM CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.75 
30. When a students do better than usual in as object, is it difficult to tell 0.40 
why? 
26. If the teacher asks a student a hard question and he or she answers 0.42 
correctly, is it usually difficult to work out why the student gave the right 
answer? 
46. If a student get a good grades in school, is it hard to know the reason 
why? 
55. Is it hard to know why a student does really well on a test? 
31. If students do badly in school, is it hard to work out why this has 
happened? 
27. When a student makes a lot ofrnistakes (e.g., in a spelling test), is it 
hard to know the reason why? 
54. When students give the wrong answer to teachers' questions, do you 
find it hard to know why it has happened? 
59. Is it difficult to know "'hy a student does worse than usual in a 
subject? 
N= 203 in English fonn; N= 198 in Turkish form 
0.50 
0.51 
0.52 
0.36 
0.54 
0.35 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.76 
0.47 
0.48 
0.51 
0.53 
0.41 
0.44 
0.51 
0.32 
4.3.1.7. Agency for Effort Subscale: See table 4.3.1.7 for item-total correlations and Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 4 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.49 (item 37) and the maximum was 0.70 (item 33). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.57 (item 37)and the 
maximum was 0.66 (item 33). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations in 
the two language forms and all English and Turkish items were good. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this sub scale were 0.81 and 
0.79 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale is not significant and they have 
high and good reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.7: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Effort Subscale. 
AGENCY BELIEFS FOR EFFORT SUBSCALE'S ITEM 
1. Do you try as hard as you can in school? 
4. Do you pay attention in class? 
37. When it comes down to it; do you really work hard on your 
homework? 
33. Do you listen very care:fully to what your teacher says? 
N=20 1 in English form; N=204 in Turkish form. 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.81 
0.65 
0.67 
0.49 
0.70 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.79 
0.58 
0.62 
0.57 
0.66 
4.3.1.8. Agency for Attribution Subscale: See table 4.3.1.8 for item-total correlations and Cronbach 
alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.33 (item 44) and the maximum was 0.58 (item 2). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.47 (item 44) and the 
maximum was 0.57 (item 9). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations in 
the two language fOIIDs and all English and Turkish items were good. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 0.69 and 
0.73 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale is not significant and they both 
medium and good reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.8: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Attributes Sub scale. 
AGENCY BELIEFS FOR ATTRIBUTES SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
2. Can you learn things you need to for school quickly, without really 
having to work on them? 
9. Are you successful in your school work even without having to study 
hard? 
39. Do you get problems right (e.g. in maths), even if you don't tIy hard? 
44. Can you understand the teachers' lesson easily? 
N=203 in both English and Turkish fonns. 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.69 
0.58 
0.55 
0.45 
0.34 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.73 
0.54 
0.57 
0.50 
0.47 
4.3.1.9. Agency for Powerful Others Subscale: See table 4.3.1.9 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 4 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.47 (item 43) and the maximum was 0.65 (item 12). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.45 (item 12) and the 
maximum was 0.57 (item 43). There was a significant difference (p<0.01) between item-total 
correlations in the two language forms for item 12 (r= .65 in English, r= .45 in Turkish). These results 
show that all Turkish and English items were good but that one item (12) was poorly translated. Item 
12 is "When you want them to, will your teachers help to see that you do well in school?" 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this sub scale were 0.73 and 
0.72 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subsca1e is not significant and they both 
have good reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.9: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms CAMI's 
Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale. 
AGENCY BELIEFS FOR POWERFUL OTHERS SUBSCALE'S 
ITEMS 
12. When you want them to, will your teachers help to see that you do 
well in school? 
11. On the whole, do your teachers like you? 
40. Do you have teachers who will help you when you want them to? 
43. When you think about it, would you say that your teacher satisfied 
with you? 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.73 
0.65 (*) 
0.48 
0.51 
0.47 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.72 
0.45 (*) 
0.50 
0.53 
0.57 
N=204 in English fonn; N=203 in Turkish fonn. P <0.01 (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between 
the two 1-T correlations in the two language fonns. 
4.3.1.10. Agency for Luck Subscale: See table 4.3.1.10 for item-total correlations and Cronbach 
alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 4 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.25 (item 8) and the maximum was 0.56 (item 36). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.40 (item 38; item 8) 
and the maximum was 0.49 (item 36). There were no significant differences between the two forms. 
One English item but no Turkish items were below 0.30. These results show that translation of the 
sub scale was good and that all Turkish items were also good. Only one English item was poor. Item 8 
is "When the teacher calls on you, are you usually lucky in knowing the right answer?" 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 0.61 and 
0.64 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the sub scale is not significant and they both 
have medium reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
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Table 4.3.1.10: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach Alpha of English and Turkish Fonns for 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Luck Subscale. 
AGENCY BELIEF FOR LUCK SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
6. Are you the sort of person who has luck with their homework? 
8. When the teacher calls on you, are you usually lucky in knowing the 
right answer? 
38. When it comes to learning something hard, do you usually have luck 
on your side? 
36. Are you usually luck")" when it comes to schoolwork? 
N=20 1 in English form; N=204 in Turkish form. 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELA nONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.61 
0.31 
0.25 
0.49 
0.56 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.64 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
0.49 
4.3.2. Nowicki-Strickland LOC Scale for Children (CNSIE) (Nowicki and Strickland, 1973). See 
table 4.3 .1.1 0 for item-total correlations and Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 40 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was -0.09 (item 4) and the maximum was 0.35 (item 35). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the .minimum item-total correlation was -0.07 (item 10) and the 
maximum was 0.41 (item 36). There was a significant difference between item-total correlations in the 
two language forms for Item 36 (r= .19 in English, r= .40 in Turkish) at 0.01. Most item-total 
correlations in both English (33/40) and Turkish (34/40) were below 0.30 (see table 4.3.2). These 
results show that only one item 36 "Do you feel that when someone doesn't like you there is little you 
can do about it?" had poor translation fidelity. The majority of items in both in English and Turkish 
forms were poor. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 0.68 and 
0.67 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale is not significant and they both 
have medium reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
We shall discuss this scale later. 
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Table 4.3.2: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
Nowicki-Strickland Internal-External Locus of Control Scale for Children (CNSIE). 
NOWICKI-STRICKLAND'S LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE ITEMS ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.68 
1. Do you believe that most problems will usually sort themselves out in 0.Q3 
time? 
2. Do you believe that you can stop yourself from catching a cold? 0.10 
3. Are some children just born luck)'? 0.10 
4. Most of the time do you feel that getting good grades means a great -0.09 
deal to you? 
5. Are you often blamed for things that just aren't your fault? 0.26 
6. Do you believe that if somebody studies hard enough he or she can 0.25 
pass any subject? 
7. Do you feel that most of the time it doesn't pay to try because things 0.38 
never turn out right anyway? 
8. Do you feel that if things start out well in the morning it's going to be 0.12 
a good day no matter what you do? 
9. Do you feel that, most of the time, parents listen to what their children 0.00 
have to say? 
10. Do you believe that good things can be made to happen simply by 0.12 
wishing them? 
11. When you get punished does it usually seem to be for no good 0.25 
reason at all? 
12. Most of the time do you find it hard to change a friend's opinion? 0.24 
13. Do you think a team is helped to win more by cheering than by luck? 0.20 
14. Do you feel that it's nearly impossible to change your parent's rnind 0.33 
about anything? 
15. Do you believe that your parents should allow you to make of your 0.06 
own decisions? 
16. Do you feel that when you do something wrong there is very little 0.18 
you can do to make it right? 
17. Do you believe that some children are just born good at sports? 0.07 
18. Are most of the others children your age stronger than you are? -0.04 
19. Do you feel that one of the best ways to handle most problems isjust 0.16 
not to think about them? 
20. Do you feel that you have a lot of choice in deciding who your 0.30 
friends are? 
21. If you find a four-leaf clover do you believe that might bring you 0.08 
good luck? 
22. Do you feel that whether you do your homework has much to do 0.12 
with what kinds of grades you get? 
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ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
INTURKlSH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.67 
-0.01 
0.24 
0.23 
-0.06 
0.24 
0.18 
0.22 
0.12 
0.00 
-0.08 
0.25 
0.09 
0.19 
0.22 
0.22 
0.38 
0.12 
0.19 
0.25 
0.18 
0.00 
0.07 
23. Do you feel that when another teenager your age decides to hit you, 0.16 0.18 
there is little you can do stop him or her? 
24. Have you ever had a good luck charm? -0.00 -0.04 
25. Do you believe that whether or not people like you depends on how 0.15 0.20 
you act? 
26. Will your parents usually help you if you ask them to? 0.34 0.38 
27. Have you felt that when people were mean to you it was usually for 0.21 0.37 
no reason at all? 
28. Most of the time, do you feel that you can change what might happen 0.26 O.ll 
tomorrow by what you do today? 
29. Do you believe that when bad things are going to happen no matter 0.21 0.21 
what you do to try to stop them? 
30. Do you think that children can get their own way if they just keep 0.28 0.32 
trying? 
31. Most of the time do you find it useless to try to get your own way at 0.29 0.09 
home? 
32. Do you feel that when good things happen they happen because of 0.23 0.16 
hard work? 
33. Do you feel that when somebody your age wants to be your enemy 0.27 0.38 
there is little you can do to change matters? 
34. Do you feel that it is easy to get friends to do what you want them 0.27 0.12 
to? 
35. Do you usually feel that you have little to say about what you get to 0.35 0.27 
eat at home? 
36. Do you feel that when someone doesn't like you there is little you can 0.l9 (*) 0.41 (*) 
do about it? 
37. Do you usually feel that it is almost useless to try in school because 0.23 0.25 
most other children are just cleverer than you are? 
38. Are you the kind of person who believes that planning ahead makes 0.27 0.20 
things tum out better? 
39. Most of the time, do you feel that you have little say in what your 0.32 0.28 
family decides to do? 
40. Do you think it is better to be clever than to be luck)'? 0.30 0.18 
N=193 in English from; N=198 in Turkish form. P <0.01 (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between 
the two 1-T correlations in the two language forms. 
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4.3.3. MASLOC (palenzuela, 1988). 
4.3.3.1. MASLOC for Internal Subscale: See table 4.3.3.1 for item-total correlation and Cronbach's 
alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 5 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.40 (item 7) and the maximum was 0.55 (item 11). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.34 (item 7) and the 
maximum was 0.48 (item 10). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations in 
the two language forms. All English and Turkish items were above 0.30. These results show good 
translation fidelity of the subscale and that all items were good. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this subscale were 0.70 and 
0.64 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale is not significant and they have 
a good and medium reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
Table 4.3.3.1: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
MASLOC's Internal Sub scale. 
MASLOC INTERNAL SUBSCALE'S ITEMS ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.70 
2. The grade I get at the end of the year will always be closely related to 0.46 
what 1 do during the year. 
5. 1 am convinced that the grades 1 will get depend on how well or badly 0.40 
1 do in my exams. 
7. The kind of grades 1 will get in my studies depends on how capable 1 0.40 
am in preparing my self 
10. Ifl want to get a good academic record 1 have to be competent and 1 0.54 
must work hard. 
11. In general, 1 believe that, if one is competent and works hard one will 0.55 
get good result 
N=203 in English form; N=200 in Turkish form. 
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ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.64 
0.46 
0.38 
0.34 
0.48 
0.40 
4.3.3.2. MASLOC for Helplessness Subscale: See table 4.3.3.2 for item-total correlation and 
Cronbach's alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 5 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.18 (item 15) and the maximum was 0.32 (item 14). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was -0.12 (item 8) and the 
maximum was 0.43 (item 14). There was a significant difference between item-total correlations in the 
two language forms for item 8 (r= .22 in English, r= -.12 in Turkish) at 0.01. The majority of English 
(4/5) and Turkish (3/5) item-total correlations were below 0.30. These results show that only item 8 
had poor translation fidelity. Item 8 is "I do not think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grades I 
will get will be completely manipulated"). The majority of items in both in English and Turkish forms 
were poor. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this sub scale were 0.45 and 
0.40 respectively. The difference between the two sub scale was not significant but the reliability of the 
sub scale in both languages is poor. We will discuss this subscale later. 
Table 4.3.3.2: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
MASLOC's Helplessness Subscale. 
MASLOC HELPLESSNESS SUBSCALE'S ITEMS ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATION IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.45 
4. It is an absolute waste of time for me to make any effort, since there is 0.22 
no relationship between my capability, how hard I work, and the grades I 
will get 
8. I don't think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grades I will get 0.23 (*) 
will be completely manipulated 
9. I am convinced that whatever I do my teacher will always give me the 0.25 
grades they want to. 
14. It makes absolutely no difference whether I prepare well for a subject 0.32 
or not since in the long run teachers are "out to catch you". 
15. Regarding my academic life I just don't know what to do. Anything 0.18 
might happen: may be I will do an exam well and fail or may be I will do 
it badly and pass. 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATION 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=OAO 
0.28 
-0.12 (*) 
0.22 
0.43 
0.33 
N=199 in both English and Turkish fonns. P <0.01 (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the 
two I-T correlations in the two language fonns. 
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4.3.3.3. MASLOC for Luck Subscale: See table 4.3.3.3 for item-total correlation and Cronbach's 
alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 5 items were presented in English, the 
minimwn item-total correlation was 0.07 (item 6) and the maximwn was 0.45 (item 12). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimwn item-total correlation was 0.13 (item 6) and the 
maximwn was 0.51 (item 12). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations in 
the two language forms. The majority of English (3/5) and Turkish (3/5) item-total correlations were 
below 0.30. These results show that even though this subscale had good translation fidelity, the 
majority of items in both in English and Turkish forms were poor. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this sub scale were 0.46 and 
0.55 respectively. The difference between the two subscales is -0.09, with the reliability of the English 
version less. This is greater than our criterion value of -0.08 so the difference is significant. Also the 
reliability of the subsca1e in both languages is poor. 
We will discuss this subscale later. 
Table 4.3.3.3: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
MASLOC's Luck Subscale. 
MASLOC LUCK SUBSCALE'S ITEMS ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.46 
L If I want to obtain a good exam record it is essential that I should have 0.34 
good luck. 
3. Whatever the quality of my work I am always luck')' when it comes to 0.17 
examinations. 
6. My getting good or bad grades in my exams is related to whether the 
precise the topics I have studied come up in exam. 
12. Luck is decisive in the kind of grades I get in my studies. 
13. The grades I get are always determined by a series of random 
circumstances. 
N= 199 in English form; N=203 in Turkish form. 
127 
0.07 
0.45 
0.20 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.55 
0.37 
0.29 
0.13 
0.51 
0.29 
4.3.4. Religiosity Scale (Rohrbaugh and Jessor, 1976): See table 4.3.3.3 for item-total correlation and 
Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 8 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.49 (item 2) and the maximum was 0.67 (item 8). When the same 
items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.45 (item 2) and the 
maximum was 0.66 (item 9). There were no significant differences in item total correlations between 
the two language forms. All item-total correlations in both English and Turkish were above 0.30. These 
results showed that this sub scale had good translation fidelity and that all items were good. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this scale were 0.84 and 
0.83 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the sub scale is not significant and they both 
have high reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
Table 4.3.4: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
MASLOC's Luck Subscale. 
RELIGIOSITY SCALE'S ITEMS ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.84 
2. How often have you attended religious services dming the past year? 0.49 
3. Which of the following best describe your views on prayer or religious 0.57 
meditation? 
4. When you have a serious personal problem how often do you take 0.53 
religious advice or teaching into consideration? 
5. How much of an influence would you say that religion has on the way 0.58 
that you choose to act or the way that you choose to spend your time 
each day? 
6. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your belief 0.64 
about God? 
7. Which of the following statements comes closest to your beliefs about 0.51 
life after death (immortality)? 
8. During the past year, how often have you experienced feeling of 0.67 
religious reverence or devotion? 
9. Do you agree with the following statement: "Religion gives me great 0.61 
amount of comfort and security" 
N= 195 in English form; N=200 in Turkish form. 
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ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=0.83 
0.45 
0.58 
0.53 
0.53 
0.56 
0.55 
0.56 
0.66 
4.3.5. Authoritarianism Scale (Adorno, 1954; Robinson, Shaver and Wrightsman, 1991): See table 
4.3.5 for item-total correlation and Cronbach alpha 
Item-Total correlations: The results showed that when these 30 items were presented in English, the 
minimum item-total correlation was 0.16 (item 2) and the maximum was 0.52 (item 17). When the 
same items were presented in Turkish, the minimum item-total correlation was 0.09 (item 2) and the 
maximum was 0.51 (item 8). There were no significant differences between item-total correlations of 
the two forms. Seven out of thirty items in English (items 2,4,6, 19,26,28 and 29) and eight out of 
thirty items in Turkish (items 2, 4, 6, 9, 13, 16, 18, 19 and 23) had correlations below 0.30. These 
results show that even though this subscale had good translation fidelity, some items in both English 
and Turkish forms were poor. 
Reliability: The reliability coefficients for the English and Turkish forms of this scale were 0.83 and 
0.82 respectively. The difference between the two forms of the subscale is not significant and they both 
have high reliability so the scale has survived translation. 
Table 4.3.5: Item-Total Correlations, and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Forms for 
Authoritarianism 'F' Scale. 
AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE'S ITEMS 
1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues 
children should learn. 
2. No weakness or difficult can holds us back if we have enough will 
power. 
3. Science has its place but there are many important things that can 
never be understood by the human mind 
4. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict. 
5. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power 
whose decisions are obeyed without question. 
6. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think 
about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things. 
7. A person who has no manners, bad habits, and poor breeding can 
hardly expected to get along with decent people. 
8. What youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and 
the will to work and fight for family and country. 
9. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places. 
10. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and 
mix together, a person has to protect himself carefully especially against 
catching an infection or disease from them. 
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ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.83 
0.38 
0.16 
0.41 
0.21 
0.35 
0.22 
0.35 
0.39 
0.31 
0.50 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
FORM 
CRONBACH 
ALPHA=O.82 
0.38 
0.09 
0.37 
0.03 
0.33 
0.21 
0.36 
0.51 
0.28 
0.34 
11. An insult to our honour should always be punished. 0.31 0.34 
12. Y Olmg people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up 0.45 0.40 
they ought to get over them 
13. It is essential for learning or effective work that our teacher or bosses 0.38 0.27 
outline in detail what is to be done and exactly how to do it. 
14. What this country needs most, more than laws and political 0.31 0.37 
programmes, is a few courageous, tireless leaders in whom the people 
can put their faith. 
15. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than 0.38 0.44 
mere imprisonment; such criminal ought to be publicly whipped, or 
worse. 
16. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the week and strong. 0.34 0.23 
17. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a 0.52 0.46 
great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents. 
18. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot 0.33 0.10 
of things. 
19. Some leisure is necessary but it is good hard work makes life 0.26 0.26 
interesting and worthwhile. 
20. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should 0.35 0.31 
remain personal and private. 
21. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake of 0.38 0.46 
flood that will destroy the whole world. 
22. Most of our social problems could be solved ifwe could somehow 0.35 0.38 
get rid of immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people. 
23. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared 0.40 0.28 
to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people 
might least expect it. 
24. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better 0.43 0.37 
off. 
25. Most people don't realise how much our lives are controlled by plots 0.31 0.33 
hatched in secret places. 
26. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be 0.21 0.33 
severely punished. 
27. Books and videos ought not to deal so much with the unpleasant and 0.37 0.34 
seamy side of life: they ought to concentrate on themes that are 
entertaining or uplifting. 
28. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close 0.20 0.35 
friends and relative. 
29. Familiarity breeds contempt. 0.27 0.38 
30. When you come right down to it, it is human nature never to do 0.40 0.33 
anything without an eye to profit. 
N=181 in English form; N= 179 in Turkish form. 
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4.4. SUMMARY 
4.4.1. Item comparisons between forms: 
CAMI: Only one item in the Control beliefs subscale (item 41: "If you want to can you keep from 
doing badly in school?") and one in the Agency beliefs for Powerful Others (item 12: "When you want 
them to, will your teachers help to see that you do well in school?") were significantly different. 
CNSIE: For CNSIE one item (item 36) showed a significant difference between the two language 
forms ("Do you feel that when someone doesn't like you there is little you can do about it?"). 
MASLOC: There was only one significant difference. This was in the MASLOC for Helplessness 
subscale (item 8: "I don't think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grade I will bet will be 
completely manipulated?"). 
RELIGIOSITY: There were no significant differences between the language forms. 
AUTHORITARIANISM: There were no significant differences between the language forms. 
Overall, investigation of the items for differences between language forms have shown that two out of 
sixty four items in CAMI, one out of forty in CNSIE, and one out of fifteen in MASLOC were 
significantly different in the two language forms. The Religiosity and Authoritarianism items were fine. 
These results indicate that· classical item analysis has shown good item fidelity in these scales and 
subscales. 
4.4.2. Absolute values of item-total correlations (r<0.30). The item-total correlations were low for 
some of the items. 
CAMI: In CAMI nine out one hundred and twenty eight item-total correlations were lower then .30. 
Most of these items (7/64) were in the English form: two items in M-E for Effort (items 23, 16); two in 
M-E for Attribute (items 53, 22); one item in M-E Powerful others (item 14) and one for M-E for Luck 
(item 25); one in Agency for Luck (item 8). There were only 2 items (2/64) which showed low item-
total correlations in the Turkish sample. These were in the Means-Ends for Attributions (items 13, 
17 subscale. 
CANSIE: In CANSIE twenty eight out of forty items did not function well in both of the language 
forms. Items which showed less then .30 item-total correlations in both language are follows: Items 1-
6, 8, 9, 11-15, 17-19, 21-25, 28-29, 31-32, 34, 37-38. There were also some items which showed 
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lowcorrelations in only one form. These were: Items 5, 27,33,36 in English and items 7, 10, 19,29, 
37 in Turkish. There were only three out of forty items (items 16, 26, 39) which were good in both 
language fOlTIlS. 
MASLOC: Six out of fifteen items showed low item-total correlations in both language forms. These 
were in the Helplessness subscale (items 4,8, and 9) and the Luck sub scale (items 3,6 and 13). Item 15 
was low only in English. 
AUTHORITARIANISM: In both scales fifteen out of sixty items showed low correlations. Four of 
them were low in both language forms (items 2,4, 6, 19). Two items were low in the English form 
(items 28,29) and five more were low in the Turkish form (items 9, 13, 16, and 18). 
4.4.3. Means, SD and Reliability: 
The minimum and maximum average means in English were 1.60 and 3.79 respectively. In Turkish 
they were 1.64 and 3.79. The differences were not significant. Note that a four 4 point rating scale used 
for CAMI and CANSIE and a six point rating scale for used for MASLOC, with a high score 
representing high internal perceived control; a five point scale was used for Religiosity and a four point 
rating scale for the F -Scale, with high scores representing high religiosity and high authoritarianism 
respectively. The minimum and maximum standard deviations for English were 0.41 and 2.00, 
respectively and those for Turkish 0.42 and 1.95. These also were not different. The mean scores and 
standard deviations of all the scales and subscales were very similar in the two language forms. See 
table 4.4.3. 
The internal consistency of the scales was medium or better (alpha> 0.60). The minimum and 
maximum values were 0.45 and 0.85 in English and 0.40 and 0.83 in Turkish. There were two 
exceptions which were MASLOC's Helplessness (0.45 in English and 0.40 in Turkish) and Luck 
subscales (0.46 in English and 0.55 in Turkish). In MASLOC for Luck the reliability of the English 
form was less than the Turkish form. 
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Table 4.4.3: Summary table of Item Means, Standard Deviations and Internal Consistencies of the Scales and Subscales in the English and Turkish Forms 
and in the Literature. 
_._-
- -
~~ 
SCALES No. of MEANS STANDARD DEVIATIONS INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
Items 
ENGLISH TURKISH ENGLISH TURKISH ENGLISH TURKISH LITERATURE 
CONTROL, MEANS-ENDS, 
AGENCY BELIEFS 
Control Belief 8 1.83 1.85 0.53 0.53 0.85 0.78 0.81 
Means-Ends Beliefs 
I 
Effort 8 2.23 2.23 0.48 0.48 0.66 0.70 0.77 
, 
Luck 8 1.60 1.64 0.41 0.42 0.82 0.81 0.90 
Unknown Factors 8 1.76 1.78 0.48 0.51 0.75 0.76 0.82 
Attribute 8 2.82 2.85 0.47 0.46 0.68 0.68 0.81 
Powerful Others 8 1.97 1.98 0.44 0.46 0.71 0.75 0.70 
Agency Beliefs 
Effort 4 2.35 2.37 0.70 0.60 0.81 0.79 0.67 
Luck 4 2.40 2.40 0.56 0.55 0.61 0.64 0.69 
Attribute 4 2.41 2.36 0.53 0.47 0.69 0.73 0.76 
Powerful Others 4 2.79 2.71 0.68 0.62 0.73 0.72 0.61 
CANS IE 
-w 
.j::., 
I 
Nowicki-Strickland LOC Scale 
MASLOC 
Palenzuela's LOC Scale 
Internal 
Helplessness 
Luck 
RELIGIOSITY SCALE 
AUTHORITARIANISM 
SCALE 
40 2.12 2.08 
5 2.09 2.06 
5 2.82 2.93 
5 3.27 2.96 
8 2.85 2.85 
30 3.79 3.79 
0.66 0.61 0.68 0.67 0.64-0.91 
l.l9 1.20 0.70 0.64 0.81 
2.12 2.21 0.45 0.40 0.82 
1.68 1.56 0.46 0.55 0.84 
1.16 1.21 0.84 0.83 0.90 
2.00 1.95 0.83 0.82 0.81-0.97 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Low item-total correlations in both language fonns for the same item could be explained by the fact 
that these items were completed by bilingual students in Turkey. The other possibility is that the items 
are not as good as the literature suggests (Skinner et al., 1988; Nowicki-Strickland, 1973, Palenzuela, 
1988; Christie, 1991). The only way of finding this out is to repeat the study with other samples. The 
results of such a cross-cultural comparison at the item level will be presented in the second part of this 
study (see chapter 6). The low item-total correlations in the English fonn could be explained partly by 
the students' level of bilingualism or by the good quality of translation. It is quite possible that the latter 
reasoning is correct. 
It seems that, although the classical theory approach cannot take into account biases such as time and 
some fonn differences, as the generalizability approach does, it can help us to investigate the items of 
different language forms. If we compare the number of differences detected by the generalizability 
approach (5/16 scales or subscales) with the classical approach (4/16 scales or subscales) we can see 
the advantages of using the generalizability approach against the classical approach for our purposes. 
On the other hand it is important to know that false alarms can be given by the ANOV A analysis 
because of the sensitivity of the statistics, even though Classical theory is not a sensitive way of 
measuring differences at the item level (Algina & Crocker, 1989). 
Reliability in the Literature: The reliabilities for CAMI's Means-Ends for effort, luck, unknown factors 
and attribute, Agency for luck and attribute; and all MASLOC's subscales were lower than the original 
studies in both language forms (Skinner et al., 1988; Palenzuela, 1988) but only the MASLOC 
subscales were much less than in the original study (Palenzuela, 1988). The subscales for CAMl's 
Means-Ends for powerful others and Agency for effort and powerful others were more reliable than in 
the original sample (Skinner et al., 1988). See table 4.4.3. This can be attributed to the good adaptation 
and translation fidelity of these subscales. Other possible reasons, such as a high relationship between 
agency and outcomes in the Turkish culture, will be discussed later on (see chapter 9). 
Also, when the reliabilities were compared with the literature we mainly found that CAMI's reliability 
was similar to others reported in the literature. In the Agency beliefs subscale the results of the Turkish 
bilingual sample was even better (e.g. for the Agency for effort sub scale the reliability of the English 
fonn was 0.79 and that of the Twkish fonn was 0.81. In the literature it is 0.67 (Skinner et al., 1988). 
See table 4.4.3. for the summary. For MASLOC the reliabilities were lower than the literature, 
particularly for the Helplessness and Luck sub scales (Palenzuela, 1988) (see the summary table). The 
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Religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1976) and Authoritarianism (Christie, 1991) scales were fine. 
CNSIE's reliability was at the lower range of the many reported in the literature but most importantly 
most of the items had low item-total correlations in both forms. Therefore use of the scale is 
questioned. No decision will be made until further investigation with Item Response theory (IRT) in the 
next chapter. 
Comparisons between language forms of this study have shown that CAMI's Control beliefs sub scale 
and MASLOC's Internal subscale reliabilities were better in the English form. CAMI's means-ends for 
effort, powerful others, Agency for attribute and MASLOC's Luck subscales reliabilities were better in 
the Turkish form. 
Reliability indices were compared using Cronbach's alpha Only MASLOC's luck subscale showed a 
large difference between the two language forms. The other scales had very similar reliabilities in both 
languages. 
To conclude it can be said that apart from the Helplessness and Luck subscales MASLOC's translation 
fidelity seems fine according to classical item analysis. These results are slightly different from the 
earlier analysis using the generalizability approach. According to the ANOV A results in the previous 
chapter, most of the scales needed further investigation. The discrepancies between these two different 
methods may be because there were more sources of variance to be detected in the Generalizability 
analysis (forms, occasions, interaction) than in the Classical analysis (forms only). Collapsing the data 
from four language forms to two language forms for the Classical analysis removed the occasion 
differences and order effects which were a source of variance (Shavelson & Webb, 1991, Hambleton et 
al., 1991; Algina & Crocker, 1989). The item level analysis will be taken further using Item Response 
theory (see chapter 7) 
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CHAPTER 5: ITEM RESPONSE THEORY 
CHAPTER 5: ITEM RESPONSE THEORY: DETECTING TRANSLATION FIDELITY 
WITH ITEM RESPONSE THEORY 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the third part of the item fidelity study, item response theOlY has been used to detect bias in the 
translated CAM!, CANSIE, MASLOC, Religiosity, and Authoritarianism questionnaires. 
Item response theory has been developed as an alternative to classical test theory in psychometrics over 
the last 29 years (Lord, 1968). It produces itern characteristic curves which show the probability of 
giving a particular response to an itern as a function of the respondent's position on the dimension being 
measured. One other important characteristic of Itern Response theory is that, like classical item 
analysis, it measures parameters of the item. These are ( a) item discrimination, (b) item difficulty and, 
for some models, (c) guessing. The parameters estimated depend on the situation (e.g., whether there 
are two or more response alternatives) and the precise model chosen by the analyst (Thissen, Steinberg 
& Wainer 1993; Algina & Crocker, 1989; Hambleton et al., 1991). 
5.2.MEmOD 
5.2.1. Design 
Data from the four conditions and two occasions or times were combined in the same way as for the 
classical item analysis. 
5.2.5. Analysis 
Thissen's (1991) Multi10g package was used to fit Samejimas (1969) Graded Model to the items of 
each subscale in the questionnaires. The MUL TILOG analysis treats the two language forms of each 
scale or subscale as one scale. For example, the CAMl-Control Beliefs subscale consists of 8 items but 
this is analysed as a scale with 16 items. MUL TILOG estimates the parameters for each item on this 
combined scale which fits the data best. For any scalelsubscale the number of parameters depends on 
the number of altemative responses (e.g. strongly disagree, strongly agree) represented on a monatomic 
rating scale. If there are n altemative responses then there are n parameters. One parameter, the "a" 
parameter, always measures the discriminating power of the item. The remaining n-l parameters are 
"b" parameters and show the location of the cut-off points between each response and the other. In 
CAMl and CANSIE there are four parameters (one "a", three "b"). The religiosity scale has five 
parameters (one "a", four "b") and MASLOC and the Authoritarianism scale has 6 parameters (one "a", 
five "b"). 
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The programme is nul once in free fonn and once in constrained fonn. In the free fonn parameters are 
estimated for each item independently. In the constrained fonn the programme estimates parameters 
for each item which are the same for both the English and Turkish versions of that item. For each nul 
of the programme it calculates a ~ statistic of goodness of fit The difference between these two 
values is then looked up to see if they are significantly different If they are not significantly different 
then the English and Turkish versions of the scale are considered equivalent If they are significantly 
different then further investigation of each item is required. See Figme 5.2.5 illustration of data design. 
Figure 5.2.5: illustration of data design for DIF analysis of the two language fonns investigated. 
--------------------------------------_._-_. 
Items 
-----------------------------------------------------------------_ .. 
Ell EI2 ED EI4 TIl TI2 TI3 TI4 
Sl 2 3 4 2 3 4 
S2 1 3 3 2 2 4 4 
S3 2 4 3 2 1 3 4 
--------------------------------- ---.-----------------------
EIl..n: Item no in English, TIl ..• n: Item no in Turlcish, S1-n: participants. 
The aim of the item investigation is to identify the items responsible for the difference, so the 
parameters for the English and Turkish fonns from the free nul are compared. If the item characteristic 
curves for each version of the item are different then this item is marked as possibly responsible for the 
difference. Items are rank ordered in terms of the differences between ICCs. The X2 for the constrained 
nul of the programme is calculated again but this time the item with the biggest difference is allowed to 
be free and all others are still constrained. If this X2 is still significantly different from the free X2 then 
the process is repeated, with two items (with the two biggest differences) being allowed to be free. This 
process is repeated until there is no significant difference between the totally free and partially free X2• 
As a result of this the items contributing to the difference between the two versions of the scale have 
been identified. 
In the IRT literature, the investigation of differences between item functions is called differential item 
functioning (DJF) (Hambleton et al., 1991, Holland and Wainer, 1993). DIF identifies the testing bias 
of the item by comparing the response to it by different groups or subgroups. Different methods have 
been introduced to do this. Two major method are: (a) comparison of item parameters "a" and "b"s 
(Lord, 1980; Hambleton, 1991) and (b) comparison of the ICCs rather than their parameters (Rudner, 
Getson & Knight, 1980; Raju, 1988, 1990). When the area between the ICCs is not zero DIF is 
present The area to test for differences between ICCs can be chosen arbitrarily and can be calculated 
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with a formula The problem with the first method is that because the differences are tested by the chi-
square statistic, there is a high chance of getting a false-positive (Mc Laughlin & Drasgow, 1987; 
Hambleton et al., 1991). The problem of using ICCs is that they use cut-off values to detect the DIF 
which may be unstable from one sample to another (Hambleton et al. 1991; Rogers & Hambleton, 
1989). There are other DIF methods introduced recently from outside IRT (e.g. Mantel-Haenszel 
(Holland & Thayer, 1988; Holland and Wainer, 1993) and there is the logistic regression procedure 
(Swaminathan & Rogers, 1990) but these will not be discussed here. 
In this study we are going to use a combined method. Firstly, we test "a" and "b" differences at the 
scale or subscale level rather than at the item level using X2. Secondly, we looked at "a" and "b"s in 
terms of their item information value in order to assess each item's contribution to the scale. IRT uses 
item infonnation functions Ii (theta) to detect the amount of information gathered from an item. Item 
information is highly dependent on an item's discriminating power. The value of Ii (theta) is high if the 
person is not guessing and it is a good indicator of the utility of test items. According to these criteria 
information is higher when the "b" value is close to theta than when the "b" value is far from theta and 
information is generally higher when the "a" parameter is high (Hambleton, Swaminathan & Rogers, 
1991 p.91). These two criteria (a and b) are equivalent to the r<0.30 criterion used in the classical 
approach. Good and bad items are assessed using a criterion value. This is whether the "a" value is 
bigger than 0.50. For high item discrimination the optimum value is about 2. The value of "a" (item 
difficulty) increases and gets close to the optimum value of2 when the responses to each item are well 
distributed and get smaller when the responses accumulate on one rating point. When the value of "a" is 
small, the value of bs is large and will not give any information and therefore should be ignored. An 
item discrimination value ("b" parameters) may also get bigger if very few subjects use a particular 
rating point. This is because there will be a big discrepancy between the expected and real response 
frequencies for this rating point and therefore the information gathered from this rating point will be 
low. 
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5.2.2. Instruments 
The questionnaire used were CAMI, CANSIE, MASLOC, Religiosity and Authoritarianism as 
described in previous chapter. 
5.2.3. Subjects 
The same 204 Turkish bilingual students. See the Method chapter. 
5.2.4. Procedure 
This was the same as in the previous analysis. 
5.2.5. Hypothesis 
If the items have been well translated there will not be any differences between the parameters-free and 
parameters-constrained runs of the programme. By examining chi-square difference values from these 
two analyses, any significant differences in the behaviour of the items in the two languages can be 
identified. 
5.3. RESULTS: Detecting Item Bias With Item Response Theory 
5.3.1. CAMI (Skinner et al., 1988) 
5.3 .1.1. Control Beliefs 
The results showed that this subsca1e was similar in the two language forms (the differences between 
X2=52.1, d:f=32, N.S.). The items were also fine in terms of the absolute values of the parameters (for 
all items: a>O.50). See table 5.3.1.1. 
For a graphical illustration of an item with different English and Turkish ICCs see figure 5.3.1. (item 7) 
. For a graphical illustration of an item with similar English and Turkish ICCs see figure Figure 5.3.2. 
(item 5). 
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Figure 53."; Item Charactertstics Curves for Item 5 in 
English and Turkish Languages, as an Example of 
One Unsuccessfully Translated Item. 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 5 in English Form 
Response posibility 
1~3T222SG7222G~C7==722S2222n 
- Almost Never 
-\- Sometimes 
"*" Often 
----- Almost Always 
Subjects z score on item (Theta) 
Q. 3: If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 5 in Turkish Form 
Response probability 
1~~~~~~~~~~--~----~~--~~ 
- Almost Never 
0.6 
-\- Sometimes 
0.4 "*" Often 
----- Almost Always 
o. 
·3.5. -3 . ·2.5. -2 . -1.S. -1 . -0.5. 0 . 0.5. 1 . 1.5. 2 . 2.5. 3 . 3.5 
Subjects z score on item (Theta) 
Q. 3: Dusununki ogretmen size bir soru sordu ve siz cevabi bilemediniz. Bunun basiniza 
gelmemesi icin yapabileceginiz bir sey var midir? 
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Figure53.i Item Characteristics Curves for Item 3 in 
English and Turkish Languages, as an Example of 
One Successfully Translated Item. 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 3 in English Form 
Response probability 
1~~~7Z~77~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Subjects z score on scale (Theta) 
- Almost Never 
+ Sometimes 
""*"" Often 
-- Almost Always 
Q.42: Can you get all the problems (for example in spelling) right, when you want to? 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 3 in Turkish Form 
Response probability 
1r-----~--------------------------_, 
0.8 .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. - - - - -
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 - - - - -
o ' ," 
-3,5. -3 . ·2.5. -2 . -1.5. ·1 . -0.5.· a . 0.5. 1 . 1.5. 2 . 2,5. 3 . 3.5 
Subjects z scor~ on scale (Theta) 
- Almost Never 
+ Sometimes 
""*"" Often 
-- Almost Always 
Q.42: Istediginiz zaman (ornegin imla ve gramer konusunda) butun sorulari dogru 
yapabilen birisi misiniz? 
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Table 5.3.1.1: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Fonns of the 
CAMI's Control Beliefs Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI7 1.37 -.43 1.59 4.07 0.69 -1.15 2.39 8.05 
CAMIIO 2.00 - .13 1.58 3.29 1.65 - .36 1.79 3.61 
CAMI42 1.79 - .79 U5 2.90 1.56 -1.38 1.04 2.85 
CAMI35 1.93 - .25 1.62 3.67 2.18 - .37 1.63 2.78 
CAMI3 1.19 - .65 1.48 3.70 .69 -1.87 1.63 6.05 
CAMI5 .83 -1.01 2.23 6.85 .94 -.42 2.39 6.10 
CAMI34 1.29 -U7 1.30 4.21 1.66 - .87 1.32 3.31 
CAMI41 1.73 - .39 1.47 2.69 1.58 - .56 1.44 2.92 
5.3.1.2. Means-Ends for Effort 
The results showed that this subscale was similar in the two language forms (differences X2=34.6, 
df=32, N.S.). The items were also fine in terms of the absolute values of the parameters (for all items: 
a>O.50). See table 5.3.1.2. 
Table 5.3.1.2 : Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Effort Sub scale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 II A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI23 0.79 -2.56 1.39 5.72 1.04 -2.13 1.51 4.00 
CAMI20 0.85 -2.34 1.37 5.38 0.97 -1.96 1.31 5.22 
CAMI61 1.35 -1.43 1.78 3.53 1.07 -1.86 1.33 3.94 
CAMI64 UO -1.00 2.02 4.30 U7 -1.21 1.28 3.88 
CAMI19 0.84 -2.14 0.90 5.40 1.08 -2.08 0.61 3.32 
CAMI16 0.78 -2.89 0.94 4.17 1.08 -2.00 0.82 3.85 
CAMI56 0.95 -3.53 -0.09 2.91 0.94 -3.79 -0.21 3.09 
CAMI47 1.16 -2.78 -0.10 2.79 0.92 -3.02 -0.27 3.39 
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5.3.1.3. Means-Ends for Attribute 
The results showed that this subscale was similar in the two language fonus CXZ=14.8, df=32, N.S.). In 
tenus of absolute values, item 13 showed very low a and high bs in both language forms (a=O .03, b 1 =-
85.9, b2=12.18, b3=89.45; a=O.04, b1=-66.9, b2=4.82, b3=69.88 in English and Turkish, 
respectively). When the item discrimination (a) value is very low the bs do not give any meaningful 
information. On this occasion a vet)' small number of subjects selected the first and fourth rating points 
on the scale. See table 5.3.1.3. 
Table 5.3.1.3: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Fonus of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Attribution Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM I TURKISH FORM I 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMU8 0.98 -3.64 -0.27 3.22 1.48 -3.00 -0.10 2.27 
CAMI13 0.Q3 -85.9 12.18 89.45 0.04 -66.9 4.82 69.88 
CAMISO 1.34 -2.73 -0.23 2.05 1.33 -2.92 -0.17 2.39 
CAMI53 0.68 -4.46 -0.34 3.35 0.66 -5.59 0.25 4.03 
CAMI17 0.87 -4.61 -1.21 2.58 0.84 -5.03 -1.36 2.74 
CAMI22 1.48 -3.52 -1.71 0.87 1.34 -3.51 -1.90 1.01 
CAMI49 1.19 -4.47 -2.14 0.67 1.01 -4.63 -1.90 1.18 
CAMI52 1.28 -4.71 -2.37 0.39 1.15 -5.15 -2.14 0.91 
5.3.1.4. Means-Ends for Powerful others 
The results showed that this sub scale was similar in two language form (X2=31.8, df=32, N.S.). In 
terms of absolute values, item 14 showed. a low "a" in the English form (a=O.40, bl=-2.5, b2=3.57, 
b3=9.54; a=O.65, b1=-1.64, b2=2.41, b3=5.48 in English and Turkish, respectively). See table 5.3.1.4. 
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Table 5.3.1.3: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Fonns of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Powerful Others Sub scale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI24 1.46 -1.00 1.36 4.00 1.32 -1.17 1.63 3.71 
CAMI14 0.40 -2.50 3.57 9.54 0.65 -1.64 2.41 5.48 
CAMI60 1.43 -1.26 1.52 4.59 1.47 -0.94 1.19 3.49 
CAMI45 0.60 -2.54 2.32 6.53 0.67 -2.48 1.76 5.60 
CAMI15 1.20 -0.60 2.36 3.78 1.82 -0.51 2.24 4.04 
CAMI21 1.77 -0.59 1.94 3.63 2.18 -0.41 2.10 3.33 
CAMI63 1.13 -2.35 1.32 3.74 1.45 -2.05 1.13 2.76 
CAMI51 1.05 -2.48 1.91 4.16 0.94 -3.05 1.58 3.89 
5.3.1.5. Means-Ends for Luck 
The results showed that the subscale was significantly different in the two language fonn (X2=60.4, 
df=32, p<O.Ol). The parameters and ICCs showed that item 28 (a=1.4 1, bl=-O.03, b2=2.54, b3=14.48 
in English fonn; a=1.22, bl=-O.08, b2=2.46, b3=5.03 in Turkish fonn) and item 29 (a=1.87, bl=O.18, 
b2=2.56, b3=8.67 in English fonn; a=1.25, bl=-0.27, b2=2.83, b3=4.29 in Turkish fonn) were 
functioning differently in the two language fonns. These items were fine in tenns of absolute value (all 
items: a>O.50). See table 5.3.1.5. 
Table 5.3.1.5: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Fonns of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Luck Sub scale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI28 1.41 -0.03 2.54 14.48 1.22 -0.08 2.46 5.03 
CAMI25 0.69 0.61 3.52 5.45 0.70 0.24 3.09 4.78 
CAMI57 1.91 -0.07 2.62 3.09 1.65 -0.40 1.84 3.62 
CAMI48 1.45 -1.00 2.43 3.90 1.55 -1.05 2.00 3.93 
CAMI29 1.87 0.18 2.56 8.67 1.25 -0.27 2.83 4.29 
CAMI32 1.41 -0.09 2.63 4.52 1.17 -0.34 2.52 3.92 
CAMI58 1.53 0.53 2.57 3.57 1.53 0.01 2.33 3.68 
CAMI62 1.64 0.14 2.56 4.09 1.52 -0.08 2.15 3.50 
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5.3.1.6. Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
The results showed that the subsca1e was not significantly different in the two language forms 
(X2=14.8, df=32, N.S.). The items were fine in terms of absolute value, which means that for all items 
a>0.50. See table 5.3.1.6. 
Table 5.3.1.6: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Unknown Factors Subsca1e with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI30 0.89 -0.57 2.24 3.79 1.35 -0.39 1.40 3.14 
CAMI26 1.06 -0.46 2.19 4.71 1.29 -0.68 1.70 3.33 
CAMI46 1.37 -0.11 2.14 3.81 1.68 -0.22 1.81 2.65 
CAMI55 1.41 0.16 2.40 3.82 2.20 -0.13 1.47 2.32 
CAMI31 1.29 -0.78 2.02 3.13 1.24 -0.95 1.91 3.83 
CAMI27 0.84 -1.03 2.43 4.25 1.29 -0.54 1.70 3.15 
CAMI54 1.27 -0.58 2.58 4.61 1.80 -0.76 1.96 2.75 
CAMI59 0.62 -2.06 2.92 5.58 1.38 -0.80 1.71 3.29 
5.3.1. 7. Agency for Effort 
The results showed that this subscale was similar in the two language forms (X2=23.8, df=16, N.S.). 
The items were also fine in terms of the absolute value (all items: a>O.50). See table 5.3.1.7. 
Table 5.3.1.7: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Effort Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMII 2.30 -1.43 -0.20 1.46 1.93 -1.71 -0.16 1.83 
CAMI4 2.94 -1.32 -0.03 1.60 2.66 -1.67 0.14 1.77 
CAMI37 1.33 -1.59 0.36 2.28 1.59 -1.28 0.31 2.13 
CAMI33 2.73 -1.56 0.27 1.59 2.76 -1.35 0.12 2.01 
5.3.1.8. Agency for Attribute 
The results showed that this subsca1e was similar in two language form (X2=14.8, df=16, N.S.). In 
terms of absolute value item 9 showed a low "a" and high "bs" in both language forms (a=O.03, bl=-
91.6, b2=-4.07, b3=78.37; a=O.03, bl=-96.9, b2=-4.77, b3=73.39 in English and Turkish, 
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respectively). Due to a very low discrimination value (a) this item did not function well in either of the 
samples. See table 5.3.1.8. 
Table 5.3.1.8: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Fonns of the 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Attribution Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI2 2.05 -1.83 0.20 2.11 1.93 -1.71 0.33 2.37 
CAMI9 0.03 -91.6 -4.07 78.37 0.03 -96.9 -4.77 73.39 
CAMI39 1.19 -3.46 -0.41 2.50 1.38 -2.32 -0.17 2.33 
CAMI44 1.38 -1.36 1.01 3.16 1.89 -1.18 0.84 3.04 
5.3.1.9. Agency for Powerful Others 
The results showed that the subscale was significantly different in the two language forms (X2=46.2, 
df-=16, p<0.01). The parameters showed that item 12 (a=2.58, b1=-1.67, b2=-0.29, b3=O.95 in English 
form; a=1.99, b1=-2.20, b2=-0.30, b3=1.23 in Turkish form) was functioning differently in the two 
language forms. When the programme was run with item 12 free the differences between X2 became 
non significant. The items were fine in tenns of absolute value (all items: 3>0.50). See table 5.3.1.9. 
Table 5.3.1.9: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Fonns of the 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI12 2.58 -1.67 -0.29 0.95 1.99 -2.20 -0.31 1.23 
CAMIll 1.39 -3.07 -1.14 0.83 1.38 -2.87 -0.68 1.54 
CAMI40 1.89 -1.88 -0.42 1.09 2.26 -1.84 -0.03 1.12 
CAMI43 1.58 -2.05 -0.42 2.21 1.48 -2.70 -0.40 1.58 
5.3.1.10. Agency for Luck 
The results showed that this subscale was similar in the two language forms (X2=23.8, df=16, N.S.). 
The items were fine in terms of absolute value (all items: a>0.50). See table 5.3.1.10. 
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Table 5.3.1.10: Items Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish FonTIS of the 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Luck Subscale with Samejima's Model in IRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI6 0.98 -1.98 0.68 2.59 1.21 -1.33 0.59 2.34 
CAMI8 1.08 -4.12 -0.27 3.00 1.19 -4.40 -0.l4 2.72 
CAMI38 1.69 -2.03 0.38 2.54 1.41 -2.21 0.l9 2.38 
CAMI36 1.57 -2.08 0.53 2.84 2.l4 -1.67 0.33 2.02 
5.3.2. Nowicki-Strickland Internal vs External Locus of Control Scale (CNSIE) (Nowicki and 
Strickland, 1974). 
This test has no subscales and consists of 40 items. The English and Turkish versions combined have 
80 items. Because the programme was not designed for so many items there are no results for this scale 
when the parameters were fixed. We believe this occurred for two reasons. Firstly, the number of 
subjects was small for the size of the scale (204 subjects for 80 items). We know from the literature 
that it is better to have a large sample and small number of question to get the best-fit for the model 
(Lord, 1980, Hambleton at al., 1991). Secondly, both the classical analysis and the free run of the 
programme suggest that this may be a poor scale. If this is true then the responses to the individual 
items will have been inconsistent and affected the estimation of the best-fit for the model. Even the free 
run did not seem to run efficiently. The maximum inter-cycle parameter change (which gives the 
overallleve1 of parameter fitness) was greater than the expected value of 0.05. So the results of the 
analysis for this scale have to be treated carefully. See table 5.3.2. 
Investigation of the individual items from the results of the free run showed that 11140 items had very 
low discrimination values in both language fonTIS (e.g. item 1,3,4,8,9, 10, 17-19,21 and 24),2/40 
had low discrimination value in the Turkish fonn (7, 14) and 14/40 had low discrimination values in 
the English fonn (6, 15, 16, 22, 25, 27, 29, 32-35, 38, 39 and 40). The remaining items (13/40) 
functioned well. 
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Table 5.3.2: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Fonns of the 
Nowicki-Strickland mternal vs External Scale for Children with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
NOVI 0.11 -22.4 0.62 18.17 0.09 -33.8 -5.54 18.97 
NOV2 0.58 -2.93 0.81 4.47 0.75 -2.65 1.19 3.76 
NOV3 0.08 -28.1 4.55 20.27 0.16 -12.3 2.88 10.98 
NOV4 0.03 -49.4 14.74 83.98 0.06 -23.3 8.26 43.91 
NOV5 0.60 -2.76 2.77 6.06 0.80 -2.55 2.17 4.07 
NOV6 0.73 -0.15 3.71 7.58 0.82 0.00 3.59 5.99 
NOV7 1.10 -1.23 1.88 3.60 0.60 -2.53 2.02 6.09 
NOV8 0.12 -11.7 3.49 22.98 0.06 -31.2 5.57 39.27 
NOV9 0.16 -11.7 1.00 16.12 0.05 -53.1 -6.77 41.57 
NOVIO 0.D7 -26.7 12.24 39.96 0.04 -49.8 6.90 52.78 
NOVll 0.65 -2.81 1.60 4.49 0.69 -3.40 1.18 4.55 
NOV12 0.88 -2.47 0.96 3.40 0.52 -4.01 1.70 6.09 
NOV13 0.44 -4.46 0.87 5.53 0.55 -3.02 0.89 5.01 
NOV14 0.78 -2.17 1.28 2.89 0.44 -3.38 1.70 5.90 
NOV15 0.32 -3.81 1.50 7.37 0.53 -2.41 1.55 5.42 
NOV16 0.50 -3.16 2.97 6.19 0.81 -2.24 1.87 3.95 
NOV17 0.08 -17.2 1.05 20.08 0.12 -18.4 -2.81 11.16 
NOV18 0.04 -24.9 43.80 79.79 0.23 -5.79 6.74 15.27 
NOV19 0.39 -0.81 3.13 5.94 0.69 -0.03 2.36 4.42 
NOV20 1.05 -1.18 0.74 2.86 0.87 -1.38 1.15 3.30 
NOV21 0.01 -28.8 71.98 188.8 0.02 -40.3 50.74 123.0 
NOV22 0.05 -30.7 10.73 50.80 0.43 -2.10 1.66 7.07 
NOV23 0.07 -4.68 20.11 38.39 0.54 -0.83 2.72 5.72 
NOV24 0.02 -89.7 39.67 146.7 0.02 -93.7 45.62 178.5 
NOV25 0.14 -5.10 9.19 23.71 0.58 -1.38 2.44 7.02 
NOV26 0.74 0.44 2.80 5.98 1.09 0.26 1.90 4.01 
NOV27 0.27 -7.10 5.84 11.21 0.82 -2.05 2.37 4.42 
NOV28 0.69 -2.45 0.88 3.92 0.81 -2.20 0.61 3.97 
NOV29 0.07 -16.0 16.06 39.01 0.57 -2.73 1.92 5.64 
NOV30 0.66 -1.53 2.43 6.62 1.62 -0.51 1.36 3.44 
NOV31 0.57 -1.52 2.92 7.14 0.62 -1.39 2.82 6.56 
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ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
NOVI 0.11 -22.4 0.62 18.17 0.09 -33.8 -5.54 18.97 
NOV2 0.58 -2.93 0.81 4.47 0.75 -2.65 1.19 3.76 
NOV32 0.04 -57.2 10.34 70.75 0.54 -3.22 1.57 6.44 
NOV33 0.34 -3.02 4.02 8.41 0.98 -1.12 1.78 3.93 
NOV34 0.32 -6.03 0.73 7.55 1.22 -1.04 0.78 3.66 
NOV35 0.08 -0.72 19.08 30.06 1.52 0.16 1.36 2.16 
NOV36 0.49 -2.52 2.88 6.49 1.01 -1.34 1.68 4.25 
NOV37 0.80 0.57 4.02 4.93 0.78 0.33 3.25 5.02 
NOV38 0.37 -3.27 2.89 7.39 0.98 -1.40 1.28 3.62 
NOV39 0.32 -2.48 4.06 8.73 0.99 -0.68 1.57 2.84 
NOV40 0.20 -1.96 5.87 15.87 0.44 -0.98 0.76 2.84 
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5.3.3. MASLOC (palenzuela, 1988). 
5.3.3.1. MASLOC's Internal Subscale 
The results showed that this subscale was significantly different in the two language fOlm Qf=62.0, 
df=30, p<O.OI). The Parameters and ICes showed that item 10 (a=1.9S, bl=O.11, b2=1.49, b3=2.26, 
b4=2.61, bS=2.91 in English fOIm; a=1.08, bl=-O.OS, b2=1.S7, b3=2.99, b4=13.32, bS=-4.66 in 
Turkish form) and item 11 (a=1.66, b1=-0.14, b2=1.42, b3=2.30, b4=2.81, bS=3.S1 in English form; 
a=1.08, b1=-0.01, b2=2.22, b3=3.00, b4=4.37, bS=8.80 in Turkish form) were functioning differently 
in the two language forms. When the program run after freeing item 10 and 11 but still constraining the 
other items, X2 became non-significant. All the items were fine in terms of absolute value (all items: 
a>O.SO). See table S.3.3.1. 
5.3.3.2. MALSOC's Helplessness Subscale 
The results showed that this subscale was not significantly different in the two language forms 
(X2=46.9, df=30, N.S.). In terms of absolute value item 8 showed "a" Iowa and therefore high "bs" in 
both language forms (a=O.08, bl=-23.3S, b2=-10.S7, b3=-2.84, b4=S.30, bS=17.SS; a=O.14, b1=-
13.0S, b2=-3.96, b3=O.91, b4=5.36, b5=15.01 in English and Turkish, respectively). Item 15 showed a 
low "a" and a high "b" in Turkish only (a=O.84, b1=-1.84, b2=-0.37, b3=0.31, b4=1.94, bS=3.76; 
a=O.30, b1=-1.84, b2=-0.37, b3=O.31, b4=1.94, bS=3.76, b4=1.94, b5=7.71 in English and Turkish 
respectively). See table 5.3.3.2. 
5.3.3.3. MASLOC's Luck Subscale 
The results showed that this sub scale was significantly different in the two language forms (X2=89.6, 
df=30, p<O.Ol). The parameters and ICes showed that item 13 was functioning differently in the two 
language forms (a=O.23, b1=-6.34, b2=-2.27, b3=1.17, b4=7.41, b5=14.S6; a=1.42, b1=-0.52, 
b2=0.64, b3=1.12, b4=2.01, b5=2.81 in English and Turkish forms respectively). When the program 
was run after freeing item 13 but still constraining the other items X2 became non-significant. See table 
S.3.3.3. 
In terms of absolute values, item 3 and 13 functioned poorly in the English form (Item 3: a=O. 41, b 1 =-
3.45, b2=-0.09, b3=2.09, b4=6.29, b5=l1.33; a=O.62, b1=-2.87, b2=-0.07, b3=1.23, b4=3.91, 
b5=7.07 in English and Turkish form respectively. Item 13 see above). Item 6 was poor in the Turkish 
form (a=0.60, bl=-7.91, b2=-4.31, b3=-2.65, b4=-O.OS, bS=3.33 for English; a=0.36, b1= -1O.8S, 
b2=-6.01, b3=-4.18, b4=O.55, b5= 4.44 in Turkish). 
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Table 5.3.3.1: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the MASLOC's Internal Sub scale with Samejima's Model of 
IRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
MASLOC2 1.11 -0.67 1.02 1.63 2.53 3.98 1.57 -0.76 0.82 1.62 2.04 2.65 
MASLOC 5 1.07 -1.30 0.83 2.16 3.57 5.45 0.93 -1.45 0.97 1.77 2.61 3.68 
MASLOC 7 0.93 -1.66 0.76 2.48 3.35 5.38 0.94 -2.14 0.68 1.94 3.36 4.90 
MASLOC 10 1.95 0.l0 1.48 2.24 2.59 2.90 1.55 -0.06 1.56 2.98 9.13 -3.88 
MASLOC 11 1.67 -0.14 1.41 2.28 2.79 3.49 1.08 -0.02 2.21 2.98 4.35 8.68 
Table 5.3.3.2: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the MASLOC's Helplessness Subscale with Samejima's Model 
ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
MASLOC4 0.79 -0.54 0.62 1.49 2.78 4.21 0.75 -0.55 0.88 1.69 2.63 5.55 
MASLOC 8 0.20 -9.38 -4.32 -1.20 2.11 7.07 0.30 -6.39 -1.95 0.41 2.58 7.20 
MASLOC9 1.53 -0.90 0.38 1.00 1.77 2.76 1.31 -1.44 0.20 0.92 2.26 3.33 
MASLOC 14 1.67 -1.l7 -0.12 0.62 1.72 2.62 0.94 -1.19 0.24 1.11 2.79 4.83 
MASLOC 15 0.84 -1.85 -0.38 0.31 1.93 3.76 0.30 -6.32 -2.01 0.18 
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Table 5.3.3.3: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the MASLOC's Luck Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT. 
- - --
~ - --_._- --~ 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
MASLOC 1 0.82 -2.70 -0.59 0.29 2.58 6.00 1.63 -1.52 -0.25 0.56 1.96 3.56 
MASLOC 3 0.49 -2.96 -0.09 1.78 5.34 9.60 0.73 -2.53 -0.07 1.06 3.39 6.12 
MASLOC6 0.62 -7.69 -4.21 -2.60 -0.06 3.22 0.45 -8.70 -4.90 -3.41 0.46 3.65 
MASLOC 12 0.75 -2.76 -0.20 1.11 3.55 6.46 2.86 -0.99 0.09 0.60 1.64 2.20 
MASLOC 13 0.36 -4.05 -1.48 0.70 4.62 8.97 1.30 -0.56 0.66 1.16 2.09 2.94 
-----
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5.3.4. Religiosity Scale (Rohrbaugh and Jessor, 1976). 
The results showed that this scale worked well in both languages without showing any difference 
between different language foons (X2=43.2, df=40 N.S.). All absolute values for all item of this scale 
were fine. See table 5.3.4. 
5.3.5. Authoritarianism (Christie, 1991). 
This scale has no subscales and has 30 items. Like the Nowicki-Strickland we found it difficult to run 
the programme because the analysis is designed for 50 items and the English and Turkish versions 
combined have 60 items. The scale showed significant differences between the two runs (X2=277.6, 
df-=180, p<O.OI). However, the value ofX2 when the parameters were fixed was 0.0. The expectation 
usually is that X2 increases when the parameters are fixed. It does not seem that we can use this result. 
Investigation of the individual items from the results of the free run showed that 3/30 items had very 
low discrimination values in both language forms (e.g. item 2, 4, 18); 1/30 had low discrimination 
value in the Turkish form (item 20) and 4/30 had low discrimination values in the English form (3, 16, 
19,25). The remaining items (22/30) functioned well. See table 5.3.5. 
153 
-Vl 
.j::.. 
Table 5.3.4: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the Religiosity Scale with Samejima's Model of IRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A B1 B2 B3 B4 A B1 B2 B3 
RELIGIOSITY 1 1.73 -0.38 1.62 2.26 2.42 1.28 -0.74 1.59 2.10 
RELIGIOSITY 2 1.55 -2.14 -1.19 -0.82 0.95 1.71 -2.16 -1.08 -0.94 
RELIGIOSITY 3 1.53 -0.35 0.74 1.87 3.22 1.47 -0.28 0.91 1.76 
RELIGIOSITY 4 1.82 -0.66 0.37 1.29 2.65 1.59 -0.67 0.50 1.67 
RELIGIOSITY 5 1.59 -2.98 -2.08 -1.08 0.36 1.93 -2.64 -1.81 -0.94 
RELIGIOSITY 6 1.49 -2.51 -1.36 0.62 1.04 1.44 -2.43 -1.36 0.51 
RELIGIOSITY 7 1.78 -1.31 0.40 1.49 2.57 1.98 -0.87 0.54 1.95 
RELIGIOSITY 8 1.71 -1.96 -1.10 0.00 2.08 2.22 -1.86 -1.12 0.02 
i 
B4 I 
2.65 
0.87 
3.12 
2.83 
0.38 
0.8.7 
2.79 
1.54 
Table 5.3.5: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Forms of the Authoritarianism Scale with Samejima's Model ofIRT. 
ENGLISH FORM TURKISH FORM 
ITEMS A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 A B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
AUTO 1 1.04 -1.51 -0.48 0.04 1.15 2.78 0.95 -1.58 -0.61 0.30 1.75 3.24 
AUTO 2 0.17 -26.1 -15.4 -12.1 -5.11 4.27 0.21 -21.6 -15.7 -9.04 -4.54 5.81 
AUTO 3 0.59 -6.11 -3.29 -2.32 -0.50 2.52 0.74 -5.02 -2.83 -1.86 -0.10 2.47 
AUTO 4 0.23 -14.8 -10.1 -7.09 -2.09 3.45 0.19 -21.9 -15.1 -8.84 -3.83 4.86 
AUTO 5 0.86 -2.13 -0.85 0.15 1.52 3.53 0.76 -2.63 -1.14 -0.29 1.45 3.45 
AUTO 6 0.55 -3.54 -1.37 -0.31 1.63 4.81 0.59 -2.56 -0.50 0.50 2.64 5.07 
AUTO 7 0.75 -3.84 -2.16 -0.71 0.95 3.40 0.84 -2.77 -1.10 0.03 1.45 4.74 
AUTO 8 1.13 -1.51 -0.45 0.27 1.72 3.00 1.22 -1.95 -0.68 0.03 1.30 2.78 
AUTO 9 0.65 -3.87 -2.31 -1.38 0.69 3.28 0.58 -4.88 -2.95 -1.83 0.93 3.81 
AUTO 10 0.91 -3.83 -2.52 -1.78 -0.28 1.41 0.58 -7.49 -4.49 -2.66 -0.32 2.00 
AUTO 11 0.80 -3.42 -2.54 -1.08 -0.05 1.85 0.87 -4.97 -2.89 -1.39 0.08 1.70 
AUTO 12 1.10 -2.20 -1.07 -0.08 1.11 2.38 0.96 -2.06 -0.58 0.44 1.77 4.20 
AUTO 13 1.20 -2.90 -1.35 -0.66 0.80 2.54 0.56 -8.53 -4.99 -2.68 0.37 4.64 
--VI AUTO 14 0.71 -4.14 -2.55 -1.34 0.26 2.15 0.62 -5.91 -4.06 -2.32 -0.25 1.89 
VI AUTO 15 0.93 -2.87 -1.57 -0.73 0.38 1.87 0.89 -2.25 -1.26 -0.47 0.64 2.06 
AUTO 16 0.47 -2.35 -0.31 1.43 3.44 5.37 0.53 -2.33 -0.52 0.84 2.72 4.77 
AUTO 17 1.40 -1.79 -0.68 -0.06 0.79 1.76 1.11 -2.50 -0.97 -0.24 0.84 2.52 
AUTO 18 0.30 -5.23 -2.42 0.29 4.56 9.36 0.50 -3.02 -1.01 0.43 3.78 6.66 
AUTO 19 0.41 -8.05 -4.33 -2.04 1.13 5.00 0.61 -5.30 -2.85 -1.44 0.88 4.58 
AUTO 20 0.70 -5.92 -3.83 -1.80 0.71 2.98 0.44 -7.01 -5.75 -3.02 0.30 4.38 
AUTO 21 0.80 -2.74 -1.73 -0.97 0.69 2.59 0.80 -3.48 -1.97 -0.79 0.66 2.76 
AUTO 22 0.89 -4.36 -2.59 -1.54 0.04 1.78 0.58 -5.74 -4.40 -2.62 -0.61 2.52 
AUTO 23 0.53 -5.38 -3.72 -0.74 2.11 5.40 0.83 -4.35 -2.09 -0.63 1.47 3.52 
AUTO 24 0.87 -3.22 -2.10 -0.94 0.51 1.96 1.10 -3.06 -1.48 -0.61 0.56 2.44 
AUTO 25 0.30 -8.46 -4.15 -1.10 2.59 6.62 0.76 -3.34 -1.80 -0.48 1.35 3.95 
AUTO 26 0.94 -0.79 0.19 1.04 1.87 3.49 0.80 -0.83 0.64 1.35 2.26 4.11 
AUTO 27 1.15 -1.38 -0.41 0.37 1.52 2.80 0.89 -1.52 -0.24 0.54 1.85 4.12 
AUTO 28 0.62 -3.89 -2.61 -1.00 0.46 2.70 0.99 -3.08 -1.93 -0.58 0.14 1.74 
AUTO 29 0.69 -2.97 -1.96 -0.75 1.44 4.57 0.72 -2.89 -1.10 -0.23 1.77 4.04 
AUTO 30 0.73 -4.28 -2.97 -1.32 0.60 3.40 0.92 -3.18 -1.80 -0.83 1.23 3.04 
5.4. SUMMARY 
Two out often CAMI sub scales (Means-Ends for Luck and Agency for Powerful Others), the CNSIE 
scale, 2/3 MASLOC subscales (Internal, Luck) and the Authoritarianism scale showed significant 
differences between the two runs. The results of CNSIE and Authoritarianism need to be treated with 
caution. We were unable to run CNSIE when the parameters were fixed. Although we ran 
Authoritarianism when the parameters were fixed, it seems that the results are not reliable. This is 
probably due to the large number of the items (originally 30, 60 in the analysis) and the relatively small 
sample (N=202). See table 5.4 for a summary of the results. 
Table 5.4: Detecting Item Bias in the Bilingual Sample by Comparison of the Differences Between 
Item Characteristics when are the Parameters Free and Fixed. 
SCALES X2 X2 x2 DF P<.01 
critical 
PARAMETERS PARAMETERS DIFF. value 
CONSTRAINED FREE 
CONTROL, MEANS-ENDS, 
AGENCY BELIEFS 
Control Belief 3836.8 3784.7 52.1 32 55.3 
Means-Ends Beliefs 
Effort 4242.8 4208.2 34.6 32 55.3 
Luck 2995.7 2935.3 60.4* 32 55.3 
Unknown Factors 3803.3 3757.2 46.1 32 55.3 
Attribute 4099.5 4070.8 28.7 32 55.3 
Powerful Others 3624.4 3592.6 31.8 32 55.3 
Agency Beliefs 
Effort 0964.1 0940.3 23.8 16 32.0 
Luck 1081.8 1067.1 21.3 16 32.0 
Attribute 1088.4 1073.6 14.8 16 32.0 
Powerful Others 1219.4 1173.2 46.2* 16 32.0 
CNSIE 
Nowicki-Strickland LOC Scale 1001.3 160 203.7 
MASLOC 
Palenzuela's LOC Scale 
Internal 2828.1 2766.1 62.0* 30 50.9 
Helplessness 4382.0 4335.1 46.9 30 50.9 
Luck 4042.0 3952.4 89.6* 30 50.9 
RELIGIOSITY SCALE 5194.8 515l.6 43.2 40 
AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE 0.0 277.6 277* 180 226.3 
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CAMI 
Two out of ten CAM! subscales (Means-Ends for Luck, Agency for Powerful others) showed 
significant differences between the two language fOImS. The results showed that three out of a total of 
sixty-four items in CAM! were biased (28, 29 in Means-Ends for Luck; 12 in Agency for Powerful 
Others). For the two subscales showing significant differences between program runs the programme 
was renm, allowing the biased items to be free in both languages and forcing the other item to be equa1. 
The results showed that there weren't any differences between the two forms on the two scales. 
In terms of the absolute value of the parameters, 7/64 items fimctioned badly in one or other or both 
language fOImS. Items 3 and 7 were bad in the Turkish form. Items 14 and 29 were bad in English. 
Items 5, 9, 13 were bad in both language fOImS. 
CNSJE 
CNSIE cannot be assessed in terms of significant differences between the two runs because the 
programme wasn't run with parameters fixed. Therefore decisions about the items are based on item 
information fimctions (a and bs) from the free parameters run. In terms of the absolute value of 
parameters, 27/40 items fimctioned badly in one or another or both language forms. Items 7 and 14 
were bad in the Turkish form. Items 6, 15, 16, 22, 25, 27, 29, 32-35, and 38-40 were bad in English. 
Items 1, 3, 4, 8-10, 17-19, 21, 24 were bad in both language forms. There were only 13/40 items which 
fimctioned well in both language forms (items 2, 5, 11-13, 20, 23, 26, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37). 
MASLOC 
Two out of three MASLOC's subsca1es showed significant differences in the two language forms. The 
significant differences were found for the Intemal and Luck subscales (p<0. ° 1). The results showed 
that 4 out of the 15 items were biased (items 10, 11, 8, 13). In terms of the absolute value of 
parameters, 4/15 items fimction badly in one or another or both language fOImS. Item 13 and 3 were 
bad in English. Items 6 was bad in Turkish, 8 was bad in both language forms. There were only 10 out 
of 15 items which fimctioned well in both language fOImS. 
RELIGIOSITY 
The Religiosity scale did not show any differences between the two language forms. 
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AUTHORITARIANISM 
TIris scale. cannot be assessed in terms of significant differences between the two nms because it wasn't 
possible to get reliable results when the parameters were fixed. Therefore the decision about items is 
based on item information functions (a and bs) from the free parameters run. In terms of the absolute 
value of parameters, 8/30 items functioned badly in one or other or both language forms. Item 20 was 
bad in the Turkish form. Items 13, 16, 19,25 were bad in English. Items 2, 4, 18 were bad in both 
language forms. There were only 8/30 items which functioned badly in both language forms. 
Nevertheless most of the items functioned well in both forms (22/30). 
5.5. CONCLUSIONS 
IRT analysis has shown similarities with the other two analyses (generalizability, and classical) for 
most of the scales (e.g. CAMl's Agency for Powerful others; MASLOC's Luck subscales). In some 
cases IRT detected differences which were not detected by the other analyses (e.g. MASLOC's Intemal 
subscale). At the item level there were also some similarities and some differences between the results 
of the different approaches. Examples of similarities are: Agency beliefs item 12, MASLOC's item 13, 
Authoritarianism item 18. Example of dissimilarities is the Helplessness item 14. 
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5.0. CONCLUSION FOR PART I 
The conclusions for part one, which was about the item fidelity of the scales, are of two kinds. First, 
about the results obtained from the three methods and second about the strengths and weaknesses of the 
three methods. 
1. Conclusions about the Item fidelity of the scales. 
Overall these three methods consistently detected some translation fidelity problems for CAMI's 
Agency for Powerful Others sub scale, MASLOC's Luck sub scale and the Authoritarianism scale. For 
CNSIE it was found that at the item level it was not a good scale in either form, although both forms 
were understood similarly. These results were also confirmed by the Classical item analysis (see 
chapter 4). The future of this scale in this study needs to be considered but the decision about its use 
will be postponed until the scale has been applied and analysed in the monolingual samples. This will 
give us a chance to see the performance of the scale with more heterogeneous samples. 
A criticism is that the IRT analysis and Differential Item Functioning is limited by the range of the 
statistical program used (MULTJLOG). There are some other problems with the method. First, using 
English and Turkish forms of the same item as different items of the same scale may artificially 
increase the reliability of the whole scale, but because the same subjects answered the questions in both 
languages this had to be done. Therefore the reliability score of the scale, at least when the parameters 
were free, has to be treated with caution. Second, the program could not be run when the parameters 
were fixed for the two scales which had many items (CNSIE, F-Scale). Although there were technical 
reasons for this (limitations of the programme and not having enough subjects to overcome the 
reliability of the number of iterations) it doesn't help us to overcome the problem of comparing these 
scales in the two languages efficiently. 
2. Comparison of the three psychometric methods. 
Generalizability theory detects translation infidelity by allowing the researcher to detect major 
differences such as occasions and language forms. However, note that this study adjusted 
Generalizability theory so that it could be used for total scores. 
Classical theory, used for translation fidelity, allowed us to compare the different language forms but 
ignored occasion differences, which were detected by the Generalizability analysis. 
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Item response theoty allowed us to get the best fit of the two given language forms. It was possible to 
constrain the parameters and force different versions of the same item (e.g. English and Turkish), 
answered by the same subjects, to be the same. To a ve:ry large extent it was possible to get the best 
information from the available data. However, IRT requires a lot of data (about 1000 participants) to 
fix the parameters if the scale has a large number of questions. In this study we only had two hundred 
participants. Furthermore, the reliability index probably became artificially increased because the 
number of items were doubled for the analysis (i.e. the English and Turkish versions were combined. 
See figure 5.2.5. Finally, because X2 is so sensitive it is possible that detected differences were false 
alarms rather than genuine (e.g. the Internal subscale of MALSOC, which was only different in the IRT 
analysis). 
In conclusion our results suggested that while IRT is the best method of detecting translation infidelity, 
its sensitivity may cause false alarms, which are more likely to occur in cross cultural data because of 
the number of sources of variance. This over sensitivity can be compensated for by also using one of 
the other two methods. 
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PART II 
DETECTING CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
CHAPTER 6: CLASSICAL THEORY 
PART TWO 
DETECTING CROSS CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
6.0. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In the second part of the research project we are trying to deal with the problem of comparison 
between cultures at the item level and to detect possible biases and differences. To do this we 
again use three different types of analysis and two major psychometric approaches. 
First, with the classical psychometric approach, to detect item differences between the two cultures 
(English and Turkish) we compared the item-total correlations between cultures using Ferguson's 
formula for the significant difference between the correlation coefficients of different samples 
(Ferguson, 1959). 
Second, with the classical psychometric approach, we compared the factor structures between two 
samples. Instead of using confirmatory factor analysis we used oblimin rotation for all scales to be 
able to compare the results with the original studies (Ferguson & Takane, 1989). 
Third, with the modem psychometric approach (item response theory), we looked at differential 
item functioning for the two samples and compared the X2 results with parameters constrained 
equal and free for both samples (Thissen, 1991; Thissen, Steinberg, Wainer, 1993). 
We are going to present the results of each of these analyses and then summarise and discuss the 
results. These analyses will be the last investigations of bias detection before we compare the two 
different samples on an ernic (comparable similarity) bases. We will also compare the results of 
the bilingual sample from the first part with these results. We will be able to attribute the 
differences between the two samples in this part to cultural differences, etic, because translation 
bias was detected in part one. 
The next task will be to make a comparison between variables on the basis of similarity between 
two. 
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CHAPTER 6: CLASSICAL ITEM ANALYSIS. DETECTING CROSS-CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES WITH CLASSICAL THEORY 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we are going to detect item differences between the two samples with classical item 
analysis. The results will be presented for each scale and subscale and then discussed. 
6.2. METHOD 
6.2.1. Design for Analysis 
Item analysis is applied to English and Turkish samples to measure the internal consistency 
(reliability) of each scale/subscale for each sample, to detect the differences between the samples 
in terms of their responses to individual items and to identifY the information level of each item of 
both samples. This analysis will help us to make decisions for the ernic and etic of each sample, 
and so help us to a derived etic basis on which to compare the results of groups. 
6.2.2. Analysis 
Classical item analysis has been used to detect item difficulties between English and Turkish 
samples. The differences between samples for each scale and subscale are detected by two sets of 
criteria. The first sets of criteria consist of the absolute value of Cronbach's alpha in the two 
samples and the difference between Cronbach's alpha in the two samples. See chapter 4 for details. 
The mean of the differences between the sixteen scales was 0.02 and the standard deviation was 
0.09. Therefore the criterion values were 0.2 (English better than Turkish) and -0.16 (Turkish 
better than English). The second set of criteria consists of the difference between item-total 
correlations, tested by Ferguson's (1959) independent correlations significant differences formula, 
and the absolute value of item-total correlations which must be greater than 0.30 for the item to be 
considered "a "good" item. 
6.2.3. Instruments 
The questionnaires were CAM!, CNSIE, MASLOC, Religiosity, and Authoritarianism. 
6.2.4. Sample 
365 English and 402 Turkish students participated in the study. The information was collected 
from five English and four Turkish secondary schools. For details of the samples see the Method 
Chapter. 
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6.2.5. Hypothesis 
Except for items which in Part 1 were found to have poor translation fidelity, the differences 
between English and Turkish samples in terms of their response to individual items will be due to 
cultural differences. 
6.3. RESULTS 
6.3.1. CAMI 
6.3.1.1. Control Beliefs. See table 6.3.1.1 for item-total correlation and Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: Items 3, 7, 10 and 4 were significantly different in the two samples (p < 
0.01). This suggests that these items were functioning differently in the two samples. Items 3 and 7 
also showed low item-total correlations in the Turkish sample (r < 0.30). 
Reliability: Cronbach's alpha was very good for the English sample (0.81) and medium for the 
Turkish sample (0.69). See table 6.3.1.1. This difference (0.12) was less than the criterion value of 
0.20 and so is not considered significant. 
Table 6.3.1.1: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Control Beliefs Sub scale. 
CONTROL BELIEFS 
SUBSCALES'ITEMS 
7. If you decide to sit down and leam really hard, can you do it? 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want 
to? 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do 
it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong 
(e.g. in maths or spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.48 (*) 
0.61 (*) 
0.57 
0.52 
0.56 (*) 
0.45 
0.51 
0.58 (*) 
0.81 
362 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH SAMPLE 
0.28 (*) 
0.38 (*) 
0.45 
0.58 
0.29 (*) 
0.32 
0.44 
0.37 (*) 
0.69 
444 
p<o.o 1 (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the two 1-T correlations in the two samples. 
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6.3.1.2. Means-Ends Beliefs for Effort. see table 6.3.1.2 for item-analysis and Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: There were no significant differences between the English and Turkish 
samples and all item-total correlations were greater than 0.30. 
Reliability: This sub scale's reliability was medium for both samples (0.59 for English; 0.64 for 
Turkish) and the difference between the two values (-0.05) of alpha was less than our criterion 
value (-0.16). See table 6.3.1.2. 
Table 6.3.1.2: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Means- Ends Beliefs for Effort Subsca1e. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR EFFORT SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
23. Is the usua1 reason that students do well at school that they try really 
hard? 
20. If a student knows a lot about something, is it usua1Iy because he or 
she has worked hard at learning it? 
61. When a student does well in school, is it usua1 because he/she works 
very carefully? 
64. Paying attention and listen carefully, is the usual reason that students 
understand what the teachers say? 
19. When a student doesn't understand something at school, is it usually 
because he or she doesn't pay enough attention? 
16. If students give the wrong answers on a test is it usually because they 
don't work carefully? 
56. When students don't learn very much in class, is it usually because 
he/she works very carefully? 
47. When a teacher ask a student gives the wrong answer, is it usually 
because the student isn't trying hard enough? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.30 
0.26 
0.35 
0.38 
0.27 
0.25 
0.25 
0.28 
0.59 
367 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH SAMPLE 
0.31 
0.30 
0.35 
0.27 
0.33 
0.29 
0.39 
0.42 
0.64 
445 
6.3.1.3. Means-Ends Beliefs for Attributes. See table 6.3.1.3 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: All the items were functioning similarly in both samples and the item-total 
correlations were greater than 0.3. 
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Reliability: The reliabilities were almost the same in both samples (0.65 for English; 0.66 for 
Turkish, respectively). Both values were of medium reliability. 
Table 6.3.1.3: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English And Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Attribute Subsca1e. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR ATTRIBUTIONS SUBSCALE'S 
ITEMS 
18. If a student does badly in school, is it usually because he or she is 
just smart? 
13. When students give the right answer to questions in class, is it 
usually only because they are good students? 
50. When a students manages to learn something, is it just because 
he/she is clever? 
53. If students understand things quickly, is it because they are very 
good at school at school? 
17. If students get bad grades, is it usually because they are no good at 
school? 
22. When a student does badly in school is the main reason usually that 
he or she is just not very bright? 
49. When students don't understand something, is it because they are just 
no good at school? 
52. If a person gives the wrong answer to teachers' question, is it usually 
sihe is just not smart? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.31 
0.20 
0.43 
0.35 
0.27 
0.35 
0.39 
0.42 
0.65 
362 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
0.46 
0.31 
0.48 
0.30 
0.25 
0.34 
0.31 
0.34 
0.66 
448 
6.3.1.4. Means-Ends Beliefs for Powerful Others. See table 6.3.1.4 for item-total correlations 
and Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: There were no significant differences between the two samples but two 
items (14 and 45) had low item-total correlations in both samples (r < 0.30). 
Reliability: The internal consistency was medium (0.63) for the English sample and good for the 
Turkish sample (0.7). The difference between the samples (-.07) was not significant. 
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Table 6.3.1.4: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Powerful Others Subsca1e. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR POWERFUL OTHERS 
SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
24. When a students gets good grades, is it usually because he or she 
gets along well with the teacher? 
14. Do some students do well at school just because their teachers help 
them? 
60. When a student does well in school, is it usually because he/she gets 
along well with the teachers? 
45. When students do really well in school, is it usually just because of 
the teacher? 
15. If a students gets bad grades, is it usually because the teacher doesn't 
like them? 
21. If a student does badly in school, is it usually because the teacher 
doesn't really like him/her very much? 
63. When students do badly in a subject, is it usually because the 
teachers just don't help them very much? 
51. When students have problems in school, is it usually because of the 
teacher? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.41 
0.04 
0.39 
0.17 
0.38 
0.41 
0.43 
0.40 
0.63 
360 
ITEM TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH SAMPLE 
0.48 
0.22 
0.53 
0.19 
0.43 
0.48 
0.45 
0.39 
0.70 
444 
6.3.1.5. Means-Ends Beliefs for Luck See table 6.3.1.5 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha 
Item-Total correlations: This sub scale was working well in both language forms and showed no 
differences between the two samples. 
Reliability: Cronbach's alpha for the two samples was similar. It was high for the English sample 
(0.8) and good for the Turkish sample (0.79). 
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Table 6.3.1.5: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Luck Sub scale. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR LUCK SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
28. Is doing well at school usually a matter ofluck? 
25. Some students learn things more easily than other students. 
57. Is getting good grades just a matter of luck? 
48. If a teacher calls on a student and student knows the right answer, 
would you say it's just because the student is lucky? 
29. If a students get bad grades, is it just they have bad luck? 
32. If a teacher asks a student a question and the student doesn't know 
the answer, is this simply because the student's unlucky? 
58. When a student finds it difficult to learn something, is it usually 
because helshe is unlucky? 
62. When a student has a hard time learning something, is it usually 
because the student is unlucJ.. .. y? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.54 
0.41 
0.55 
0.48 
0.55 
0.48 
0.52 
0.60 
0.80 
358 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
0.54 
0.32 
0.54 
0.50 
0.53 
0.47 
0.60 
0.60 
0.79 
446 
6.3.1.6. Means-Ends Beliefs for Unknown Factors Subscale. See table 6.3.1.6 for item-total 
correlations and Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: This subscale was working well in both language forms and showed no 
differences between the two samples. 
Reliability: Cronbach's alpha was similar and good in both samples (alpha= 0.71 and 0.73 for the 
English and Turkish samples respectively). 
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Table 6.3.1.6: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Means-Ends Beliefs for Unknown Factors Subscale. 
MEANS-ENDS BELIEFS FOR UNKNOWN FACTORS ITEM-TOTAL 
SUBSCALE'S ITEM CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
30. When a students do better than usual in as object, is it difficult to tell 0.54 
why? 
26. If the teacher asks a student a hard question and he or she answers 0.27 
correctly, is it usually difficult to work out why the student gave the right 
answer? 
46. If a student get a good grades in school, is it hard to know the reason 
why? 
55. Is it hard to know why a student does really well on a test? 
31. If students do badly in school, is it hard to work out why this has 
happened? 
27. When a student makes a lot of mistakes (e.g., in a spelling test), is it 
hard to know the reason why? 
54. When students give the wrong answer to teachers' questions, do you 
find it hard to know why it has happened? 
59. Is it difficult to know why a student does worse than usual in a 
subject? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
0.43 
0.45 
0.33 
0.39 
0.45 
0.37 
0.71 
361 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELA nONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
0.46 
0.37 
0.44 
0.51 
0.36 
0.39 
0.51 
0.35 
0.73 
440 
6.3.1.7. Agency Beliefs for Effort Subscale. See table 6.3.1.7 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: This sub scale was working well in both language forms and showed no 
differences between the two samples. 
Reliability: Reliabilities were similar and good in both samples (alpha= 0.78 and 0.78 for the 
English and Turkish samples respectively). 
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Table 6.3.1.7: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMJ's Agency Beliefs for Effort Subscale. 
AGENCY BELIEFS FOR EFFORT SUBSCALE'S ITEM 
1. Do you try as hard as you can in school? 
4. Do you pay attention in class? 
37. When it comes down to it; do you really work hard on your 
homework? 
33. Do you listen very carefully to what your teacher says? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.61 
0.60 
0.53 
0.60 
0.78 
366 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN ENGLISH 
SAMPLE 
0.60 
0.57 
0.57 
0.63 
0.78 
452 
6.3.1.8. Agency Beliefs for Attribute Subscale. See table 6.3.1.8 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: This subscale was working well in both language forms and showed no 
differences between the two samples. 
Reliability: Reliabilities were similar and medium in the two samples (alpha = 0.6646 and 0.6447 
for the English and Turkish samples respectively). 
Table 6.3.1.8: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Attributes Subscale. 
AGENCY BELIEFS FOR ATTRIBUTES SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
2. Can you learn things you need to for school quickly, without really 
having to work on them? 
9. Are you successful in your schoolwork even without having to study 
hard? 
39. Do you get problems right (e.g. in maths), even if you don't try hard? 
44. Can you understand the teachers' lesson easily? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
169 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.50 
0.54 
0.40 
0.34 
0.66 
365 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
INTURKlSH 
SAMPLE 
0.44 
0.45 
0.39 
0.43 
0.64 
449 
6.3.1.9. Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale. See table 6.3.1.9 for item-total 
correlations and Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: This sub scale was working well in both language fonns and showed no 
differences between the two samples. 
Reliability: Cronbach's alpha was similar for both samples and medium (0.68) or good (0.70) for 
the English and Turkish samples respectively. 
Table 6.3 .1.9: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples CAMrs 
Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others Subsca1e. 
AGENCY BELIEFS FOR POWERFUL OTHERS SUBSCALE'S 
ITEMS 
12. When you want them to, will your teachers help to see that you do 
well in school? 
11. On the whole, do your teachers like you? 
40. Do you have teachers who will help you when you want them to? 
43. When you think about it, would you say that your teacher satisfied 
with you? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.53 
0.52 
0.42 
0.39 
0.68 
367 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
0.48 
0.49 
0.48 
0.48 
0.70 
446 
6.3.1.10. Agency for Luck Subscale. See table 6.3.1.10 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: This sub scale was working well in both language fonns and showed no 
differences between the two samples. 
Reliability: Cronbach's alpha was similar in the two samples and medium (0.60) or low (0.58) in 
the English and Turkish samples respectively. 
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Table 6.3.1.10: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Luck Sub scale. 
AGENCY BELIEF FOR LUCK SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
6. Are you the sort of person who has luck with their homework? 
8. When the teacher calls on you, are you usually lucky in knowing the 
right answer? 
38. When it comes to learning something hard, do you usuaIly have luck 
on your side? 
36. Are you usually lucky, when it comes to school work? 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.39 
0.33 
0.37 
0.45 
0.60 
365 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
0.32 
0.34 
0.36 
0.44 
0.58 
448 
6.3.2. Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale for Children (CNSIE). See table 6.3.2 for 
item-total correlations and Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: Six out of 40 items showed significant differences (p < 0.01) between the 
two samples (items 4, 10, 15,24,30,34). 
The item-total correlations for this scale were overall vety low in both samples. For the English 
sample only 8 out of 40 items were highly correlated with the total score. These were: items 7 
(r=.50), 10 (r=.35), 16 (r=AI), 19 (r=.33), 26 (r=.31), 29 (r=.31), 37 (r=A3), 39 (r=.33). For the 
Turkish sample 7 out of 40 items were highly correlated with the total score. These were: items 5 
(r=.33), 16 (r=.33), 26 (r=.36), 27 (r=.35), 33 (r=.32), 36 (r=.37), 39 (r=.33). Only three items 
(item 16, 26, and 39) were highly correlated with the total score in both samples. 
Reliability: This scale also had similar and medium reliability for both samples (alpha= 0.60 and 
0.66 for the English and Turkish samples respectively). Considering that there were 40 items in the 
scale, this reliability is low. This is because most of the items had vety low correlations with the 
total score in both samples .. 
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Table 6.3 .. 2: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
Nowicki-Strickland Internal-External Locus of Control Scale for Children (CNSIE). 
NOWICKI-STRlCKLAND'S LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE 
ITEMS 
1. Do you believe that most problems will usually sort themselves out in 
time? 
2. Do you believe that you can stop yourself from catching a cold? 
3. Are some children just born lucky? 
4. Most of the time do you feel that getting good grades means a great 
deal to you? 
5. Are you often blamed for things that just aren't your fault? 
6. Do you believe that if somebody studies hard enough he or she can 
pass any subject? 
7. Do you feel that most of the time it doesn't pay to try because things 
never turn out right anyway? 
8. Do you feel that if things start out well in the morning it's going to be 
a good day no matter what you do? 
9. Do you feel that most of the time parents listen to what their children 
have to say? 
10. Do you believe that good things can be made to happen simply by 
wishing them? 
1 L When you get punished does it usually seem to be for no good 
reason at all? 
12. Most of the time do you find it hard to change a friend's opinion? 
13. Do you think a team is helped to win more by cheering than by luck? 
14. Do you feel that it's nearly impossible to change your parent's mind 
about anything? 
15. Do you believe that your parents should allow you to make of your 
own decisions? 
16. Do you feel that when you do something wrong there is very little 
you can do to make it right? 
17. Do you believe that some children are just born good at sports? 
18. Are most of the others children your age stronger than you are? 
19. Do you feel that one of the best ways to handle most problems isjust 
not to think about them? 
20. Do you feel that you have a lot of choice in deciding who your 
friends are? 
2 L If you find a four -leaf clover do you believe that might bring you 
good luck? 
22. Do you feel that whether you do your homework has much to do 
with what kinds of grades you get? 
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ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGUSH SAMPLE 
0.12 
-0.04 
0.24 
0.16 (*) 
0.28 
0.11 
0.51 
0.23 
0.25 
0.35 (*) 
0.22 
0.07 
0.03 
0.26 
-0.18 (*) 
0.41 
0.04 
0.21 
0.33 
0.09 
0.22 
0.15 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
-0.05 
0.16 
0.28 
-0.12 (*) 
0.33 
0.10 
0.19 
0.15 
0.17 
-0.05 (*) 
0.26 
0.17 
0.05 
0.28 
0.26 (*) 
0.33 
0.11 
0.15 
0.18 
0.19 
0.10 
0.05 
23. Do you feel that when another teenager your age decides to hit you, 0.26 0.16 
there is little you can do stop him or her? 
24. Have you ever had a good luck chann? 0.20 (*) -0.02 (*) 
25. Do you believe that whether or not people like you depends on how 0.06 0.14 
you act? 
26. Will your parents usually help you if you ask them to? 0.31 0.36 
27. Have you felt that when people were mean to you it was usually for 0.24 0.35 
no reason at all? 
28. Most of the time, do you feel that you can change what might happen 0.17 0.11 
tomorrow by what you do today? 
29. Do you believe that when bad things are going to happen no matter 0.31 0.25 
what you do to try to stop them? 
30. Do you think that children can get their own way if they just keep -0.02 (*) 0.21 (*) 
trying? 
31. Most of the time do you find it useless to try to get your own way at 0.17 0.11 
home? 
32. Do you feel that when good things happen they happen because of 0.18 0.11 
hard work? 
33. Do you feel that when somebody your age wants to be your enemy 0.25 0.32 
there is little you can do to change matters? 
34. Do you feel that it is easy to get friends to do what you want them -0.08 (*) 0.16 (*) 
to? 
35. Do you usually feel that you have little to say about what you get to 0.21 0.25 
eat at home? 
36. Do you feel that when someone doesn't like you there is little you can 0.28 0.37 
do about it? 
37. Do you usually feel that it is almost useless to try in school because 0.43 0.27 
most other children are just cleverer than you are? 
38. Are you the kind of person who believes that planning ahead makes 0.04 0.21 
things tum out better? 
39. Most of the time, do you feel that you have little say in what your 0.33 0.33 
family decides to do? 
40. Do you think it is better to be clever than to be lucky? 0.25 0.14 
CRONBACH ALPHA 0.69 0.66 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 330 419 
P<O.Ol (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the two I-T correlations in the two samples. 
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6.3.3. Palenzuela's Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale (MASLOC) 
6.3.3.1. MASLOC's Internal Subscale. See table 6.3.3.1 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: There was a significant difference between English and Turkish samples 
for item 5. This item also showed a low item-total correlation in the English sample (r < 0.30). 
Reliability: The reliabilities of the subscales were similar and medium (alpha= 0.60 and 0.66 for 
the English and Turkish sample respectively). 
Table 6.3.3.1: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
MASLOC's Intemal Subsca1e. 
MASLOC INTERNAL SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
2. The grade I get at the end of the year will always be closely related to 
what I do during the year. 
5. I am convinced that the grades I will get depend on how well or badly 
I do in my exam. 
7. The kind of grades I will get in my studies depends on how capable I 
am in preparing my self 
10. IfI want to get a good academic record I have to be competent and I 
must work hard 
11. In general I believe that if one is competent and works hard one will 
get good results. 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGUSH SAMPLE 
0.35 
0.20 (*) 
0.33 
0.47 
0.47 
0.60 
356 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH SAMPLE 
0.42 
0.44 (*) 
0.40 
0.43 
0.41 
0.66 
438 
P<O.OI (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the two I-T correlations in the two samples. 
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6.3.3.2. MASLOC's Helplessness Subscale. See table 6.3.3.2 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: All items in Turkish were significantly less correlated with the total score 
when compared with English (p<0.01). Item 8 functioned very badly in Turkish (r=0.60 and 0.06 
in the English and Turkish samples respectively). 
Reliability: The reliability was good for the English sample but poor for the Turkish sample (alpha 
= 0.77 and 0.48 for English and Turkish respectively). According to our criterion value for 
differences (0.2) this difference (0.29) is significant. 
Table 6.3.3.2: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
MASLOC's Helplessness Subscale. 
MASLOC HELPLESSNESS SUB SCALE'S ITEMS ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGUSH SAMPLE 
4. It is an absolute waste of time forme to make any effort, since there is 0.58 (*) 
no relationship between my capability, how hard I work, and the grades I 
will get. 
8. I don't think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grades I will get 0.59 (*) 
will be completely manipulated. 
9. I am convinced that whatever I do my teacher will always give me the 0.55 (*) 
grades they want to. 
14. It makes absolutely no difference whether I prepare well for a subject 0.66 (*) 
or not since in the long run teachers are "out to catch you". 
15. Regarding my academic life I just don't know whatto do. Anything 0.38 (*) 
might happen: may be I v.ill do an exam well and fail or may be I will do 
it badly and pass. 
CRONBACH ALPHA 0.77 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 359 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH SAMPLE 
0.32 (*) 
0.06 (*) 
0.24 (*) 
0.41 (*) 
0.28 (*) 
0.48 
434 
P<O.Ol (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the two I-T correlations in the two samples. 
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6.3.3.3. MASLOC's Luck Subscale. See table 6.3.3.3 for item-total correlations and Cronbach's 
alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: There were no significant differences between the two samples but item 3 
and 6 were not highly correlated with the total score in either sample (item 3 r = 0.23 and 0.29; 
item 6 r = 0.12 and 0.13, in English and Turkish samples respectively. 
Reliability: This sub scale showed similar and poor internal consistency in both samples (alpha = 
0.57 and 0.57 in the English and Turkish samples respectively). 
Table 6.3.3.3: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
MASLOC's Luck Sub scale. 
MASLOC LUCK SUBSCALE'S ITEMS 
1. If I want to obtain a good exam record it is essential that I should have 
good luck. 
3. Whatever the quality of my work I am always lucky when it comes to 
examinations. 
6. My getting good or bad grades in my exams is related to whether the 
precise the topics I have studied come up in exam. 
12. Luck is decisive in the kind of grades I get in my studies. 
13. The grades I get are always determined by a series of random 
circumstances. 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGliSH SAMPLE 
0.49 
0.23 
0.12 
0.48 
0.37 
0.57 
354 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
0.37 
0.29 
0.l3 
0.52 
0.35 
0.57 
446 
6.3.4. Religiosity Scale. See table 6.3.4 for item-total correlations and Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: In three out of 8 items the item-total correlations were significantly 
different (item 3, 5, and 7). All item-total correlations were high in both samples. 
Reliability: This scale showed similar and very good internal consistency in both samples 
(alpha=0.88 and 0.82, in English and Turkish samples respectively). 
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Table 6.3.4: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
MASLOC's Luck Subscale. 
RELIGIOSITY SCALE'S ITEMS ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
2. How often have you attended religious services during the past year? 0.59 
3. Which of the following best describe your views on prayer or religious 0.64 
meditation? 
4. When you have a serious personal problem how often do you take 0.69 (*) 
religious advice or teaching into consideration? 
5. How much of an influence would you say that religion has on the way 0.67 
that you choose to act or the way that you choose to spend your time 
each day? 
6. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your belief 
about God? 
7. Which of the following statements comes closest to your beliefs about 
life after death (immortality)? 
8. During the past year, how often have you experienced feeling of 
religious reverence or devotion? 
9. Do you agree with the following statements: "Religion gives me great 
amount of comfort and security" 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
0.74 (*) 
0.55 
0.76 (*) 
0.61 
0.88 
357 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
TURKISH SAMPLE 
0.46 
0.52 
0.54 (*) 
0.56 
0.56 (*) 
0.46 
0.63 (*) 
0.67 
0.82 
439 
P<O.O 1 (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the two 1-T correlations in the two samples. 
6.3.5. Authoritarianism Scale (F-Scale). See table 6.3.5 for item-total correlations and 
Cronbach's alpha. 
Item-Total correlations: Only two out of30 items showed significant differences between samples. 
These were items 16 and 18. 
For the English sample seven out of30 items showed low correlations with the total score: These 
items were: 2, 3, 4, 23, 27, 28 and 30. For the Turkish sample nine out of 40 items showed low 
correlations with the total score: These were: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 18, 19 and 25. Five of them showed 
low item-total correlations in both samples. These were items 2,3,4,23 and 30. See table 4.5. 
Reliability: This scale showed similar and very good internal consistency in both sample 
(alpha=0.84 and 0.80, in English and Turkish samples respectively). 
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Table 6.3.5: Item-Total Correlations and Cronbach's Alpha for English and Turkish Samples for 
Authoritarianism 'P' Scale. 
AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE'S ITEMS 
1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues 
children should learn. 
2. No weakness or difficult can hold us back if we have enough will 
power. 
3. Science has its place but there are many important thin that can never 
be understood by the human mind 
4. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war a conflict. 
5. every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power 
whose decisions are obeyed without question. 
6. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think 
about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things. 
7. A person who has no manners, bad habits, and poor breeding can 
hardly expected to get along with decent people. 
8. What youth needs most is strictly discipline, rugged detennination, 
and the will to work and fight for family and country. 
9. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places. 
10. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and 
mix together, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against 
catching an infection or disease from them. 
1 L An insult to our honour should always be punished. 
12. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up 
they ought to get over them. 
13. It is essential for learning or effective work that our teacher or bosses 
outline in detail what is to be done and exactly how to do it. 
14. What this country needs most, more than laws and political 
programmes, is a few courageous, tireless leaders in whom the people 
can put their faith. 
15. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than 
mere imprisonment; such criminal ought to be publicly whipped, or 
worse. 
16. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the week and strong. 
17. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a 
great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents. 
18. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot 
of things. 
19. Some leisure is necessary but it is good hard work makes life 
interesting and worthwhile. 
20. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should 
remain personal and private. 
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ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS IN 
ENGLISH SAMPLE 
0.45 
0.27 
0.25 
0.13 
0.32 
0.31 
0.43 
0.50 
0.30 
0.45 
0.44 
0.40 
0.30 
0.34 
0.40 
0.37 (*) 
0.48 
0.36 (*) 
0.41 
0.30 
ITEM-TOTAL 
CORRELATIONS 
IN TURKISH 
SAMPLE 
0.36 
0.14 
0.29 
-0.03 
0.22 
0.19 
0.34 
0.48 
0.33 
0.39 
0.38 
0.47 
0.33 
0.34 
0.43 
0.16 (*) 
0.51 
0.09 (*) 
0.29 
0.32 
21. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or 
flood that will destroy the whole world. 
22. Most of our social problems could be solved if we could somehow 
get rid of immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people. 
23. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared 
to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people 
might least expect it. 
24. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better 
off. 
25. Most people don't realise how much our lives are controlled by plots 
hatched in secret places. 
26. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be 
severely punished. 
27. Books and videos ought not to deal so much with the unpleasant and 
seamy side of life: they ought to concentrate on themes that are 
entertaining or uplifting. 
28. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close 
mends and relative. 
29. Familiarity breeds contempt. 
30. When you come right down to it, it is human nature never to do 
anything without an eye to profit. 
CRONBACH ALPHA 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
0.40 
0.53 
0.26 
0.42 
0.31 
0.30 
0.25 
0.27 
0.38 
0.27 
0.84 
313 
0.32 
0.40 
0.29 
0.35 
0.28 
0.37 
0.38 
0.38 
0.32 
0.21 
0.80 
392 
P<O.OI (*). The p value represents the significance of the differences between the two I-T correlations in the two samples. 
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6.4. SUMMARY and DISCUSSION 
The Classical item analysis has shown that most of the CAMI subscales, the Religiosity scale and 
the Authoritarianism scale were, generally acceptable in terms of our criteria. But CNSIE and 
MASLOC were not. Most of CNSIE's items showed low item-total correlations and MASLOC's 
helplessness sub scale functioned differently in the two samples. 
CAM! 
Four out of 8 items for the control beliefs showed significant differences between samples (items 
3, 7, 10,41) and two of these (items 7 and 3) also showed low item-total correlations in the 
Turkish sample. Of these four items one (item 41) also showed significant differences in the 
Turkish bilingual sample (see chapters 4) and items 3, and 7 showed significant differences in 
Turkish sample (see chapter 5). Therefore it seems that some of the differences detected here are 
due to item fidelity (items 3, 7 and 41). Only the difference on item 10 may be due to cultural 
differences (ernic). 
The Means-Ends (M-E) subscales showed medium or good or high reliability and none of them 
were significantly different on alpha values between samples. The item-total correlations did not 
show any significant differences at the 0.01 level either. However, on four out of five of the 
Means-Ends (M-E) subscales there were some items which showed low item-total correlations in 
one or other sample. In the M-E for Effort sub scale there were 5/8 items in English (items 16, 19, 
20,47,56) and 2/8 items in Turkish (item 16 and 64) which showed low item-total correlations. In 
M-E for Attribute 2/8 items (item 13 and 17) showed low item-total correlations in English sample 
and 1/8 (item 17) in Turkish sample. In M-E for Powerful Others the same 2 items (item 14 and 
45) showed low item-total correlations in both samples. In M-E for Unknown Factors 1/8 items 
(item 26) showed low item-total in the English sample. 
In terms of differences between samples these M-E scales functioned well. Therefore the items in 
these subscales were comparable (etic) for the two cultures. However, there were some items (8/45 
item in English and 2/45 item in Turkish) which were not good items. This means that not much 
information is gathered from these items. 
All the Agency Beliefs subscales showed a very similar structure in both samples. All reliability 
scores were good or medium and similar, with small differences between them. Also, all items 
were similar in terms of their item-total correlations and all of the item-total's were higher then .30. 
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CNSIE 
The reliability of the scale in both samples was medimn and similar. Only 6 out of 40 items (items 
4, 10, 15,24,30,34) were significantly different in the two cultures. However, most of the items 
showed low item-total correlations in one or both samples. Thirty three out of 40 items in English 
and thirty four out of forty in English functioned poody (r<.30). 
It seems that this scale is less reliable then expected in both samples. Although in the literature 
(Lefcourt, 1982) CNSIE is used very widely and mentioned in 200 articles in a 12 year period 
between 1984-1996, in this study it will be difficult to use CNSIE to derive inferences about our 
two samples. Although it seems that the items are similar in both culture, the locus of control 
dimension measured by the scale is not clear. 
MASLOC 
Internal 
The reliabilities were medimn and similar in both samples. No item showed significant differences 
between samples. Only 1/5 (item 5) item showed a low item-total correlation in the English 
sample. 
Helplessness 
The reliability was significantly different between samples with the Turkish sample's being lower. 
All the items (item 4, 8, 9, 14, 15) were different in the two samples and three out of 5 items (item 
8,9, 15) showed low item-total correlations in Turkish sample. Item 8 was different in the 
Bilingual sample as well so therefore this difference is probably due to translation infidelity. 
Luck 
The reliabilities in both samples were marginally lower than medimn in both samples but they 
were similar. All item-total correlations were similar. Two out of 5 items (item 3 and 6) showed a 
low item-total correlation in both samples. This was consistent with the bilingual sample results as 
well (see Ch. 2). We can say that although the items are etic (compatible with each other) two of 
them are inconsistent in both samples. 
RELIGIOSITY 
The reliabilities were high and similar in both samples. Three out of8 items (item 4,6,8) were 
significantly different in the two samples. All items showed high item-total correlations. These 
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results show that these three item differences are due to cultural differences. They all showed good 
translation fidelity in the early study (see chapter 3,4,5). 
AUTIIORIT ARIANISM 
The reliabilities were high and similar in the two samples. Only two out of30 items (item 16 and 
18) showed significant differences between samples. But 4/30 items in English (items 23,27,28, 
30), 6/30 items in Turkish (items 5, 6, 16, 18, 19,25) and 3/30 items in both samples (items 2,3, 
4) showed low item-total correlations. The differences for item 18 "Some day it will probably be 
shown that astrology can explain a lot of things" could be due to item infidelity but the differences 
in item 16 "People can be divided into two distinctive classes: the weak and strong" are explained 
by cultural or emic differences. 
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CHAPTER 7: FACTOR ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER 7: FACTOR ANALYSIS 
CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON USING FACTOR ANALYSIS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will investigate the validity of the scales across cultures with factor analysis. The 
five scales have been factor analysed separately for each culture and then the results compared. 
The differences and similarities between factors will be discussed. If the scale did not show a 
similar factor structure it has not been used subsequently. 
For CAMI the Control, Means-Ends and Agency Beliefs subscales were factor analysed in five 
subsets: Effort, Attribute, Powerful Others, Luck and Unknown. Each time the Control Beliefs 
items and items from the different domains of Means-Ends and Agency Beliefs were put into the 
factor analysis. For example, for the Effort analysis all the Control Beliefs items, the Means-Ends 
for Effort items and the Agency for Effort items were analysed. Similarly, for the Attribute 
analysis all the Control Beliefs items, the Means-Ends for Attribute items and the Agency for 
Attribute items were analysed. So, the Control Beliefs items were always the same but the Means-
Ends and Agency items were changed according to the domains analysed. This procedure f()llows 
the original study which was concerned with the subdomains in which perceived control operates 
such as Effort, Attribute, Powerful Others, Luck and Unknown factors. 
Nowicki-Strickland's Locus of Control Scale for Children (CNSIE) was also factor analysed. All 
forty items were in the an~lysis. Because there is no agreement between researchers about the 
factor structure of this scale (Watters, Thomas & Streiner, 1990; Walters & Klein, 1990), the 
author based the comparison on two cultures, English and Turkish. 
The Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale (MASLOC) was also factor 
analysed and compared with the original results. The expectation is that three factors will appear 
after the oblimin rotation is applied (e.g. Internal, Helplessness, Luck). 
The Religiosity scale showed a clear one factor structure in the original sample. Although the 
original sample was a heterogeneous American sample (Rohrbaugh & lessor, 1976) the items are 
neutral in terms of religion so the same result is expected from the two different cultures tested 
here. The scale has never been tested on a homogeneous Muslim sample. 
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There is no factor analytic study in recent studies of the Authoritarianism scale (F Scale). The 
assumption is that there is only one main common factor. This will also be checked in our 
samples. 
The items were subjected to a principal component analysis factor analysis followed by oblique 
rotations. The oblique rotations were used for all questionnaires to make a comparison between 
previous samples and this study's samples. The number of factors extracted was determined by 
Cattell's (1978) Scree test rather than Keiser'S minimum eigenvalue criterion, where only the 
factors having latent roots ( eigenvalues) equal or greater than one are extracted (Cattell & 
Vogelman, 1977). 
7.2. METHOD 
7.2.1. Design for Analysis 
The data from the two samples were tested separately. For CAMI five analyses were carried out in 
the way explained above. For the other scales all items were put into the factor analysis. 
7.2.2 Analysis 
In all the analyses the Scree test was used to decide the number of factors in the model. In all cases 
exploratory factor analyses were carried out. The percentage of variance explained by each factor 
came from principal component analysis but the factor loadings were based on oblique rotation. 
7.2.3. Instruments 
The questionnaires were CAMI, CNSIE, MASLOC, Religiosity for Youth and Authoritarianism. 
7.2.4. Sample 
In this present study, 368 English and 420 Turkish secondary school students participated. The 
social class of the samples was heterogeneous. The sample has already been described in the 
Method chapter. 
7.2.5. Procedure 
As previously described in the Method chapter. 
7.2.6. Hypothesis 
The expectation was that if the structures of the original scales were applied to these study's two 
samples then each of samples' factor structure will be the same as or similar to the original study. 
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This part of the results may support the validity of the scale as well as the internal consistency. 
Any differences in factor structure can be attributed to differences between cultures. 
7.3. RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS 
The results of each the factor analysis of each scale in each sample will be presented and the 
results compared with the original studies (Skinner, Chapman & Baltes, 1988; Nowicki & 
Strickland, 1973; Palenzuela, 1988; Rohrbaugh & lessor, 1976; Christie, 1991). 
7.3.1. Control, Means-Ends and Agency Beliefs (CAMI): 
When the original study used factor analysis its aim was to test "whether the structure of children's 
responses would correspond to the three hypothesised sets of beliefs, namely Control, Means-Ends 
and Agency" (Skinner, Chapman & Baltes, 1988). To do this for each domain of perceived control 
(i.e. Luck, Attribute, etc.) they ran a factor analysis, expecting to come out with three factors 
which would represent the three sets of beliefs. In our study we are interested in whether these 
three sets of beliefs will emerge in our Turkish and English samples. Considering that the scale has 
already been tested in the German and American cultures simultaneously we expect to [md a 
similar factor structure in the English sample. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 
item scores using principal component analysis and oblique rotations to test the factor structure in 
the English and Turkish samples. 
Five factor analyses were conducted for the 64 item scale. For the fIrst four of them 21 items were 
used for a three factor solution. In each one the control beliefs items were consistent, but the 
means-ends and agency beliefs items changed for the respective cause (e.g. means-ends and 
agency beliefs for the powerful others causes). For the fIfth factor analysis, only 16 items were 
included for a two factor solution (Control beliefs and Means-ends beliefs for unknown causes). 
The Agency belief for unknown causes items were not included because no agency belief is 
possible for unknown causes. 
The expectations were that if the original structure of Control, Means-Ends, and Agency beliefs 
were also applied to these English and Turkish samples then each of the first four factor analyses 
would also result in a three factor solution. See table 7.3.1.1.a to 7.3.1.4.b. The fInal factor 
analysis would result in a two factor solution (i.e. Control and Means-Ends). See table 7.3.1.S.a. 
and 7.3.1.S.b. 
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7.3.1.1. Factor Analysis Results for Effort 
TIrree factors emerged in the English sample. The order was Control Beliefs fIrst (19.6% of 
variance explained)), Agency beliefs second (11.5% of the variance explained) and Means-Ends 
beliefs third (9.3% of the variance explained). The overall, cumulative percentage of the variance 
explained was 41.4%. See table 7.3.1. La. 
TIrree factors also emerged for the Turkish sample but the order of the factors was slightly 
different: Agency beliefs fIrst (17.5%), Control beliefs second (11.3%) and Means-Ends beliefs 
third (9.6%). The overall, cumulative percentage of the variance explained was 38.4%. See table 
7.3. 1. Lb. 
7.3.1.2. Factor Analysis Results for Attribute 
For the Attribute causes in the English sample three factors emerged. The order of the factors was 
Control beliefs fIrst (21.7%), Means-Ends beliefs second (12.2%) and Agency beliefs third 
(6.3%). The overall, cumulative percentage of the variance explained was 40.2%. The Agency 
beliefs items had negative factor loadings. See table 7.3.1.2.a. 
TIrree factors also emerged for the Turkish sample but the order of the factors was different: 
Agency beliefs fIrst (17.3%), Means-Ends beliefs second (12.2%) and Control beliefs third 
(7.3%). The overall, cumulative percentage of the variance was explained was 36.8%. Half of the 
Control beliefs items loaded on the Agency beliefs for Attribute factor. These results are 
consistent with the classical item analysis results (see chapter 4). See table 7.3.1.2.b. 
7.3.1.3. Factor Analysis Results for Powerful Others 
TIrree factors emerged in the English sample. The order of the factors was Control beliefs fIrst 
(21.0%), Means-Ends beliefs second (12.9%) and Agency beliefs third (7.9%). The overall 
cumulative percentage of the variance explained was 41.8%. See table 7.3.1.3.a. 
The same three factors also emerged for the Turkish sample but the order of the factors was 
Means-Ends beliefs fIrst (18.1 %), Control beliefs second (12.9% )and Agency beliefs third (9.2%). 
The overall, cumulative percentage of the variance explained was 40.2%. See table 7.3.1.3.b. 
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7.3.1.4. Factor Analysis for Luck 
Three factors emerged in the English sample. The order of the factors was Control beliefs first 
(20.2%), Means-Ends beliefs second (17.1%), Agency beliefs third (7.3%). The overall, 
cumulative percentage of the variance explained was 44.6%. See table 7.3.1.4.a. 
Three factors also emerged for the Turkish sample. The order of the factors was Means-Ends 
beliefs first (20.0%), Control beliefs second (13.3%), Agency beliefs third (7.2%). The overall, 
cumulative percentage of the variance explained was 40.5%. Control beliefs items had a negative 
factor loading. Five items were loaded on agency instead of control belief. See table 7.3.1.4.b. 
7.3.1.5. Factor Analysis Results for Unknown Causes 
Two factors emerged in the English sample. The order of the factors was Control beliefs first 
(21.9%)and Means-Ends beliefs second (16.9%). The overall, cumulative percentage of the 
variance explained was 38.8%. See table 7.3.1.5.a 
These two factors also emerged for the Turkish sample but the order of the factors was Means-
Ends beliefs first (20.3%) and Control beliefs second (14.2%). The overall, cumulative percentage 
of the variance explained was 34.5%. See table 7.3.1.5.b. 
For CAM! overall, all five factor analyses confirmed that there was lot of similarity between the 
factors in each sample. The exception was the Means-Ends beliefs for Attribute causes in the 
Turkish sample. 
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Table 7.3.1.La: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Effort. Factor loadings in the English 
Sample (N=368). 
ITEMS FACTOR LOADINGS 
FI F3 F2 
Control Beliefs (Factor I) Control Means-ends Agency 
Positive events 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 0.55 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 0.73 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? 0.69 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 0.62 
Negative events 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 0.72 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourseIf getting bad grades? 0.59 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in maths or 0.65 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 0.68 
Means-Ends beliefs for effort (Factor 3) 
Positive events 
23. Is the usual reason that students do well at school that they 1Iy really hard? 0.49 
20. If a student knows a lot about something, is it usually because he or she has 0.48 
worked hard at learning it? 
61. When a student does well in school, is it usual because he/she works veIY 0.57 
carefully? 
64. Paying attention and listen carefully, is the usual reason that students understand 0.61 
what the teachers say? 
Negative events 0.49 
19. When a student doesn't understand something at school, is it usually because he or 
she doesn't pay enough attention? 
16. If students give the wrong answers on a test is it usually because they don't work 0.45 
carefully? 
56. When students don't learn veIY much in class, is it usually because he/she works 0.44 
veIY carefully? 
47. When a teacher ask a student gives the wrong answer, is it usually because the 0.49 
student isn't 1Iying hard enough? 
Agency beliefs for effort (Factor 2) 
1. Do you 1Iy as hard as you can in school? 0.80 
4. Do you pay attention in class? 0.78 
37. When it comes down to it; do you really work hard on your homework? 0.69 
33. Do you listen veIY carefully to what your teacher says? 0.76 
EIGENVALUES 3.92 2.30 1.86 
PERCENTAGE OF 1HE VARIANCES 19.6 11.5 9.3 
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Table 7.3 .l.l.b: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Effort. Factor loadings in the Turkish 
Sample (N=453). 
lTElV!S 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
F2 F3 FI 
Control Beliefs (Factor 2) 
Positive events 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 0.51 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 0.47 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? 0.68 
35. lfyou want do well in school, can you? 0.74 
Negative events 
3. lfyou really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 0.36 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 0.33 
34. lfyou really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in maths or 0.67 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. lfyou want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 0.61 
Means-Ends beliefs tOr effort (Factor 3) 
Positive events 
23. Is the usual reason that students do well at school that they try realJy hard? 0.52 
20. If a student knows a lot about something, is it usually because he or she has 0.58 
worked hard at learning it? 
61. When a student does well in school, is it usual because he/she works vety 0.48 
carefully? 
64. Paying attention and 1isten carefully, is the usual reason that students understand 0.39 
what the teachers say? 
Negative events 0.60 
19. When a student doesn't understand something at school, is it usually because he or 
she doesn't pay enough attention? 
16. If students give the wrong answers on a test is it usually because they don't wOIk 0.46 
carefully? 
56. When students don't learn vety much in class, is it usually because he/she works 0.59 
very carefully? 
47. When a teacher ask a student gives the wrong answer, is it usually because the 0.59 
student isn't trying hard enough? 
Agency beliefs for effort (Factor I) 
1. Do you try as hard as you can in school? 0.79 
4. Do you pay attention in class? 0.78 
37. When it comes down to it; do you really work hard on your homework? 0.77 
33. Do you listen vety carefully to what your teacher says? 0.73 
EIGENVALUES 3.49 2.27 1.91 
PERCENTAGE OF 1HE VARIANCES 17.5 11.3 9.6 
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Table 7.3.1.2.a: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Attributes. Factor laodings in the English 
Sample (N=368). 
ITEMS FACTOR LOADINGS 
Fl F2 F3 
Control Beliefs Control Means-Ends Agency 
Positive events 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 0.59 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 0.71 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, ",nen you 'want to? 0.66 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 0.67 
Negative events 0.68 
3. If you rea11y make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 0.51 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in maths or 0.59 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 0.72 
Means-ends beliefs for attributes 
Positive events 
18. If a student does badly in school, is it usually because he or she is just smart? 
0.43 
13. When students give the right answer to questions in class, is it usually only 0.34 
because they are good students? 
50. When a students manages to learn something, is it just because he/she is 0.65 
clever? 
53. If students understand things quickly, is it because they are very good at school 0.53 
at school? 
Negative events 0.44 
17. If students get bad grades, is it usually because they are no good at school? 
22. When a student does badly in school is the main reason usually that he or she is 0.56 
just not very bright? 
49. When students don't understand something, is it because they are just no good 0.62 
at school? 
52. If a person gives the wrong answer to teachers' question. is it usually s/he is just 0.68 
not smart? 
Agency for attribute 
2. Can you learn things you need to for school quickly, without rea11y haying to work -D.77 
on them? 
9. Are you successful in your school work even without having to study hard? -D.74 
39. Do you get problems right (e.g. in maths), even if you don't tIy bard? -D.56 
44. Can you understand the teachers' lesson easily? -D.38 
EIGENV ALVES 4.34 2.43 1.26 
PERCENTAGE OF TIffi EXPLAINED VARIANCES 21.7 12.2 6.3 
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Table 7.3.1.2.b: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Attributes. Factor laodings ill the 
Turkish Sample (N=4S3). 
ITEMS 
Control Beliefs (Factor 3 and I) 
Positive events 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 
10. Can you get good grades ~en you really want to? 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 
Negative events 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in maths or 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 
Means-ends beliefs for attributes 
Positive events 
18. If a student does badly in school, is it usually because he or she is just smart? 
13. When students give the right answer to questions in class, is it usually only 
because they are good students? 
50. When a students manages to learn something, is it just because he/she is 
clever? 
53. If students understand things quickly, is it because they are very good at school 
at school? 
Negative events 
17. If students get bad grades, is it usually because they are no good at school? 
22. When a student does badly in school is the main reason usually that he or she is 
just not very bright? 
49. When students don't understand something, is it because they are just no good 
at school? 
52. If a person gives the wrong answer to teachers' question, is it usually s/he is just 
not smart? 
Agency for attribute 
2. Can you learn things you need to for school quickly, without really having to work 
on them? 
9. Are you successful in your school work even without having to study hard? 
39. Do you get problems right (e.g. in maths), even if you don't try hard? 
44. Can you understand the teachers' lesson easily? 
EIGENVALUES 
PERCENTAGE OF TIIE EXPLAlNED VARIANCES 
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FACTOR LOADINGS 
F3 I F2 
0.46 
0.51 
0.54 
0.55 
0.32 
3.46 
17.3 
0.66 
0.48 
0.70 
0.42 
0.35 
0.55 
0.47 
0.59 
2.43 
12.2 
F1 
0.41 
0.56 
0.48 
0.47 
0.36 
0.68 
0.64 
0.60 
0.60 
1.45 
7.3 
Table 7.3.1.3.a: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Powerful Others. Factor laodings in the 
English Sample (N=368). 
TIEMS FACTOR LOADINGS 
FI F2 F3 
Control beliefs 
Positive events 0.64 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really bard, can you do it? 
10. Can you get good grndes when you really want to? 0.71 
42. Can you get allfue problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? 0.68 
35. If you want do well in school., can you? 0.63 
Negative events 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grndes, can you do it? 0.70 
5. Is fuere anyfuing you can do stop yourself getting bad grndes? 0.50 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in maths or 0.69 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 0.60 
Means-ends for powerful ofuers 
Positive events 
24. When a students gets goodgrndes, is it usually because he or she gets along 0.57 
well with fue teacher? 
14. Do some students do well at school just because their teachers help them? 0.07 
60. When a student does well in school, is it usually because he/she gets along well 0.62 
wifu fue teachers? 
45. When students do really well in school., is it usually just because offue teacher? 0.30 0.38 
Negative events 0.61 
15. If a students gets bad grndes, is it usually because fue teacher doesn't like fuern? 
21. If a student does badly in school., is it usually because 1he teacher doesn't really 0.64 
like himlher very much? 
63. When students do badly in a subject, is it usually because fue teachers just don't 0.64 
help them very much? 
51. When students have problems in school., is it usually because of fue teacher? 0.61 
Agency beliefs for powerful ofuers 
12. When you want fuern to, will your teachers help to see that you do well in 0.67 
school? 
II. On fue whole, do your teachers like you? 0.74 
40. Do you have teachers who will help you when you want fuern to? 0.57 
43. When you 1hink about it, would you say that your teacher satisfied wifu you? 0.65 
EIGENVALUES 4.19 2.57 1.58 
PERCENTAGE OF TIlE EXPLAINED VARIANCE 21.0 12.9 7.9 
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Table 7.3.1.3.b: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Powerful Others. Factor laodings in the 
Turkish Sample (N=453). 
ITEMS 
F2 
Control beliefs 
Positive events 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 0.49 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 0.53 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, \vhenyou wantto? 0.67 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 0.75 
Negative events 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 0.41 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 0.44 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems MOng (e.g. in rnaths or 0.64 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 0.56 
Means-ends for powerful others 
Positive events 
24. When a students gets good grades, is it usually because he or she gets along 
well with the teacher? 
14. Do some students do well at school just because their teachers help them? 
60. When a student does well in school, is it usually because he/she gets along well 
with the teachers? 
45. When students do really well in school, is it usually just because of the teacher? 
Negative events 
15. If a students gets bad grades, is it usually because the teacher doesn't like them? 
21. If a student does badly in school, is it usually because the teacher doesn't really 
like himlher vexy much? 
63. When students do badly in a subject, is it usually because the teachers just don't 
help them vexy much? 
51. When students have problems in school, is it usually because of the teacher? 
Agency beliefs for powerful others 
12. When you want them to, will your teachers help to see that you do well in 
school? 
1 L On the whole, do your teachers like you? 
40. Do you have teachers who will help you when you want them to? 
43. When you think about it, would you say that your teacher satisfied with you? 
EIGENV ALOES 
PERCENTAGE OF TIffi EXPLAINED VARIANCE 
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3.61 
18.1 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
I Fl I F3 
0.69 
0.33 0.53 
0.70 
0.29 0.50 
0.66 
0.66 
0.64 
0.59 
0.71 
0.48 
0.63 
0.46 
2.58 1.83 
12.9 9.2 
Table 7.3.1.4.a: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Luck. Factor laodings in the English 
Sample (N=368). 
ITEMS 
Fl 
Positive Events 
7. If you decide to sit doml and learn really hard, can you do it? 0.54 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 0.78 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? 0.69 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 0.67 
Negative events 0.70 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 0.51 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems mong (e.g. in maths or 0.58 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 0.67 
Means-Ends beliefs for luck 
Positive events 
28. Is doing well at school usually a matter ofluck? 
25. Some students learn things more easily than other students. 
57. Is getting good grades just a matter ofluck? 
48. If a teacher calls on a student and student knows the right answer, would you 
say it's just because the student is lucky? 
Negative events 
29. If a students get bad grades, is it just they have bad luck? 
32. If a teacher asks a student a question and the student doesn't know the answer, 
is this simply because the student's unlucky? 
58. When a student finds it difficult to learn something, is it usually because he/she 
is unlucky? 
62. When a student finds difficulty in learning something, is it usually because 
he/she is unlucky? 
Agency for luck 
6. Are you the sort of person who has luck with their homework? 
8. When the teacher calls on you, are you usually lucky in knowing the right answer? 
38. When it comes to learning something hard, do you usually have luck on your side? 
36. Are you usually lucky, when it comes to school work? 
EIGENVALUES 
PERCENTAGE OF TIlE VARIANCES 
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4.04 
20.2 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
F2 
0.64 
0.45 
0.73 
0.56 
0.63 
0.58 
0.69 
0.79 
3.41 
17.1 
F3 
0.73 
0.45 
0.53 
0.71 
1.46 
7.3 
Table 7.3.1.4.b: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Luck. Factor laodings in the Turkish 
Sample (N=453). 
ITEMS 
F2 
Positive Events 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? -D.49 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? -D.37 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? -D.66 
35. If you want do well in schooL can you? 
-D.71 
Negative events 
-D.32 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? -D.25 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in maths or -D. 7 5 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to canyoukeep from doing badly in school? -D.61 
Means-Ends beliefs for luck 
Positive events 
28. Is doing well at school usually a matter ofluck? 
25. Some students learn things more easily than other students. 
57. Is getting good grades just a matter ofluck? 
48. If a teacher calls on a student and student knows the right answer, would you 
say it's just because the student is lucky? 
Negative events 
29. Ifa students get bad grades, is it just they have bad luck? 
32. If a teacher asks a student a question and the student doesn't know the answer, 
is this simply because the student's unlucky? 
58. When a student finds it difficult to learn something, is it usually because he/she 
is unlucky? 
62. When a student finds difficulty in learning something, is it usually because 
he/she is unlucky? 
Agency for luck 
6. Are you the sort of person who has luck with their homework? 
8. When the teacher calls on you, are you usually lucky in knowing the right answer? 
38. When it comes to learning something hard, do you usually have luck on your side? 
36. Are you usually lucky, when it comes to school work? 
EIGENVALUES 
PERCENTAGE OF THE VARIANCES 
195 
4.01 
20.0 
FACTOR LOADlNGS 
I Fl I 
0.67 
0.44 
0.68 
0.64 
0.68 
0.60 
0.72 
0.72 
2.66 
13.3 
F3 
-D.30 
0.68 
0.59 
0.54 
0.76 
1.44 
7.2 
Table 7.3.1.4.a: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Unknown factors. Factors loadings in the 
English Sample (N=368). 
ITEMS 
Control Beliefs 
Positive items 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn rea11y hard, can you do it? 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 
Negative items 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in maths or 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school? 
30. When a students do better than usual in as oJiect, is it difficult to tell why? 
26. If the teacher asks a student a hard question and he or she answers correctly, is 
it usually difficult to work. out why the student gave the right answer? 
46. If a student get a good grades in school, is it hard to knowthe reason why? 
55. Is it hard to know why a student does rea11y well on a test? 
31. If students do badly in school, is it hard to worlc out why this has happened? 
27. When a student makes a lot of mistakes (e.g., in a spelling test), is it hard to 
know the reason why? 
54. When students give the wrong answer to teachers' questions, do you find it 
hard to know why it has happened? 
59. Is it difficult to know why a student does worse than usual in a subject? 
EIGENVALUES 
PERCENTAGE OF 1HE VARIANCES 
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Fl 
0.54 
0.73 
0.69 
0.65 
0.69 
0.58 
0.63 
0.71 
3.51 
21.9 
FACTOR LOADING 
F2 
0.72 
0.43 
0.63 
0.63 
0.46 
0.53 
0.65 
0.55 
2.69 
16.9 
Table 7.3.1.4.b: Control beliefs, Means-Ends and Agency for Unknown factors. Factors loadings in 
the Turkish Sample (N=453). 
ITEMS 
Control Beliefs 
Positive items 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 
10. Can you get good grades when you really want to? 
42. Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want to? 
35. If you want do well in school, can you? 
Negative items 
3. If you really make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it? 
5. Is there anything you can do stop yourself getting bad grades? 
34. If you really decide that you are going to get any problems wrong (e.g. in rnaths or 
spelling) can you do it? 
41. If you wantto can you keep from doing badly in school? 
30. When a students do better than usual in as object, is it difficult to tell why? 
26. If the teacher asks a student a hard question and he or she answers correctly, is 
it usually difficult to work out why the student gave the right answer? 
46. If a student get a good grades in school, is it hard to know the reason why? 
55. Is it hard to know why a student does really well on a test? 
31. If students do badly in school, is it hard to work out why this has happened? 
27. When a student makes a lot of mistakes (e.g., in a spelling test), is it hard to 
know the reason why? 
54. When students give the wrong answer to teachers' questious, do you find it 
hard to know why it has happened? 
59. Is it difficult to know why a student does worse than usual in a subject? 
EIGENVALUES 
PERCENTAGE OF 1HE VARIANCES 
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FACTOR LOADING 
F2 I FI 
0.51 
0.51 
0.65 
0.76 
0.40 
0.44 
0.66 
0.54 
3.25 
20.3 
0.61 
0.47 
0.65 
0.66 
0.49 
0.54 
0.71 
0.49 
2.27 
14.2 
7.3.2. Factor Analysis Results for Nowicki-Strickland Internal and External Locus of 
Control for Children (CNSIE): 
Using Cattell's (1978) Scree test, it was difficult to decide between a two and four factor solution. 
The cumulative percentage of the variance explained in each case was: (1) two factor - 16.2% for 
Turkish and 18.3% for English, (2) four factor - 25.3% for Turkish and 27.8% for English. 
In the literature there is no agreement about the factor structure of the scale. Some of the research 
indicates a three factor solution with the varimax rotation (Barling, 1980; Nowicki, 1976; 
Piotrowski & Dunman, 1983) while others came up with the short version of the scale (20 items) 
and the four factor solution with the varimax rotation (Raine, Derek & Venables, 1981) or with 
oblimin rotation (Linda! & Venables, 1983). Also, the items emerged in different factors in 
different studies (Watters et al., 1990). Some of the researchers found Helplessness to be a first 
main factor (Wolf, Sklow, Hunter & Brenson, 1982), as Nowicki (1976) suggested. Watters and 
his colleagues (1990) have argued that it is almost impossible to replicate the factor structure of 
CNSIE in different samples. Because of a certain level of compatibility with the literature the 
results presented here are based on the four factor solution. Overall, we decided to compare results 
within our samples (TurkishlEnglish) instead of with the literature. It was possible to came up with 
a fairly consistent four factor solution which applied to both samples. 
Although the order of the four factors and the number of items is different, they are still consistent. 
Therefore we eliminated the items which were not present in the same factor in the two samples. 
Finally we identified the same items in the same factors in each sample. The total number of items 
which emerged in these four factors for both samples was 27. We call these factors: Relationships 
with peers (containing the six items 12, 18,23,27,33,36); Powerful Others (containing the six 
items 5, 11, 14, 15, 19,31); Internal (containing the seven items 4,6,22,25,28,32,40), and 
Luck (containing the eight items 1, 3, 8,7, 10, 17,21,24). See table 7.3.2 for summary. The order 
of the factors and the number of the items in each factors are given in the following paragraphs for 
each sample. 
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Table 7.3.2: Nowicki-Strickland Internal-External Locus of Control Scale for Children SummaI)' table 
for Common Four Factors solution (Total Questions=27). 
FactorslSamples FI(furkish)/ 
F3(English) 
Items 12,18,23,27,33,36 
Explained Percentage of the Turkish 9.2% 
Variance English 5.3% 
FI(furkish)1F3(English): RelatIOns With peer. 
F2(furkish)1F4(English): Powerful others, avoidance, fatalism. 
F3(fllIkish)1F2(English): Internal (Effort, ability, and skill) 
F4(fllIkish)lFl(English): Luck, fatalism, and avoidance. 
F2(fllIkish)/ F3(furkish)/ F4(f ,~ ~ 
F4(English) F2(English) 
5,11,14,15,19,31 4,6,22,25,28,32,40 1,3,7,8,10,17,21,24 II 
TllIkish 7.0% Turkish 4.8% TllIkish 4.4% 
English 4.2% English 7.2% English 11.1 % 
In the English sample the order of the four factors was: Luck, containing eight items which 
explained 11.1 % of the variance, Internal, containing eleven iterns and explaining 7.2% of the 
variance, Relationships with Peers, containing eight items and explaining 5.3% of the variance and 
Powerful Others, containing seven items and explaining 4.2% of the variance. Together they 
explained 27.8% of the variance. See table 7.3.2.a. 
The same four factors also emerged for the Turkish sample but in a different order. The order of 
the factors was: Relationships with Peers, containing eleven items and explaining 9.2% of the 
variance, Powerful Others, containing eight items and explaining 7.0% of the variance, Internal, 
containing nine items and explaining 4.8% of the variance and Luck, containing ten items and 
explaining 4.4% of the variance. The overall, explained cumulative percentage of the variance 
explained was 25.3%. See table 7.3.2.b. 
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Table 7.3.2.a: Four factors solution with varimax rotation, for the English sample for Nowicki-
Strickland Internal-External Locus of Control Scale for Children (CNSIE). 
NOWICKI-S1RICKLAND'S LOCUS OF CON1ROL SCALE ITEMS 
1. Do you believe that most problems will usually sort themselves out in time? 
2. Do you believe that you can stop yourself from catching a cold? 
3. Are some children just born lucky? 
4. Most of the time do you feel that getting good grades means a great deal to you? 
5. Are you often blamed for things that just aren't your fault? 
6. Do you believe that if somebody studies bard enough he or she can pass any 
subject? 
7. Do you feel that most of the time it doesn't pay to tIy because things never turn out 
right anyway? 
8. Do you feel that if things start out well in the morning it's going to be a good day no 
matter what you do? 
9. Do you feel that most of the time parents listen to what their children have to say? 
10. Do you believe that good things can be made to happen simply by wishing them? 
11. When you get punished does it usually seem to be for no good reason at all? 
12. Most of the time do you find it bard to change a mend's opinion? 
13. Do you think a team is helped to win more by cheering than by luck? 
14. Do you feel that it's nearly impossible to change your parent's mind about 
anything? 
15. Do you believe that your parents should allow you to make of your own decisions? 
16. Do you feel that when you do something wrong there is very little you can do to 
make it right? 
17. Do you believe that some children are just born good at sports? 
18. Are most of the others children your age stronger than you are? 
19. Do you feel that one of the best ways to handle most problems is just not to think 
about them? 
20. Do you feel that you have a lot of choice in deciding who your mends are? 
21. lf you find a four-leaf clover do you believe that might bring you good luck? 
22. Do you feel that whether you do your homework has much to do with what kinds 
of grades you get? 
23. Do you feel that when another teenager your age decides to hit you, there is little 
you can do stop him or her? 
24. Have you ever had a good luck charm? 
25. Do you believe that whether or not people like you depends on how you act? 
26. Will your parents usually help you if you ask them to? 
27. Have you felt that when people were mean to you it was usually for no reason at 
all? 
28. Most of the time, do you feel that you can change what might happen tomorrow by 
what you do today? 
29. Do you believe that when bad things are going to happen no matter what you do to 
tIy to stop them? 
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FACTOR LOADINGS 
FI F4 
0.33 
-0.31 
0.66 
0.52 
0.64 
0.45 
0.51 0.38 
0.54 
0.34 0.44 
0.52 
0.56 
0.36 
0.22 
0.31 0.40 
-0.53 
0.35 0.36 
0.30 
0.56 
0.48 
0.32 
0.42 
0.55 
0.49 
0.37 
0.56 
0.47 0.33 
0.40 
0.41 
0.35 0.30 
30. Do you think that children can get their own way if they just keep trying? -D.27 
31. Most of the time do you find it useless to try to get your own way at home? 0.28 
32. Do you feel that when good things happen they happen because ofhard wotk? 0.57 
33. Do you fuel that when somebody your age wants to be your enemy there is little 0.66 
you can do to change matters? 
34. Do you feel that it is easy to get friends to do what you want them to? .o.41 
35. Do you usually feel that you have little to say about what you get to eat at home? 0.42 
36. Do you feel that when someone doesn't like you there is little you can do about it? 0.60 
37. Do you usually feel that it is almost useless to try in school because most other 0.51 
children are just cleverer than you are? 
38. Are you the kind of person who believes that planning ahead makes things tum out 0.28 
better? 
39. Most of the time, do you feel that you have little say in what your fumily decides to 0.46 0.36 
do? 
40. Do you think it is better to be clever than to be luck)'? 0.41 
EIGENVALUE 4.5 2.9 2.1 1.7 
PERCENTAGE OF TIffi VARIANCE 11.1% 7.2% 5.3% 4.2% 
NUMBER OF TIffi SUBJECTS 368 
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Table 7.3.2.b: Four factors solution with varimax rotation, for the Turkish sample for Nowicki-
Strickland Internal-External Locus of Control Scale for Children (CNSIE). 
NOWICKI-STRICKLAND'S LOCUS OF CONIROL SCALE ITEMS FACTORWADINGS 
F1 F4 
1. Do you believe that most problems will usually sort themselves out in time? 0.39 
2. Do you believe that you can stop yoU!Self from catching a cold? 0.22 
3. Are some children just born lucky? 0.58 
4. Most of the time do you fuel that getting good grades means a great deal to you? 0.34 
5. Are you often blamed for things that just aren't your fault? 0.42 
6. Do you believe that if somebody studies bard enough he or she can pass any 0.41 
subject? 
7. Do you teel that most of the time it doesn't pay to try because things never tum out 0.35 
right anyway? 
8. Do you feel that if things start out well in the morning it's going to be a good day no 0.51 
matter what you do? 
9. Do you feel that most of the time parents listen to what their children have to say? 0.44 
10. Do you believe that good things can be made to happen simply by wishing them? 0.51 
11. When you get ptmished does it usually seem to be for no good reason at all? 0.47 
12. Most of the time do you find it hard to change a friend's opinion? 0.32 
13. Do you think a team is helped to win more by cheering than by luck? -0.24 
14. Do you feel that it's nearly imposSIble to change your parent's mind about 0.57 
anything? 
15. Do you believe that your parents should allow you to make of your own decisions? 0.55 
16. Do you feel that when you do something wrong there is very little you can do to 0.47 
make it right? 
17. Do you believe that some children are just born good at sports? 0.38 
18. Are most of the others children your age stronger than you are? 0.33 
19. Do you feel that one of the best ways to handle most problems is just not to think 0.20 
about them? 
20. Do you fuel that you have a lot of choice in deciding who your friends are? 0.36 
21. If you find a four-leaf clover do you believe that might bring you good luck? 0.50 
22. Do you feel that whether you do your homewOIk has much to do with what kinds 0.52 
of grades you get? 
23. Do you feel that when another teenager your age decides to hit you, there is little 0.44 
you can do stop him or her? 
24. Have you ever had a good luck charm? 0.37 
25. Do you believe that whether or not people like you depends on how you act? 0.52 
26. Will your parents usually help you if you ask them to? 0.62 
27. Have you felt that when people were mean to you it was usually for no reason at 0.49 
all? 
28. Most of the time, do you feel that you can change what might happen tomOIfOW by 0.33 
what you do today? 
29. Do you believe that when bad things are going to happen no matter what you do to 0.36 
try to stop them? 
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30. Do you think that children can get their own way if they just keep 1r)ing? 0.41 
31. Most of the time do you find it useless to try to get your own way at home? 0.26 
32. Do you feel that when good things happen they happen because ofbard work? 0.56 
33. Do you feel that when somebody your age wants to be your enemy there is little 0.52 
you can do to change matters? 
34. Do you feel that it is easy to get friends to do what you want them to? 0.48 
35. Do you usually feel that you have little to say about what you get to eat at home? 0.38 
36. Do you feel that when someone doesn't like you there is little you can do about it? 0.57 
37. Do you usually feel that it is almost useless to try in school because most other 0.44 
children are just cleverer than you are? 
38. Are you the kind of person who believes that planning ahead makes things turn out 0.55 
better? 
39. Most of the time, do you feel that you have little say in what your fumily decides to 0.56 
do? 
40. Do you think it is better to be clever than to be lucky? 0.50 0.30 
EIGENVALUE 3.67 2.80 1.91 1.76 
PERCENTAGE OF THE VARIANCE 9.2% 7.0% 4.8% 4.4% 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 453 
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7.3.3. Factor Analysis Results for Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control 
Scale (MASLOC): 
This scale showed a fairly clear three factor solution in both samples. The factors are compatible 
with the original study. The Turkish sample result was more like the original sample. In the 
original sample the first factor was Internality, the second factor was Luck and the third factor was 
Helplessness. Also, the first factor before extraction explained most of the variance (Palenzuela, 
1988). 
The order of the factors was different in our samples. For the English sample, Helplessness was 
the fIrst factor (third in the original) and explained 26.7% of the variance. Items pooled in this 
factor were 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 15 (items in the original were 4, 8, 9, 14, 15). The second factor 
was Luck and explained 12.1% of the variance. The items in this factor were 1, 3,5,6, 12 and 13 
(items in the original factor were 1, 3, 6, 12, 13). Items 1, 3, 6, 12 and 13 were negatively loaded. 
Items 12 (-0.43) and 13 (-0.29) had a negative and high factor loading on this factor but also 
appeared in Factor 1. Factor three, called Internality, explained 8.1 % of the variance and contained 
the items 2, 7, 10, 11 (items in the original were 2,5, 7, 10, 11). Although item 5 (0.24) appeared 
in the second factor (called luck) it was also loaded on this factor. The other item which seems 
highly loaded on this third factor was item 3 (0.46). When we looked at the first factor extracted 
before rotation all items except 2 (0.27), 5 (0.16) and 6 (.-0.05) were above the 0.30 limit. See 
table 7.3.3.a. 
For the Turkish sample, Luck was the first factor and explained 26.7% of the whole variance. The 
items pooled in this factor were 1, 3,4, 12, 13 (items in the original factor were 1, 3, 6, 12, 13). 
Item 6 appeared in this (0.32) and the second (0.44) factor, which was Internality in the original 
study. The second factor was Internality and explained 10.7% of the whole variance. The items (2, 
5, 6, 7, 10, 11) were mostly negatively loaded (items in the original were 2, 5, 7, 10, 11). Factor 
three, called Helplessness, explained 8.9% of the whole variance. The items were 8,9, 14, 15 
(items in the original were 4, 8, 9, 14, 15). Although item 13 (0.48) appeared in the first factor 
(called luck) it was also loaded on factor three (helplessness). When we looked at the first factor 
extracted before rotation all items, except 3 (0.26), 6 (0.01) and 8 (0.25) were above the 0.30 
limit. See table 7.3.3.b. 
Although item 6 ("My getting good or bad grades in my exams is related to whether the precise 
topics I have studied come up in the exam") loaded on the Luck subscale in both samples it seems 
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to have made very little contribution to the one factor solution. Also it loaded not only highly but 
also positively on the Internality subscale in the Turkish sample. 
It seems that this is related to differences in the education system and therefore the connotation 
meaning of the whole sentence. It seems that thinking of selecting certain subjects to study for the 
exam depends on their skills and effort as well as luck. 
Table 7.3.3.a: MASLOC Scale. Factors loadings in the English Sample. 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
MASLOC ITEMS FI F2 F3 1st Factor 
EX1racted 
1. If I want to obtain a good exam record it is essential that I should have good luck. .24 -.62 .14 0.44 
2. The grade I get at the end of the year will always be closely related to what I do -.17 -.05 .72 0.27 
dming the year. 
3. Whatever the quality of my work I am always lucky when it comes to examinations. -.04 -.48 .46 0.33 
4. It is an absolute waste of time for me to make any effort, since there is no .68 .06 .13 0.70 
relationship between my capability, how hard I wOlk, and the grades I will get 
5. I am convinced that the grades I will get depend on how well or badly I do in my .11 .41 .24 0.16 
exams. 
6. My getting good or bad grades in my exams is related to whether the precise the -.06 -.61 -.21 .(J.05 
topics I have studied come up in exam. 
7. The kind of grades I will get in my studies depends on how capable I am in .00 .16 .61 0.32 
preparing myself 
8. I don't think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grades I will get will be .74 .18 .08 0.70 
completely manipulated. 
9. I am convinced that whatever I do my teacher will always give me the grades they .73 .04 -.09 0.62 
want to. 
10. If I want to get a good academic record I have to be competent and I must WOlk .35 .09 .54 0.62 
hard. 
11. In general I believe that if one is competent and works hard one will get good .19 .03 .62 0.53 
result 
12. Luck is decisive in kind of grades I get in my studies. .46 -.43 .15 0.61 
13. The grades I get are always determined by a series of random circumstances. .56 -.29 -.08 0.54 
14. It makes absolutely no difference whether I prepare well for a subject or not since .85 .10 -.06 0.73 
in the longrun teachers are "out to catch you". 
15. Regarding my academic life I just don't know what to do. Anything might happen: .48 -.27 .01 0.52 
may be I will do an exam well and fail or may be I will do it badly and pass. 
EIGENVALUE 4.01 1.81 1.22 
PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE 26.7 12.1 8.1 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 368 
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Table 7.3.3.b.: MASLOC Scale. Factors loaclings in the Turkish Sample. 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
MASLOC ITEMS Fl F2 F3 1st Factor 
Extracted 
1. If I want to obtain a good exam record it is essential that I shouldbave good luck. .66 .01 .00 0.45 
2. The grade I get at the end of the year will always be closely related to what I do -.05 -.55 -.26 0.50 
during the year. 
3. Whatever the quality of my work I am always lucky when it comes to .63 .12 .17 0.26 
examinations. 
4. It is an absolute waste of time for me to make any effort, since there is no .45 -.20 -.14 0.53 
relationship between my capability, how bard I work, and the grades I will get 
5. I am convinced that the grades I will get depend on how well or badly I do in my -.02 -.58 -.24 0.53 
exams. 
6. My getting good or bad grades in my exams is related to whether the precise the .32 .44 -.19 0.01 
topics I have studied come up in exam. 
7. The kind of grades I will get in my studies depends on how capable I am in .03 -.63 .08 0.43 
preparing myself. 
8. I don't think it is worthwhile studying bard since the grades I will get will be .38 -.28 .40 0.25 
completely manipulated. 
9. I am convinced that whatever I do my teacher will always give me the grades they -.05 -.07 -.55 0.31 
want to. 
10. If I want to get a good academic record I have to be competent and I must work .13 -.66 .05 0.53 
hard. 
11. In general I believe that if one is competent and works bard one will get good .14 -.61 -.06 0.57 
result 
12. Luck is decisive in kind of grades I get in my studies. .71 -.08 -.16 0.64 
13. The grades I get are always determined by a series of random circumstances. .48 -.10 -.31 0.57 
14. It makes absolutely no difference whether I prepare well for a subject or not since .16 -.15 -.64 0.56 
in the long run teachers are "out to catch you". 
15. Regarding my academic life I just don't know what to do. Anything might .11 .03 -.69 0.43 
happen: may be I will do an exam well and fail or may be I will do it badly and pass. 
EIGENVALUE 3.26 1.60 1.33 
PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE 26.7 10.7 8.9 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 453 
7.3.4. Religiosity Scale for Youth: 
Factor analysis of this scale showed a clear one factor solution for both samples. The factor 
explained 55.6% of the total variance in the English sample and 45.8% of the total variance in the 
Turkish sample. Overall, except for item 9 ("Do you agree with the following statements: 
"Religion gives me a great amount of comfort and security"), it seems that all other items were 
more highly loaded on the factor in the English sample than in the Turkish sample. See table 7.3.4. 
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Table 7.3.4: Religiosity Scale. Factor loadings for the English (N=368) and the Turkish Samples 
(N=453). 
RELIGIOSITY SCALE'S ITEMS 
2. How often have you attended religious services during the past year? 
3. Which of the following best describe your views on prayer or religious meditation? 
4. When you have a serious personal problem how often do you take religious advice or teaching into 
consideration? 
5. How much of an influence would you say that religion has on the way that you choose to act or the way 
that you choose to spend your time each day? 
6. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your belief about God? 
7. Which of the following statements comes closest to your beliefs about life after death (immorta1ity)? 
8. During the past year, how often have you experienced feeling of religious reverence or devotion? 
9. Do you agree with the following statements: "Religion gives me great amount of comfort and secwity" 
EIGENVALUE 
PERCENTAGE OF THE V ARlANCE 
NUMBER OF THE SUBJECTS 
7.3.5. Authoritarianism (F-Scale): 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
ENGLISH TURKISH 
0.69 0.58 
0.74 0.66 
0.78 0.67 
0.75 0.69 
0.80 0.67 
0.63 0.59 
0.83 0.74 
0.70 0.76 
4.45 3.66 
55.6 45.8 
368 453 
Cattell's (1978) Scree test for both samples suggested that one, two and four factor solutions were 
possible for Adorno's F-scale. For the English and Turkish samples respectively, the percentage of 
the variance explained by the ftrst factor was 17.0% and 16.7%; for the second factor 7.4% and 
6.9%; for the third factor 5.2% and 6.0% and for the fourth factor 4.8% and 4.6%. Because the 
amount of variance explained was the most in the ftrst factor and because there was a clear cut-off 
on the scree between the fIrst factor and the others we decided to use the one factor solution for 
this scale. See table 7.3.5. 
For the English sample, all but four items were highly loaded on the ftrst factor (items 2 (0.29), 3 
(0.22),4 (0.12) and 23 (0.26)). See table 7.3.5. In the Turkish sample eight items were below the 
0.30 limit. These were items 2 (0.14),4 (-0.07), 5 (.20), 6 (0.26), 16 (0.14), 18 (0.06), 25 (0.26), 
30 (0.23). Item 2 and 4 were low in both samples, and this is also supported by the item analysis 
results (see Ch 2,3,4). These two quite old fashioned items, "No weakness or difficulty can hold 
us back if we have enough will power" (item 2) and "Human nature being what it is, there will 
always be war and conflict" (item 4),do not seem very good for measuring authoritarianism in 
today's adolescent. 
On the other hand item 3, "Science has its place but there are many important things that can never 
be understood by the human mind" are connotationally different in English schools. Nowadays in 
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western culture, but not in Turkey, alternative medicine etc. is fairly well known and therefore has 
status here but not in Turkey. For this reason, this item didn't appear clearly in the first factor and 
may be highly loaded on another sub factor. Item 23, "The wild sex life of the old Greeks and 
Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people 
might least expect it" was not understood by some of the students in English schools. Perhaps their 
selective knowledge of Greek and Roman civilisations left them in ambiguity. This applied to a 
certain extent to Turkish pupils as well. In our view, this statement is very biased and reflects 
bygone opinions about Greek and Roman cultures (this test was ftrst published in 1954). 
In the Turkish sample, we believe item 16 " People can be divided into two distinct classes: the 
weak and strong", has a different connotational meaning for the pupils. They may not agree with 
this kind of statement because of high mobility between classes. Item 18, "Some day it will 
probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things" did not work because of the 
translation difficulty. The term astrology includes the meaning of "agony aunt" ("yildiz fali") in 
Turkish and this may have misled the subjects. 
Table 7.3.5: Authoritarianism 'F' Scale. Factor loadings for the English (N=368) and the Turkish 
Samples (N=453). 
AUTIIORITARIANISM SCALE'S ITEMS 
1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
learn. 
2. No weakness or difficult can hold us back if we have enough will power. 
3. Science has its place but there are many important thin that can never be 
understood by the human mind. 
4. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war a conflict. 
5. every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose 
decisions are obeyed without questiOIL 
6. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think about it, but 
to keep busy with more cheerful things. 
7. A person who has no manners, bad habits, and poor breeding can hardly expected 
to get along with decent people. 
8. What youth needs most is strictly discipline, rugged detennination, and the will to 
work and fight for family and country. 
9. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places. 
10. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix 
together, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an 
infection or disease from them. 
11. An insult to our honour should always be punished. 
12. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up they ought to 
get over them. 
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FACTOR LOADINGS 
ENGLISH TURKISH 
0.53 0.53 
0.29 0.14 
0.22 0.33 
0.12 -0.07 
0.37 0.20 
0.38 0.26 
0.52 0.43 
0.56 0.60 
0.34 0.35 
0.50 0.47 
0.50 0.47 
0.48 0.62 
13. It is essential for learrring or effective work that our teacher or bosses outline in 0.33 0.45 
detail what is to be done and exactly how to do it 
14. What this cOlmtry needs most, more than laws and political programmes, is a 0.38 0.40 
few courageous, tireless leaders in whom the people can put their faith. 
15. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere 0.42 0.52 
imprisonment; such criminal ought to be publicly whipped, or worse. 
16. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the week and strong. 0.40 0.14 
17. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, 0.55 0.64 
gratitude, and respect for his parents. 
18. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can ex-plain a lot of things. 0.39 0.06 
19. Some leisure is necessary but it is good hard work makes life interesting and 0.49 0.41 
worthwhile. 
20. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain 0.34 0.37 
personal and private. 
21. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake of flood that 0.43 0.34 
will destroy the whole world 
22. Most of our social problems could be solved if we could somehow get rid of 0.58 0.50 
immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people. 
23. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of 0.26 0.30 
the goings-on in this COlllltry, even in places where people might least expect it 
24. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off. 0.49 0.44 
25. Most people don't realise how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in 0.34 0.26 
secret places. 
26. Homosex1.lllls are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely pllllished 0.37 0.47 
27. Books and videos ought not to deal so much with the unpleasant and seamy side 0.34 0.51 
of life: they ought to concentrate on themes that are entertaining or uplifting. 
28. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friends and 0.33 0.52 
relative. 
29. Familiarity breeds contempt. 0.41 0.35 
30. When you come right down to it, it is human nature never to do anything without 0.31 0.23 
an eye to profit. 
EIGENVALUE 5.11 5.02 
PERCENTAGE OF TIlE VARIANCE 17.00 16.7 
NUMBER OF TIlE SUBJECTS 368 453 
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7.4. SUMMARY 
The factor analysis results indicated that the CAMI scale shows the factor structure suggested by 
the original study (Skinner, Chapman & Baltes, 1988). In the English sample the factors always 
came out in the same order as the original study. In the Turkish sample the order was different. In 
the Turkish sample's Attribute subscale, three Control Beliefs items (items 7, 42 & 41) loaded on 
Agency. Also, in the Turkish sample's Powerful Others sub scale, items 14 and 45, which are 
Means-End items in the original, loaded on both Means-End and Agency. The same structure 
occurred in the English sample only for item 45. 
The CNSIE functioned poorly and showed a different factor structure for the two samples. Still, a 
four factor solution was identified for both of the samples in this study. The factors were Luck, 
Internal, Relationships with peers, and Powerful others. 
MASLOC showed a fairly clear three factor solution, as in the original. Only the order of the 
factors was different from the original. Also it seems that the results of the Turkish sample are 
more like the original in terms of the order of the factors and the valence of the sign (e.g. 
Internality loaded negatively in both the original and the Turkish sample). As the original study 
was done in Spain, which is a Mediterranean culture, one could hypothesise a greater similarity 
between Spain and Turkey than between Spain and Britain. 
The Religiosity Scale (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1976) was the most successful scale of the five scales 
used in this research. The factors were clear and similar in both this sample and the original. 
The Authoritarianism scale (F-scale) (Adorno et al. 1950; Christie, 1991) was the second best 
functioning scale. A one factor solution emerged for both samples. Items 2 and 4 were loaded low 
(less than the 0.30 limit) in both samples and this was also supported by the item analysis (see 
chapter 6). Items 3 and 23 were lower than .30 in the English sample and items 5, 6, 16, 18,25,30 
also seemed to have a low factor loading in the Turkish sample. Therefore 10 of the 30 items were 
dropped from this scale. 
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7.5. CONCLUSIONS 
It was decided that for the main body of this research there are some modifications to be made 
before any cross-cultural comparison can be made. From the factor analysis results it seems that 
CAM! and the Religiosity scale showed the same factorial design as the original study. The 
Authoritarianism scale showed a one factor solution after eliminating 10 of the items from the 
scale. CNSIE gave no clear factor solution, which is consistent with the literature, but it was 
possible to come out with a fairly stable four factor solution for both samples in this study. 
MASLOC had a three factor solutions as in the original but there were problems with the order 
and the location of the questions in the factors. This scale was also found to have a consistent one 
factor solution. 
For the CAM! scale 5 factor analyses were run as in the original to confirm three domains 
(Control, Means-Ends, Agency) of the CAM! scale. Although the order of the factors sometimes 
differed from one sample to another nevertheless they appeared to be the same. This can 
interpreted as suggesting that the scales' conceptual validity also applies to this study's samples. 
Given that in this study an older age group, between 15 and 18 years old, was compared with the 
original sample who were between 7 and 12 years old (Skinner et al., 1988) it is encouraging and 
reassuring to find the same domairis as the early study. This factor analysis showed that the CAMI 
has conceptual validity for different cultures and different age groups. Additionally, these results 
can be taken as evidence for the theoretical developments of the concept of, at least for children 
and adolescents (see the argument for the domain specificity of the concept in chapter 1). 
CNSIE did not show a one factor solution for either of the samples. It is certainly not a one factor 
scale as Nowicki and Strickland (1973) originally suggested. After several tries a four factor 
solution seemed to be best for both our samples. These four factors were Luck, Helplessness, 
Relationships with Peers and Powerful Others. This fits with later studies which say that there is 
more than one factor to investigate (Nowicki, 1976; Lefcourt, 1981, 1991). The problem is that 
although it is possibly multidimensional there is no evidence of a stable factor structure from one 
sample to another (Watters et al., 1990). It is also difficult to make a decision about how many 
factors exist (Watters et al., 1990) or whether the factors apply to different subgroups based on 
gender (Kearney & Kearney, 1983; Nowicki, 1976; Wolf et al., 1982), age, grades (Nowicki, 
1976; Wolf et al., 1982; Piotrowski & Dunham, 1983), or race (Wolf et al., 1982). 
The inconsistent results in the literature and in this study create doubt about the quality of the 
scale. Firstly the evidence that it is not unidimensional invalidates the total-score studies done with 
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the scale. Secondly the inconsistent factorial structure in the literature and in this study works 
against attempts to establish a multifactorial measurement of perceived control. These results may 
well be evidence of changes in the structural validity of the concept. Perhaps the early studies and 
measurement only took into account one domain (internal/external) and tested this in different life 
domains in an unplanned way. For example CNSIE did not make any attempt to represent equally 
the Luck, Helplessness or Powerful Others domains. So because the conceptual validity of the 
scale is doubtful it is not valid for this study or for new studies of perceived control. 
MASLOC showed one and three factors solutions. It seems that the one factor solution is more 
stable than the three factor solution in the two samples. This result seems rather ironic because 
MASLOC attempts to be a multidimensional scale but in our study it appear to be unidimensional. 
Palenzuela's (1988) conceptual analysis of perceived controlled him to develop the new domain 
specific multidimensional scale. In his early study the early versions of the same scale appear to 
have four factors as well one main factor (Palenzuela, 1984). Perhaps our study supports his early 
finding. Additionally, it was interesting to see more similarities between our Turkish and the 
original (Spanish) sample than between English and Spanish. This may be explain as showing 
either the validity of the scale in Mediterranean cultures or the poor translation of the English 
version. 
The RELIGIOSITY scale had a clear one factor solution. Astonishingly clear and successful 
measurement was found in the original American sample, our English, predominantly Christian 
sample and our Turkish, predominantly Muslim sample. The scale seems to be valid for different 
cultures and religions. The scale was originally developed to test the relationships between 
individual and social variables and drug use in adolescents in America. It proved to be very 
predictive and valid in these studies in the early seventies (Jessor & Jessor, 1974) and late eighties 
as well (Jessor, Donovan & Costa, 1994). This scale was the most successful of all the 
measurements used in the study cross-culturally. 
AUTHORITARIANISM There was a one factor solution after ten omissions. Given that the scale 
was developed in the early fifties it was expected that some of the items would not be valid for 
today's adolescents. In fact the results were more positive than we expected. The cultural 
differences were minimum at the item level, opposite to our expectation. These results show that 
regardless of the age of the scale it is a valid and reliable one factor measure of authoritarianism. 
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CHAPTER 8: ITEM RESPONSE THEORY 
CHAPTER 8: DIFFERENTIAL ITEM FUNCTIONING BETWEEN CULTURES 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this third part of the cross-cultural comparison, detecting item bias between cultures has been 
done using Item Response Theory (lRT). There are at least two ways of comparing item 
characteristics using IRT. First there is a comparison of parameters such as a, item discrimination, 
b, item difficulty and c, pseudo guessing (Linn, Levine, Hasting, and Wardrop, 1981). Second 
there is a calculation of the area between the curves (lCCs) (Rudner, Getson, and Knight, 1980; 
Raju, 1988). In this study the differences between responses for the same item were detected with 
the Differential Item Functioning (DIP) model using the parameters ofItem Response Theory 
(IRT) for rating scales. 'This is called Samejima's graded model and has been tested by 'Thissen 
(1991) and 'Thissen, Steinberg & Wainer (1993). The common accepted definition of Differential 
Item Functioning (DIF) is that "an item shows DIF if individuals having the same ability, but from 
different groups, do not have the same probability of getting the item right." (Hambleton, 
Swaminathan & Rogers, 1991). DIP rather than item bias has been used at this stage to clarify 
possible misunderstandings about the concept tested by the scale. DIP only presents empirical 
evidence of the difference between samples whereas item bias includes inferences about this 
difference. 
To compare item parameters (a, b and sometimes c) for two groups a chi-square statistic is 
computed. The statistic mayor may not include c parameters depending on the model that has 
been used. There are clear advantages and disadvantages to chi-square statistics. An advantage is 
that it is a known distribution but on the other hand it may give a high false-positive rate because 
of robustness of the test (Hambleton et al., 1991). 
8.2. METHOD 
8.2.1. Design 
For the analyses the two samples are treated as one sample containing two groups. The data design 
for this analysis was adapted from 'Thissen, Steinberg & Wainer (1993) differential item 
functioning model. An example of the data organisation (plan) for this analysis is given in figure 
8.2.1. 
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Figure 8.2.1: Arrangement of the data for Differential Item Functioning analysis of English and 
Turkish samples. 
Items 
English sample items Turkish sample items 
Ell E12 E13 El4 TIl T12 T13 TI4-
Ell: English sample response to the item 1, TIl: Turkish sample response to the item 1. 
8.2.2. Analysis 
Again Thissen's (1991) MULTILOG package program was used to fit Samejima's (1969) Graded 
Model to the data. This model applies if the items have more then one possible response, like, in 
our case, a monotonic rating scale. The program was first run when the parameters were free for 
each item (e.g. CAM!: for each item, one item discrimination value (a) and three item difficulty 
values (bs) for each cut-off between responses on the four point rating scale). Then the same 
analyses were run with these parameters constrained to be equal for both samples of each item. 
8.2.3. Instruments 
The questionnaires were CAMI, CNSIE, MASLOC, Religiosity, and Authoritarianism (see 
Method chapter). 
8.2.4. Sample 
Eight hundred and twenty students' data from two samples redesign to test item functioning. Same 
sample as before (see Method chapter). 
8.2.5. Procedure 
Here we report the results of using MUL TILOG (1991) to detect Differential Item Functioning 
(DIF) between the two samples for each questionnaire. As we mentioned before (chapter 3), for 
CAM! and CNSIE there are four alternative responses to each item, representing a monotonic 
rating scale. For MASLOC and the Authoritarianism Scale there are six alternative responses, and 
for the Religiosity in Youth scale there are five alternative responses to each item. The parameters 
estimated are therefore four, five or six, according to the number of responses represented on the 
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scale. The a parameter reflects the discriminating power of the item. The other three or four or five 
(according to the scale) show the location of the cut off point between one response and the next 
for the rating scale (Samejima, 1969; Thissen, 1991). These parameters in each scale are first 
allowed to be different in each sample and are then forced to be the same for both samples 
(Thissen et al, 1993). We have the responses of monolingual students from the two cultures who 
responded to the items in their own native language. By comparing Chi-square values, we can test 
for the significance of any differences between English and Turkish students responses to each 
item. Thus we can detect the differential item functioning (item bias between samples). 
8.2.6. Hypothesis 
Differences between samples will be due to item malfunctioning (Hambleton et al., 1991) or 
cultural differences (Hui & Triandis, 1983; Van der Vijver & Poortinga, 1982; Poortinga & Van 
der Vijver, 1987, Hulin, 1987). 
8.3. RESULTS 
In this part we are going to present the results for differential item functioning but only for 
differences between X2. The "a" and "b" values will not be presented or interpreted even though 
most of them were above the criterion values for both samples because the results seemed 
numerically unstable in most of the subscales. This unreliability was due to the sample size. 
However, see appendix D for the "a" and "b" values. 
8.3.1. Control, Means-Ends and Agency beliefs (CAMI): 
The results showed that for CAM! all ten subscales functioned differently in the two cultures. All 
subscales exceed the critical value ofX2. However, for all the Agency beliefs subscales the chi-
square values were negative when the parameters were free or constrained. For Means-Ends 
beliefs for Luck the chi-square values were negative when the parameters were free (X2= -93.6, 
df=32). These negative values make us suspect numerical instability in the data. The square of a 
number is a positive numerical value, therefore the negative results we have got can only be 
explained by numerical instability. We think that although we had a fairly big sample to run the 
program it may not be enough. IRT programs in general require 1000 subjects to run and we had 
820. Furthermore, the number of parameters are much higher then demonstration samples given 
in the manual (Thissen, 1991) and other literature (Thissen & Steinberg, 1984; Thissen, Steinberg 
and Wainer, 1993). In demonstrations the scales usually have three monotonic ratings and only 
two items are investigated at one time. Therefore the maximum number of parameters dealt with at 
once is twelve. In our case, the scales had at least four rating points and at least four items. 
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Therefore the minimum number of parameters to be estimated is 32. The maximum number of 
parameters is 320. This is in CNSIE which has forty items and four rating points. 
8.3.2. Nowicki-Strickland Internal vs External Locus of Control Scale (CNSIE) : 
With this scale we had running problems with the early version so we needed to use a high 
capacity version of the program (MULTILOG) to enable us to process more then 50 items at once. 
Although CNSIE has got only 40 items, because of the study's requirements we needed to treat the 
items in the two languages as being completely different (e.g. 80 items instead of 40). 
CNSIE showed substantial differential item functioning. The difference between X2 for parameters 
fixed and free was 2110.5; df=180 (see summary table 8.4.1). 
8.3.3. Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale (MASLOC): 
The results showed that each ofMASLOC's subscales functioned differently in the two samples. 
For the Internal subsca1e the difference was 406.3; df=30; for Helplessness 189.2, df=30; for Luck 
53.1. When the parameters were free X2 for the Internal sub scale was negative, (X2=-190.0). 
8.3.4. Religiosity in Youth Scale: 
The results showed that even the most stable scale in the questionnaire showed differential item 
functioning. The differences between samples was 331.4, df=32. This can only be interpreted as a 
cultural difference or ernic (Berry et al., 1992). The item fidelity study with the bilingual sample 
showed that there was no bias or different interpretations of the same items in the two languages. 
Therefore the differences between X2 are due to cultural differences rather than item bias. 
8.3.5. Authoritarianism F -Scale: 
The differences between samples was 314.8, df=160, p<O.Ol. Therefore the Authoritarianism 
scale shown differential item functioning, which we think is the result of two causes. First, because 
we did not drop any items after the first part of this research some of them (e.g. 2,4) may have 
functioned badly because of translation biases. Second, some other items differences may be 
because of cultural differences or ernic. 
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8.4. SUMMARY 
The results showed that for CAMI all thesubsca1es functioned differently in the two cultures. 
Additionally, in CAMI Means Ends For Luck and the Agency beliefs subscales (e.g. agency for 
effort, luck, attribute, powerful others) the chi-square values were negative in both cases when the 
parameters were free and constrained. These negative X2 values suggests numerical instability in 
the data The results showed that each ofMASLOC's subscales functioned differently in the two 
cultures. When the parameters were free X2 for the Internal sub scale was negative. Both the 
Religiosity scale and the Authoritarianism scale functioned differently in the two cultures. In these 
cases X2 was numerically stable. Therefore the results were reliable. 
Table 8.4.1: Detecting Item Bias in English and Turkish Samples with the Comparison of the 
Differences Between Item Characteristics when are the Parameters Free and Constrained. 
SCALES PARAMETERS PARAMETERS DIFF. DF P<.01 
CONSTRAINED FREE 
CONTROL, MEANS-ENDS, 
AGENCY BELIEFS 
Control Belief 3033.0 2662.0 371 32 55.3 
Means-Ends Beliefs 
Effort 3431.9 3224.7 207.2 32 55.3 
Luck 33.7 -93.6 nla 32 55.3 
Unknown Factors 1843.4 1764.0 79.4 32 55.3 
Attnbute 2682.6 2441.1 241.5 32 55.3 
Powerful Others 2199.5 2034.7 164.8 32 55.3 
Agency Beliefs 
Effort - 4042.7 -4163.6 nla 16 32.0 
Luck -3740.8 -3831.6 nla 16 32.0 
Attribute -3923.8 -3970.4 nla 16 32.0 
Powerful Others -3589.8 -3642.1 nla 16 32.0 
CNSIE 65388.4 63277.9 2110.5 160 
Nowicki-Strickland's LOC Scale 
MASLOC 24200/3 23530.5 669.8 90 l24.1 
Palenzuela's LOC Scale 
Internal 216.3 -190.0 nla 30 50.9 
Helplessness 1305.9 1116.7 189.2 30 50.9 
Luck 1511.7 978.6 533.1 30 50.9 
RELIGIOSITY SCALE 4745.3 44133.9 611.4 40 63.7 
AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE 67724.6 67409.8 314.8 180 226.3 
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8.5. CONCLUSIONS 
There are a few problems related to the results ofDIF in this study. Firstly unlike other item 
analyses the differences between the two samples were far more significant. This could be 
explained by the sensitivity of item characteristic curves, item information and the nature of the 
analysis, but also may be caused by the robustness of the ~ analysis used for DIF detection 
(Hambleton et al., 1991). Secondly and most importantly, in some of the DIF analyses X2 was 
negative, which is impossible. Therefore the reliability of these analyses should be treated with 
caution. This brings up the issue of the limitation of the programme and most importantly the 
reliability ofItem Response Theory when the sample size is not bigger than 1000. 
The results ofDIF in this comparison were different from the those of the other methods used. It is 
not clear if the differences detected were reliable or a false alarm of the analysis. Because 'X2 is so 
sensitive it is likely that detected differences may be false alarms. These are more likely to occur in 
cross cultural data because of the number of sources of variance. 
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8.0. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FOR PART IT 
The general finding of this part is that there are differences between the English and Turkish data 
at the item level. But the are also differences in the size of differences detected by the different 
methods. Classical item analysis detected some differences but also many similarities at the item 
level. Factor analysis revealed factor similarities for most of the scales (CAM!, Religiosity and 
Authoritarianism in particular). But IRT, investigated with Thissen's MULTlLOG and Samejiroa's 
Graded model for rating scales, came out with many differences in all the scales concerned. 
Additionally, some of the results contained unexpectedly negative results, which raises the 
possibility of the unreliability of the results in these cases (Means-End beliefs for Luck of CAM! 
and for the Internal sub scale ofMASLOC as well as CNSIE) and suggests that a larger sample size 
was needed. 
The general conclusions drawn for scales from the second part are: 
CAM! proved to be a good, cross-culturally reliable scale and all 10 subscales can be used. The 
factor structures were very similar in both samples of this study and to the original sample in 
West-Berlin but the order of the factors was different on some occasions. Factor structures have 
also been found to be valid in recent years for East-Berlin and Russian samples (Little et al., 1995; 
Statsensko, et al., 1995; Oettingen, Little, Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994). 
The CAM! Control beliefs sub scale is problematic. The CAM! Means-Ends Scale is acceptable on 
cross-cultural comparability but was not in tenns of item quality (item-total correlations) in one or 
the other culture. Means-Ends for Luck and Unknown were fine but in the scales for Effort, 
Attribute and Powerful others, between one and three items out of 8 were low on item-total 
correlations. 
The CAM! agency subscales were fine on cross-cultural comparisons as well as item-total 
correlations. 
The Control belief scale had some problems in the original studies as well. It was not a good 
predictor of academic perfonnance (Skinner, Schindler & Tschechne, 1990) and was not very 
infonnative theoretically because it only represented the direct causal relationship between agency 
and outcome without any mediation. So it was not about competence or strategies of the individual 
in fulfilling his or her aims (Skinner, 1995). Second, unlike other domains it was only represented 
by eight questions which is a small representation of the concept. In the author's view this domain 
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is like a general aspect of perceived control that does not take into account multidimensionality, as 
the subscales of Agency and Means-Ends do, each of which is represented by 8 items. 
These results so far support the idea that the Means-Ends beliefs are more culture dependent than 
Agency beliefs. But most importantly, they are applicable to both cultures (Derived etic or etic). 
Evidence from other studies is that Agency seems more likely to be an etic aspect of perceived 
control (Little et al., 1995). The CAMI scale will be used in the cross-cultural comparison part of 
the study because it passes investigation of the derived etic, at least for the Means-Ends and 
Agency beliefs subscales. 
CNSIE: This will be taken out of the study for more than one reason. Although translation fidelity 
was mainly acceptable, the scale failed to show good reliability and high item-total correlations. 
This raises the possibility of the multidimensionality of the scale. But although the factor analysis 
suggested the multidimensionality of the scale it was hard to see any consistent factor structure. 
This is also found in the literature. Therefore, the multidimensionality of the scale may also be 
questioned. One other explanation of this inconsistent factor structure may be related to early 
theories that the concept was unidimensional (Rotter, 1966, 1975; Nowicki & Strickland, 1973). 
Recent literature indicates that the concept is multidimensional therefore CNSIE was developed on 
an immature conception of perceived control. 
MASLOC: The three factor solution failed at a certain level but the one factor solution was fine 
after an item had been dropped. The Helplessness and Luck subscales were problematic in all of 
the analyses carried out. The reliability of the scale and most of the items seemed to be better in 
the Turkish sample than the English. This can be related to the similarities in experiences between 
Turkish and Spanish cultures, as the scale was originally in Spanish. The expressions used in the 
English scale have also been questioned. The differences in English were more to do with nuance 
differences rather than the meaning but it may be still important enough to effect the results. 
RELIGIOSITY. The factor and classical item analysis results have been taken into account. It is 
retained without any changes and the one factor solution is accepted. 
AUTHORITARIANISM: Factor analysis and classical item analysis were used to take some of the 
items out of the scale to leave the derived etic items for the final comparisons. 
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PART III 
COMPARISON BETWEEN CULTURES 
CHAPTER 9: ANTACEDENTS OF 
PERCEIVED CONTROL BETWEEN CULTURES 
CHAPTER 9: ANTECEDENTS OF PERCEIVED CONTROL BETWEEN CULTURES 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
The cross-cultural comparability of the scales was investigated in depth in the first and second 
parts. Now, finally, in this chapter we will investigate the relationship between perceived control 
and its social antecedents using the instruments that have been shown to be similar (derived etic) 
for the two cultures. 
We know that perceived control is a very good predictor of perfOimance at all ages, particularly 
during late childhood and adolescence in secondary schools (Findley & Cooper, 1983), Because of 
its predictive value for many behaviours we would like to know how perceived control develops 
during an individual's life. The developmental aspects and the effects of environmental factors on 
perceived control have been discussed but it seems that the literature is not at all conclusive. 
First of all, in the early literature, developmental changes in perceived control were thought to be 
linear (Findley & Cooper, 1983) but recent research provides evidence that the development may 
be curvilinear, with changes around the age of 10 related to other features of cognitive 
development (Skinner & Chapman, 1990). It adjusts with real experiences and becomes more 
external, but then becomes more internal again. It shows a decline again around late adulthood, 
though the results at this end of the life span are still not comprehensive or very consistent 
(Flammer, 1995). 
One way in which environmental factors such as available resources can be understood is by 
comparing developed and developing countries. 
Secondly, environmental factors have always been considered important in the development of 
perceived control but have never been investigated in depth. Cross-cultural studies have tended to 
show that western cultures are more internal than their Asian and African counterparts but the 
results vary from country to country (Dyal, 1984; Hui, 1982). Religion seems another inconclusive 
but influential variable in perceived control. Some studies have found that religiosity was highly 
positively related with Internal perceived control but others have found the opposite or no 
significant differences at all. Combining this with other cross-cultural studies, our expectation is 
that there will be negative relationships between religiosity and internal perceived control, 
particularly in Islam because of the nature of the religion, which encourages social support and is 
authoritarian. In terms of SES, it seems that there are fairly consistent results showing low SES 
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populations are less internal, but the number of studies in this area is vety limited. Although some 
studies found that females are more external than males, many studies have not found any 
significant differences between genders. 
Thirdly, above all, studies on environmental differences create real methodological problems in 
psychology. These problems were investigated in the previous two parts of this thesis. See 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 for translation fidelity and chapters 6, 7 and 8 for comparability-derived etic. 
The questionnaires were analysed in terms of a derived etic and in this part of the study only those 
items which were reliable and valid have been used. We found that CAMI and the Religiosity 
scale for Youth functioned similarly in both cultures. So did the third scale of the MASLOC 
questionnaire after the subscales were combined rather than being used separately. However, the 
Authoritarianism Scale (F-Scale) needed to be changed by dropping 10 of the questions and 
CNSIE had to be completely excluded (see Ch 6). 
So, this part of the study will investigate the true influence of the social antecedents of perceived 
control. We will be re-analysing some parts of the data collected for Part 2. Any relationship 
between perceived control and its predictive variables (e.g. culture, socio-economic status, 
religiosity, religion) will be due to individuals' experiences within their environment. Adolescents 
are the age group in which we are particularly interested because they represent the new 
generation, but also because their perceived control is relatively more stable than that of children 
(Skinner & Chapman, 1990). 
9.2. METHOD 
9.2.1. Design 
The results of the perceived control scales collected from the English and Turkish samples 
(dependent variables) were investigated in terms of the antecedents of perceived control 
(independent variables) such as age, gender, SES, culture, religion, religiosity and 
authoritarianism. 
9.2.2. Analysis 
A preliminary descriptive analysis, univariate ANOV A were used to identifY significant 
differences in perceived control in terms of age, gender, SES, culture, and religion. In this 
preliminaty analysis religiosity and authoritarianism were also considered dependent variables, and 
the differences in scores investigated in terms of age, gender, etc. Religiosity and authoritarianism 
were not treated in the ANOVA as independent variables because they consist of interval data. 
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Their effect on perceived control was investigated in the second step. Additionally Pearson 
product-moment correlations were calculated for religiosity, authoritarianism and all perceived 
control scales to see the relationships between the main independent and dependent variables. 
In the second step a multivariate data analysis was used to investigate the relationships between 
age, gender, culture, religion, religiosity and anthoritarianism and perceived control. Canonical 
correlations and multiple regressions were used to identify the major effects of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable after the effect of the covariances had been eliminated (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, Black, 1995). 
Canonical correlation analysis is usually used to see the functional relationships between 
dependent variables and latent functions derived from the independent variables. Canonical 
correlation analysis can be used when we have several kinds of measurements (some interval, 
some ordinal) at the same time. So metric and nonmetric measurements are both permissible. If the 
predictor (independent) variables are only categorical, MANOV A can be used, but if some of 
them are metric (in our case religiosity and authoritarianism) then canonical correlation analysis 
can be used. Although it assumes nonnal distribution of the underlying variable it can be used for 
a binary distribution as well (Hair et al. 1995). This technique enables researchers to develop 
independent canonical functions that maximise the correlations between the linear composites of 
sets of criterion (dependent) and predictor (independent) variables (Hair et al., 1995). 
"Interpretation ofthe canonical variates in a significant function is based on the premise that 
variables in each set that contribute heavily to shared variances for these functions are considered 
to be related to each other" (Hair et al., 1995, p. 333). 
There are several properties of canonical analysis that have been used to interpret the results. These 
are canonical cross-loading and canonical weights (Hair et al., 1995). Canonical loading is the 
between sets variable-variate correlation. It It ••• reflects the variance that an observed variable in one 
set of variables shares with the canonical score for that set. Canonical weights are the relative 
importance of a variable in each set of variables It (Hair et al., 1995). This infonnation is simply 
constructed from canonical loadings. In our study, after we test the validity of the analysis with 
one of the subtraction methods to assure the stability of the score, we will be giving canonical 
weights and loadings to identify latent canonical variables which share common variance with 
observed variables. Although the results of both the canonical weights and the canonical loadings 
are given in the table, because of the greater stability of the scores only canonical loadings will be 
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interpreted. Simultaneously, multiple regression analysis is used with canonical correlation 
analysis to find out which independent variables are best at explaining the dependent variables. 
9.2.3. Instruments 
We analysed the original ten subscales of the CAM!, a total score for the three subscales of the 
MASLOC, the Religiosity for Youth scale and the Authoritarianism scale. Therefore, 13 scores 
were calculated. 
9.2.4. Sample 
The participants were the same as in Part 1. They were 362 British and 420 Turkish pupils. The 
age range was 14 to 18 years old. In the Turkish sample 93.98 % said they were Moslem. In the 
English sample 54.64 % said they were Christian and 32.78 % non religious. See the Method 
chapter for details. 
9.2.5. Procedure 
The procedure is the same as for Part 2. See the Method chapter for details. 
9.2.6. Hypothesis 
The aim of this research is to see how much social variables affect perceived control within a 
cross-national setting. This was tested in several ways with the criterion variables we set. In terms 
of our criterion variables these are the hypotheses we are going to test. 
Final result chapter: 
The results of part 1 and part 2 have altered the final set of hypotheses slightly. Because CNSIE 
has been eliminated from this part of the thesis the hypotheses are now more specific to CAM! and 
MASLOC. 
HI: For reasons discussed earlier we expect the English pupils to be more internal than the Turkish 
pupils 
H2: For reasons discussed in the Introduction we expect older pupils, boys and pupils with high 
SES to be more internal. 
H3: As discussed before we expect Christians to be more internal than Muslims. But it should be 
noted that religion is highly confounded with culture in general. Most of the Turkish sample said 
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that they were Muslim but in the English sample more variation was observed. Therefore the 
confounding effect may be greater in the Turkish sample. 
H4 & H5: It is expected that high religiosity and high authoritarianism will be highly related to 
external perceived control. This will be more true for strategy beliefs because they refer to the 
means used for reaching the ends in a social environment and therefore they are more likely to be 
learned from social experiences. 
H6: There will be different amounts of influence on different types of perceived control as a result 
of cultural and other kinds of social and individual differences. Control beliefs and strategy beliefs 
will be more affected by cultural differences, SES and all other related predictors. On the other 
hand, capacity beliefs, which highly related to a person's individual skills, will be less affected by 
socio-environmental variables. 
9.3. RESULTS 
9.3.1. Differences in Perceived Control, Religion and Authoritarianism: 
See table 9.3.1 for a summary of F values of the main effects. 
9.3.1.1. Cross-culturallNational differences on perceived control, religiosity and 
authoritarianism: 
Culture Main Effect. 
The cross-cultural differences between the cultures were tested with a one way ANOV A. The 
results showed that there were significant differences between cultures for six out often CAMI's 
subscales. These differences were concerned with Control beliefs (F(I,776)= 40.75, p<O.OOI), 
Means and Ends for Effort (F(1,782)= 89.92, p<O.OOl), for Powerful Others (F(1,774)= 6.82, 
p<O.Ol), and for Unknown Factors (F(1,771)= 7.21, p<O.Ol), Agency beliefs for Powerful Others 
(F(I,783)= 75.98, p<O.OOI), and for Luck (F(1,783)= 9.66, p<O.OI) All these differences, except 
Agency for Luck, showed that Turkish pupils scored more Internal on CAMI's subscales than their 
English peers. This result disproves the hypothesis that the English students will have more 
perceived internal control than the Turkish students (hypothesis (1) and (4) above). 
The MASLOC scores did not show any differences between cultures. 
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Table 9.3.1.1: Mean Scores for Culture. 
Means Means Grand Total 
(Turkish) (English) Means 
SCALES/Subscales N=407 N=319 
CAMI 
Control Beliefs 14.96 17.02 15.87 
M-EEffort 17.34 19.61 18.35 
M-ELuck 12.41 12.88 12.61 
M-EUnknown 14.42 15.38 14.85 
M-E Attribute 22.76 22.67 22.72 
M-E Powerful Others 15.66 16.43 16.00 
Agency Effort 8.84 9.43 9.10 
Agency Attribute 9.95 10.34 10.12 
Agency Powerful Others 10.63 12.00 11.24 
Agency Luck 9.47 8.84 9.19 
MASLOC 32.54 33.45 32.94 
Religiosity 24.60 18.74 21.98 
Authoritarianism 82.34 65.66 75.00 
It was also expected that the Turkish sample would score higher on the Religiosity and 
Authoritarianism scales. This was supported for Religiosity (F(l,766)= 152.89, p<O.OOl) and for 
Authoritarianism (F(1,692)= 222.87, p<O.OOI). This results supports hypothesis 3, and part of 1 
(above). See table 9.3.1 for F values and table 9.3.1.1 for Means. 
9.3.1.2. Gender, Age and SES Differences for Perceived control, Religiosity and 
Authoritarianism scores: 
Gender Main Effect. 
Gender differences were observed on six out often CAM! subscales: Means-Ends for Attribute 
(F(1,781)= 18.92, p<O.OOI), for Powerful Others (F(1,774)= 6.84, p<O.Ol), for Luck 
(F(1.774)=8.87, p<O.Ol) and for Unknown Factors (F(l,771)= 32.34, p<O.OOI); Agency for Effort 
(F(I,788)= 8.71, p<O.OI) and for Powerful Others (F(I,783)= 8.86, p<O.OI). The differences 
observed were not always in the same direction. Girls scored more external on Means-Ends for 
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Attribute (p<O.OOl) and Agency for Powerful others (p<O.OI), but boy scores more external on 
Means-Ends for Unknown (p<O.OOI), Powerful Others (p<O.OI), and Agency for Effort (p<O.OI). 
Therefore hypothesis 2 is partially supported. 
Table 9.3.1.2.a: Mean scores for Gender. 
Means Means Grand Total 
(Girls) (Boys) Means 
SCALES/Subscales N=387 N=339 
CAM! 
Control Beliefs 15.88 15.86 15.87 
M-EEffort 18.30 18.41 18.35 
M-ELuck 12.24 13.05 12.61 
M-EUnknown 14.20 15.59 14.85 
M-EAttribute 23.15 22.23 22.72 
M-E Powerful Others 15.86 16.38 16.00 
Agency Effort 8.80 9.44 9.10 
Agency Attribute 10.28 9.94 10.12 
Agency Powerful Others 11.35 11.11 11.24 
Agency Luck 9.47 8.84 9.19 
MASLOC 32.06 33.45 32.94 
Religiosity 22.48 2l.43 2l.98 
Authoritarianism 75.14 74.84 75.00 
MASLOC also showed significant gender differences (F(1,726)= 8.53, p<O.OOI). There were no 
differences for Religiosity or Authoritarianism. See table 9.3.1 for F values and table 9.3.1.2.a for 
means. 
Age Main Effect. 
Age did not produce any significant differences except for CAMl's Agency beliefs for Effort. The 
older the pupils the less likely they were to believe in their own effort to success, so they became 
more external. See tables 9.3.1.2.a and 9.3.1.2.b. 
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Table 9.31.2.b: Mean scores for Age. 
Means Means (16 yrs Means Means (18 yrs 
(- 15 old) (17yrsold) old-) 
yrs old) N=91 N=224 N=231 N=180 
SCALES/Subscaies 
CAM! 
Control Beliefs 15.70 16.05 15.79 15.84 
M-EEffort 19.94 17.72 17.15 17.35 
M-ELuck 12.01 12.85 12.69 12.54 
M-EUnknown 15.27 14.73 14.91 14.70 
M-E Attribute 22.83 22.68 22.74 22.64 
M-E Powerful Others 15.53 16.43 16.10 15.73 
Agency Effort 8.13 9.25 9.12 9.40 
Agency Attribute 10.39 10.13 10.00 10.13 
Agency Powerful Others 11.09 10.96 11.50 11.34 
Agency Luck 9.48 9.05 9.19 9.21 
MASLOC 32.68 34.06 32.59 32.13 
Socio-Economic Status Main Effect. 
The socio-economic status of the pupils was measured (or decided) indirectly from the schools' 
catchment area and reputations. The result of this section should therefore be treated with care (e.g. 
Sedghill school in London-England and Sidika Rodop in lzmir-Turkey were counted as low SES 
schools). Five out of the ten CAM! subscales showed differences. These were Control Beliefs 
(F(3,776)= 5.9, p<O.OI), with middle SES pupils scoring more external then the rest; Means-Ends 
beliefs for Luck (3, 774)= 6.36, p<O.OOI) and for Powerful Others (F(3,774)= 4.41, p<O.OI), with 
scores increasing (becoming more external) with increasing SES; Agency beliefs for Effort 
(F(3,783)= 10.7, p<O.OOI), with scores being more external with increasing SES and for Attribute 
(F(3,784)= 13.3, p<O.OOI), with scores being internal with increasing SES (see hypothesis 2). 
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Table 9.3.1.2.c: Mean scores for Socio-Economic Status. 
Means (SES 1) Means (SES 2) Means 
N=167 N=121 (SES 3) 
SCALES/Subscales N=382 
CAMI 
Control Beliefs 15.70 16.94 15.48 
M-EEffort 17.69 18.52 18.63 
M-ELuck 11.70 12.45 13.21 
M-EUnknown 14.53 15.43 14.86 
M-E Attribute 22.85 23.03 22.40 
M-E Powerful Others 15.22 16.04 16.46 
Agency Effort 8.30 8.93 9.57 
Agency Attribute 10.25 10.66 9.97 
Agency Powerful Others 11.30 11.27 11.04 
Agency Luck 9.22 8.97 9.20 
MASLOC 31.34 33.l3 34.02 
Religiosity 23.41 21.68 21.36 
Authoritarianism 85.67 73.37 72.31 
.. SES 1= Low SOClo-econonnc statue (Sldika Rodop and Sedgbill schools) 
SES 2= Middle Socio-Economic statue (Suphi KO)'1UlCUOglU and Pimlico schools) 
SES 3= Upper-Middle Socio-Economic statue (Bomova Anodolu, Alleyn and Haydon Schools) 
SES 4= Upper Socio-Economic statue (American Koleji and Westminster Schools) 
Means (SES 
4) 
N=86 
14.79 
18.39 
l3.22 
14.32 
22.55 
16.06 
9.71 
8.94 
11.66 
9.68 
32.74 
21.94 
67.55 
Authoritarianism showed a very significant decrease with increasing (high) SES (F(3,692)= 27.79, 
p<O.OOl). Religiosity did not have and effect (see hypothesis 2). See tables 9.3.1 and 9.3.1.2.c. 
9.3.1.3. Interactions For Culture, Gender, Socio-Economic Status. 
See table 9.3.1.3 for F values of the interactions. We also tested whether there were any 
interactions between culture and other independent variables such as gender and SES. There were 
interactions between SES and Culture on one out ten of CAMl's subscales: Means-Ends for Luck 
(F(3,774)= 3.78, p<O.01). The Turkish scores became more external for the upper SES while the 
English scores become more internal. MASLOC, the other Perceived Control Scale, also showed a 
significant interaction between Culture and SES (F(3,726)= 5.91, p<O.001). For MASLOC the 
Turkish scores became more external with higher SES but the English scores became more 
Internal. An interaction was also found between Culture and SES for Religiosity (F(3,766)= 14.33, 
p<O.001). The Religiosity scores decreased as SES increased in the Turkish sample but increased 
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in the English sample. Only the religiosity result was highly significant (P<0.001) and this needs to 
be pursued further. The other differences were relatively small and did not show any trend. 
There were interactions between gender and SES on two out often CAMI's subscales. The first 
was Means-Ends for Luck (F(3,774)=3.62, p<O.Ol), where girls with low SES scored more 
internal than boys. Boys with high SES scored more internal than girls with the same SES. The 
second was Agency for Luck (F(3,774)= 5.05, p<O.Ol), where girls with low SES scored more 
internal but boys with high SES scored more internal. Overall boys were more internal than girls 
for most levels of SES. 
These results give good reason to think that the differences between cultures are mainly linear. It is 
therefore possible to look at the effects of the independent variables combining the English and 
Turkish samples rather than looking at them separately. See summary table 9.3.1 for significant 
differences. 
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Table 9.3.1: Summary table of the F Values for the main effects of Culture, Gender and SES and Age. 
SCALES/Subscales F-Valueof F-Valueof F-Value ofSES F-Valueof 
Cultural dif. Genderdif. dif. AGE 
CAMI 
Control Beliefs 40.75 ** 0.02 5.90 '" 1.01 
Means-Ends Beliefs 
For Effort 89.92 ** 0.93 1.99 1.45 
For Attnbute 0.14 18.92 ** 1.76 0.11 
For Luck 1.39 8.87 '" 6.36* 0.82 
For Powerful Other 6.82 * 6.84* 4.41* 2.24 
For Unknown Fact 7.21 * 368.2 ** 3.20 1.49 
Agency Beliefs 
For Effort 6.33 8.71 * 10.7 "'* 5.90* 
For Attribute 3.90 2.50 13.3 ** 1.47 
For Luck 9.66 * 5.42 2.31 0.53 
For Powerful Other 75.98 "'* 8.86 '" 3.l0 2.38 
MASLOC 0.89 8.53 * 2.42 1.38 
Religiosity Scale 152.90 ** 0.04 2.27 2.02 
F-Scale 222.87 ** 4.76 27.79** 
p<O.Ol *, p<O.OOl ** 
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Table 9.3.1.3: Summary table of the F Values for the two and three way interactions between Culture, 
Gender and SES. 
SCALES/Subscales Culture X Culture X SES GenderXSES Culture X 
GenderF- F-Value F- Value GenderXSES 
Value F-Value 
CAM! 
Control Beliefs 0.53 0.14 0.80 2.23 
Means-Ends Beliefs 
For Effort 0.77 3.65 0.99 1.51 
For Attribute 3.24 2.09 0.60 0.75 
For Luck 0.02 3.78 '" 3.62 * 1.55 
For P. Others 3.24 2.57 1.16 0.80 
For Unknown Factors. 0.27 2.14 2.42 2.79 
Agency Beliefs 
For Effort 0.18 2.27 2.00 0.93 
For Attribute 5.22 2.66 2.67 1.39 
For Luck 0.58 2.56 5.05* 1.19 
For P. Others 0.61 3.30 2.31 0.87 
MASLOC 2.67 5.91* 1.498 0.81 
Religiosity 2.26 14.30 *'" 0.252 0.56 
F-Scale 1.27 2.76 1.637 0.81 
P<O.OI *,p<0.001 ** 
9.3.1.4. Summary of ANOV A results: 
Culture 
Six out of the 10 CAMI subscales showed cultural differences. Three out of six were highly 
significant at 0.001 (Control Beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and Agency for Powerful Others). 
Apart from Agency for Luck, in all other subscales the Turkish sample scored more internal than 
their English peers. The results disproved the hypothesis that the Turkish sample would score more 
external because of their experiences and religious background. 
MASLOC didn't show any differences. 
Religiosity and Authoritarianism were significantly different for the two cultures (p < 0.001). The 
Turkish sample were more religious and more authoritarian than the English. 
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Gender 
Seven out of the 10 CAM! subscales showed gender differences. Two of them were highly 
significant: Means-Ends for Attribute (boys scored more internal than girls), and Unknown Factors 
(girls scored more internal then boys) (p<0.001). Others significant atp < 0.01 were: Means-Ends 
Beliefs for Powerful Others (girls more internal), Agency Beliefs for Effort (girls more internal) 
and Powerful Others (boys more internal). 
MASLOC scores showed a significant gender effect (girls scored more internal then boys) 
(p<0.01). 
No Religiosity or Authoritarianism differences were found between girls and boys. 
Socio-Economic Status 
Six out of the 10 CAM! subscales showed significant differences in terms of SES. Two out of six 
were highly significant (p<0. 001): Agency for Effort (low SES scored more internal, with scores 
gradually getting more external with increasing SES) and Agency for Attribute (as SES increased 
they became more internal). Significant at 0.01 were: Control Beliefs (upper SES scored the most 
internal while Middle SES scored more external), Means-Ends for Powerful Others (Low SES 
scored more internal with the most external group being the upper-middle SES group). No 
significant differences were found for MASLOC. 
The Authoritarianism scores were significantly different for different SES groups (Upper SES 
scored less authoritarian with scores gradually increasing as SES decreased) (p<0.001). 
9.3.2. ReIatioships Between Religiosity, Authoritarianism and Perceived Control 
The relationships between the perceived control scales and religiosity and authoritarianism were tested 
with the Spearman product-moment correlation coefficient. The relationships were looked at for each 
culture separately and then together to see whether the pattem was different from one culture to 
another. The results show that the correlations between the perceived control scales and subscales and 
religiosity and authoritarianism were generally low (max. -.32 for authoritarianism and Means-Ends for 
Effort). Nevertheless there were a number of them that were statistically significant (20 out of 66). The 
relationships between religiosity and authoritarianism were also tested. They were highly significantly 
for the Turkish sample and for the whole sample (r=.46, and .41, p<O.OO 1, respectively), but not for the 
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English sample (r=.lO). This difference can be attributed to the English sample being more 
heterogeneous and diverse than the Turkish sample in relation to the types of religious beliefs. 
Additionally, possible curvilinear relationships were investigated with regression analyses in which 
each subscale of perceived control was the dependent variable and religiosity and the square root of 
religiosity or authoritarianism and the square root of authoritarianism were independent variables. A 
significant beta value of the first independent variable (religiosity or authoritarianism) would indicate a 
significant correlation between the perceived control subscale and religiosity or authoritarianism. A 
significant beta value for the second independent variable (the square root of religiosity or 
authoritarianism) would indicate a curvilinear relationship between the perceived control subscale and 
the first independent variable (religiosity or authoritarianism). The results of these analyses were that 
three subscales of CAMI showed significant (p<0. 01) curviliear relationships. These were Control 
Beliefs and religiosity and Agency for Luck and Powerful Others and authoritarianism. Two subscales 
which showed curvilinear relationships to a lesser extent were Means-Ends for Luck and Powerful 
Others and authoritarianism (see appendix E for details). 
9.3.2.1. Correlation between religiosity and perceived control 
English sample 
One out of 11 scales and subscales was found to be significantly related to religiosity. This was for 
Agency for Effort (r= -.15, p<O.OI). Pupils who scored high on religiosity scored more internal in 
agency for effort. 
Turkish sample 
Four out of the 11 scale and subscales were found to be significantly related to religiosity. These were 
Means-ends for Effort (r= -.20, p<O.OOI), Agency for Effort (r= -.25, p<O.OI), Agency for Powerful 
Others (r= .18, p<O.OOI), and MASLOC (r= -.13, p<O.OI). Pupils who scored Internal on Means-Ends 
for Effort, Agency for Effort and MASLOC scored high on religiosity. This wasn't the case for the 
Agency for Powerful Others sub scale of CAMI; pupils who scored External also scored high on 
religiosity. 
Whole sample 
Five out of the 11 scales and subscales were found to be significantly related to religiosity. These were 
Control Beliefs (r= -.10, p<O.OI), Means-Ends for Effort (r= -.21, p<O.OOI), Means-Ends for Powerful 
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Others (r= -.10, p<O.OI), Agency for Effort (r= -.21, p<O.OOI), and MASLOC (r= -.12, p<O.OI). See 
table 9.3 .2.1 for r-values. For all of these pupils who were high on religiosity scored Internal. 
9.3.2.2. Correlations between authoritarianism and perceived control. 
English sample 
There were significant relationships between 5 out of 11 scales and subscales and authoritarianism. 
These were Means-Ends for Effort (r= -.15, p<O.OI), Means-Ends for Luck (r= .16, p<O.OI), Means-
Ends for Unknown (r= .20, p<O.OOI), Agency for Effort, and MASLOC (r= .17, p<O.OI). Pupils who 
scored high on authoritarianism scored more Internal on Means-Ends and Agency for Effort but they 
scored External on Means-Ends for Luck, Unknown, and MASLOC. 
Turkish sample 
Only 2 out of 11 scales and subscales were found to be significantly related to authoritarianism. These 
were Means-End for Effort (r= -.25, p<O.OOI) and Agency for Effort (r= -.23, p<O.OOI). Pupils who 
scored Internal on Means-Ends and Agency for Effort scored high on authoritarianism. 
Whole sample 
Three out of 11 scales and subscales were found to be significantly related to religiosity. These were 
Control Beliefs (r= -.10, p<O.OI), Means-Ends for Effort (r= -.32, p<O.OOI) and Agency for Effort (r= 
-.22, p<O.OI) .. See table 9.3.2.1 for r-values. For these significant results pupils who scored Internal 
scored high on authoritarianism. 
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Table: 9.3.2. Correlations between perceived control scales, religiosity, and authoritarianism for sub-
samples and the whole samples. 
English Turkish Total 
Religiosity Authoritarianism Religiosity Authoritarianism Religiosity Authoritarianism 
Control Beliefs 
- .06 - .04 .07 .12 - .10* - .10* 
M-EEffort 
- .00 - .15* - .20** - .25** - .21 ** - .32** 
M-E Attribute 
- .06 - .07 - .00 - .09 - .01 - .04 
M-ELuck 
- .03 .16* - .08 - .05 - .07 .02 
M-E Pow. Others 
- .03 .07 - .09 - .05 - .10* - .06 
M-EUnknown 
.05 .20** - .01 - .01 - .03 - .00 
Agency Effort 
- .15* -.18* - .25** - .23** - .21 ** - .22** 
Agency Attribute 
.01 .11 .01 .08 - .02 .04 
Agency Luck 
.05 .02 .04 - .04 .05 .07 
Agency Pow. Others 
.11 .05 .18** .12 .01 - .09 
MASLOC 
- .09 .17* - .13* - .08 - .12* .01 
Authoritarianism 
.10 .46** .41** 
P<o.O 1 *, p<o.OO 1 ** 
9.3.2.3. Summary of correlation results: 
English Sample 
Only Agency for Effort was related to religiosity. Five out of the 11 subscales and scale were related to 
authoritarianism. These were Means-Ends for Effort, Luck, and Unknown, Agency for Effort and 
MASLOC. Only Means-Ends for Unknown factors was significant at 0.001. The others were only 
significant at 0.01. For those which were significant at 0.01 there were possibly curvilinear 
relationships between the two variables. 
Turkish Sample 
Three out of 11 subscales and scale were found to be highly significantly (significant at 0.001) related 
to religiosity. These were Means-Ends for Effort, Agency for Effort and Agency for Powerful Others. 
Means-Ends and Agency for Effort and MASLOC were negatively correlated to religiosity but Agency 
for Powerful Others was positively related. So, in the first three the Internals scored high on religiosity, 
which is the opposite to what we expected (see Hypothesis 4 and 5). The correlation for Agency for 
Powerful Others was in the expected direction. Externals scored high on religiosity. Only two Effort 
subscales, Means-Ends and Agency, were highly significantly related to authoritarianism. The Internals 
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scored high on authoritarianism. lbis was in the opposite direction to what we expected (see hypothesis 
4 and 5). 
Although they weren't significantly correlated three subscales showed significant (p<0.01) curvilinear 
relationships. These were control beliefs with religiosity and agency beliefs for luck and powerful 
others with authoritarianism. Two means-ends scales also showed significant curvilinear relationships 
(only p<0.05). These were means-ends for luck and powerful others with authoritarianism. The 
curvilinearities were positively U shaped for Agency for luck and powerful others. Pupils who scored 
high Internal or External on CAMI's Agency for luck and powerful others subscales scored high on 
authoritarianism but those who scored average scored low on authoritarianism. For Means-Ends for 
Luck and Powerful others the curvilinearities were negatively U shaped: pupils who were average 
InternallExternal (neither Internal or External) scored high on authoritarianism, but those who scored 
high Internal or External scored low in authoritarianism. The same applied to control beliefs and 
religiosity. 
Whole sample 
Five out of 11 scales and subscales were significantly related to religiosity. Only two of these were 
consistent with the subsample analyses and were highly significant at 0.001, namely, Means-Ends and 
Agency for Effort. Two had not been significant in the separate English and Turkish analyses. Three 
out of 11 sub scales and scales were related to authoritarianism. Two of these were similar to and 
consistent with the subsample results -Means-Ends and Agency for Effort. These results were again in 
the opposite direction to what we expected. See hypothesis 4 and 5. 
Overall, across the samples, consistent and highly significant correlations were found for the Agency 
for Effort subdomain ofCAMI. Second, consistent significant correlations were found for Means-Ends 
for Effort but not as much as for Agency for Effort in the English sample. None of those relationships 
were found to be curvilinear (p<0.01). Two other subscales (Means-Ends for Luck and Powerful 
Others) were curvilinear to a lesser extent (p<0.05). None of these curvilinear relationships were found 
to be linearly significant 
9.3.3. Canonical Correlation Data Analysis: 
9.3.3.1. Overview. 
The data were analysed using canonical correlation analysis to test for relationships between the 
perceived control variables (e.g. Control beliefs, means-ends for effort etc.) and predictor 
variables (culture, religion, religiosity level, authoritarianism) and other demographic variables 
(e.g. gender, age, location of the school (SES)) as a set of criterion variables. 
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Table 9.3.3.1: Variance explained by Canonical Variables of the Covariances. 
Can. Var. Pet. Var. DE Cum. Var.DE Var. CO Cum. Var. CO 
1 12.17 12.17 41.30 41.30 
2 2.26 14.42 13.81 55.10 
3 .949 15.37 8.91 64.02 
4 .598 15.97 9.82 73.84 
The canonical correlation analysis showed that it is possible to model the relationship between 
independent variables (e.g. Culture, Gender, Authoritarianism) and dependent variables (CAMI's 
Subscales such as Means-Ends and Agency, MASLOC), with reference to four canonical 
functions. Firstly multiple regression analysis showed that the relationship between independent 
and dependent variables was very significant. Overall, the standardised variances of the dependent 
and independent variables explained by the canonical functions were 45.6% and 73.84% 
respectively. The shared variance for function 1 was 10.30% for dependent and 12.17% for 
independent variables; function 2 was 14.05% for dependent variables and 2.26% for independent 
variables; function 3 was 11.75% for dependent and 0.95% for independent variables; function 4 
was 9.50% for dependent variable and 0.60% for independent variables. The cumulative 
percentage of covariance was 7.16% for dependent variables and 73.84% for independent 
variables. The last two functions' contribution to the total variance was very small therefore we are 
not going to interpret them any further. See table 9.3.3.1. Because of the small amount of 
covariance between dependent variables we will also be using regression analysis. 
9.3.3.2. Validation and Diagnosis 
The validity of the canonical correlation analysis was tested with sensitivity analysis. This analysis 
was derived from a comparison of the full model (all dependent variables in the model) against 
removal of an independent variable form the mode1. Detection of consistency is derived from this 
result. This procedure was repeated three times, with three different independent variables 
(authoritarianism, age, and culture) being deleted from the model one at a time. Differences 
between shared variance are also presented for each detection. The results reveal that omission of 
an independent variable did not change the variance of the other variables but affected the shared 
variance. As seen, the canonical loadings of the independent variables, after removal of an 
independent variable, were still very stable and consistent in each of the three cases where the 
independent variable (Xl, X3, or X5) was deleted. The overall canonical correlation (R2) also 
remained stable. See table 9.3.3.2. 
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Table 9.3.3.2: Sensitivity Analysis of the Canonical Correlation Results to Removal of an 
Independent Variable. 
Results After Deletion of Xl, XS, X6 
Complete Variate Xl (Fl) X5 (FI) X6 (FI) 
Sq. Mul. R .84 .78 .82 .81 
AdjRSq. .72 .61 .70 .70 
Independent Variables 
Canonical Loadings 
Xl Culture -.96 Omitted -.97 -.96 
X2 Being Christian -.89 -.89 -.90 -.89 
X3 Being Muslim .94 .95 .95 .94 
X4 Religiosity .41 .43 .39 .40 
XS Authoritarianism .67 .70 Omitted .67 
X6Age .11 .10 .10 Omitted 
X7Gender -.08 -.09 -.08 -.08 
X8SES -.30 -.34 -.30 -.30 
Dependent Variables 
Canonical Loadings 
X9 Control Beliefs -.35 -.32 -.34 -.35 
XlO M-E Effort -.64 -.64 -.58 -.64 
XII M-E Attribute .04 .01 .09 .04 
X12 M-E Pow. Others -.26 -.28 -.27 -.25 
X13 M-ELuck -.17 -.19 -.19 -.17 
X14 M-E Unknown Factors -.28 -.27 -.27 -.27 
X15 Agency Effort -.30 -.34 -.26 -.29 
X16 Agency Attribute -.13 -.10 -.12 -.13 
Xl7 Agency Pow. Others -.46 -.45 -.51 -.47 
Xl8 Agency Luck .23 .21 .22 .24 
Xl9MASLOC -.23 -.24 -.22 -.23 
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9.3.3.3. Canonical Analysis 
The canonical loadings showed that in the first canonical fimction the independent variables of 
Culture (-.96), being Moslem (.94), being Christian (-.89), Authoritarianism (.67), Religiosity 
(.41) and SES (-.30) shared variance with the dependent variables (Means-Ends for Effort (-.64), 
Agency for Powerful Others (-.46) and Control beliefs (-.35). In the second canonical fimction the 
independent variables ofSES (.66), Authoritarianism (-.46), Religiosity (-.37), and Gender (.36) 
shared variance with the dependent variables of Agency for Effort (.66), Agency for Powerful 
Others (-.55), MASLOC (.46) and Means-Ends for Luck (.42). See table 9.3.3.3.a for canonical 
loadings. The canonical weights are presented in table 9.3.3.3.b for information. 
In the first fimction, Culture, being Muslim and being non-Christian were the most explanatory 
variables for Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and Agency for Powerful others. The 
negative correlations of Culture, being Christian and each of the three subscales with the canonical 
fimction means that Turkish and non-Christian (i.e. Muslim) pupils were most likely to score 
internal on all these scales. The positive correlation of Authoritarianism, Religiosity and being 
Muslim with the canonical fimction and the negative correlation of the three subscales with the 
canonical fimction means that authoritarian, religious and Muslim pupils were more internal. 
Finally, the (low) negative correlation ofSES and the three subscales with the canonical fimction 
mean that pupils with low SES were more internal. 
In the second fimction, SES, Authoritarianism, Religiosity and Gender were the most explanatory 
variables for the other three Agency beliefs subscales (Effort, Powerful Others, Attribute), for 
another two of the Means-Ends beliefs subscales (Luck and Powerful Others) and MASLOC. The 
results mean that upper SES, less authoritarian and less religious boys were most likely to score 
external on Means-Ends beliefs for Luck and Powerful Others, Agency beliefs for Effort and 
MASLOC but they were most likely to score internal on Agency belief for Attribute and Powerful 
Others. 
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Table 9.3.3.3.a: Canonical Loadings for the Four Canonical Functions. 
Canonical Loadings 
Fl F2 F3 F4 
Correlations Between the Independent Variables and Their Canonical Variates 
Xl Culture -.96 -.23 .03 .10 
X2 Being Christian -.89 -.27 .08 -.06 
X3 Being Muslim .94 .25 -.07 .06 
X4 Religiosity Al -.37 .25 .03 
X5 Authoritarianism .67 -.46 .47 .08 
X6Age .11 -.07 -.03 -.31 
X7 Gender -.08 .36 .43 .69 
X8 SES -.30 .66 .48 -043 
Correlations between the Dependent Variables and Their Canonical Variates 
X9 Control Beliefs -.35 -.21 -.27 .11 
XIO M-E Effort -.64 .27 -.52 -.01 
XII M-E Attribute .04 -.00 -.66 -.27 
X12 M-E Pow. Others -.26 .37 .34 .17 
X13 M-ELuck -.17 .42 042 .01 
X14 M-E Unknown Factors -.28 .15 .15 .72 
XIS Agency Effort -.30 .66 -.08 -.05 
Xl6 Agency Attribute -.13 -.36 -.31 .23 
X17 Agency Pow. Others -046 -.55 .32 -.33 
X18 Agency Luck .23 .08 -.00 -040 
X19MASLOC -.23 .46 -.05 .30 
Table 9.3.3.3.b: Canonical Weights for the Four Canonical Functions. 
Canonical Weights 
Fl F2 F3 F4 
Standardised Canonical Coefficient for the Independent Variables 
Xl Culture -.56 -.41 .01 .76 
X2 Being Christian -.00 -.16 .10 .06 
X3 Being Muslim .28 .16 -.35 .84 
X4 Religiosity .06 -.38 .22 -.01 
X5 Authoritarianism .20 -.52 .88 -.09 
X6Age .02 -.15 -.06 -.37 
X7 Gender -.03 .33 .35 -.77 
X8SES -.11 .47 .72 -.55 
Standardised Canonical Coefficient for the Dependent Variables 
X9 Control Beliefs -.14 -.30 -.11 -.17 
XI0M-EEffort -.55 .23 -.44 .02 
XII M-E Attribute .91 -.01 -.41 -.23 
X12 M-E Pow. Others -.27 .08 .22 .02 
X13 M-ELuck -.11 .18 .48 -046 
X14 M-E Unknown Factors -.12 -.05 -.09 .80 
XIS Agency Effort -.37 .48 .03 .36 
X16 Agency Attribute -.06 -.39 .29 .05 
X17 Agency Pow. Others -.75 -.43 .37 -.35 
X18 Agency Luck .18 .05 -.37 -.39 
X19MASLOC -.03 .15 -.15 .26 
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9.3.3.4. Summary 
The canonical functions revealed that the fIrst function, which shared variance with most of the 
predictive variables, only explained three of the dependent variables. These were Control beliefs, 
Means-Ends beliefs for Effort and Agency beliefs for Powerful Others. 
The second canonical function mainly explained the variance of the Agency beliefs subscales 
(Agency for Effort, for Attribute and for Powerful Others), the Means-Ends for Luck and for 
Powerful Others subscales and MASLOC, which was used in a unidimensional way. The same 
function shared variance with the predictive variables of SES, Authoritarianism, Religiosity and 
Gender. 
Overall, SES appeared in both functions, which means that it explained many of the dependent 
variables. Agency for Powerful Others also appeared in both functions which means that it is 
explained by many of the independent variables. 
Age on the other hand was not loaded on either of the canonical functions. Because of the age of 
children used in this study (14 to 18) no curvilinear relationship was expected. However, the 
literature for children older than 12 yrs old has found a linear relationship (Findley & Cooper, 
1983; Skinner & Chapman, 1990; Flammer, 1995). It is not clear why this was not found in this 
study. 
9.3.4. The Results of Regression analysis 
Along with canonical multivariate analysis we investigated simple regression analysis for each 
perceived control scale and subscale to see whether and how much the social antecedents 
explained the variances of these scores. According to the literature, the sub domains of CAMI are 
independent from each other because each of them measures different domains of perceived 
control (Skinner et al., 1988). This was also true in our analysis (see previous section 9.3.3). 
Therefore, as well as multivariate analysis it is valid and informative to use univariate statistical 
analysis to explain the relationships between individual perceived control subscales and the 
explanatory variables (e.g. Culture, Gender etc.). The results of the regression analyses for each 
sub scale ofCAMI and MASLOC are given below and in table 9.3.4. 
Control Beliefs. The variance of the Control belief scale was not signifIcantly explained by any of 
the independent variables. None of the signifIcance levels reached p<O.Ol. 
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Means-Ends for Effort. The variance was mostly explained by Authoritarianism (Beta= -.30, t= -
6.56, p<O.OOO). The less authoritarian scored more external and the more authoritarian scored 
more internal. 
Means-Ends for Luck. The variance was mostly explained by SES (Beta= -.09, t= -2.21, 
p<O.OOO). Upper SES pupils scored more external. 
Means-Ends for Unknown. The variance was mostly explained by Gender (Beta= .18, t= 4.64, 
p<O.OOO). Boys scored more external and girls more internal. 
Means-Ends for Attribute. The variance was mostly explained by 
Authoritarianism (Beta= -.18, t= -3.66, p<O.OOO), SES (Beta= -.14, t= -3.4, p<O.OOI) and gender 
(Beta= -.11, t= -2.74, p<0.006). Authoritarian, high SES and boys scored more Internal. 
Means-Ends for Powerful Others. The variance was explained by SES (Beta= .14, t= 3.31, 
p<O.OOI), Gender (Beta= .12, t= 3.06, p<0.002) and Religiosity (Beta= -.11, t= -2.58, p<O.OI). 
Low SES, girls and high religious pupils scored more internal. 
Agency for Effort. The variance was explained by Authoritarianism (Beta= -.18, t= -3.81, 
p<O.OOO), Religiosity (Beta= -.15, -3.72, p<O.OOO) and SES (Beta= .12, 3.01, p<0.003). 
Authoritarian, more religious, and low SES were scored more internal. 
Agency for Attribute. The variance was explained only by SES (Beta= -.16, t= -3.89, p<O.OOO). 
The high SES group was more internal than the low SES group. 
Agency for Powerful Others. The variance was explained by Authoritarianism (Beta= .16, t= 
3.44, p<O.OOI), Religiosity (Beta= .11, t= 2.69, p<0.007) and being Muslim (Beta= -0.37, t=-
2.56, p<O.OI). Authoritarian, non Muslim and religious pupils scored more external. 
Agency for Luck. This sub scale was not explained by any of the independent variables. None of 
the significance levels reached p<O. 01. 
MASLOC. The variance was explained by Religiosity (Beta= -.16, t= -3.88, p<O.OOO) and Age 
(Beta= -.11, t= -2.77, p<0.006). The older and more religious pupils were more Internal. 
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Table 9.3.4: Summary of Regression Analysis Results. 
Culture Christian Muslim Religiosity Authoritar Age Gender SES 
ianism 
Control Beliefs B= 
t= 
p< 
M-EEffort B= -.30 
t= -6.56 
p< .001** 
M-E Attribute B= -.18 -.11 -.14 
t= -3.66 -2.74 -3.40 
p< .001 ** .01 * .01 * 
M-E Pow. Others B= -.11 .12 .14 
t= -2.58 3.06 3.32 
p< .01* .01 * .001** 
M-ELuck B= .20 
t= 4.76 
p< .001 ** 
M-E Unknown F. B= .18 
t= 4.64 
p< .001** 
Agency Effort B= -.15 -.18 .12 
t= -3.72 -3.81 3.01 
p< .001** .001** .01 * 
Agency Attribute B= -.16 
t= -3.89 
p< .001** 
Agency P. Others B= -0.37 .11 .16 
t= -2.56 2.69 3.44 
p< .01* .01* .01* 
Agency Luck B= 
t= 
p< 
MASLOC B= -.16 -.11 
t= -3.88 -2.77 
p< .001** .01 ** 
p<O.OI *,p<O.OOI ** 
9.3.4.1. Summary 
SES was a significant explanatory variable for five out of eleven perceived control scale and 
subscales. This was followed by Religiosity which explained four out of eleven subscales, and 
Gender and Authoritarianism which both explained three out of eleven. SES was an explanatory 
variable for Means-Ends beliefs for Attribute, for Powerful Others and for Luck, Agency beliefs 
for Effort and for Attribute. Gender was an explanatory variable for Means-Ends for Luck, for 
Unknown factors, for Attribute and for Powerful Others. Religiosity was an explanatory variable 
for Means-Ends for Powerful Others, Agency for Effort and for Powerful Others and MASLOC. 
Finally Authoritarianism was an explanatory variable for Means-Ends for Effort and for Attribute 
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and Agency for Powerful Others. Being Muslim was an explanatory variable for Agency for 
Powerful Others and Age was an explanatory variable for MASLOC. 
9.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of these three analyses seem mainly consistent with each other. Because it is 
multivariate analysis and particularly appropriate for the variables investigated in this study, 
canonical correlation analysis was the best in explaining the relationships between the variables 
tested. All three analyses indicated that culture and religion were important variables, but only for 
3/16 subscales ofCAMI. The other culture related variables (Religiosity and Authoritarianism) 
and demographic variables (SES and Gender) explained the other perceived control subdomains. 
Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and Agency for Powerful Others in particular showed 
differences between cultures. According to the ANOV A results, in almost all the scales and 
subscales the Turkish pupils scored more internal than their English counterparts. This result 
deserves more explanation. One explanation is that up to now all cross-cultural studies have been 
affected by measurement bias, therefore the results may not have represented actual differences 
between western and non-western cultures but different responses to the instrument in the imposed 
culture (Berry et al., 1992). Another explanation is that multivariate measurements of perceived 
control have only recently been used in different cultures and therefore we have detected cultural 
differences in domains which have not been investigated separately before. Most importantly, we 
did not expect the Turkish sample to be more Internal than the English sample. In fact the opposite 
had been hypothesised. 
The results for each hypothesis are as follows: 
HI: For reasons discussed earlier we expect the English pupils to be more internal than the 
Turkish pupils. 
The hypothesis was shown to be wrong. The ANOV A found that significant differences were 
found for six out often CAMI subscales. These were Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort, for 
Powerful Others, for Unknown Factors, Agency for Luck and for Powerful Others. Except for one 
of these subscales the Turkish sample scored more internal than their English counterparts. The 
exception was Means-Ends for Luck. 
The regression analysis did not show significant relationships for any of the perceived control 
subdomains. 
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The canonical correlations showed that culture was highly related to function 1, together with 
Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and Agency for Powerful Others. 
Although the regression analyses did not show any significant relationships between culture and 
perceived control, both ANOV A and the canonical correlations consistently showed significant 
relationships between culture and three subscales: Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and 
Agency for Powerful Others. 
These results suggest that the Turkish pupils had greater feelings of control over environmental 
factors in certain domains. This result may be explained if we remember that high educational 
motivation in pupils is quite a well known fact in Turkey and that all the items were school related. 
H2: For reasons discussed in the Introduction we expect older pupils, boys and pupils with high 
SES to be more internal. 
AGE 
The ANOV A results showed that there was only one significant age difference. This was for 
Agency beliefs for Effort, where pupils became more external with age. The regression analysis 
also showed significant relationships between MASLOC and age but in this general scale pupils 
became more internal with age. Overall, age did not have an effect on perceived control. This is 
consistent with the literature on teenagers and adolescents, for who linear relationships have been 
reported (Findley & Cooper, 1983). 
SES 
SES was found to be highly related with many of the perceived control subscales. The ANOVA 
showed that five out of the eleven subscales scored significantly different in terms ofSES. These 
were: Control Beliefs, Means-Ends for Luck, for Powerful Others, Agency for Effort and for 
Attribute. On Means-Ends for Luck, for Powerful Others and Agency for Effort low SES scored 
more Internal. On Control beliefs, Agency for Attribute high SES scored more Internal. 
According to the regression analysis five out of eleven subscales showed a significant relationship. 
These were: Means-Ends beliefs for Attribute, for Powerful Others, for Luck, Agency beliefs for 
Effort and for Attribute. The directions of the relationships were the same as ANOV A. 
Additionally in Means Ends for Attribute high SES scored more Internal. 
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SES also contributed significantly to all canonical latent functions and explained many of 
perceived control scales in one or other function. In function 1 SES explained Control beliefs, 
Means-Ends for Effort and Agency for Powerful Others. Low SES scored more Internal on all 
domains. In function 2 SES explained Means-Ends for Powerful Others, Agency for Effort, for 
Attribute and for Powerful Others, and MASLOC. In this function high SES scored Internal on 
Agency for Attribute and for Powerful Others and External on the others. 
Three out of eleven subscales were consistently significant in all three statistical analyses. These 
were: Means-Ends for Powerful Others and Agency for Effort and for Attribute. The direction of 
the relationship for each sub scale was the same across the three analyses. 
GENDER 
The ANOVA showed that Gender was related to most of the Means-Ends beliefs subscales. These 
were Means-Ends for Attribute, for Luck, for Powerful Others and for Unknown Factors. Except 
for Means-Ends for Attribute the girls scored more Internal. 
The regression analysis showed that Gender was related to three out of eleven subscales. These 
were: Means-Ends for Attribute, for Powerful Others and for Unknown factors. Girls scored more 
Internal on Means Ends for Powerful Others and for Unknown Factors. 
According to the canonical correlations Gender contributed to Means-Ends for Powerful Others, 
Agency for Effort, for Attribute and for Powerful Others and MASLOC. However the 
relationships were not always consistent. Boys scored more internal on Agency for Attribute and 
for Powerful Others, girls scored more internal on Means-Ends for Powerful Others, Agency for 
Effort and MASLOC. 
The only consistent result across all three analyses was for Means-Ends for Powerful Others, 
which showed that girls scored more Internal. 
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H3: As discussed before we expect Christians to be more internal than Muslims. But it should be 
noted that religion is highly confounded with culture in general. Most of the Turkish sample said 
that they were Muslim but in the English sample more variation was observed. Therefore the 
confounding effect may be greater in the Turkish sample. 
The regression analysis showed that Agency for Powerful Others was significantly related to 
being Muslim. Muslims scored more Internal. According to the canonical analysis three out often 
CAMl subscales were significantly different between religions. These were Control beliefs, 
Means-Ends for Effort and Agency for Powerful Others. Being Muslim and not being Christian 
was highly related with Internal perceived control in the first function. 
The common results of regression and canonical analysis showed that Agency for Powerful Others 
was related to being Muslim. Muslims scored more Internal in this domain. Therefore the 
hypothesis was not supported. It must be remembered that religion is highly confounded with 
culture and this is supported by the fact that the same significant relationships were observed for 
culture. In the literature there is no similar research on the Muslim population so the results are 
hard to interpret. 
H4 & H5: It is expected that high religiosity and high authoritarianism will be highly related to 
external perceived control. This will be more true for strategy belieft because they refer to the 
means used for reaching the ends in a social environment and therefore they are more likely to be 
learned from social experiences. 
Correlational analyses showed that there were consistent significant relationships between the M-E and 
Agency for Effort subscales and religiosity in both English and Turkish samples and the combined 
sample. The relationships were stronger for the Turkish sample. Correlational analyses also showed 
that there were consistent significant relationships between M-E and Agency for Effort subscales and 
authoritarianism in both English and Turkish samples and the combined sample. The relationships were 
stronger for the Turkish sample. 
The regression analysis showed that there were strong relationships between four out of eleven 
perceived control sub/scales and the religiosity level. These were: Means-Ends for Powerful 
Others, Agency beliefs for Effort and for Powerful Others and MASLOC. Religious pupils scored 
more Internal on these subdomains. Canonical correlations showed that there were strong 
relationships between three out of eleven perceived control subscales and Religiosity in function 
one and an additional five out of eleven in function two. In function 1 these were Control Beliefs, 
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Means-Ends for Effort and Agency beliefs for Powerful Others. In function 2 they were Means-
Ends for Powerful Others, for Luck, Agency for Effort, for Attribute and for Powerful Others and 
MASLOC. In function one, religious people scored more internal. In function two less religious 
people scored more Internal on Agency for Attribute and for Powerful Others and more External 
on Means-Ends for Powerful Others, Agency for Effort and the MASLOC. 
Both statistical analyses showed consistent relationships between religiosity and perceived control 
for four out of eleven scale and subscales. These were: Means-Ends for Powerful Others, Agency 
for Effort, for Powerful Others and MASLOC. These results are consistent with some of the 
literature. Lesser & Painser (1985) and Gabbard, Howard & Taggeson (1986) found high 
correlations between internal perceived control and religiosity. Friederberg & Friderberg (1985) 
suggested that religiosity may be related to internal perceived control in a more complicated way: 
that religious people may be internal in some areas of perceived control but not others. This was 
true to some extent in our results too. But Furnham's (1982) finding of religious people being 
more internal in some subdomains like ability, but external on other subdomains like fate and 
powerful others, did not always prove to be the case in this study. 
The regression analysis showed that there were significant relationships between authoritarianism 
and four out of the eleven scales and subscales. These were: Means-Ends beliefs for Effort and for 
Attribute, Agency beliefs for Effort and for Powerful Others. Authoritarians scored more Internal 
on first three but more external on Agency for Powerful Others. The canonical correlation analysis 
showed the same results for religiosity. Although both variables were strongly related to perceived 
control they were not always in the predicted direction. 
Both statistical analyses showed consistent relationships between Authoritarianism and perceived 
control for three out of eleven subscales. These were: Means-Ends for Effort, Agency for Effort 
and for Powerful Others. 
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H6: There will be different amounts of influence on different types of perceived control as a result 
of cultural and other kinds of social and individual differences. Control beliefS and strategy 
beliefS will be more affocted by cultural differences, SES and all other related predictors. On the 
other hand, capacity beliefS, which highly related to a person's individual skills, will be less 
affocted by socia-environmental variables. 
The consistent results (across the three analyses) of the previous four hypotheses have shown that 
Culture as well as other culture-related social antecedents (e.g. religion, religiosity etc.) were 
consistently related to some of the perceived control sub domains, but not always in the expected 
direction. Control beliefs was related to culture. Only Means-Ends for Effort and Powerful Others 
were consistently related to some of these variables e.g. Effort with Culture and Authoritarianism, 
Powerful Others with Religiosity, SES and Gender. The same Agency beliefs subscales were 
related to some of these variables e.g Effort with Religiosity, Authoritarianism and SES; Powerful 
Others with Culture, Religiosity, Authoritarianism and being Muslim. Also Agency for Attribute 
was related to SES. 
So the hypothesis that social antecedents will be more related to Means-Ends (strategy) beliefs 
rather than Agency (capacity) has been disproved. The social antecedents were related to both 
Means-Ends (strategy) for Effort and Powerful Others and Agency (Capacity) beliefs for Effort 
and Powerful others. This shows the importance of these social antecedents for some of the 
subdomains of Capacity beliefs as well as Strategy beliefs. 
The finding that social antecedents were related to Agency (capacity) and Control beliefs 
contradicts our hypothesis and needs further investigation. Little et al., (1995) and Schmitz & 
Skinner (1993) suggested Agency beliefs are more directly related to academic performance. 
Combining their findings with ours suggests that these results need further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION 
CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION 
10.1. OVERVIEW 
This study focused on the investigation of the antecedents of perceived control in two cultures. 
The first two parts of the study investigated the cross-cultural comparability of information. Then 
several hypotheses were tested with multivariate statistics. The investigation of comparability 
employed three different psychometric methods to test for cross-cultural equivalence of 
measurement. One of the outcomes of parts one and two was to show the utility of certain 
psychometric methods in future studies. The second outcome was a derived etic which enabled us 
to compare the two cultures. To derive the etic of the two cultures, translation fidelity and then 
item equivalence were tested across the samples. 
In part one, item fidelity was generally shown to exist. Only four out of sixteen scales and 
subscales showed a translation problem. Investigation at the item level found that two out of sixty 
four items in CAMI, and one item in MASLOC showed differences. These results were consistent 
throughout the three different psychometric analyses of the same scales. 
In part two, all 16 scales and subscales were tested in monolingual samples of the two cultures. 
The results showed that the CAMl subscales were generally satisfactory and, although its 
translation fidelity was acceptable, CNSIE was not a good scale to measure perceived control in 
either of the samples. CNSIE's poor quality can be attributed to conceptual changes in perceived 
control, which is now largely considered to be a multidimensional concept. MASLOC needed to 
be regarded as one scale rather than three subscales and one item needed to be removed from the 
scale because of poor functioning in the Turkish sample. The Religiosity scale performed 
satisfactorily. Ten out of thirty items needed to be removed from the Authoritarianism scale, 
mainly because of poor item quality in both of the samples. 
Overall investigation of the translation fidelity and derived etic of the scales at the item level 
proved to be useful and the psychometric methods used for the purpose were good. But, Item 
Response theory was not always consistent with the other methods and in some cases the 
information could not be gathered due to the limitations of the programme. This problem may be 
overcome with larger samples. 
In part three, investigation of the antecedents of perceived control showed that Culture was an 
important variable in only three out of eleven scales and subscales. These were Control beliefs, 
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Means-Ends for Effort, and Agency for Powerful Others. Religiosity, Authoritarianism and SES 
were explanatory variables for all the Agency beliefs subscales (except Luck) and for MASLOC. 
Gender, SES and Authoritarianism were explanatory variables for most of the Means-Ends 
subscales but to a lesser extent because they were all correlated with the third canonical function. 
Means-Ends for Unknown factors and Agency for Luck were not significantly related to any latent 
variable of the canonical functions but were marginally explained by the fourth function and were 
related to gender, SES and age. 
10.2. FINDINGS 
10.2.1. Findings for Translation Fidelity: 
According to the Generalizability approach, only Means-Ends for Effort showed a difference 
between forms. The two Luck subscales in Means-Ends beliefs and Agency beliefs, as well as the 
Helplessness subsca1e in MASLOC, showed differences between the first and second occasions of 
testing. An interaction between forms and occasions was only found for the Helplessness and Luck 
subscales ofMASLOC. Additionally, variances for CAMl's Control beliefs and Agency for 
Powerful Others were different under different conditions. Therefore the results for these two 
subscales were not reliable. 
Classical item analysis revealed that only two out sixty four items in CAMl, one of forty in CNSIE 
and one out of fifteen items in MASLOC were significantly different (p<0.01) between samples. 
These were item 41 in CAMI's Control beliefs sub scale, item 12 in Agency beliefs for Powerful 
Others, item 36 in CNSIE and item 8 in the MASLOC Helplessness subscale. The Religiosity for 
Youth and Authoritarianism scales were similar in the two language forms. Examination of these 
items showed that the differences were caused partly by slight changes in the translation procedure 
e.g. using a different verb to make understanding easier. This explanation was appropriate for item 
12 "When you want them to, will your teachers help to see that you do well in school?" and 41 "If 
you want to can you keep from doing badly in school?". The difference between forms for item 8 
in MASLOC was caused by a translation mistake. The English item was "I don't think it is 
worthwhile studying hard since the grades I will get will be completely manipulated" and this was 
translated as, "I do think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grades I will get will be 
completely manipulated". For item 36 in CNSIE, "Do you usually feel that, when someone doesn't 
like you, there is little you can do about it?", there was no obvious translation problem which 
would cause the difference in the two language forms. Given that the item made a greater 
contribution to the total score in the Turkish form (the i-t correlation was 0.41) this difference 
could be attributed to connotational differences of the item in the two languages. An alternative 
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explanation is that the English of the bilingual sample was not good enough but this does not seem 
to be a very plausible explanation on this occasion. 
The analysis with Item Response theory showed similarities with other analyses for CAMI, 
MASLOC, and the Religiosity for Youth scales. But the number of items detected to be different 
in the two languages was greater compared to classical item analysis in some of the scales. The 
scales or subscales, which showed significant differences from one sample to another, were 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Luck, Agency for Powerful Others and MASLOC's Internal and Luck 
subscales. The Means-Ends for Luck and MASLOC's Internal subscales were, for the first time, 
found to be different from one language form to another. There were no results for the CNSIE and 
Authoritarianism scales when the parameters were constrained to be the same because of the large 
number of items (40 and 30 respectively) and the limited sample size (Hambleton, et al., 1991; 
Lord, 1980; Thissen, 1991; Holland & Weiner, 1993). Four out of sixty-four items in CAMI, and 
three out of fifteen in MASLOC were found to be different between language forms. These were, 
in CAM!, item 13 in Means-Ends for Attribute, items 28 and 29 in Means-Ends for Luck and item 
12 in Agency beliefs; items 10 and 11 in the MASLOC Internal sub scale; and item 13 in the 
MASLOC Luck subscale. 
Overall, translation fidelity of the scales was good although some items, scales and subscales 
seemed to differ from one language form to another. These were item 41 "If you want to can you 
keep from doing badly in school?" in CAM! Control beliefs; item 12 "When you want them to, 
will your teachers help to see that you do well in school?" in CAM! Agency beliefs for Powerful 
Others, item 8 "I don't think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grades I will get will be 
completely manipulated" in the MASLOC Helplessness sub scale and all items in the MASLOC 
Luck subscale. Only item 12 in CAM! Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others was consistently 
different for both the Classical and Item Response analyses. CNSIE was also found to be 
functioning poorly in both languages but did not show translation infidelity. There was evidence 
that the results from the different analyses were complementary to each other. Some of the 
differences were detected by all the analyses, some others were detected by only two analyses and 
a few detected only by IRT. Thus we conclude that perhaps Classical Item analysis is not sufficient 
on its own to identify the differences, but, with one other complementary method, could be more 
sensitive to possible differences. The method to complement Classical Item analysis should be 
IRT. However, although in the recent literature on cross-cultural testing it has been strongly 
recommended (Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996), due to technical problems such as sample 
size, it is not always possible to use it. In our case there was one additional problem, which was 
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that the rating scales we used had far too many points compared with examples ofDIF given in the 
literature (Thissen, 1991; Thissen, Steinberg and Wainer, 1993). These were usually four (CAMI) 
but were sometimes five (Religiosity in Youth) and six (MASLOC and Authoritarianism 
sub/scales points). 
Part two was dedicated to detecting ernic and etic, and eventually a derived etic for both cultures. 
The scales were tested at the item level again to detect the similarities and differences between the 
cultures. Classical item analysis, factor analysis and IRT were used. 
10.2.2. Findings for Comparability (Derived Etic) of the samples: 
The methods used to test metric equivalence were the classical methods of item and factor analysis 
and IRT. The results of the classical item analysis factor analysis and Item Characteristic Curves 
will first be discussed separately then in combination. 
The item analysis results revealed that four out of eight items of the Control Beliefs subscale in 
CAMI were significantly different from one culture to the other. These were item 3 "If you really 
make up your mind not to get any bad grades, can you do it?", item 7 "If you decide to sit down 
and learn really hard, can you do it?", item 10 " Can you get good grades when you really want 
to?" and item 41 "If you want to can you keep from doing badly in school?". Item 41 had already 
been detected in the translation fidelity analysis but the other three items were possibly different 
due to cultural differences. However, item 3 (r=O.56 and r=0.29 in the English and Turkish 
samples respectively) and item 7 (r= 0.48 and r= 0.28 in the English and Turkish samples 
respectively) made relatively small contributions to the total variance. It was also found that these 
items had changed in the translation processes. This left item 10 ("Can you really get good grades 
when you really want to?") being different between cultures. Therefore this item can be considered 
an ernic item. None of the other CAMI items showed any significant differences between samples. 
However some low item-total correlations, and therefore low scale reliability, was observed in 
Means-Ends beliefs for Effort, for Attribute, for Powerful Others, and for Unknown factors. The 
Agency beliefs sub scale was fine in terms of all the criteria used in the Classical item analysis. The 
decision about CAMI's subscales was to keep them all in the study without making any changes 
and to be aware of strong cultural differences for Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and 
Agency for Powerful Others. 
Six out of 40 items of CNSIE showed significant differences between cultures. The items were 4 
"Most of the time do you feel that getting good grades means a great deal to you?", item 1 0 "Do 
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you believe that good things can be made to happen simply by wishing them?", item 15 "Do you 
believe that your parents should allow you to make of your own decision?", item 24 "Have you 
ever had a good luck charm?", item 30 "Do you think that children can get their own way if they 
just keep trying?" and item 34 "Do you feel that it is easy to get friends to do what do you want 
them to?". No specific reason was found for the differences other than ernic or culture specific 
experiences. Most importantly again, most of the items (thirty-three out of forty) showed low 
item-total correlations. This scale was eventually removed from the final part of the study due to 
poor reliability. With a large number of items it is possible to obtain a medium reliability level, 
but this does not mean that all the items contribute strongly to the total variance of the scale. The 
larger the items pool the higher the reliability, regardless of how small the contribution of the 
individual items. But there is also a limit to the minimum number of items that will give high 
reliability to a scale. However, there is not a fixed or advised number of items given in the 
literature for optimum reliability (Nunnally, 1978, Ferguson & Takane, 1989). 
In MASLOC, one item in the Internal scale (Item 5 "I am convinced that the grades I will get 
depend on how well or badly I do in exam. ") and all items in the Helplessness scale showed 
significant differences between cultures (Item 4 "It is an absolute waste of time for me to make 
any effort, since there is no relationship between my capability, how hard I work, and the grades I 
will get", item 8 "I don't think it is worthwhile studying hard since the grades I will get will be 
completely manipulated.", item 9 "I am convinced that whatever I do my teacher will be always 
give me the grades they want to.", item 14 "It makes absolutely no difference whether I prepare 
well for a subject or not since in the long run teachers are "out to catch you", item 15 "Regarding 
my academic life I just don't know what to do. Anything might happen; may be I will do an exam 
well and fail or may be I will do it badly and pass. "). Additionally, item 3 "Whatever the quality of 
my work I am always lucky when it comes to examinations" and item 6 "My getting good or bad 
grades in my exam is related to whether the precise the topics I have studied come up in exam." in 
the Luck subscale showed low Item-Total correlations in both cultures. Although the difference 
was significant for Item 5 the items were highly correlated with total scores in both cultures. The 
same pattern was observed for Helplessness items except that item 8 showed a very low item-total 
correlation due to translation infidelity. This item is a very good example of where translation may 
go wrong. The only problem with this item was that the sentence was phrased positively in Turkish 
while it was negative in the English version. Although the scoring was adjusted accordingly after 
the problem was detected in part one, it was not possible to rescue the item. 
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In the Religiosity scale, three out of eight items functioned differently in the two cultures. This 
scale was fine in tenus of item fidelity, therefore the differences can only be attributed to culture 
differences (ernie). The items were item 3, "Which of the following best describe your views on 
prayer or religious meditation?", item 6, "Which of the following statements comes closest to your 
belief about God?" and item 8 "During the past year, how often have you experienced a feeling of 
religious reverence or devotion?". The Turkish sample's item-total correlations were relatively 
lower than the English. Overall, all of the item-total correlations were much higher then 0.30 so 
this difference between samples may be because differences between correlations are detected 
much more easily (sensitively) when correlations are high. The other possible explanation is that, 
the majority of the sample were Christian (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1976; Jessor et al., 1994). This 
seems to be the first time this scale was used in a Muslim culture. Therefore minor differences can 
be attributed to differences between Christian and Muslim cultures. Overall the scale was highly 
reliable in both cultures, so it was decided to keep it without any changes. 
In the Authoritarianism scale only two out of thirty questions were different in the two cultures. 
The items were item 16, "People can be divided into two distinct classes: The weak and the 
strong", and item 18, "Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of 
things". They both functioned badly in the Turkish form, particularly item 18. On both occasions it 
was not the translation but the connotational meanings that were different. In item 18 the 
difference may have been because astrology is known only from horoscopes in the daily 
newspapers and weekly magazines and is not much respected in Turkey. 
The factor analysis results revealed mostly that CAMl showed a similar factor structure in the 
English and Turkish samples compared with the original. The English sample's comparability with 
the original was better than the Turkish sample's in all cases. The order of the factors in the English 
data was only different for the factor analysis of both Effort subscales, but in the Turkish sample 
the order of factors was consistently different except for Unknown factors. However, replicability 
of exploratory factor analysis is not always perfect in cross-cultural comparisons and differences 
in factor order in the imposed culture are often reported in the literature. Similarities between 
factor structures are enough to conclude that there are no differences. Also, in this study the 
explained level of variance was similar in both samples. But on two occasions, when the Attribute 
and Powerful Others factors were tested in the Turkish sample, some items loaded on different 
factors from what was expected. Some Control belief items (items 7, 34, 35, 41, 42; e.g. item 42 
"Can you get all the problems (e.g. in spelling) right, when you want toT') loaded on the Agency 
beliefs for Effort and some Means-Ends beliefs for Powerful Others items (14 & 45; e.g. item 45 
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"When student do really well in school, is it usually because the teacher doesn't like them?"), also 
loaded on Agency for Powerful Others. There were also some negative factor loadings in both 
samples. These were the Agency factor in the Attribute analysis in the English sample and the 
Control beliefs factor in the Luck analysis in the Turkish sample. This can be interpreted as either 
an ernie difference or a slight validity problem of the scales across samples. 
The CNSIE scale did not show a one factor solution as has been suggested (Lefcourt, 1991). 
Although the factor orders were different, a four factor solution for both cultures seems to be 
plausible. The first factor was related to peers, the second to powerful others, avoidance and 
fatalism, the third was internal, and the fourth was luck, fatalism and avoidance. Overall, twenty-
seven out of forty items loaded on one or other of these factors. Failures of replication of factor 
structure ofCNSIE is also found in the literature (Walters & Klein, 1980; Raine, Derek & 
Venables, 1981). 
For the MASLOC scale, the three factor solution did not succeed. The one factor solution was fine 
except that items 2, 5 and 6 in the English sample and items 3, 6 and 8 in the Turkish sample had 
low loadings. In particular, item 6 "My getting good or bad grades in my exams is related to 
whether the precise the topics I have studied come up in exam" was very low in both of the 
samples (-0.05 and 0.01 in English and Turkish samples respectively). 
The Religiosity scale showed a one factor solution in both cultures. 
The Authoritarianism scale also showed a one factor solution, but some of the items did not load 
highly on the factor and were removed from the scale later. These items were 2-6, 18,23,25, and 
30. 
Using IRT for comparison purposes was not successful for all scales and subscales. The 
programme was run for all scales and subscales including CNSIE and Authoritarianism but the 
results showed that the scales functioned significantly differently in the two cultures. More 
importantly there were many negative values of~' which should not have happened. This may be 
attributed to numerical instability arising from too small a sample. For this reason it was decided 
not to use these results in the decision-making procedure of the comparisons. A large sample is 
needed to overcome this problem. 
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Overall, combined information from the item and factor analyses of cross-cultural data revealed 
that there were some ernic differences between the two cultures and also one or two with poor 
translation fidelity from the first part. But the main differences were caused by the ernic of the 
cultures. Most importantly, some of the scales failed to show the consistent factor structure that 
has been suggested. For this reason we decided not to use CNSIE any further in this study. We 
decided to use MASLOC as a one factor scale after removing one item from the scale because of 
its low contribution to the total score. The Authoritarianism scale showed a one factor solution and 
ten items were taken out due to their small contribution. The decision was made on the basis of the 
item-total correlation analysis as well as the factor analysis. For comparison purposes, although 
IRT may have been the most sophisticated method to use, it was not reliable due to the sample size 
and other unknown factors. 
10.2.3. Findings for the antecedents of perceived control: 
10.2.3.1. Group comparisons: 
Culture: 
The comparison between cultures showed that six out of ten subscales of CAM! showed 
differences. These were Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort, Powerful Others, Unknown 
Factors and also Agency for Luck and for Powerful Others. The significant differences were great 
for Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and Agency beliefs for Powerful Others (p =< 0.001). 
Except for Agency for Luck, in all other scales and subscales the Turkish sample scored more 
internally. The Religiosity and Authoritarianism scores showed large significant differences as 
well - the Turkish sample being more religious and authoritarian than the English. 
Gender: 
Gender differences were observed on six out often CAM! subscales and on MASLOC. The 
CAM! scales were Means-Ends for Attribute, for Luck, for Powerful Others and for Unknown 
Factors; Agency for Effort and for Powerful Others. The differences between gender were greater 
for CAM!'s Means-Ends for Attribute (boys scored more internal then girls) and for Unknown 
factors (girls scored more internal then boys). 
Socio-Economic Status: 
Socio-Economic Status or, rather, the catchment area of the schools, showed significant 
differences in five out of ten CAM! subscales and for the Authoritarianism scale as well. The 
CAM! subscales were Control Beliefs, where high SES scored more internal, Means-Ends for 
Powerful Others and for Luck, where low SES scored more internal, Agency for Effort, where low 
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SES scored more internal, and Agency for Attribute, where high SES scored more internal. The 
differences were greater for Agency for Effort and Attlibute (p=<O.OOI). The Authoritarianism 
scale was also highly significant with those from the upper socio-economic classes being less 
authoritarian than those from the lower classes. 
Age: 
Age did not produce any significant differences except for CAMI's Agency beliefs for Effort. The 
older the pupils the less likely they were to believe in their own effort to succeed. They become 
more external. 
Interactions: 
Although, some interaction effects were observed between culture and gender, culture and SES, 
and gender and SES at 0.01 level no general trend was observed. The only exception was the 
interaction between culture and SES for the religiosity scale. In the Turkish sample the trend 
observed was that the low SES students were more religious then their high SES peers, whilst, in 
England, low SES students were less religious. This is not a surprise from the author's point of 
view. In Turkey, well-educated middle and upper middle class families are less religious compared 
with low and middle SES families. This is highly related to internal immigration and the 
catchment area of low SES schools, which usually contains relatively new city residents compared 
with the middle and upper SES groups. This does not seem to be the case in England. On the other 
hand, in England, the upper SES groups, in particular, seem to be the most conservative in terms 
of social values. This sociological finding may need more explanation and investigation in the 
future. 
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10.2.3.2. Relationships between perceived control and its antecedents: 
The relationhips between variables were investigated in three different ways. First, simple Pearson 
Product-moment correlations were calculated between the Perceived Control Scales and two major 
independent variables, religiosity and authoritarianism, for the sub samples as well as the whole 
sample. Second, all variables were tested in a causal model of multiple regression analysis and 
third, canonical correlations were calculated to test the effects of the independent variables 
(religiosity, religion, authoritarianism, SES and gender) on perceived control. 
10.2.3.2.1. Correlations between perceived control and religiosity and authoritarianism: 
Highly significant correlations were found only for the Agency for Effort subscales of CAM!. This 
was consistent for the sub samples and the whole sample. The second consistent result found was 
for the Means-Ends for Effort, where authoritarian students were found to be more internal, but in 
this case the significance level was less for the English sample. Overall, the relationships with 
religiosity and authoritarianism were found to be positive and highly significant for the Turkish 
sample but not for the English sample. It was also found that, however small, most of the 
significant correlations in the English sample were between perceived control and authoritarianism 
(5/11 in the English sample; 1111 in the Turkish sample) but in Turkish sample they were between 
perceived control and religiosity (4/11 in Turkish, 2/11 in English). 
10.2.3.2.2. Regression analysis results: 
Culture 
The regression analysis results showed that culture was not a particularly predictive variable for 
almost any of the perceived control scales and subscales. However, culture was found to affect 
Control beliefs and Means-Ends for Effort, which were both only significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
On the other hand SES, Authoritarianism, Religiosity and Gender were predictive for most of the 
CAMl and MASLOC scales and subscales. 
SES 
SES, in particular, appears to be predictive for three out of five Means-Ends beliefs subscales as 
well as two out of four Agency beliefs subscales. These were Means-Ends for Attribute, for Luck 
and for Powerful Others and also Agency for Effort and for Attribute. Students in the high SES 
groups scored internal on both of the Attribute scales in Means-Ends and Agency beliefs, and 
scored External on Means-Ends beliefs for Luck and for Powerful Others and Agency beliefs for 
Effort. 
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Authoritarianism: 
Authoritarianism was predictive for Means-Ends for Effort and Attributes and Agency beliefs for 
Effort and Powerful Others. Students high on authoritarianism were more internal on Means-Ends 
beliefs for Effort and Attribute and Agency beliefs for Effort, but those who were less 
authoritarian were more internal on Agency beliefs for Powerful Others. 
Religiosity and Religion: 
Religiosity was a predictive variable for Means-Ends for Powerful Others, Agency for Effort and 
Powerful Others, and for MASLOC as well. Highly religious students scored more Internal on 
Means-Ends for Powerful Others, Luck, Agency beliefs for Effort and MASLOC. Only on 
Agency beliefs for Powerful Others did more religious students score more external. Additionally 
the students who scored more external on the Powerful Others sub scale were mainly Muslim. 
Gender: 
Males were more external on Means-Ends for Luck, for Powerful Others and for Unknown 
factors, females were more external on Mean-Ends for Attribute and there were no gender 
differences on Means-Ends for Effort. As Means-Ends beliefs are related to strategies these 
differences suggest that boys and girls in both cultures may have different experiences about 
which strategies are successful. Girls were more external on Agency for Powerful Others. 
Age: 
Age showed differences only for Agency for Effort. Older students were more external. We 
expected to find no differences TIris was the case for all of the other sub scales. 
Interactions: 
An interaction was found between culture and gender for CAMl's Agency for Attribute, where 
girls scored more internal in Turkey and boys scored more internal in England. There were also 
interactions between culture and SES for Means-Ends for Luck and MASLOC, where the Turkish 
scores were more external for the upper SES and the English scores were more internal, and 
Religiosity, where the religiosity scores decreased in the Turkish sample but increased in the 
English sample as SES increased. Finally there were interactions between gender and SES for 
Means-Ends for Luck and Agency for Luck, where girls with low SES scored more internal but 
boys with high SES scored more internal. Only the religiosity interaction was very significant 
(p<O.OOl). 
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10.2.3.2.2. Findings from the Canonical Correlation Analysis: 
Culture and all other culture related variables such as authoritarianism, religiosity, religion and, to 
a lesser extent SES, loaded on the first function, together with CAM!'s Control beliefs, Means-
Ends beliefs for Effort and Agency beliefs for Powerful Others. The results showed that 
authoritarian, religious (mainly) Turkish students and non Christians or Muslims with low SES 
were more likely to score Internal on Control Beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and Agency beliefs 
for Powerful Others. Because one item of Control Beliefs and Agency for Powerful Others of 
CAM! showed item infidelity some of the differences could be attributed to bias rather than 
cultural differences. But it was also the case that in the second part of the study more items of 
Control Beliefs were found to be different (ernic). Therefore, the differences between samples are 
more likely to be due to cultural differences. Also Means-Ends for Effort and Agency for 
Powerful Others showed relatively low reliability in the English sample (alpha= 0.59 and 0.63 
respectively) and the Control beliefs reliability was lower in the Turkish sample (alpha= 0.69). 
Bearing in mind that some bias was detected in part one and two, particularly for Control Beliefs 
and Agency for Powerful Others, these results are very significant from this study's point of view. 
Firstly not all of the perceived control domains seem affected by cultural differences. Secondly the 
ones which were affected by cultural differences were the ones that may be considered to affect 
individual development. It seems that Turkish students believe more that their actions directly 
affect outcomes. This is because they scored significantly more internal on the Control Beliefs 
sub scale of CAM! which refers to the direct relationships between actions and outcomes. Also it 
seems that Turkish students believe more that a person's efforts can change the outcome. This is 
because they scored more internal then their English counterparts on Means-Ends for effort 
sub scale. Finally, it seems that Turkish students believe more in their capacity to attract the 
attention of powerful others (i.e. teachers) is much higher then their English counterparts. This is 
because, they scored more internal on the Agency for Powerful Others sub scale of CAM!. This 
could be explained by their higher motivation and belief in their ability to change their 
circumstances and performance in school. The results seem to apply to Muslim students in 
England as well. The relevance of authoritarianism, religiosity and SES to these results is not very 
clear. One would like to think that the religiosity and SES are just another type of cultural 
difference that we have hypothesised in this thesis. 
SES, together with Authoritarianism and Religiosity and Gender loaded on the second canonical 
function, together with most of the Agency beliefs subscales (Agency for Effort, for Attribute and 
Powerful others). Also two Means-Ends beliefs scales loaded on the same function. These were 
Means-Ends for Luck and for Powerful Others. The relationships between this function and the 
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independent and dependent variables were that non-authoritarian and less religious, high SES boys 
scored more External on Means-Ends for Luck, for Powerful Others, Agency for Effort and 
MASLOC, and scored more Internal on Agency for Attribute and Powerful Others. Basically high 
SES boys who were not authoritarian or religious showed very external beliefs in strategies (Luck 
and Powerful Others) but most importantly they carried these external beliefs to the Capacity for 
Effort domain as well. The only aspects of their capacity in which they were internal was Attribute 
and Powerful Others who in this particular scale were teachers. 
The last two functions in the canonical analysis explained less then one percentage of total 
variance, therefore there were trivial from this study's point of view. We mention them because the 
third function was where all the Means-Ends beliefs subscales and gender and SES were loaded. 
The last function only explained the Means-Ends for Unknown factor, which did not load on any 
other function. 
Going back to the first two functions, it is very important to have found that culture is only 
important for three out of ten subscales of CAM!. But on the other hand the importance of culture 
on an individual's life needs further investigation. For example, do the effects of strategies on 
effort and capacity on influencing powerful others have any big influences on outcomes such as 
performance in school. 
Explanations: 
Overall, how much do Control beliefs, without the involvement of any strategy and capacity 
beliefs, directly predict an individual's behaviour? In the short term perhaps an individual believes 
that there is a direct relationship between actions and outcomes. This is the one way deterministic 
model of perceived control in which control beliefs playa big role. In the long term the 
relationship between actions and outcomes will be mediated by strategies and capacities. In this 
case Bandura's and Skinner's triadic reciprocal models apply. Capacity beliefs will develop 
through experiences of one's own ability to affect outcomes and strategy beliefs will develop from 
observations of the relationships between actions and outcomes in life. 
The finding that Turkish, Muslim and low SES students were more religious and authoritarian, and 
also more internal on CAMI's Control beliefs and Strategy beliefs for Effort and Powerful Others, 
is meaningful and unexpected at a certain level. This can be explained by the overall cultural 
nature of this specific group who are highly motivated towards education and told by parents that 
success depends on being well educated. It is also interesting to see that regardless of culture, 
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religiosity and authoritarianism had an influence on the capacity beliefs of individuals. The latter 
model seems to work well for the girls but not for the boys. Boys who are not particularly 
religious or authoritarian and from high socia-economic groups believe in the effects of their 
internal capacity on external causes such as Powerful Others and Attributes ( cognitive styles) but 
they also believe in the effects of external strategies on external causes such as Luck and Powerful 
Others. Also, they have no belief that their own efforts will make any difference to the outcomes. 
Summary of Findings: 
The aim of this study was to compare Turkish and English samples in terms of the effects of some 
social antecedents on development of perceived control. The study firstly aimed to assure cross-
cultural comparability of the two cultures by detecting translation infidelity and metric 
equivalency. After this was done the results for the two cultures were compared to find out the 
importance of some of the social antecedents of perceived control. The results revealed that culture 
and other culture based variables such as religiosity and authoritarianism were only related to some 
domains of perceived control. These were Control beliefs, Strategy beliefs for Effort and Capacity 
beliefs for Powerful Others. Unexpectedly, the Turkish students scored more internal. Although 
this result may have been affected by the translation infidelity of one item in the Agency for 
Powerful Others subscale (on item 12, see detail in part 1) the final results were too marked to be 
explained only by this. The second important result was that many other domains of perceived 
control were explained by demographic variables which may be considered as the micro level of 
environmental factors. This seems to be the case beyond cross-cultural differences. In particular, 
Capacity beliefs (agency beliefs) and some Strategy beliefs (Means-Ends) were affected by an 
individual's gender and the immediate social (SES) environment. It seems that the direction of the 
relationships is consistent from one culture to another. 
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10.3. CONCLUSIONS 
Although the three analyses used (e.g. classical item analysis etc.) are usually used to detect scalar 
equivalency, in this study (part I) they were used to detect conceptual equivalence as well. This 
was done by the application of scalar equivalence techniques in the bilingual experimental design 
which enable us to look at item fidelity. Although there were some discrepancies, the methods 
used to test item fidelity were consistent with each other. This is consistent with studies which find 
strong correlations between different statistical techniques of item bias detection e.g. Rogers & 
Swarninathan, 1993; Raju, Drasgow, & Slinde, 1993). During the scalar investigation in the 
second part of this study the same scales or items were found to be different in the two cultures. 
There two findings indicate that scalar and conceptual equivalence have been distinguished. 
Returning to item fidelity, some of the scales, or in some cases items, were different only in one 
analysis and this was highly related to the sophistication or sensitivity of the methods used. Thus, 
IRT usually detected more bias than the other methods. The only problem with IRT is that the 
significance test of Differential Item Functioning is not yet well established in the programmes 
available (Thissen, 1991; Thissen et al, 1993; Holland & Weiner, 1993). This also seems to be 
consistent with the literature showing low and moderate correlations between different methods of 
item bias detection (Devine, Raju, 1982; Ironson & Subkoviak, 1979; Reise, Wideman, & Pugh, 
1993, Rutner, Getson, & Knith, 1980). The implication of our results is that it is important to test 
item fidelity using psychometric methods. This allows us to be more flexible in the translation 
procedure, unlike decentralisation and other back-translation methods, and take into account 
connotational meanings. But which statistical or psychometric methods will be most beneficial is 
open to debate. This study's results draw attention to the use of psychometric methods to test item 
fidelity but cannot make any clear recommendation as to which method should be used. In terms 
of costs and availability, it is easier to use the most available psychometric techniques of Classical 
item analysis and perhaps Generalizability theory. On the other hand the superiority ofIRT to 
other methods is unquestionable if the researcher has a large sample and the necessary knowledge 
of the method. 
It is worthwhile to emphasise the importance of a separate investigation of item fidelity using a 
bilingual sample. This obviously enables us to separate two different sources of bias or variance 
from each other. One of these is translation or connotational bias, also called non-uniform bias, 
where, due to connotational differences, an item acts in completely different ways in different 
cultures. This was tested in bilingual sample (Part I). The other type is cultural or uniform bias (in 
some cases differences) where one culture consistently outperforms another culture (van de Vijver 
& Leung, 1997). This was tested in the monolingual samples (Part II). 
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Generalizability theory detects translation infidelity by allowing the researcher to detect major 
differences across time and language forms. However, it should be noted that this study adjusted 
the analysis so that it could be used for total scores. 
When Classical theory is used for translation fidelity it allows us to compare different language 
forms but will ignore time differences (which are detected by the generalizability analysis). The 
advantage of using classical analyses is that they are widely available in common statistical 
packages (e.g. SPSS). Also, they do not require very large samples. 
Item response theory allows us to get the best fit of two given language forms. It is possible to fix 
the parameters and force different versions of the same item (e.g. English and Turkish), answered 
by the same participants, to be tested mathematically. To a large extent it is possible to get the best 
information from the available data. However, it requires a lot of data to fix the parameters and 
this requirement becomes important if the scale has a large number of questions. Furthermore, the 
reliability index becomes artificially increased because the number of questions doubles when we 
combine English and Turkish versions of the answers. And finally, because X2 is so sensitive it is 
possible that the detected differences are false alarms rather than genuine (e.g. on MALOSC's 
internal sub scale differences were found only in the IRT analysis). 
In conclusion the results suggest that while IRT is the best method to detect translation infidelity, 
its sensitivity may cause false alarms, which are more likely to occur in cross-cultural data because 
of the number of sources of variance. This over sensitivity can be compensated for by using one of 
the other two method together with IRT. For practical purposes it seems that classical theory and 
generalizability theory are still effective when the researcher has no access to the specialist 
programs needed for IRT (e.g. MULTILOG, BILOG etc.). 
The derived etic between cultures was tested with metric equivalence. Again two psychometric 
methods were used. Metric equivalency was investigated using classical item analysis and factor 
analysis as well as IRT but due to some numerical instability in IRT analysis only the Classical 
theory results were used in the interpretation. According to these, the CAM! and Religiosity scales 
were kept in the final analysis without any change, the MASLOC and Authoritarianism scales were 
altered and CNSlE was completely removed. CNSlE did not show good item-total correlations 
therefore the reliability was low in both cultures. It also failed to show any consistent factor 
structure in both cultures, which was attributed to the multidimensionality of perceived control. 
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This was not seriously considered in the early studies of perceived control (Rotter, 1975; Novicki, 
Stricklands, 1973). 
The psychometric information gathered about perceived control scales has reinforced the 
multidimensionality of the concept (Weigel, Wertlieb, & Feldstein, 1989). In particular the 
validity of multidimensional measurement of CAMI has been shown to be the case for both 
samples. On the other hand MASLOC proved to be unidimensional, rather than multidimensional 
as it is meant to be: This fmding conflicts with the literature (Palenzuela, 1988) that MASLOC 
measures the Internal, helplessness and Luck domains separately. 
Classical analysis was very informative. The IRT results seemed to be unreliable due to negative 
Chi-square values. This may have been caused by sample size. There is only one demonstration of 
the use ofIRT in the literature to test for Differential Item Functioning with similar data but the 
number of parameters tested were much smaller (Thissen et al., 1993). The need for a large sample 
seems to be a drawback of this method. On the other hand, the benefits of this technique should 
not be overlooked, even though it was found to be unreliable in this study. IRT is a valuable 
statistical test for cross-cultural studies because of the independence hypothesis of the analysis. 
Unlike classical analysis the parameters estimated do not depend on the groups being investigated 
but on the nature of the latent trait being studied. In classical analysis, the item difficulty is 
dependent on the average responses of the group. Van de Vijver & Leung (1997) state that " ... the 
estimation of person's standing on a latent trait in IRT is independent of the item used. An 
interesting implication of this property of the IRT model is that using identical stimuli are no 
longer required when comparing different cultural groups" p. 78. As a result of this, in ideal 
circumstances the method's flexibility when tailoring items (making new scales from combinations 
of items tested on different occasions) is very attractive for cross-cultural studies. Therefore, the 
utility of IRT can not be denied and should certainly be encouraged in future studies (de Gruijter 
& Van der Kamp, 1984; Lord, 1980; Hulin, 1987; Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996; Hambleton 
et al., 1991). 
The third part of the study also showed that perceived control is a multidimensional concept. In 
some cases the participants scored internal in one domain of CAM! but external in another. This 
kind of result is consistent with the literature and shows the multidimensional nature of perceived 
control (Levenson, 1982; Lefcourt, 1984; Skinner et al., 1988; Palenzuela, 1989). What we are not 
able to say from these results is the nature of the relationship between general and specific 
domains of perceived control because of the omission of CNSIE, which is a general scale, from 
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the later stages of our analysis. On the other hand, in the last stage we used MASLOC as a one 
dimensional scale. Therefore, perhaps because MASLOC, and CAMl's Agency belief subscales 
were loaded on function two, it is possible to say that Agency (capacity/self-efficacy) sub domains 
are related to the general domain of perceived control. So, it possible to suggest that there is a link 
between general and specific domains. These results also show the value of conceptualisations in 
this area. Palenzuela (1988) has argued that perhaps it is time to refine our understanding of 
perceived control. In his view perceived control is closer to Seligman's (1975; 1995) concept of 
Learned Helplessness than Bandura's (1986) concept of self-efficacy. According to Skinner and 
her colleagues (1988; 1987) old perceived control scales such as CNSIE are more correlated to 
Means-Ends (strategies) beliefs rather than Agency beliefs. This is contradicted by what we found, 
but it supports the point made by Palenzuela that the reshaping of the concept is in place. 
One of our hypotheses, that cultural differences will influence some dimensions of perceived 
control, was shown to be true for only three subscales, Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort and 
Agency for Powerful Others. What was not expected, but was found, was that the Turkish sample 
was more Internal than their English counterparts on all of these dimensions. These results are not 
the only ones in the cross-cultural literature to show that non-western cultures are more internal 
than, or at least equally internal to, their Western counterparts. Particularly in personal (self) 
control, some cultures are known to be equally, or sometimes even more internal than their 
western counterparts (Rafaei & Rahman, 1976; Carment, 1974 Cited in Hui; La & Loftus, 1998). 
There is some evidence in the literature that Agency beliefs (also called self-efficacy; Oettingen, 
1995) are all highly and consistently related to academic performance (Chapman & Skinner, 1989; 
Chapman, Skinner & Baltes, 1990). It seems that this is a domain where consistent relationships 
between macro-environmental variables (culture, religion, religiosity and authoritarianism) and 
perceived control have been found. 
In a time series analysis of classroom data by Schmitz & Skinner (1993), Means-ends for Effort 
was found to be significantly related to the academic performance of individuals, but in a more 
complicated and indirect way, where the perceived control domains act as mediators of academic 
success. One explanation for the results is that classroom structure may be playing a role in the 
development of perceived control. Perhaps in the whole class teaching system, as in Turkey, 
children get more immediate feedback about their capacity compared with their peers, whilst in 
England, where skill-based teaching is in place, children get less immediate feedback about their 
capacity. Little and his colleagues (1995) favoured this explanation when they found that an 
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American sample were more Internal than German and Russian samples. But their second finding 
was that while this high Internality was not related to high achievement for the American sample, it 
was for the German and Russian sample, where whole-class teaching more common and therefore 
led to children developing very realistic perceptions of their capacity (Agency) beliefs. 
Little's explanation may not be a good one for our results for two reasons. First, we did not test 
academic achievement therefore we cannot make the same inferences that they made. Second, 
where their East German and Russian samples were more external as a result of a whole class 
teaching experience our Turkish sample was more internal. Therefore we favour the explanation 
that children in Turkey are more intrinsically motivated for school achievement and their 
achievement motivation is encouraged by their social environment (Weisz & Stipek, 1982; Harter 
& Connell, 1984). 
Whatever the reason might be, it is important to highlight this internally oriented locus of control 
(it may be called optimism) of the Turkish pupils' control beliefs. High achievement motivation 
may come from the need to improve living circumstances and social position through education 
and employment in highly paid professions. This is consistent with the family structure in Turkey 
where education is encouraged because this enables the whole family to move up in social status 
(Kagitcibasi, 1996). However, the motivation to succeed is highly dependent on an optimistic 
evaluation of the circumstances. One needs a positive view of the future to pursue long term goals 
such as good educational qualifications and highly paid employment (Oettingen, 1996). When 
Oettingen (1995) looked at the explanatory styles of East and West Berlin residents she found that 
for both negative as well as positive life events East Berliners' tended to use more internal, stable 
and global explanatory styles. This is like people with depressive tendencies, whereas people 
without depressive tendencies use internal, stable and global explanatory styles only for positive 
life events. 
Optimistic and pessimistic thinking in relation to culture is an interesting idea which is able to 
explain some of our findings better than some of the other literature on perceived control 
introduced in this thesis. However, the results of research in this area are not conclusive. Some 
studies have found that Western and individualistic cultures are more optimistic than Eastern 
cultures (Lee & Seligman, 1998). Others have found that fundamentalism is highly positively 
related to optimism in North America subcultures (Sethi & Seligman, 1993). 
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The second important fmding of the final study was that almost all Agency beliefs (except Agency 
for Luck, where the Turkish sample scored more external) were explained by demographic 
variables (gender and SES) and micro-social variables (religiosity and authoritarianism). Cultural 
(macro environment) differences were not significant. The results showed that girls with low SES 
were more internal on Agency for Effort but they also scored more external on Agency for 
Attribute and for Powerful Others. It is evident that these CAMI's sub domains are independent 
from each other. But it is still believed that their combined and multivariate effect on final 
performance is important. From our point of view, it is very difficult to make any predictions 
about the girls performance apart from speculating that their Agency belief about Effort will help 
them try even after they have made an unsuccessful attempt (Schmitz & Skinner, 1993). Boys with 
high SES on the other hand, who are less religious and authoritarian, seem more External on 
Agency for Effort and more Internal on Attribute and Powerful Others. This may well be simply a 
result of their experiences of being praised and rewarded disproportionately when they are 
successful. From our results, it is not clear how these pupils perform in school. But, in the recent 
literature, studies of the effects of coping on perceived control have shown that coping and 
motivation may have a crucial effect on engagement in a task and therefore on performance and 
the development of perceived control (Skinner, 1995; Smiths, 1989; Schmitz & Skinner, 1993). In 
the literature the importance of perceived control on performance has been shown, from both 
Means-Ends (strategy) and Agency (Capacity) beliefs. What has not been said before clearly and 
what has been found in our research is that Religiosity and authoritarianism are important 
predictors of Internal Agency ( capacity) beliefs. Although some preliminary results (Lesser & 
Painser, 1985; Furnham, 1982; Jackson & Courtsey, 1988) suggest that perhaps religious people 
are more internal than their counterparts, particularly in certain domains such as luck (chance), 
these studies were done with highly religious groups. Therefore the findings are not generalizable 
to normal samples. They also used adult samples. Apart from these exceptions in the literature it 
seems that most of the relationships found are in the other direction, where high religiosity is 
related to external locus of control (Davies & Stephan, 1995; Ramussen & Charman, 1995). 
Additionally, investigations of the causes of life events in religious and non-religious groups have 
shown that causal explanations do not differ between them, except that religious people tend to use 
God as a causal agent in health related and death related life events (Loewenthal & Cornwall, 
1995). To our knowledge the effect of religiosity has not been investigated in a large Muslim 
sample, except in a study where Hindus and Muslims (125 in each group) were compared in terms 
of their dependence proneness and internal locus of control. Although Muslims were found to be 
more dependence prone the differences on LOC were not significant (Saeeduzzafar & Sharma, 
1992). These results are perhaps worth pursuing until the links between specific perceived control 
270 
domains and performance have been established and until our understanding of the effects of 
Religiosity on perceived control is clear. One explanation is that Religiosity creates a subculture 
where intrinsic motivation is praised a lot. Another explanation is that during development a 
person's understanding of the world is expanded and developed by all these values and belief 
systems together. Therefore the effect of Religiosity on perceived control is more than just as a 
social or individual motivating factor. If this is the case, perhaps the relationships is more between 
two cognitive category systems which are, by their nature, connected to each other. The 
connectedness could be mediated by their general or domain specific nature. Then again, it will 
again be very interesting to study the relationships between domain specific and domain general 
development (Gelman et al., 1994; Medin & Ortony, 1986; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1986; Semin & 
Fiedley, 1996). Although religiosity and authoritarianism were found to explain most of the 
agency beliefs subdomains using canonical analysis, they were also found to be related to mean-
ends and agency beliefs for effort using Pearson product-moment correlations. Their explanatory 
value, even though higly significant, is limited by the small variances explained. 
Sethi and Seligman (1993) investigated nine major religions in North America (sample of 623). 
They ordered these religions from fundamental (this group includes Muslims, Orthodox Jews and 
Calvanists) to liberal. When they content analyzed the ceremonial materials used in each religion 
for explanatory style they found that the fundamentalist religious services expressed much more 
optimism (internal, stable, global explanatory style) than the moderates and liberals. This was 
consistent with the followers self-reports on an attribution style questionnaire. Other studies on 
optimism also showed that there were differences between cultures which were related to their 
experiences. People from different cultures tend to use different explanatory styles (Oettingen & 
Seligman, 1990; Oettingen, 1995; Lee & Seligman, 1998). Oettingen found that because of 
political differences people from East-Berlin were more pessimistic than West-Berliners in 
common domains of experiences such as the Olympic games. Even though they won more medals 
than West Berliners they tended to be more pessimistic and used a negative explanatory style 
(internal, stable, global). Lee & Seligman (1998) also found that Americans were more optimistic 
than Chinese living on Mainland China. Chinese living in America scored in between these two 
groups. 
In relation to authoritarianism, there is no clear conclusion from the literature about the direction 
of the relationship between locus of control and authoritarianism. Where some studies have found 
negative relationships between authoritarianism and Internal Locus of control (Ray & Subick, 
1998; Ojha, 1997; Morrison, de-Man & Drumheller, 1993) others, like our study, have found 
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positive relationshisp between authoritarianism and Internal locus of control (Na & Loftus, 1998; 
Diakonova & Gilgen, 1998; McCollaum & Lester, 1995). In all of these studies the samples used 
were either adults or university students and the samples were not always big. Diakonova et al. 
(1995) particularly draw attention to the small amount of variance explained by the variable. What 
is interesting is that similar results to those reported in this thesis are being found in other cross-
cultural research. Na and Loftus (1998) compared American, Korean and Japanese samples and 
found the direction of the relationship to be similar in the non-western cultures. The American and 
Korean samples were found to be similar on LOC, and Internal LOC and Authoritarianism were 
found to be related to each other and to provide an explanation for the people's attitude towards 
the law and prisoners in both cultures. The partial correlations were relatively small (.27) but still 
very significant. 
The significant relationships between religiosity, authoritarianism and Internal LOC for the 
Agency subscales were found mainly in the Turkish sample, where the majority of the population 
is Muslim, because the positive correlation between religiosity and authoritarianism was found to 
be high for the Turkish sample but low for the English. So the unexpected results between religion, 
authoritarianism and Internal LOC may be unique to socio-cultural variables, which have not been 
tested in this particular way before. The opposite relationship between religiosity and Locus of 
control found in the literature (e.g. Rasmussen & Charmann, 1995) may be specific to these 
investigations, which were of Christians. 
Overall it is important to show the predictive value of social variables such as nationality, religion, 
religiosity and authoritarianism and SES, as well as gender, on perceived control (Lefcourt, 1991; 
Little et al, 1995) Statsenko et al, 1995). What is most important is that the relationships between 
these variables were not in the direction one would have predicted. However small in magnitude, 
this was particularly the case of the relationships between perceived control and religiosity and 
authoritarianism. 
This can be explained in two ways. One is that this study took into consideration comparability of 
measurement in different cultures, therefore most of the variance may have been caused by 
cultural as well as measurement differences. Therefore, the study is based on more reliable 
information than previous studies. The second explanation is that the results are specific to the 
Turkish culture. If this is true they may have been caused either by sample bias or by specific 
experiences in the culture, one of which may be the Turkish pupils' schooling experience. 
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What also seems important is that the Agency beliefs subscales did not show cultural differences at 
the macro level, but did show differences at the micro level of social variables (Religiosity and 
Authoritarianism, SES and gender). These results can be taken as evidence of the validity of the 
comparability aspect of this research and for the cross-cultural validity of the CAM! scale and the 
theory behind it. 
10.4. IMPLICATIONS 
The comparability of the cross-cultural data needs to be regulated by the existing framework, such 
as the derived etic or decentralisation approaches (Berry et al., 1992). Additionally psychometric 
methods should be used to assure the reliability of the information gathered in the cultures 
investigated (Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
It seems that existing methods are useful but they need to be amended for the specific needs of 
cross-cultural data. For example, most of the cross-cultural research in psychology uses self-report 
rating scales but existing methods in contemporary psychometric comparisons, such as the Mantel-
Haenszel procedure, are mainly about skill based binary scores (Holland & Wainer, 1993). 
Perhaps Generalizability theory is the most promising for dealing with rating scales, but usually it 
is difficult to use at the item level because of the large number of items to be investigated. Vande 
Vijver & Leung (1997) suggest using an analysis of variance conditional to deal with the problem. 
In this analysis the scores are the dependent variable and culture and score levels (e.g. high, 
medium, low) are independent variables. But, the programme still doesn't overcome the number 
of comparisons that need to be done (a 20 item scale with 5 point rating scale for each would 
require 100 comparisons). The Classical approach was not challenged by this problem in the past 
and therefore was not designed for it. Nevertheless, it is still informative and practical. 
There are at least two more alternatives to using psychometric methods to detect differences 
between cultures. These are the SINCLAR and Structural Equation models, which both apply to 
multivariate scales. In future the use of these methods should also be considered (Hui & Triandis, 
1983; Little et al., 1995). Also, Van de Vijver & Leung (1997) suggest that Level oriented 
statistical techniques would be useful for Cross-cultural bias detection. They suggest hierarchical 
regression analysis and multi-level models to be examples of this. 
The implication here of the comparison between cultures is that macro environmental variables 
such as culture are important but not on all domains of perceived control. Micro environmental 
variables such as SES and gender had the greatest effect on capacity beliefs. The importance of 
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Religiosity on Control beliefs, Means-Ends for Effort, as well as almost all Capacity beliefs, 
suggests that general and domain specific learning work together. However small the magnitude of 
the relationship it would be worthwhile to investigate in detail to find out the causal links between 
them. It is also possible that there are other explanatory variables which not included in this study, 
equally explain perceived control. The other antecedents such as teaching methods are worth 
further investigation. Knowing that Turkish students are more Internal on most of the perceived 
control domains can be taken at face value to suggest the success of the new Turkish generation. 
But this inference can only be made safely when the antecedents of perceived control have been 
linked with actual performance, something, which has not been done in this study. 
One conclusion of this research is that optimism and pessimism, as an extended theory oflearned 
helplessness, may be a valuable area in the investigation of the relationship between LOC and 
religion and authoritarianism. This is one area which seems to have been overlooked in the past. 
Without making any judgements, it would be worthwhile investigating in depth the relationships 
between fundamentalist discourse, which has been adopted by some religions or sectors and 
optimism. Also, it would be interesting to compare not only the differences in discourse between 
different religions but also the differences of meaning and the practice of the religion between 
nations. 
10.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The results of this study were limited by the selective nature of the samples and the materials used. 
In Turkey in particular the sample represented only children and adolescents who were in 
secondary education. Given that education is not compulsory after 14 to 15 years of age, and the 
sample tested were between 14 and 18 years of age, the representativeness of the sample of all 
Turkish adolescent of this age can be questioned. 
There is also some evidence that the school ethos sometimes causes a certain type of attitude in 
pupils. In the Turkish sample and some parts of the English sample some of the schools were very 
selective. This may have encouraged certain types of self-perception. The problems of differences 
between schools have been investigated and taken into account by some educational studies and 
the analysis of these variables is called Multi Level Structural Analysis (Goldstein & Wood, 
1989). However, care was taken to ensure that the schools in our two samples were matched as far 
as possible, and some of the schools in both samples were representative of ordinary schools. It is 
also the case that the schools were chosen from big inner cities in both countries, but even though 
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they were therefore matched they did not represent rural schools. We do not know whether this is 
an important variable. 
We would like to have tested the same variables with more measurements of perceived control, 
such as other multidimensional and unidimensional as well as domain general and domain specific 
scales (Lefcourt, 1982; Levenson, 1981; Paulhus, 1983). This may have allowed us to make better 
predictions about the dimensions and domains measured and the relationships involved. It would 
also have allowed scales or items to be dropped from the study without affecting the amount of 
information collected. But, even with the battery we used we found that the students' attention span 
and the time the schools allowed for the project was limited. 
10.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The fmding that the Turkish sample was more Internal in some domains of perceived control 
should be investigated in more detail and the reasons should be identified. The consequences of 
this for performance should also be tested before any conclusions are drawn about the link 
between perceived control and achievement. At the moment there are many conflicting results 
about the relationships between perceived control and academic performance and knowing a 
person's perceived control does not necessarily predict their performance. 
The link between micro level social and environmental variables and perceived control needs to be 
explained more. So the investigation should be repeated in one culture to clarify the role of micro 
level environmental variables. 
It is worthwhile trying to identify classroom and school dynamic variables, which may have an 
influence on the development of perceived control. There is already some evidence for the effect 
of these variables in Schmitz & Skinner's (1993) time series study of classroom tasks and in Little 
et al.'s (1995) study of teaching style in different cultures. 
It would be interesting to investigate the relationships between religion, religiosity and 
authoritarianism in relation to optimism because in these factors may make life events (e.g. school 
engagement and performance) more predictable. 
In terms of methodology, further investigation of the use ofIRT with a larger sample seems 
warranted. Its use in detecting DIF is promising. Alternative methods of bias detection need to be 
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emphasised for all future cross-cultural research. Multi Level analysis would also be another 
promising test to use in this area (Vande Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
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APPENDIX A: Scales in two language forms 
Scale 1: 
Control beliefs, Means-Ends beliefs and Agency beliefs (CAMI) 
ill These questions, you use the following possible answers; 
1 =Almost Never 2= Sometimes 3=Often 4=Almost Always 
1. Do you try as hard as you can in school? 
2. Can you learn things you need to for school pretty fast, without really working on them? 
3. If you decide not to get any bad marks, can you really do it? 
4. Do you really pay attention in class? 
5. Can you do anything to keep from getting bad marks? 
6. Are you sort of person who is lucky with their homework? 
7. If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you learn it? 
8. When the teacher calls on you, are you usually lucky in knowing the right answer? 
9. Are you clever in school even without studying a lot? 
10. Can you get good marks when you really want to? 
11. Do your teachers, on the whole, like you? 
12. When you want them to, will your teachers help to see that you do well in school? 
13. When students give the right answer to questions in class, is it usually only because they're just 
good students? 
14. Do students do well at school because their teachers don't like them? 
15. If a student gets bad marks, is it usually because the teacher doesn't like them? 
16. When students give the wrong answers on a test, is it usually because they don't work 
carefully? 
17. When students get bad marks, is it usually because they are no good at school? 
18. When a student does well at school, is it usually because he or she is just clever? 
19. When a student doesn't understand something at school, is it because he or she doesn't pay 
enough attention? 
20. When a student knows a lot about something, is it because he or she works hard at learning it? 
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21. When a student does badly in school, is it usually because the teacher doesn't really like him or 
her very much? 
22. When a student does badly in school, is the main reason usually that he or she is just not 
clever? 
23. Is trying hard the usual reason that students do well in school? 
24. If a student gets good marks, is it usually because he or she gets along well with the teacher? 
25. Some students learn things more easily than other students do. Is it because they are luckier? 
26. If the teacher asks a student a hard question and he or she answers correctly, is it usually 
difficult to work out why the student gave the right answer? 
27. When a student gets a lot of problems wrong (for example, in a spelling test), is it usually 
difficult to work out why the student gave the right answer? 
28. Is doing well at school usually a matter ofluck? 
29. When students get bad marks, is it because they have bad luck? 
30. When students do better than usual in a subject, is it hard to tell why? 
31. When students do badly in school, is it hard to work out why that happens? 
32. If a teacher asks a student a question and the student doesn't know the answer, is it simply 
because the student's unlucky? 
33. Do you listen very carefully to what your teacher says? 
34. If you decide that you're not going to get any problems wrong (for example, in maths or 
spelling) can you do it? 
35. If you wantto well in school, can you? 
36. When it comes to schoolwork, are you usually luck? 
37. When it comes down to it, do you really work hard on your homework? 
38. When it comes to learning something hard, do you usually have luck on your side? 
39. Do you get problems right (for example, in math), even you don't try hard? 
40. Do you have teachers who will help when you want them to? 
41. If you want to, can you keep from doing badly in school? 
42. Can you get all the problems (for example, in spelling) right, when want to? 
43. When you think about it, would you say that your teachers are pretty satisfied with you? 
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44. Can you understand the teachers' lessons easily? 
45. When students do really well in schooL is it hard to know the reason why? 
46. When students get good marks in schooL is it hard to know the reason why? 
47. When a teacher asks a student a question and the student gives the wrong answer, is this 
usually because the student isn't trying hard enough? 
48. If a teacher calls on a student and the student knows the right answer, would you say it's 
because the student is lucky? 
49. When students don't understand something, is it because they are just no good at school? 
50. When a student manages to learn something hard, is it because the student's clever? 
51. When students have problems in school, is it usually because of the teacher? 
52. If students have problems in school, is it usually because of the teacher? 
53. If students understand things quickly, is it because they are very good at school? 
54. When students give the wrong answer to a teacher's questions, do you find it hard to know why 
that happens? 
55. Just imagine that a student does really well on a test. Is it hard to know why? 
56. When students don't learn very much in class, is it usually because they don't work very hard? 
57. Is getting good marks just a matter ofluck? 
58. When a student has a hard time learning something, is it usually because the student's unlucky? 
59. When a student does worse in a subject than usual, is it hard to now why? 
60. When a student does well in school, is it usually because the student gets along well with the 
teachers? 
61. When a student does well in schoolwork, is it usually because the student works very 
carefully? 
62. When a student has a hard time learning something, is it usually because the student is 
unlucky? 
63. When students do badly in a subject, is it usually because the teachers just don't help them very 
much? 
64. Is the usual reason that students understand what the teachers say, that they pay attention and 
listen carefully? 
280 
Scale 2: 
Novicki-Strickland's Internal and External Locus of Control Scale for Children (CNSIE) 
In these questions, use the following possible answers: 
I=Almost Never2= Sometimes 3= Often 4= Almost Always 
1. Do you believe that most problems will usually sort themselves out in time? 
2. Do you believe that you can stop yourself from catching a cold? 
3. Are some children just bom lucky? 
4. Most of the time do you feel that getting good marks means a great deal to you? 
5. Are you often blamed for things that just aren't your fault? 
6. Do you believe that if somebody studies hard enough he or she can pass any subject? 
7. Do you feel that most of the time it doesn't pay to try hard because things never turn out right 
anyway? 
8. Do you feel that if things start out well in the morning it's going to be a good day no matter 
what you do? 
9. Do you feel that, most of the time; parents listen to what their children have to say? 
10. Do you feel that wishing can make good things happen? 
11. When you get punished does it usually seem to be for no reason at all? 
12. Most of the time, do you find it hard to change a friend's opinion? 
13. Do you think that cheering more than luck helps a team to win? 
14. Do you feel that it's nearly impossible to change your parent's rnind of your own decisions? 
15. Do you believe that your parents should allow you to make more of your own decisions? 
16. Do you feel that, when you do something wrong, there's very little you can do to make it right? 
17. Do you believe that some children are just born good at sports? 
18. Are most of the other children your age stronger than you are? 
19. Do you feel that one of the best ways to handle most problems is just not to think about them? 
20. Do you feel that you have a lot of choice in deciding who your friends are? 
21. If you find a four-leaf clover do you believe that it might bring you good luck? 
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22. Do you feel that whether you do your homework has much to do with what kinds of marks 
you get? 
23. Dou you feel that when another teenager your age decides to hit you, there's little you can do 
to stop him or her? 
24. Have you ever had a good luck charm? 
25. Do you believe that whether or not people like you depend on how you act? 
26. Will your parents usually help you if you ask them to? 
27. Have you felt that, when people were mean to you, it was usually for no reason at all? 
28. Most of the time, do you feel that you can change what might happen tomorrow by what you 
do today? 
29. Do you believe that when bad things happen, they are just going to happen, no matter what 
you do try to stop them? 
30. Do you think that children can get their own way at home? 
31. Most of the time, do you find it useless to try to get your way at home? 
32. Do you feel that, when good things happen, they happen because of hard work? 
33. Do you feel that, when somebody your age wants to be your enemy, there's little you can do to 
change matters? 
34. Do you feel that it's easy to get friends to do what you want them to? 
35. Do you usually feel that you have little to say about what you get to eat at home? 
36. Do you feel that, when someone doesn't like you, there's little you can do about it? 
37. Do you usually feel that it's almost useless to try in school because most other children are just 
cleverer than you are? 
38. Are you the kind of person who believes that planning ahead makes things turn out better? 
39. Most of the time, do you feel that you have little to say what your family decides to do? 
40. Do you think it is better to be clever than to be lucky? 
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Scale 3: 
Multidimensional Academic Specific Locus of Control Scale (MASLOC) 
In these questions, the possible answers are: 
1 =Strongly Disagree 2=Somewhat Disagree 3=Slightly Disagree 
4=Slightly Agree 5=Somewaht Agree 6=Strongly Agree 
1. If I want to obtain a good exam record, it is essential that I should have good luck. 
2. The marks I get at the end of the year will always be closely related to what I do during the 
year. 
3. Whatever the quality of my work, I am always lucky when it comes to exams. 
4. It is an absolute waste of time for me to make any effort, since there is no relationship between 
my ability, how hard I work, and the marks I get. 
5. I am convinced that the marks TIl get depend on how well or badly I do in my exams. 
6. My getting good or bad mark in my exams is related to whether precisely the topics I have 
studied came up in the exams. 
7. The kind of marks I will get in my studies depends on how capable I am in preparing myself 
for the subjects. 
8. I don't think it is worthwhile studying hard, since the marks I will get will be completely 
manipulated. 
9. I am convinced that whatever I do, my teacher will always give me the marks they want to. 
10. If I want to get a good academic record, I have to be competent and I must work hard. 
11. In general, I believe that, if one is competent and works hard, one will get good results in one's 
studies. 
12. Luck is decisive in the kind of marks I get in my studies. 
13. The marks I get in my subjects are always determined by a series of random circumstances. 
14. It makes absolutely no difference whether I prepare well for a subject or not, since, in the long 
run, teachers are "out to catch you". 
15. Regarding my academic life, I just don't know what to do. Anything might happen: may be TIl 
do an exam well and fail, or may be I1l do it badly and pass. 
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Scale 4: 
Religiosity in Y outb 
Please answer the following questions: 
1. What religious group do you belong to? 
1) Christian (please specify what sort) 2) Muslim 
3) Jewish 4) Hindu 5) Others (please specify) 
2. How often you attend religious services during the past year? (tick only one) 
1) Not at all 2) A few times 3) About once a mount 
4) About once a week 5) More often 
3. Which of the following best describes your practice of prayer or religious meditation? 
1) Prayer is a regular part of my daily life. 
2) I usually pray in times of stress or need, but rarely at any other time. 
3) I pray only during ceremonies. 
4) Prayer has little importance in my life. 
5) I never pray. 
4. When you have a serious personal problem how often do you take religious advice or teaching 
into consideration? 
1) Almost always 2) Usually 3) Sometimes 4) Rarely 5) Never 
5. How much of an influence would you say that religion has on the way that you choose to act 
or the way that you choose to spend your time each day? 
1) No influence 2) A small influence 3) Some influence 
4) A fair amount of influence 5) A large influence 
6. Which one of following statements comes closest to your belief about God? 
1) I am sure that God really exists and that He is active in my life. 
2) Although I sometimes question His existence, I do believe in God and believe he knows of 
me as a person. 
3) I don't know if there is a personal God or higher power of some kind. 
4) I don't know if there is a personal God or higher power of some kind, and I don't know if I 
will ever know. 
5) I don't believe in a personal God or in a higher power. 
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7. Which of the following statements comes closest to your belief about life after death 
(immortality)? 
1) I believe in life after death and a soul existing as a specific individual. 
2) I believe in soul existing after death as part of a universal spirit. 
3) I believe in a life after death of some kind, but I really don't know what it would be like. 
4) I don't know whether there is any kind of life after death, and I don't know if I will ever 
know. 
5) I don't believe in any kind of life after death. 
8. During the past year, how often have you experienced a feeling of religious reverence or 
devotion? 
1) Almost daily 2) Frequently 3) Sometimes 4) Rarely 
9. Do you agree with the following statement? 
"Religion gives me a great deal of comfort and security in life." 
1) Strongly disagree 
4) Agree 
2) Disagree 3) Uncertain 
5) Strongly agree 
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5) Never 
Scale 5: 
Authoritarianism Scale 
In these questions, use following possible answers: 
1 =Strongly Disagree 2=Somewhat Disagree 3=Slightly Disagree 
3=Strongly Agree 5=Somewhat Agree 6=Slightly Agree 
1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. 
2. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power. 
3. Science has its place but there are many important things that can never be understood by the 
human mind. 
4. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict. 
5. Every person has a problem or worry, it is best for him or her not to think about it, but to keep 
busy with more careful things. 
6. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him or her not to think about it, but to 
keep busy with more cheerful things. 
7. A person who ahs no manners, bad habits, and poor breeding can hardly expected to get along 
with decent people. 
8. What youth needs most is strictly discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and 
fight for family and country. 
9. Some people are born with an urge from high places. 
10. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together, a person 
has to protect him or herself especially against catching an infection or disease from them. 
11. An insult to our honour should always be punished. 
12. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but, as they grow up, they ought to get over 
them. 
13. It is essential for learning or effective work that our teacher or bosses outline in detail what is 
to be done and exactly how to do it. 
14. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programmes, is a few courageous, 
tireless leaders in whom the people can put their faith. 
15. Sex crimes, such as rape, and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such 
criminals ought to be whipped, or worse. 
16. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and strong. 
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17. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and 
respect for his parents. 
18. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things. 
19. Some leisure is necessary, but it is good hard work that makes life interesting and worthwhile. 
20. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and 
private. 
21. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy 
the whole world. 
23. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on 
in this country, even in places where people might least expect it. 
24. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off 
25. Most people don't realise how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places. 
26. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished. 
27. Books and movies ought not to deal so much with the unpleasant and seamy side of life; they 
ought to concentrate on themes that are entertaining or uplifting. 
28. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative. 
29. Familiarity breeds contempt. 
30. When you come right down to it, it's human nature never to do anything without an eye to 
one's profit. 
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1. Olcek 
Bu sorular icin asagidaki mumkun cevap fonnlarini kullaniniz; 
1 =Hemen Hicbir Zaman 2=Bazen 
3=Cogunlukla 4=Heman Her Zaman 
1. Dusununuz: Okulda basarmak icin tum cabanizi sarfediyor musunuz? 
2. Okulda ihtiyaciniz olan seyleri ogrenirken, cok fazla calismadan, kolayca ogrenebiliyor 
musunuz? 
3. Dusununki ogretmen size bir soru sordu ve siz cevabi bilemediniz. Bunun basiniza 
gelmemesi icin yapabileceginiz bir sey var midir? 
4. Derste gercekten dikkatli olabiliyor muslU1uz? 
5. Muhakkak ki kotu not almak istemezsiniz. Kotu not almamak icin yapabileceginiz bir sey 
var midir? 
6. Odevlerinizi hazirlarken kendinizi sansli bir insan olarak goruyor musunuz? 
7. Eger gercekten zor olan bir konuyu kendi kendinize ogrenmeye karar verirseniz, blU1U 
gerceklestirebilir misiniz? 
8. Ogretmen size soru sorduglU1da, dogru cevabi bilme konusunda genellikle sansli misiniz? 
9. Cok calismamsaniz bile sinifta iyi misiniz? 
10. Istediginiz zaman iyi not alabilir misiniz? 
11. Ogretmen1erinizin hepsi sizden hoslaniyor mu? 
12. Istediginizde ogretmen1eriniz sizin basarili olmaniz icin yardimci oluyorlar mi? 
13. Ogrenciler sinifta bir SorunlU1 cevabini dogru verdiklerinde genel olarak bunun nedeni 
onlarin gercekten iyi ogrenci olmalari midir? 
14. Ogretmen1eri onlara yardim ettigi icin mi, ogrenciler okulda basarilidirlar? 
15. Eger bir ogrenci kotu notlar aliyorsa, genel olarak bunun nedeni ogretmenin ondan 
hoslanmasi midir? 
16. Ogrenciler testte yanlis cevap verdiklerinde, genel olarak bunun nedeni onlarin dikkatlice 
calismamis olmalari midir? 
17. Ogrenciler kotu not aldiklarinda, genel olarak bunlU1 nedeni onlarin derslere devamsizligi 
midir? 
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18. Bir ogrenci okulda basarili oldugW1da, genel olarak bW1W1 nedeni onW1 yeterince dikkat 
sarfetmemis olmasi midir? 
19. Bir ogrenci bir konuyu tam anlamadiginda, genel olarak bW1W1 nedeni onW1 bu konuyu 
ogrenmek icin cok calismamis olmasi midir? 
20. Bir ogrenci bir konuyu tam anIamadiginda, genel olarak bW1W1 nedeni onW1 bu konuyu 
ogrenmek icin cok calismamis olmasi midir? 
21. Bir ogrenci okulda basarisiz oldugunda, genel olarak bW1W1 nedeni ogretmenin ondan 
hoslamiyor olmasi midir? 
22. Bir ogrenci okulda basarisiz oldugW1da genel olarak bW1W1 nedeni onW1 zeki olmamasi 
midir? 
23. Ogrencilerin okulda basarili olmalarinda genel olarak bW1W1 nedeni cok calismalari midir? 
24. Eger bir ogrenci iyi notlar almissa, genel olarak bW1W1 nedeni ogretmeniyle arasinin iyi 
olmasi midir? 
25. Bazi ogrenciler, digerlerinden daha kolay ogrenirler. Bu onlarin daha sansli olmasindan 
midir? 
26. Eger ogretmen bir ogrenciye zor bir soru sorarsa ve 0 da dogru cevap verirse, geen1likle 
ogrencinin nasil dogru cevap verdigini anIamak zor mudur? 
27. Bir ogrenci bir cok problemi yanlis cozerse (omegin imla ve gramerde, matematikte), 
bW1W1 nedenini anIamak zor mudur? 
28. Okulda basarili olmak genel olarak sansa mi baglidir? 
29. Ogrenciler kotu notlar aldiklarinda, bu onlarin sanslarinin kotu olmasindan midir? 
30. Ogrenciler bir konuda her zamankinden daha iyi olduklarinda, bW1W1 nedenini bilmek zor 
mudur? 
31. Ogrenciler okulda basariszi olduklarinda, neden boyle oldugunu anlamak zor mudur? 
32. Eger ogretmen bir ogrenciye soru sorar ve 0 da bilmezse, bunun nedeni basitce ogrencinin 
sansiz olmasi midir? 
33. Derslerde ogretmeninizin ne soyleyecegini dikkatle dinler misiniz? 
34. Eger herhangi bir soruyu (omegin Matematik veya imla ve gramerde) yanlis 
cevaplandirmamamya azmederseniz, bunu gercekten yapabilir misiniz? 
35. Eger okulda basarili olmaya kara verirseniz, bW1U gercekten yapabilir misiniz? 
36. Okulla ilgili calismalarinizda genel olarak sansli misinizdir? 
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37. Okulda basariniz dustugunde; evde ders ve odevleriniz uzerinde gercekten siki calisir 
misiniz? 
38. Ogrenilmesi guc bir konuya denk geldiginizde; sonuca ulasmada genellikle sansli misiniz? 
39: Omegin matematikte cok cab a sarfetmeseniz bile, problemleri dogru cozebilr misiniz? 
40. Ogretmen1eriniz istediginiz zaman size yardimci olan kisiler rni? 
41. Eger okulda derslerinizde basarisiz olmamaya karar verirseniz bunu yapabilir rnisiniz? 
42. Istediginiz zaman (omegin imla ve gramer konusunda) butun sorulari dogru yapabilen 
birisi rnisiniz? 
43. Dusundugunuzde, ogretmen1erinizin sizden yeterince hosnut oldukalarini soyleyebilir 
misiniz? 
44. Ogretmen1erin verdigi dersleri kolayca anlayabiliyor musunuz? 
45. Ogrenciler okulda iyi notlar aldigiklarinda, bunun nedenini anlamak zor mudur? 
46. Ogrenciler okulda gercekten basarili olduklarinda, bunun nedeni ogretmen1eri rnidir? 
47. Bir ogretmen, bir ogrenciye soru sordugunda ve ogrenci yanlis cevap verdiginde, genel 
olarak bunun nedeni ogrencinin yeterince caba sarfetmernis olmasi rnidir? 
48. Eger ogretmen bir ogrenciye soru soruyor ve ogrenci de dogru cevap veriyorsa, bunun 
ogrencinin sansli olmasindan dolayi boyle oldugunu soyleyebilir misiniz? 
49. Ogrenciler bazi seyleri anlamadiklarinda, bunun nedeni onlarin okulda pekte iyi ogrenci 
olmamalari rnidir? 
50. Bir ogrenci bazi zor seyleri ogrenmeyi basardiginda, bunun nedeni ogrencinin cok zeki 
olmasi rnidir? 
51. Ogrencilerin okulda bir problemleri oldugunda, genel olarak bunun nedeni ogretmen1eri 
midir? 
52. Eger bir ogrenci, ogretmenin sorusuna yanlis cevap verirse, bu onun yeterince zeki 
olmamasindan rnidir? 
53. Eger ogrenciler konulari cabuk anliyorsa, bunun nedeni onlarin okulda basarili olmamalari 
rnidir? 
54. Ogrenciler ogretmen1erinin sorularina yanlis cevap verdiklerinde, bunun nedenini anlamak 
zor mudur? 
55. Bir ogrencinin girdigi testte cok basarili oldugunu dusunun. Bunun nedenini anlamak zor 
mudur? 
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56. Ogrenciler sinifta cok iyi ogrenemedikierinde, genel olarak bunun nedeni onlarin yeterince 
calismiyor olmalari midir? 
57. 1yi not alma sansa mi baglidir? 
58. Bir ogrenci bir konuyu ogrenmekte guc1uk cekiyorsa, bunun nedeni bu ogrencinin sansiz 
olmasi midir? 
59. Bir ogrenci bir konuda nonnalde diger konularda oldugundan daha kotuyse, bunun 
nedenini anlamak zor mudur? 
60. Bir ogrenci okulda basarili oldugunda, bunun nedeni bu ogrencinin ogretmeniyle arasinin 
iyi olmasi midir? 
61. Bir ogrenci okulda basarili oldugunda, genel olarak bunun nedeni bu ogrencinin cok 
dikkatli calisiyor olmasi midir? 
62. Bir ogrenci okulda basarili oldugunda, genel olarak bunun nedeni ogrencinin sansiz olmasi 
rnidir? 
63. Ogrenciler bir konuda cak basarisiz olduklarinda, genel olarak bunun nedeni ogretmenlerin 
onlara yeterince yardim etmememis olmasi midir? 
64. Ogrencilerin ogretmenlerinin onlara ne dedigini anlamalarinin nedeni, onlari dikkat 
sarfederek dinlemeleri midir? 
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2.0lcek 
Bu sorulara asagidaki mumkun eevap formlarini kull anini z: 
1 =Hemen Hiebir Zaman 2=Bazen 
3=Cogunlukla 4=Hemen Her Zaman 
1. Cogu problemin genellikle zaman icinde hallolaeagina inanir misiniz? 
2. Soguk almaktan kacininabilaeaginize inanir misiniz? 
3. Bazi eoeuklar hakikaten sansli dogar? 
4. Cogu zaman iyi not almanin sizin icin onemli oldugunu dusunur musunuz? 
5. Cogu zaman sizin hataniz olmayan seylerden dolayi suclanir misiniz? 
6. Eger herhangi bir insan yeterinee ealisirsa, herhangi bir konuyu basaracagina inaniyor 
musunuz? 
7. Ne yaparsaniz yapin sonue degismeyeeegi icin eogu kere yeterinee eaba sarfetmediginizi 
dusunuyor musunuz? 
8. Eger sabah gune iyi baslarsaniz, 0 gunun devaminin da ne olursa olsun iyi geleeegini 
hisseder misiniz? 
9. Cogu zaman anne-babalarin eoeuklarinin soylediklerini dinlemedegini dusunuyor 
musunuz? 
10. Dilerseniz iyi seyler olaeagina inanir misiniz? 
11. Cezalandirilidiginiz zaman, genellikle size, eezalandirilmak icin aslinda hakli bir neden 
yokmus gibi gelir mi? 
12. Cogu zaman arkadaslarinizin fikirIerini degistermenin gue oldugunu dusunuyor musunuz? 
13. Alkislamanin, bir takimin kazanmasina sanstan daha fazla yardimei olaeagini dusunur 
musunuz? 
14. Arme-babanizin herhangi bir konuda fikrini degistirmenin hemen hemen imkansiz oldugtmu 
dusunuyormusunuz? 
15. Kendi kararIarinizin eogunu uygulamaniza ailenizin izin vereeegine inaniyor musunuz? 
16. Bir seyler ters gittinginde bunu duzeltmek icin yapabileeeginiz pek bir sey olmadigini 
dusunuyormusunuz? 
17. Bazi eoeuklarin daha dogustan spora yetenekli olduklarina inaiyor musunuz? 
18. Yasitiniz bireok gene sizden daha gucludur? 
292 
19. problemlerle basetmenin en iyi yollll1lll1 onlar hakkinda dustmmemek oldugu gorusoode 
misiniz? 
20. Kiminle arkadas olaeaginiz konusooda karar vermede pek eok seeeneginiz oldugunu 
dusunuyormuslll1uz? 
21. Dort yaprakli yonea bulursaniz blll1lll1 sans getireeegini dusoour musunuz? 
22. Evde ders ve odevlerinizi yapip yapmamanin alaeaginiz notu etkileyeeegini dusunuyor 
mususnuz? 
23. Sizin yasinizdaki bir baska gene size vurmaya kalkisirsa, onu durdurmak iein 
yapabileeeginiz eok az sey oidugoou mu duslll1uyorslll1uz? 
24. Hie sansli oldunuz mu? 
25. Insanlarin sizden hoslanim hoslanmamasinin sizin eylemlerinize bagli olduguna mi 
inanirsiniz? 
26. Eger yardimlarini isteyeeek olursaniz anne-babaniz genellikle size yardimci olurlar mi? 
27. Genellikle bir neden olmadigi halde insanlarin size karsi mesafeli ve soguk olduklarini 
hisseder misiniz? 
28. Cogu kere bugun yaptiklarinizla yarin olaeaklari degistirebileeeginize inanir misiniz? 
29. Kotu bir seyin olaeagi varsa, durdurmak iein ne yaparsaniz yapin yine de olaeagina inanir 
misiniz? 
30. Eger denerlerse genclerin kendi yollarinda ilerleyebileeeklerini dusoour musunuz? 
31. Cogu kere evde kendi bildiginizi yap maya ealismayi faydasiz mi buluyorsunuz? 
32. lyi bir sey oldugunda, bunun siki ealismanizdan dolayi oldugunu dusunur muslll1uz? 
33. Sizin yasitiniz birisi size dusman oldugtmda, boou degistirmek iein yapaeaginiz pek bir sey 
olmadigini mi dusoourslll1uz? 
34. Istediginiz zaman kolayea arkadas edinebileeeginiz goruslll1uzde misiniz? 
35. Evde yiyeeeginizi seeme konusooda genellikle eok az bir soz hakkiniz oldugu gorusunde 
misiniz? 
36. Birisi sizden hoslanmadigi zaman bu durumu degistirmek iein yapabileeeginiz pek bir sey 
olmadigini dusunur musunuz? 
37. Okuldaki diger eoeuklarin sizden daha zeki olmalari nedeniyle okuldaki eabanizin yarasiz 
oldugunu hisseder misiniz? 
38. Geleeege yonelik plan yaparak onu iyi yonde degistirebileeeginize inanir misiniz? 
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39. Cogu zaman, ailenizde verilen kararlar hakkinda cok az bir soz hakkiniz oldugu gorusunde 
misiniz? 
40. Sansli olmaktansa, zeki olmanin daha iyi oldugunu mu dusunur sunuz? 
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3.01cek 
BlU1dan sonraki sorular iein asagidaki eevap fonnatini kull anini z: 
1 =Tamamen Karsi 2=CoglU1lukla Karsi 
3=Biraz Karsi 4=Biraz Taraftar 
5=CoglU1lukla Taraftar 6=Tamamen Taraftar 
1. Eger iyi bir okul dereeesine sahip olmak istiyorsam blU1lU1 icin en onemli sey iyi bir sansa 
sahip olabilmemdir. 
2. Sene sonlU1da elde ettigim not her zaman icin sene icinde ne yaptigimla eok iliskili 
olaeaktir. 
3. Calismanin niteligi ne olursa olslU1, sinav zamaninda sansim bana hep yardim eder. 
4. Calismarnin rniktari ve alaeagim not ile benim yeteneklerim arasinda bir iliski olmadigi iein 
ealismaya sarfettigim eaba tamamen zaman kaybidir. 
5. Inaniyorum ki sinavlarda aldigim notlartamamen benim 0 sinavlarda ne kadar iyi ya da 
kotu yaptigima bagli olaeaktir. 
6. Sinavlarimdan iyi ya da kotu not almanin, tamamen sinavda ealisrnis oldugum konularin 
gelip gelmemesiyle iliskilidir. 
7. Calismalarim sonueu, alaeagim not benim bu konulari hazirlama kapasiteme baglidir. 
8. Cok ealisarak alaeagim notlari tamamen belirleyebileeegime inaniyorum. 
9. Inaniyorum ki, ogretmenim icin ne yaparsam yapayim, 0 her zaman bana kendi istedigi 
notu verir. 
10. Eger iyi bir dereee elde etmek istersem, yeterli olmaliyim ve siki ealismaliyim. 
11. Genelde inaniyorum ki, eger birisi yetenekliyse ve siki ealisiyorsa bu kisi ealisma!arindan 
iyi sonue alaeaktir. 
12. Calismalrimdan nasi! bir not alaeagim sansa baglidir. 
13. Kendi dalimda aldigim notlar her zaman tesadufi kosullar serisiyle belirlenmektedir. 
14. Benim bir ders iein iyi hazirlik yaprnis olup olmamam hie bir anlam tasimaz, zira uZlU1 
vadede ogretmen1erin isi ogrenei!erin bosluklarini yaka!amaktir. 
15. Okul hayatimda ne yapaeagirni gereekten bilrniyorum. Hersey olabilir; belki sinavi iyi 
yapip basarisiz olaeagim, belki kotu yapip geeeeegim. 
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4.0lcek 
Bu olcek icin her sonmun altinda ayri ayri belirtilmis olan cevap fonnatini kullaniniz; 
1. Asagidaki din gruplarindan hangisi sizin dininizi kapsiyor? 
a. Hristiyanlik (hangisi belirtiniz) b. Muslumanlik 
c. Yahudilik d. Diger (belirtiniz) 
2. Gecen yil dininizin gereklerini yerine getirdiniz mi? 
a.Hic 
d. Haftada Bir Kere 
b. Birkac Kere c. Ayda Bir Kere 
e. Surekli olarak 
3. Asagidakilerden hangisi sizin dua etme sikliginizi daha iyi tanimliyor? 
a. Dua etmek gunluk yasamimin surekli bir parcasidir. 
b. Cogunlukla sikisik oldugum ve ihtiyacim oldugu zamanlarda dua ederim, fakat bunun 
disinda nadiren dua ederim. 
c. Sadece dini toren1erde dua ederim. 
d. Dua etmek yasamimda cok az bir oneme sahiptir. 
e. Hic dua etmem. 
4. Cok ciddi bir kisisel problerniniz oldugunda ne siklikla dini oneri veya ders almayi 
duslmursunuz? 
a. Hemen her zaman b. Genellikle c. Bazen 
d. Nadiren e.Hic 
5. Hareketlerinizin veya gunluk yasarninizi nasi 1 gecireceginizin secirninde dininizin ne kadar 
etkili oldugunu soyleyebilr rnisiniz? 
a. Hic etkilemez b. Ufak bir etkisi vardir c. Biraz etkiler 
d. Yeterli oranda etkiler e. Oldukca fazla etkiler 
6. Asagidaki tanimalamalardan hangisi sizin Tanri hakkindaki inanciniza yakin dusuyor? 
a. Erninim ki Tanri hakikaten var ve 0 benim yasamim da surekli etkilidir. 
b. Her ne kadar zihnimde bazen O'nun varligi ile ilgili soru olussa da Tanri'nin varligina 
inaniyorum ve inaniyorum ki 0 beni kisi olarak biliyor. 
c. Tanri'nin var olup olmadigini bilmiyorum ve bundan soma bunu bilip bilemeyecegirni 
kestiremiyorum. 
d. Tanri'nin veya bir yuksek gucun var olup olamadigini bilmiyorum ve bundan soma bunu 
bilip bilemeyecegimi kestiremiyorum. 
e. Tanri'nin veya bir yuksek gucun varligina inanmiyorum. 
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7. Asagidaki goruslerden hangisi sizin olumden sonraki hayatla ilgili dusuncenize yakin 
dusuyor? 
a. Olumden sonraki hayata, her bireyin kendine ozgu bir ruhunun var olduguna 
maruyorum. 
b. Evrensel ruhun bir parcasi olarak olumden sonra ruhun var olduguna inaniyorum. 
c. Olumden sonraki bir tur hayata inaniyorum, fakat onun nasil olabilecegini gercekten 
bilrniyorum. 
d. Olumden sonraki herhangi bir tur hayatin olup olmadigini bilrniyorum, bundan sonra 
bilip bilemeyecegirni de kestirerniyorum. 
e. Olumden sonraki herhangi bir tur yasama inanrniyorum. 
8. Gecen yil boyunca, dini gereklerinizi hangi siklikla yerine getirdiniz? 
a. Hemen Her Gun b. Siklikla c. Bazen d. Nadir Olarak 
9. Asagidaki cumleye katiliyor musunuz? 
" Din benim yasarnima buyuk oranda guven ve rahatlik veriyor" . 
a. Tamamen Karsiyim 
d. Katiliyorum 
b. Karsiyim c. Karasizim 
e. Tamamen Katiliyorum 
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e.Hic 
5.0lcek 
BlU1dan sonraki sorular iein asagida belirtilmis olan eevap fonnatini kullaniniz; 
I=Tamamen Karsi 2=CoglU1!ukla Karsi 
3=Biraz Karsi 4=Biraz Taraftar 
5=Cogunlukla Taraftar 6=Tamamen Taraftar 
1. Coeuklarin ogrenmesi gereken en onemli erdem otoriteye saygi ve itiattir. 
2. Eger yeterli guee sahip olursak hie bir zaaflik bizi geriletemez. 
3. Bilimin yeri vardir, fakat insan zihni tarafmdan hie bir zaman anlasilamayaeak eok 
onemli seyler de vardir. 
4. Insanin dogasi geregi, her zaman savas ve eatismalar olaeaktir. 
5. Bazi doga ustu guclerin kararIarina soru sonnaksizin itaat etmek herkesin kaderidir. 
6. Birinin problemi veya sikintisi oldugooda, yapaeagi en iyi sey 0 konu hakkinda 
dusunmemek, eg1endiriei seylerle mesgul olmaktir. 
7. Kotu aliskanliklari, tarzlari ve egitimi olan kisilarin iyi insanlarla gorusmesi beklenemez. 
8. Gecligin en eok ihtiyaei olan seyler siki bir disiplin, kararlilik ve gerek ulkesi gerek ailesi 
icin savasmak, ealismaktir. 
9. Bazi insanlar, yuksek mevkilere ulasma arzusu ile dogarlar. 
10. GlU1umuzde etrafta eok eesitli turden insanlar dolastigi ve birbirlerine karistigi iein, kisi 
kendini korumalidir, ozellikle onlardan geleeek hastalik veya enfeksiyonlara karsi dikkatli 
olmalidir. 
II. Serefimize yapilan hakaretler mutlaka eezalandirilmalidir. 
12. Genclerin bazen isyankar fikirleri vardir, aneak buyuduklerinde 0 fikirlerden 
vazgeemelidirIer. 
13. Etkili ealisma ve ogrenme iein, is verenlerimizin veya ogretmenlerimizin tasarilarinin 
ayrintilarini ve blU1!ari nasiI uyguladiklarini bilmek onemlidir. 
14. Bu ullkenin, kanlU1!ardan, politik programlardan ziyade, bir kae eesur, fedakar, yorulmak 
bilmez ve halkin arkalarindan gitmek isteyeeegi yorulmak bilmez liderlere ihtiyaei vardir. 
15. Cinsel suclar-tipki teeavuz, eoeuklara saldiri gibi- hapsedilmekten daha fazlasini hak eder: 
Bu tur suclar halkin gozu onlU1de veya daha agir sekillerde eezalandirilmalidir. 
16. Insanlar iki sinifa ayrilabilirler; gucluler ve guesuzler. 
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17. Anne-babaya sevgi, saygi ve minnettarlik duymayan bir insandan daha kotu bir sey yoktur. 
18. Bir gun astrolojinin (yildiz falinin) pek cok seyi aciklayabilecegi gorulecektir. 
19. Bazen bos zaman gereklidir, fakat yasami degerli ve ilginc kilan siki cali sma, daha iyidir. 
20. Gunumuzde her gecen gun daha fazla kisi mahrem ve kisisel konulara bumunu 
sokmaktadir. 
21. Savaslar ve sosyal karisikliklar bir gun butun dunyayi yok edecek bir tufan veya depremIe 
son bulabilir. 
22. Savaslar ve sosyal karisikliklar bir gun butun dunyayi yok edecek bir tufan veya depremIe 
son bulabilir. 
23. Ahlaksizlik, hilekarlik ve budallaliktan kurtulabilirsek toplumumuzun pek cok problemini 
cozebiliriz. 
23. Eski Yunanli ve Romalilarin ahlak disi hayati, bu gun ulkemizde olan bazi seylerle 
karsilastirildiginda, daha hafifkalmistir. 
24. Eger insanlar az konusup cok calisirsaydi, herkes daha iyi olurdu. 
25. Cogu kisi dusunmez ama, hayatimiz gizli yerlerdeki bir takim suikastlar ve entrikalar 
tarafindan kontrol edilmektedir. 
26. Homoseksueller suclulardan daha iyi degildirler ve onlarda siddetli bicimde 
cezalandirilmalidirlar. 
27. Kitaplar ve filmIer hayatin sikintili ve hos olmayan yanlariyla cok fazla ilgili olmamalidir. 
Eglendirici olmali ve hayatin yuce yanlarini islemelidirler. 
28. Akli basinda, normal, iyi bir kisi asIa yakin bir arkadasi veya akrabasini incitmeyi 
dusunemez. 
29. Asiri samimiyet saygisizlik dogurur. 
30. Haklarini kaybettiginde; insan dogasi geregi baskasinin malin a goz dikmeden edemez. 
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APPENDIX B: ANOV A tables of Generalizability analysis 
Table Ba : Multivariate Variance of Analysis Between Subjects Effects of the Control Beliefs 
Subscale in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 4471.82 196 22.82 
Constant 84443.83 1 84443.83 9.81 0.002 
Form 235.74 3 78.58 3.08 0.029 
Table Baa: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for Control Beliefs Subscale 
in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 971.99 196 4.96 
Time 48.65 1 48.65 9.81 0.002 
Form by Time 45.76 3 15.25 3.08 0.029 
." 
Table Bb: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for Means-Ends Beliefs for 
Effort Subscale in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 2675.97 196 13.65 
Constant 125096.00 1 12509.09 9160.63 0.000 
Form 170.97 3 56.99 4.17 0.007 
Table Bbb: Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Analysis Within Subjects Effects for Means-Ends 
Beliefs for Effort Subscale in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F SigofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 869.06 196 13.65 
Time 44.86 1 44.86 10.12 0.002 
Form by Time 38.74 3 12.91 2.91 0.036 
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Table Bc:Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Means-Ends Beliefs 
for Luck Subscale in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 3202.15 194 16.51 
Constant 65260.61 1 65260.61 3953.77 0.000 
Form 95.84 3 31.95 1.94 0.125 
Table Bcc: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects of the Means-Ends Beliefs 
for Luck Subscale in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1165.49 194 6.01 
Time 152.50 1 152.50 25.38 0.000 
Form by Time 46.42 3 15.47 2.58 0.055 
Table Bd: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Means-Ends 
Unknown Factors Subscale in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 3099.56 193 16.06 
Constant 77272.56 1 77272.56 4811.53 0.000 
Form 157.29 3 52.43 3.26 0.023 
Table Bdd: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Means-Ends Beliefs 
Unknown Factors Subscale in CAMI. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1298.62 193 6.73 
Time 14.16 1 14.16 2.10 0.149 
Form by Time 16.31 3 5.44 0.81 0.491 
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Table Be: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Means-Ends Beliefs 
Attribute Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 2031.32 197 10.31 
Constant 202122.79 1 202122.79 19602.14 0.000 
Form 90.06 3 30.02 2.91 0.036 
Table Bee: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Means-Ends Beliefs 
Attribute Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 580.64 197 2.95 
Time 17.24 1 17.24 5.85 0.017 
Form by Time 27.10 3 9.03 3.06 0.029 
Table Bf: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Means-Ends Beliefs 
Powerful Others Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 3259.66 197 16.55 
Constant 98500.38 1 98500.38 5952.94 0.000 
Form 31.42 3 10.47 0.63 0.595 
Table Bff: Multivariate Variance of Analysis Within Subjects Effects for the Means-Ends Beliefs 
Powerful Others Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig off 
Variation 
Within Cells 721.10 197 3.66 
Time 0.10 1 0.10 0.03 0.866 
Form by Time 5.65 3 1.88 0.51 0.672 
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Table Bg: Multivariate Variance of Analysis Between Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs 
Effort Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 2332.15 197 11.84 
Constant 35324.75 1 35324.75 2983.93 0.000 
Fonn 35.42 3 11.81 1.00 0.395 
Table Bgg: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs 
Effort Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 244.47 197 1.24 
Time 0.10 1 0.10 0.08 0.778 
Fonn by Time 6.73 3 2.24 1.81 0.147 
Table Bh: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs 
Attribute Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 480.14 198 2.42 
Constant 37184.65 1 37184.65 15334.14 0.000 
Fonn 15.57 3 5.19 2.14 0.096 
Table Bhh: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs 
Attribute Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 206.80 198 1.04 
Time 3.92 1 3.92 3.75 0.054 
Fonn by Time 5.31 3 1.77 1.69 0.170 
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Table Bj: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs 
Powerful Others Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1939.28 199 9.75 
Constant 48801.20 1 48801.20 5007.76 0.000 
Form 15.56 3 5.19 0.53 0.661 
Table Bjj: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs 
Powerful Others Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 350.56 199 1.76 
Time 0.75 1 0.75 0.43 0.514 
Form by Time 13.65 3 4.55 2.58 0.055 
Table Bk: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs Luck 
: Subscale in CAM!. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1304.41 197 6.62 
Constant 36900.78 I 36900.78 5572.96 0.000 
Form 26.20 3 8.73 1.32 0.269 
Table Bkk: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Agency Beliefs Luck 
Subscale in CAM!. . 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 319.79 197 1.62 
Time 11.85 1 11.85 7.30 0.008 
Form by Time 1.87 3 0.62 0.38 0.765 
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Table BI: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the CNSIE Nowicki-
Strickland's Internal and External Control Scale for Children. 
Source of SS DF MS F SigofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 21299.09 183 116.39 
Constant 2612430.07 1 2612430.10 22445.78 0.000 
Form 14.47 3 4.82 0.04 0.989 
Table Bll: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the CANS IE Nowicki-
Strickland's Internal and External Control Scale for Children. 
Source of SS DF MS F SigofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 5980.08 183 32.68 
Time 48.07 1 48.07 1.47 0.227 
Form by Time 228.00 3 76.00 2.33 0.076 
Table Bm: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Internal Subscale 
inMASLOC. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 3671.86 195 18.83 
Constant 42831.95 1 42831.95 22.74.66 0.000 
Form 29.13 3 9.71 0.52 0.672 
Table Brnm: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Internal Subscale in 
MASLOC. 
Source of SS DF MS F SigofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1462.84 195 7.50 
Time 3.08 1 3.08 0.41 0.522 
Form by Time 18.55 3 6.18 0.82 0.482 
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Table Bn: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subject Effects for the Luck Subscale in 
MASLOC. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 3693.50 194 19.04 
Constant 95937.24 1 95937.24 5039.07 0.000 
Form 56.88 3 18.96 1.00 0.396 
Table Bo: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Luck Subscale in 
MASLOC. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1438.75 194 7.42 
Time 8.03 1 8.03 1.08 0.299 
Form by Time 361.64 3 120.55 16.25 0.000 
Table Boo: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Helplessness 
Subscale in MASLOC. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig off 
Variation 
Within Cells 3734.28 190 19.65 
Constant 78694.17 1 78693.17 4003.91 0.000 
Form 34.28 3 11.43 0.58 0.628 
Table Bp: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Helplessness Subscale 
inMASLOC. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1834.04 190 9.65 
Time 138.48 1 138.48 14.35 0.000 
Form by Time 250.88 3 83.63 8.66 0.000 
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Table Bq: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the Religious Scale. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 12362.61 190 65.07 
Constant 198970.18 1 198970.18 3057.96 0.000 
Fonn 125.90 3 41.97 0.64 0.587 
Table Bqq: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the Religious Scale. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 1075.25 190 5.66 
Time 0.14 1 0.14 0.03 0.874 
Fonn by Time 9.81 3 3.27 0.58 0.630 
Table Br: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Between Subjects Effects for the California F 
(Authoritarianism) Scale. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 72866.98 158 461.18 
Constant 4207473.60 1 4207473.60 9123.21 0.000 
Fonn 1558.48 3 519.49 1.13 0.340 
Table Brr: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Within Subjects Effects for the California F 
(Authoritarianism) Scale. 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig ofF 
Variation 
Within Cells 17857.90 158 113.02 
Time 528.41 1 528.41 4.68 0.032 
Fonn by Time 187.04 3 62.35 0.55 0.648 
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Appendix C: Examples of Item Characteristic Curves (ICC) 
Figure 1: Item Characteristic Curves for Item 1 in 
English and Turkish Languages, as an Example of 
One Unsuccessfully Tra~slated Item. 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 1 in English form 
Response Probability 
1G?~G22±~~GSGG0S20~~U 
- Almost Never 
-+- Sometimes 
"* Often 
........ Almost Always 
. -2.5. -2 . -1.5. -, . -0.5. 0 . 0.5. , . 1.5. 2 . 2.5. 3 . 3.5 
Subjects z score on scale (Theta) 
Q_ 7: If you decide to sit down and learn really hard, can you do it? 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 1 in Turkish Form 
'{~ 
Response probability 
1~~~~T:?~07~~~~~~7J 
- Almost Never 
-+- Sometimes 
"* Often 
........ Almost Always 
-3.5. -3 . -2.5. ·2 . ,1.5 .. 1 . -0.5. 0 . 0.5. 1 . ,:5 _ 2 . 2.5. 3 . 3.5 
Subjects z score on scale (Theta) 
Q. 7: Eger gercekten zor olan bir konuyu kendi kendinize ogrenmeY,e 
karar verirseniz. bunu gerceklestirebilir misiniz? 
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Figure 2: Item Characteristic Curves for Item 8 in 
English and Turkish Languages, as an Example of 
One Successfully Translated Item. 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 8 in English Form 
Response probability 
1 
- Almost Never 
+ Sometimes 
""* Often 
---- Almost Always 
Subjects z score on scale (Theta) 
0.41: If you want to can you keep !rom doing badly in schooL? 
Control Beliefs Subscale 
Item 8 in Turkish Form 
Response probability 1 . . 
0.8 • 
- Almost Never 
0.6 
-+- Sometimes 
0.4 "*" Often 
...... Almost Always 
0.2 
. . 
o " . . ,; ,. .:. . :~'; 
.3.5. -3 . -2.5. ·2 . -'.5. -, . -0.5. 0 . 0.5 , 1.5 2. 2.5. 3 . 3.5 
Subjects z score on scale (Theta) 
0.41: Eger okulda derslerinizde basarisiz olmamaya kararverirseniz 
bunu yapabilir misiniz? 
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'''. 
MASLOC Helplessness Subscale 
Item 4 in English form 
.' Strongly disagree 
Response Probability 
Ir-------------------------------____ ~ 
0.8 ........ - e • •• • •••••••• _ ......... ~ ••••• __ • __ ...... . 
• Somewhat disagree 
0.6 ...... . II 
Slightly disagree 
0.4 ..... ". 
.-. 
0.2 
Slightly agree 
•• o~~--"~~~~~~=-~~~~==~""iji~~~ Somewhat agree 
-3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 ~1.5 -I -0.5 0 . 0.5 I 1.5' 2 2.S "-3.' 3~5 1------:-:::--:-:----111 
• 
Subjects z score on item (Theta) 
; :,-,: .. ------------------,,--------~,..,-:-.;.,-,.' 
i :~. ~'. _ Q 14: It makes absolutely no difference' whether I prepa;.:ew~br,:<t ~tronglyagree 
1', ". W a subject or not since in the long run teachers~re.9~!?§f'h:y~,;; 
i, ~.<;i;,.F·IIIIG·· ··U·R·E·2.,..-----·"~----__ • __·.:,IIIIi~ ............. -1IIIi0_;. . : .. :: ... ~ ~~:c.::.:, •.... iii!I;~ ... iii, :., •. ,._co ........ 1iI. ------.. 
~~~;' I 
;<.11:, 
: ; 
i 
. i;. 
t I: 
! ~'. ~.­
; :~:~ 
. -.J' " . 
. .~ 
-.'-:: " 
s'oale 
. -, ~ -. - .. ~ . 
• Strongly disagree 
• Somewhat disagree 
• Slightly disagree 
0.4 
~~~_---::iIO~~--.J''''--~ ....... --I~--. ---.---------.-Slightly agree 
0.2 
ot;;;~~~~~~~~~~~;;~~~~::~~~§j somew~tagree 
-3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -I -0.5 0 0.5 I 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 1-________ -. 
Subjects z score on item (Theta) 
Srxongly ag"ee _ Q 14: Benim bir ders icin iyi hazirlanmis olup olmamam hie bir anlam tasimaz. 
W, uzun vadede ogretmenlerin isi ogrencilerin bosluklarini yakalamaktir. .. --~ .......... ~-----..... --.... ---......... ~ 
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Appendix D: Item discrimination (A) and difficulties (Bs) for~English 
and Turkish Forms of the Scale and Subscale. 
Table Da: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAMI's Control Beliefs Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT (N=820). . 
ENGUSH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
S A Bl B2 !!J~ A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI7 1.08 .03 1.51 4.00 0.70 -2.11 0.56 5.18 
CAMI10 2.09 - .30 1.08 5.73 1.09 -.94 1.45 3.61 
CAMI42 1.56 -1.34 0.12 1.75 1.40 -2.40 -.16 1.90 
CAMJ35 1.59 -.76 0.90 2.81 3.06 -.96 0.65 1.83 
CAMI3 1.62 -1.09 0.33 2.50 0.64 -2.63 0.50 3.84 
CAM15 1.14 -1.42 0.67 3.33 0.82 -.73 2.30 6.14 
CAMI34 1.26 -2.20 - .26 1.56 1.40 -1.55 0.50 2.72 
CAMI41 1.84 - .73 0.64 2.33 1.29 -1.21 0.63 1.70 
Table Db: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Effort Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT (N=820). 
ENGUSH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
I~S A Bl B2 ..,.~ Bl B2 B3 
CAMI23 0.91 -1.01 1.23 4.34 0.94 -2.09 1.58 4.30 
CAMI20 0.72 -2.49 1.05 4.91 0.88 -1.94 1.20 3.98 
CAMI61 1.31 -1.84 0.48 1.19 -1.57 1.25 2.75 
CAMI64 1.48 -0.99 0.69 2.60 0.83 -1.52 1.56 3.89 
CAMI19 0.59 -5.85 -1.77 4.05 0.92 -2.20 0.23 2.72 
CAMI16 0.69 -3.31 -0.60 3.80 1.24 -2.51 -0.31 2.28 
CAMI56 0.64 -4.74 -2.08 2.29 1.26 -2.48 -0.31 1.90 
CAMI47 1.16 -2.78 -0.10 2.79 0.92 -3.02 -0.27 3.39 
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Table Dc: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Attribution Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMIl8 0.71 -3.97 -0.19 4.56 1.56 -1.69 0.31 2.09 
CAMIl3 0.47 -4.90 -1.01 4.64 0.80 -3.18 0.03 2.97 
CAMI50 1.50 -2.59 -0.82 1.48 1.81 -2.09 -0.04 1.67 
CAMI53 0.96 -2.60 -0.08 3.02 0.67 -3.43 0.90 4.14 
CAMIl7 0.79 -5.19 -1.92 1.89 0.56 -5.19 -0.99 4.47 
CAMI22 1.17 -3.25 -1.54 1.75 1.16 -3.30 -1.63 0.73 
CAMI49 1.49 -3.36 -1.99 0.23 0.74 -6.75 -2.19 1.31 
CAMI52 1.79 -2.75 -1.77 0.55 1.21 -4.64 -2.16 0.42 
Table Dd: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Powerful Others Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI24 1.04 -1.34 1.30 3.78 1.72 -1.41 0.68 2.22 
CAMIl4 0.11 -20.8 3.93 23.4 0.34 -3.55 2.69 8.58 
CAMI60 1.04 -1.88 1.07 3.19 1.73 -1.43 0.36 2.27 
CAMI45 0.24 -9.17 2.17 11.0 0.37 -5.00 1.20 6.42 
CAMIl5 1.53 -0.06 1.91 2.82 2.04 -0.87 1.17 2.38 
CAMI21 1.63 -0.26 1.89 2.94 1.80 -1.05 1.28 2.18 
CAMI63 1.50 -1.14 1.15 2.44 1.56 -2.41 0.37 1.92 
CAMI51 1.41 -1.59 1.18 2.49 1.41 -2.25 0.61 2.07 
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Table De: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Luck Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
I~ A BI B2 B3 II A BI B2 B3 
CAMI28 1.67 0.63 1.98 2.94 1.75 -1.35 OAO 1.38 
CAMI25 1.03 -0.24 1.66 3A7 0.87 -LIO 0.69 2.28 
CAMI57 1.93 0.31 1.76 2.65 2.16 -1.56 0.37 1.39 
CAMI48 1.38 -0.35 2.05 3.37 1.73 -2.14 0.29 1A5 
CAMI29 1.61 0.27 2.22 3.06 1.99 -1.39 OA4 1.43 
CAMI32 1.31 0.14 1.99 3.03 1.52 -1.53 OA9 1.47 
CAMI58 1.70 0.04 1.76 2.83 2.64 -LI4 0.35 1.03 
CAMI62 2.15 -0.01 1.59 2.37 2.32 -1.43 0.37 1.31 
Table Df: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAMI's Means-Ends for Unknown Factors Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A BI B2 B3 A Bt B2 B3 
CAMI30 1.88 -0.99 1.26 2A6 1.32 -1.29 0.56 2.04 
CAMI26 0.79 -1.21 2.37 3.95 1.00 -2.00 1.09 2.71 
CAMI46 1.38 -0.65 1.70 3.12 1.84 -0.91 0.85 1.44 
CAMI55 1.43 -OA1 1.71 3.10 2.11 -0.86 0.65 lAO 
CAMI3t 0.94 -1.60 2.02 4.19 1.04 -1.85 0.93 2.51 
CAMI27 1.06 -1.02 1.43 3.00 1.18 -1.58 0.89 2.75 
CAMI54 1.55 -0.94 1.56 2.86 1.82 -1.54 0.79 1.77 
CAMI59 1.04 -1.91 1A8 3.56 1.00 -2.04 0.87 2.85 
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Table Dg: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAJv1I's Agency Beliefs for Effort Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
A Bl B2. B3 ·A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI1 2.03 -1.15 0.26 1.94 1.93 -1.57 0.18 2.14 
CAMI4 2.27 -1.19 0.47 2.24 2.01 -1.78 0.04 2.17 
CAMI37 1.56 -1.71 -0.31 1.33 1.72 -1.31 0.35 2.07 
CAMI33 2.19 -1.31 0.30 1.75 2.57 -1.34 0.49 2.28 
Table Dh: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAJv1I's Agency Beliefs for Attribution Subscale with Samejima's Model ofIRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A Bl B2 R1 A- Bl B2 B3 
CAMI2 2.11 -1.57 -0.43 1.82 1.61 -2.00 -0.15 2.60 
CAMI9 2.38 -1.54 -0.40 1.17 1.52 -2.10 -0.15 2.12 
CAMI39 1.14 -2.68 -0.96 1.40 1.16 -2.75 -0.69 1.68 
CAMI44 0.87 -1.92 0.78 4.01 1.47 -1.60 0.18 3.40 
Table Dj: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAJv1I's Agency Beliefs for Powerful Others Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI12 1.98 -2.37 -0.77 0.43 1.10 -2.35 0.10 1.85 
CAMI1l 1.85 -2.73 -0.99 0.47 2.20 -1.93 -0.49 1.39 
CAMI40 1.23 -2.88 -1.14 0.34 1.09 -2.27 -0.11 1.64 
CAMI43 1.10 -2.59 -0.59 1.86 2.05 -1.84 -0.11 1. 76 
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Table Dk: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
CAMI's Agency Beliefs for Luck Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT (N=820). 
ENGUSH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 A Bl B2 B3 
CAMI6 1.24 -1.56 0.62 2.11 0.99 -1.93 0.66 2.36 
CAMI8 0.89 -2.52 0.11 2.85 1.11 -3.54 -0.13 2.61 
CAMI38 1.29 -0.77 1.29 2.76 1.27 -2.14 0.53 3.26 
CAMI36 1.92 -1.09 0.72 2.07 1.92 -1.97 0.18 2.15 
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Table DI: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the 
Nowicki-Strickland Internal vs External Scale for Children with Samejima's Model of IRT 
(N=820). 
16 ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE A BI B2 B3 A BI B2 B3 
NOVI 0.27 -8.31 0.31 6.58 0.08 -38.65 -7.03 18.71 
NOV2 0.10 -31.1 -14.96 -0.69 0.27 -7.68 0.47 7.17 
NOV3 0.69 -0.73 2.07 4.00 0.45 -5.36 0.10 3.15 
NOV4 0.24 -2.74 4.84 11.48 0.01 -49.8 128.0 340.6 
NOVS 0.84 -2.64 0.49 2.04 0.81 -2.91 1.22 2.99 
NOV6 0.09 -7.10 9.66 31.20 0.39 -0.11 7.19 11.78 
NOV7 1.77 -0.04 1.30 2.54 0.50 -4.10 1.20 4.60 
NOVS 0.68 -1.43 1.50 3.99 0.25 -9.26 -0.05 8.12 
NOV9 0.43 -5.20 -0.55 4.57 0.40 -6.31 -0.16 5.13 
NOVIO 1.04 0.64 2.04 3.29 0.04 -51.97 1.02 43.78 
NOVll 0.68 -1.34 2.21 3.95 0.72 -3.96 0.68 3.20 
NOVl2 0.20 -9.77 2.37 11.89 0.58 -4.31 0.88 4.61 
NOV13 0.12 -12.3 -0.79 13.72 0.19 -9.24 1.28 12.06 
NOVl4 0.59 -3.15 0.85 3.39 0.84 -2.59 0.35 2.48 
NOVIS 0.02 -43.2 11.60 90.91 0.63 -3.12 -0.05 2.79 
NOVl6 1.24 -1.71 0.77 2.19 0.88 -2.40 1.40 4.07 
NOVl7 0.13 -15.9 -2.56 8.51 0.28 -6.58 -0.76 4.95 
NOVIS 0.57 -2.83 2.34 5.71 0.46 -3.36 2.69 7.10 
NOVl9 1.10 -0.56 1.48 2.57 0.42 -0.52 3.01 6.02 
NOV2O 0.12 -6.47 5.70 22.48 0.65 -2.45 0.46 3.82 
NOV21 0.56 -0.25 1.74 3.72 0.08 -4.67 12.60 29.99 
NOV22 0.26 -2.98 2.15 9.21 0.04 -22.60 32.11 79.46 
NOV23 0.65 -1.17 1.47 3.47 0.47 -0.56 3.06 6.04 
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ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A BI B2 B3 A BI B2 B3 
NOVI 0.27 -8.31 0.31 6.58 0.08 -38.65 -7.03 18.71 
NOV2 0.10 -31.1 -14.96 -0.69 0.27 -7.68 0.47 7.17 
NOV24 0.61 -0.22 1.74 3.23 0.03 -75.93 19.84 85.14 
NOV25 0.18 -1.60 5.92 17.77 0.27 -3.10 5.03 13.28 
NOV26 0.75 -0.07 1.77 4.14 0.95 -0.52 1.43 3.87 
NOV27 0.54 -4.25 1.13 3.92 1.06 -2.09 1.27 2.46 
NOV28 0.14 -14.9 -2.34 12.42 0.29 -7.30 -0.17 6.31 
NOV29 1.01 -1.70 0.97 2.52 0.72 -2.72 1.12 3.68 
NOV30 0.07 -32.6 -8.23 30.03 0.60 -1.55 2.42 5.93 
NOV31 0.46 -2.44 3.09 6.36 0.38 -3.14 3.77 7.76 
NOV32 0.20 -8.53 0.67 12.61 0.09 -17.73 12.96 42.73 
NOV33 0.68 -3.11 0.54 2.69 1.05 -1.24 1.56 3.39 
NOV34 0.04 -56.4 -22.3 44.86 0.59 -1.95 1.45 5.38 
NOV35 0.66 -0.53 2.22 4.03 0.76 -0.05 2.07 3.26 
NOV36 0.80 -2.67 1.10 3.44 1.30 -1.38 1.33 2.76 
NOV37 1.52 0.13 1.55 2.50 0.83 -0.27 2.70 4.28 
NOV38 0.12 -14.0 -2.80 15.82 0.51 -2.62 2.31 6.65 
NOV39 1.00 -1.17 1.51 2.81 1.06 -1.16 1.08 2.30 
NOV40 0.43 -1.31 1.41 5.34 0.16 -3.19 5.03 16.67 
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Table Dm: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the MASLOC's Internal Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT 
(N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 A Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 
MASLOC2 0.81 -1.57 0.44 1.45 2.91 4.77 1.17 -1. 76 0.05 1.00 1.50 2.30 
MASLOC5 3.74 -0.72 0.05 0.50 1.24 2.01 1.41 -1.S2 -0.11 0.60 1.17 1.S4 
MASLOC7 0.67 -1.66 -0.01 1.66 3.26 5.34 1.31 -2.45 -0.44 0.79 1.70 3.02 
MASLOC 10 0.24 -14.9 -S.20 -5.23 0.18 6.91 1.95 -0.85 0.56 1.32 1.65 2.06 
MASLOCll 0.17 -8.03 1.98 9.54 17.58 25.34 1.95 -0.70 0.78 1.22 1.61 2.45 
Table Dn: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the MASLOC's Helplessness Subscale with Samejima's Model of 
IRT (N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A BI B2 B3 B4 B5 A BI B2 B3 B4 B5 I 
MASLOC4 1.94 -O.OS 0.55 1.03 1.66 2.24 0.59 -0.40 1.33 2.54 4.04 6.44 
MASLOC8 2.24 -0.07 0.72 1.26 1.69 2.28 0.17 -6.10 4.38 8.63 11.17 17.37 
MASLOC9 1.55 -0.36 0.64 1.29 2.02 2.54 0.82 -1.48 -0.06 0.65 2.00 3.14 
MASLOC 14 2.48 -0.25 0.58 1.10 1.62 2.26 11.57 -0.59 -0.30 0.47 0.84 1.56 
MASLOC 15 0.92 -1.51 -0.41 0.53 1.43 2.88 0.70 -2.44 -0.98 -0.17 1.67 2.96 
w 
...... 
\0 
Table Do: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the MASLOC's Luck Subscale with Samejima's Model of IRT 
(N=820). 
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A BI B2 B3 B4 B5 A BI B2 B3 B4 B5 
MASLOCI 0.83 -1.41 0.08 1.04 2.59 3.84 1.00 -1.83 -0.50 0.50 2.55 4.49 
MASLOC3 0.34 -3.23 0.22 2.18 5.60 9.81 0.70 -2.04 -0.18 1.11 3.99 6.50 
MASLOC6 1.02 -0.07 0.86 1.57 2.48 3.34 0.25 -15.08 -9.47 -6.06 -0.69 5.32 
MASLOC 12 3.67 -0.33 0.79 1.45 1.88 2.15 11.89 -0.61 -0.17 0.53 1.55 1.73 
MASLOC 13 1.86 -0.45 0.83 1.69 2.24 2.85 1.39 -0.51 0.85 1.53 2.48 3.65 , 
W 
N 
o 
Table Dp: Items Discrimination (A) and Difficulties (Bs) for English and Turkish Samples of the Religiousity Scale with Samejima's Model ofIRT (N=820). 
--
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A BI B2 B3 B4 A BI B2 B3 B4 
RELIGIOSITY 1 1.65 -0.21 1.14 1.47 2.40 1.77 -0.91 1.27 1.65 2.12 
RELIGIOSITY 2 1.99 -0.62 0.01 0.52 1.66 1.56 -2.45 -1.49 -1.16 0.45 
RELIGIOSITY 3 2.48 0.06 0.86 1.52 2.04 1.70 -0.55 0.33 1.41 2.44 
RELIGIOSITY 4 I. 91 -0.03 0.83 1.46 2.31 1.74 -1.02 -0.10 1.11 2.36 
RELIGIOSITY 5 2.63 -1.32 -0.38 0.38 1.25 1.55 -2.74 -2.07 -1.33 0.37 
, 
RELIGIOSITY 6 1.40 -1. 61 -0.28 1.18 1.67 1.22 -2.70 .1. 81 0.74 1.06 
RELIGIOSITY 7 . 2.56 -0.10 0.79 1.57 2.38 2.35 -1.13 0.18 1.64 2.42 
RELIGIOSITY 8 1.69 -0.95 -0.13 0.98 1.88 2.11 -2.03 -1.40 -0.21 1.29 
W 
N 
.. 
Table Dq: Item Discrimination (A) and Difficulties CBs) for English and Turkish Samples of the Authoritarianism Scale with Samejima's Model of IRT 
(N=820). 
-_._-
--
~-
------ ------ -
ENGLISH SAMPLE TURKISH SAMPLE 
ITEMS A B1 B2 B3 B4 BS I A I B1 I B2 I B3 I B4 I BS 
AUTO 1 1.12 -1.76 -0.83 -0.\0 0.97 2.57 1.11 -1.50 -0.61 0.07 1.21 2.23 
AUTO 2 0.44 -6.74 -4.33 -2.41 -0.07 3.40 0.33 -11.5 -7.25 -4.10 -1.15 4.28 
AUTO 3 0.3\ -9.53 -5.34 -2.58 1.11 4.65 0.65 -5.41 -3.25 -2.06 -0.17 2.46 
AUTO 4 0.20 -18.26 -12.03 -6.77 -1.42 5.46 0.16 -15.27 -9.28 -5.91 -0.54 7.72 
AUTOS 0.77 -0.56 0.73 1.93 2.98 4.42 0.31 -4.48 -1.69 0.70 4.50 8.93 
AUTO 6 0.66 -3.30 -1.31 0.21 1.95 4.29 0.42 -3.30 -1.01 0.11 2.60 5.50 , 
AUTO 7 0.99 -2.07 -1.05 0.09 1.10 2.21 0.76 -2.39 -0.96 0.42 2.02 4.15 I 
AUTO 8 1.27 -1.30 -0.30 0.62 1.65 2.82 1.40 -1.44 -0.63 -0.04 0.81 1.92 
AUTO 9 0.63 -2.06 -0.62 0.81 2.45 3.90 0.67 -3.90 -2.47 -1.35 0.84 3.19 
AUTO 10 1.06 -1.89 -0.73 0.01 1.01 2.11 0.90 -4.79 -2.97 -1.79 -0.31 1.39 
AUTO 11 1.03 -1.67 -0.23 0.97 2.22 3.21 1.02 -3.57 -2.32 -1.14 -0.02 1.59 
AUTO 12 0.97 -3.11 -1.45 -0.11 1.31 3.35 1.50 -1.64 -0.68 -0.08 0.79 1.99 
AUTO 13 0.55 -5.66 -3.07 -0.93 1.30 4.02 1.03 -4.28 -2.69 -1.47 0.25 2.33 
AUTO 14 0.73 -2.82 -1.19 0.03 1.87 3.72 0.81 -3.99 -2.76 -1.59 -0.12 1.76 
AUTO 15 0.79 -2.73 -1.61 -0.80 0.25 1.12 1.03 -1.99 -1.11 -0.39 0.49 1.61 
AUTO 16 0.81 -1.53 0.04 1.19 2.56 4.06 0.19 -3.92 -0.65 2.12 7.29 12.76 
AUTO 17 1.23 -1.39 -0.45 0.41 1.87 2.90 1.64 -1.56 -0.86 -0.35 0.34 1.32 
w 
N 
N 
AUTO 18 
AUTO 19 
AUTO 20 
AUTO 21 
AUTO 22 
AUTO 23 
AUTO 24 
AUTO 25 
AUTO 26 
AUTO 27 
AUTO 28 
AUTO 29 
AUTO 30 
0.73 
1.00 
0.58 
0.82 
1.30 
0.42 
1.10 
0.66 
0.82 
0.65 
0.57 
0.77 
0.58 
-1.97 -0.58 
-2.76 -1.02 
-5.15 -3.03 
-1.41 -0.12 
-1.87 -0.72 
-5.83 -3.46 
-1.69 -0.42 
-2.64 -0.72 
-0.34 0.67 
-2.07 -0.47 
-3.98 -2.30 
-2.54 -1.01 
-4.40 -2.18 
0.86 2.64 4.23 
0.44 1.81 3.16 
-1.41 0.73 3.03 
0.80 1.93 3.22 
0.34 1.53 2.46 
-0.40 2.51 5.07 
0.70 2.14 3.17 
1.18 3.09 4.37 
1.39 2.09 2.79 
1.18 2.93 4.66 
-0.47 0.98 2.94 
0.79 2.80 4.16 
-0.43 1.88 4.00 
0.15 -6.67 -1.97 1.73 11.37 18.66 
0.95 -3.20 -1.91 -0.75 0.62 2.58 
0.71 -4.62 -3.38 ' -1.72 0.46 3.02 
0.67 -3.28 -1.98 -0.80 0.98 3.27 
1.04 -3.58 -2.49 -1.79 -0.59 1.17 
0.57 -4.04 -2.34 -0.50 2.24 5.03 
0.89 -2.96 -1.63 -0.80 0.61 2.41 
0.48 -4.16 -1.99 -0.29 2.49 5.34 
0.89 -0.90 0.15 0.91 1.86 3.17 
1.02 -1.96 -0.91 -0.13 0.96 2.31 
1.08 -3.22 -2.26 -1.25 -0.41 1.32 
0.61 -2.85 -1.50 -0.48 1.59 4.70 
0.38 -5.77 -3.44 -1.64 1.81 6.55 
APPENDIX E: Regression Analysis for English Sample. 
Table Eal: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between control beliefs and religiosity with 
regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 17.568 1.601 10.976 .000 
Religiosity -2.1E-02 .163 -.034 -.127 .899 
RTSQUARE 
-3.5E-04 .004 -.025 -.093 .926 
a. Dependent Variable: Control Belief 
Table Ebl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Effort and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sm. 
1 (Constant) 19.594 1.115 17.580 .000 
Religiosity -5.3E-03 .113 -.012 -.047 .963 
RTSQUARE 1.8E-04 .003 .018 .068 .946 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Effort 
Table Eel: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Attribution and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t SiQ. 
1 (Constant) 22.799 .987 23.100 .000 
Religiosity 
-9.7E-03 .100 -.026 -.097 .923 
RTSQUARE -6.9E-05 .002 -.008 -.030 .976 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Attribute 
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Table Edl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Luck and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 11.489 1.401 8.203 .000 
Religiosity 
.181 .142 .345 1.275 .203 
RTSQUARE -4.8E-03 .003 -.399 -1.475 .141 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Luck 
Table Eel: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
and religiosity with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Slg. 
1 (Constant) 15.964 1.136 14.048 .000 
Religiosity 5.6E-02 .115 .132 .487 .627 
RTSQUARE 
-1.3E-03 .003 -.133 -.493 .623 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
Table Efl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
and religiosity with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 13.440 1.222 10.999 .000 
Religiosity .208 .124 .451 1.679 .094 
RTSQUARE -4.6E-03 .003 -.436 -1.626 .105 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Unknown 
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Table EgI: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Effort and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 10.206 .931 10.964 .000 
Religiosity 
-4.5E-02 .095 -.125 -.471 .638 
RTSQUARE 1.1E-04 .002 .013 .048 .962 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Effort 
Table Ehl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Attribute and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 10.029 .843 11.897 .000 
Religiosity 3.1E-02 .086 .096 .356 .722 
RTSQUARE -6.2E-04 .002 -.085 -.316 .753 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Attribute 
Table Ej 1: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Luck and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
U nstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 8.959 .811 11.041 .000 
Religiosity 1.6E-02 .083 .052 .193 .847 
RTSQUARE -9.9E-04 .002 -.139 -.519 .604 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Luck 
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Table Ekl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Powerful Others and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sl9.. 
1 (Constant) 12.224 .877 13.938 .000 
Religiosity 
-4.6E-02 .089 -.138 -.519 .604 
RTSQUARE 1.6E-03 .002 .200 .752 .452 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Powerful Others 
Table Ell: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between MASLOC and religiosity with 
regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 31.902 3.640 8.764 .000 
Religiosity .337 .372 .251 .905 .366 
RTSQUARE 
-1.1E-02 .009 -.350 -1.259 .209 
a. Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Academic Specific LOC 
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Table Eml: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between control beliefs and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 17.018 4.548 3.742 .000 
Autoritarianism 1.1E-02 .090 .048 .124 .902 
ATSQUARE 
-1.2E-04 .000 -.100 -.259 .796 
a. Dependent Variable: Control Belief 
Table En!: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Effort and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 21.933 3.220 6.810 .000 
Autoritarianism -2.2E-02 .064 -.129 -.338 .736 
ATSQUARE 
-2.2E-05 .000 -.027 -.071 .944 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Effort 
Table Eo l: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Attribution and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 22.735 2.959 7.684 .000 
Autoritarianism 7.6E-03 .059 .050 .129 .897 
ATSQUARE -9.2E-05 .000 -.123 -.318 .751 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Attribute 
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Table Epl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Luck and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the English sample. 
Coefficient$ 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t SiQ. 
1 (Constant) 14.290 4.154 3.440 .001 
Autoritarianism 
-5.5E-02 .082 -.257 -.665 .507 
ATSQUARE 3.9E-04 .000 .375 .969 .333 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Luck 
Table Eql: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
and authoritarianism with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 20.582 3.203 6.426 .000 
Autoritarianism -9.6E-02 .064 -.586 -1.513 .131 
ATSQUARE 5.4E-04 .000 .662 1.709 .088 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
Table Erl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
and authoritarianism with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 14.128 3.519 4.015 .000 
Autoritarianism -8.7E-03 .070 -.048 -.124 .901 
ATSQUARE 2.0E-04 .000 .228 .595 .552 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Unknown 
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Table Esl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Effort and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 10.027 2.715 3.693 .000 
Autoritarianism 9.8E-03 .054 .069 .182 .856 
ATSQUARE 
-1.6E-04 .000 -.230 -.602 .547 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Effort 
Table Etl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Attribute and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 5.238 2.373 2.207 .028 
Autoritarianism 9.3E-02 .047 .762 1.983 .048 
ATSQUARE -4.1 E-04 .000 -.680 -1.771 .078 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Attribute 
Table Eul: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Luck and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 10.179 2.411 4.222 .000 
Autoritarianism -3.0E-02 .048 -.244 -.631 .529 
ATSQUARE 1.6E-04 .000 .269 .698 .486 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Luck 
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Table Ev I: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Powerful Others and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 10.112 2.510 4.028 .000 
Autoritarianism 3.5E-02 .050 .269 .697 .486 
ATSQUARE -1.4E-04 .000 -.225 -.585 .559 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Powerful Others 
Table Ewl: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between MASLOC and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the English sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 23.835 11.298 2.110 .036 
Autoritarianism .125 .229 .228 .545 .586 
ATSQUARE -2.8E-04 .001 -.103 -.246 .806 
a. Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Academic Specific LOC 
330 
Appendix E: Regression Analysis for Turkish Sample. 
Table Ea2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between control beliefs and religiosity with 
regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 9.992 1.782 5.609 .000 
Religiosity .430 .155 .721 2.767 .006 
RTSQUARE -8.7E-03 .003 -.682 -2.618 .009 
a. Dependent Variable: Control Belief 
Table Eb2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Effort and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 21.046 1.668 12.618 .000 
Religiosity -.202 .146 -.357 -1.386 .167 
RTSQUARE 1.9E-03 .003 .160 .620 .536 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Effort 
Table Ee2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Attribution and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 23.049 1.422 16.211 .000 
Religiosity 
-5.8E-03 .124 -.012 -.047 .963 
RTSQUARE -2.3E-04 .003 -.023 -.088 .930 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Attribute 
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Table Ed2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Luck and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t SiQ. 
1 (Constant) 11.360 1.808 6.282 .000 
Religiosity .126 .158 .208 .795 .427 
RTSQUARE -3.2E-03 .003 -.247 -.941 .347 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Luck 
Table Ee2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
and religiosity with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coeffide 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 15.671 1.704 9.195 .000 
Religiosity 4.4E-02 .149 .078 .299 .765 
RTSQUARE -1.8E-03 .003 -.144 -.550 .582 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
Table Ef2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
and religiosity with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 12.718 1.837 6.925 .000 
Religiosity .126 .160 .206 .787 .432 
RTSQUARE -2.2E-03 .003 -.169 -.645 .519 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Unknown 
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Table Eg2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Effort and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sl~l 
1 (Constant) 11.897 1.177 10.109 .000 
Religiosity -.148 .102 -.364 -1.444 .150 
RTSQUARE 9.4E-04 .002 .108 .429 .668 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Effort 
Table Eh2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Attribute and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sill· 
1 (Constant) 8.444 1.062 7.949 .000 
Religiosity 
.133 .092 .375 1.441 .150 
RTSQUARE 
-2.7E-03 .002 -.361 -1.387 .166 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Attribute 
Table Ej2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Luck and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 9.511 1.034 9.200 .000 
Religiosity -2.3E-02 .090 -.068 -.260 .795 
RTSQUARE 8.2E-04 .002 .112 .429 .668 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Luck 
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Table Ek2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Powerful Others and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 7.536 1.228 6.138 .000 
Religiosity .202 .107 .487 1.890 .059 
RTSQUARE -2.9E-03 .002 -.330 -1.278 .202 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Powerful Others 
Table E12: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between MASLOC and religiosity with 
regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 32.183 4.355 7.390 .000 
Religiosity .185 .380 .130 .487 .627 
RTSQUARE -6.7E-03 .008 -.220 -.823 .411 
a. Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Academic Specific LOC 
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Table Em2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between control beliefs and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 2.022 5.329 .379 .705 
Autoritarianism .217 .094 1.063 2.325 .021 
ATSQUARE 
-9.0E-04 .000 -1.010 -2.208 .028 
a. Dependent Variable: Control Belief 
Table En2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Effort and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t SiQ. 
1 (Constant) 14.181 5.122 2.769 .006 
Autoritarianism .118 .090 .584 1.312 .190 
ATSQUARE -7.6E-04 .000 -.861 -1.933 .054 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Effort 
Table E02: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Attribute and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 23.308 4.245 5.491 .000 
Autoritarianism 1.6E-02 .074 .099 .218 .828 
ATSQUARE -1.7E-04 .000 -.240 -.527 .599 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Attribute 
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Table Ep2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Luck and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sl9, 
1 (Constant) 1.552 5.308 .292 .770 
Autoritarianism .203 .093 .998 2.180 .030 
ATSQUARE 
-9.2E-04 .000 -1.039 -2.270 .024 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Luck 
Table Eq3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
and authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sjg. 
1 (Constant) 4.981 5.414 .920 .358 
Autoritarianism .198 .094 .990 2.094 .037 
ATSQUARE -8.9E-04 .000 -1.033 -2.185 .029 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
Table Er2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Unknown and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t S1.[. 
1 (Constant) 7.988 5.659 1.411 .159 
Autoritarianism .115 .099 .535 1.162 .246 
ATSQUARE -5.1 E-04 .000 -.541 -1.174 .241 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Unknown 
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Table Es2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Effort and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 6.821 3.784 1.803 .072 
Autoritarianism 6.5E-02 .066 .442 .981 .327 
ATSQUARE -4.0E-04 .000 -.618 -1.372 .171 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Effort 
Table Et2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Attribute and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t SiQ. 
1 (Constant) 5.478 3.290 1.665 .097 
Autoritarianism 6.8E-02 .058 .535 1.172 .242 
ATSQUARE -2.5E-04 .000 -.460 -1.007 .315 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Attribute 
Table Eu2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Luck and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 18.560 3.045 6.096 .000 
Autoritarianism -.157 .053 -1.334 -2.934 .004 
ATSQUARE 6.7E-04 .000 1.309 2.879 .004 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Luck 
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Table Ev2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Powerful Others and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 22.886 3.746 6.110 .000 
Autoritarianism 
-.239 .066 -1.627 -3.643 .000 
ATSQUARE 1.1 E-03 .000 1.757 3.934 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Powerful Others 
Table Ew2: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between MASLOC and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the Turkish sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 32.720 13.653 2.397 .017 
Autoritarianism 1.4E-02 .239 .028 .059 .953 
ATSQUARE -1.4E-04 .001 -.064 -.133 .895 
a. Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Academic Specific LOC 
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Appendix E: Regression Analysis for whole sample. 
Table Ea3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between control beliefs and religiosity with 
regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 17.258 1.131 15.260 .000 
Religiosity -5.7E-02 .109 -.102 -.527 .599 
RTSQUARE 
-1.5E-04 .002 -.012 -.060 .952 
a. Dependent Variable: Control Belief 
Table Eb3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Effort and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 21.593 .922 23.430 .000 
Religiosity -.207 .089 -.437 -2.325 .020 
RTSQUARE 2.4E-03 .002 .224 1.190 .234 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Effort 
Table Ec3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Attribution and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 22.616 .765 29.574 .000 
Religiosity 1.6E-02 .074 .042 .218 .828 
RTSQUARE -5.4E-04 .002 -.062 -.320 .749 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Attribute 
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Table Ed3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Luck and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 12.017 1.030 11.670 .000 
Religiosity 
.108 .099 .209 1.082 .279 
RTSQUARE 
-3.3E-03 .002 -.279 -1.443 .149 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Luck 
Table Ee3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
and religiosity with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 16.535 .910 18.176 .000 
Religiosity 
-6.5E-03 .088 -.014 -.074 .941 
RTSQUARE 
-7.0E-04 .002 -.068 -.351 .725 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
Table Ef3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
and religiosity with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t SiQ. 
1 (Constant) 14.578 .986 14.790 .000 
Religiosity 5.2E-02 .095 .105 .544 .587 
RTSQUARE 
-1.6E-03 .002 -.141 -.726 .468 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
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Table Eg3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Effort and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sl9.. 
1 (Constant) 10.681 .677 15.771 .000 
Religiosity 
-7.0E-02 .065 -.203 -1.079 .281 
RTSQUARE 
-4.9E-05 .001 -.006 -.033 .973 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Effort 
Table Eh3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Attribute and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 9.941 .613 16.224 .000 
Religiosity 2.9E-02 .059 .093 .484 .628 
RTSQUARE 
-8.1 E-04 .001 -.116 -.601 .548 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Attribute 
Table Ej3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Luck and religiosity 
with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sill: 
1 (Constant) 8.676 .594 14.595 .000 
Religiosity 4.1E-02 .057 .136 .707 .480 
RTSQUARE -7.0E-04 .001 -.103 -.538 .590 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Luck 
341 
Table Ek3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Powerful Others and 
religiosity with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 12.367 .699 17.694 .000 
Religiosity -.111 .068 -.315 -1.639 .102 
RTSQUARE 2.5E-03 .002 .307 1.596 .111 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Powerful Others 
Table E13: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between MASLOC and religiosity with 
regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 33.069 2.571 12.861 .000 
Religiosity .180 .249 .143 .724 .469 
RTSQUARE -7.5E-03 .006 -.260 -1.312 .190 
a. Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Academic Specific LOC 
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Table Em3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between control beliefs and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sill: 
1 (Constant) 16.026 3.197 5.013 .000 
Autoritarianism 2.3E-02 .060 .114 .381 .703 
ATSQUARE 
-2.2E-04 .000 -.234 -.783 .434 
a. Dependent Variable: Control Belief 
Table En3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Effort and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 19.242 2.625 7.330 .000 
Autoritarianism 4.8E-02 .049 .277 .972 .332 
ATSQUARE -5.0E-04 .000 -.619 -2.174 .030 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Effort 
Table Eo3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Attribution and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS! 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 21.821 2.230 9.786 .000 
Autoritarianism 2.8E-02 .042 .202 .672 .502 
ATSQUARE -1.8E-04 .000 -.279 -.927 .354 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Attribute 
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Table Ep3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Luck and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 8.485 2.971 2.856 .004 
Autoritarianism 7.8E-02 .056 .427 1.408 .160 
ATSQUARE -3.6E-04 .000 -.423 -1.396 .163 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Luck 
Table Eq3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
and authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 14.977 2.625 5.705 .000 
Autoritarianism 3.0E-02 .049 .184 .607 .544 
ATSQUARE -1.8E-04 .000 -.240 -.794 .428 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Powerful Others 
Table Er3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
and authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 11.074 2.863 3.867 .000 
Autoritarianism 7.2E-02 .054 .405 1.338 .181 
ATSQUARE -3.3E-04 .000 -.405 -1.338 .181 
a. Dependent Variable: Means-Ends for Unknown Factors 
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Table Es3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Effort and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS'l 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 9.200 2.008 4.581 .000 
Autoritarianism 2.5E-02 .038 .197 .669 .503 
ATSQUARE 
-2.3E-04 .000 -.392 -1.330 .184 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Effort 
Table Et3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Attribute and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientS'l 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t S19: 
1 (Constant) 6.545 1.766 3.706 .000 
Autoritarianism 6.5E-02 .033 .593 1.975 .049 
ATSQUARE 
-2.9E-04 .000 -.575 -1.916 .056 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Attribute 
Table Eu3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Luck and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
Coefficient$' 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t S19, 
1 (Constant) 11.338 1.726 6.569 .000 
Autoritarianism -4.9E-02 .032 -.457 -1.524 .128 
ATSQUARE 2.7E-04 .000 .536 1.788 .074 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Luck 
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Table Ev3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between Agency for Powerful Others and 
authoritarianism with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 16.356 2.031 8.055 .000 
Autoritarianism -8.8E-02 .038 -.693 -2.312 .021 
ATSQUARE 3.7E-04 .000 .632 2.109 .035 
a. Dependent Variable: Agency for Powerful Others 
Table Ew3: Testing for a curvilinear relationship between MASLOC and authoritarianism 
with regression analysis in the whole sample. 
CoefficientSl 
Standar 
dized 
Unstandardized Coefficie 
Coefficients nts 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 21.854 7.583 2.882 .004 
Autoritarianism .204 .143 .447 1.434 .152 
ATSQUARE -9.2E-04 .001 -.435 -1.394 .164 
a. Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Academic Specific LOC 
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